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Insofern der Geist natürliches, sinnliches Dasein hat, ist die menschliche Gestalt die 
einige Weise, in der es angeschaut werden kann. Das heiβt aber nicht, daβ der Geist ein 
Sinnliches, Materielles ist, sondern die Weise seiner Unmittelbarkeit, Realität, sein Sein 
für anderes, sein Angeschautwerden ist in menschlicher Gestalt. Deshalb haben die 
Griechen die Götter als Menschen vorgestellt. Dies hat man den Griechen wie auch 
[anderen] Völkern übergenommen; es muβ nicht gesagt werden, daβ die Menschen es 
tun, weil es ihre Gestalt sei, als ob damit die Sache erschöpft wäre, sondern sie tun recht 
daran, weil dies die einzige Gestalt ist, in der der Geist existiert; in Löwengestalt z. B. 
kann doch wohl das Geistige nicht hervortreten. Die Organisation des Menschen aber ist 
nur die Gestalt des Geistigen; die Notwendigkeit dieses Zusammenhangs gehört dem 
Gebiet der Physiologie, der Naturphilosophie an und ist ein schwieriger, in der Tat noch 
zu wenig erörterter Punkt.  
– G.W.F. Hegel 
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PREFACE 
Philosophy is widely regarded as the most difficult of all disciplines: this is no 
doubt in part because philosophers rarely write with the intention or hope of being read 
by a wide audience. With the emergence in the 17th and 18th centuries of figures like 
Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, and the Enlightenment philosophes, it must have seemed for a 
brief time that this tendency was changing, that philosophers were writing for an 
audience not of academic experts, but simply of an educated, middle-class public. Yet 
any hopes that philosophy would become a discipline readily accessible to the common 
person must have been dashed when the popular philosophy of the Enlightenment gave 
way to the exceedingly abstruse reflections of the movement we call “German Idealism,” 
which culminated in the nearly opaque work of G.W.F. Hegel.  
 It has been fashionable for nearly two centuries to bash Hegel as not only 
excessively difficult, but criminally obscure, perhaps even utterly nonsensical. Many 
philosophers—even some philosophical movements—have made a name for themselves 
by ridiculing Hegel for his supposed incomprehensibility and celebrating his demise from 
the world of letters and culture. Yet every time some zealous thinker takes it upon him or 
herself to bury Hegel, Hegel emerges again to prove that he is far from dead. It must be 
granted, even by committed Hegelians, that Hegel is difficult to read. Yet the reason for 
this difficulty, the divergence of Hegel’s writing from the plain spoken style of the man 
on the street, is not the result of any deficiency in Hegel’s thought, but rather the poverty 
 vii  
of the ‘common-sense’ way of speaking. Hegel writes the way he does because that is 
the only way his insights can be expressed. Hegel does not take for granted the 
apparatus of sophisms and half-truths that is ‘the common-sense attitude’: he 
pulverizes it and reworks the residue into a proper philosophical system. Such a 
system can only strike the uninitiated as bizarre and nonsensical, but this impression 
demonstrates not a flaw in Hegel’s philosophy; rather, it demonstrates only the vast 
extent to which ‘common sense thinking’ falls short of properly rational, 
philosophical cognition. 
 Insofar as Hegel’s philosophy is worthy of study yet not immediately 
accessible, there is a need for commentators to undertake exegetical work on the 
various parts of Hegel’s corpus, particularly those parts that are the most obscure. I 
intend this dissertation to be an exegetical study of a short, twenty-five paragraph 
section of Hegel’s Encyclopedia that he calls “the anthropology,” and which has as its 
object “the soul.” The soul as Hegel understands it is what makes the human body 
different from other bodies. Hegel’s anthropology is thus a study of the intersection of 
what is distinctly human and what is corporeal, i.e. it is a study of the specifically 
human kind of corporeity: this study culminates in an analysis of habit. 
Habit is in some sense immediately familiar to everyone: every human being 
has developed innumerable habits, through which his or her experience of the world 
is mediated. Yet, as Hegel says, sometimes what is most familiar is least understood: 
this is certainly the case with habit. Habit is, after all, the ability not to experience a 
certain feeling that results from the experience of that feeling; it is a mental 
 viii  
phenomenon, yet one which is actually characterized by the absence of thinking, or 
mental activity. Clearly then, only a bit of reflection on habit is necessary to reveal 
the startling obscurity enshrouding this ostensibly clear and familiar phenomenon. 
Habit is however, in the end, a rational and comprehensible phenomenon, as I believe 
this dissertation will show. In the course of this demonstration, Hegel’s anthropology, 
his understanding of the ensouled body of the human being, will likewise become 
clear. 
 ix  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION TO THE BODY AND SOUL 
Introduction: a note on the text 
 In this dissertation we will investigate Hegel’s understanding of what it is to be 
human. The corporeity, or embodiment of humans will be of special concern to us. The 
text with which we will concern ourselves the most will be Hegel’s anthropology, a 
relatively short section in his Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in Outline.  
We must state at the outset that Hegel is very difficult. Hegel’s famous dictum 
that “the true is the whole” applies nowhere better than to his own work: one must 
understand all of the Encyclopedia if one is really to understand any of it. Yet even 
reading a small fraction of Hegel’s work can be very frustrating because he quite literally 
creates his own terminology, which is as foreign to native German speakers as its English 
translation is to us. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that Hegel’s discussion of 
‘human nature’ in the anthropology exists only “in outline [im Grundrisse]”: this outline 
consists of a mere twenty-five short paragraphs, some also with short remarks appended 
to them (added by Hegel in the Encyclopedia’s second and third editions).  
We may also make careful use of the Zusätze, the additions from Hegel’s lectures 
collected and published by Boumann (one of Hegel’s students) after his death. Hegel 
intended the Encyclopedia to be a handbook for use in his classes, and therefore expected 
that its readers would also get the benefit of hearing his lectures. As one might expect, the 
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lectures give more examples and the language is generally more down to earth—this can 
of course be very helpful in understanding Hegel. However, because these additions were 
never actually published by Hegel, we must always take what is attributed to Hegel in the 
Zusätze with a grain of salt, and seek corroboration in the text that Hegel actually 
published for any point made in the Zusätze: it is always possible that the student who 
took the notes was inserting his own interpretation. Even if a point appears in the notes of 
several students, or in the lectures given over different semesters—that is, even if it is 
extremely likely that Hegel did actually make a certain point in his lectures—we must 
acknowledge that Hegel no doubt spoke with greater latitude in his lectures than he 
would have allowed himself in his written, published work.  
Another problem with Boumann’s Zusätze is that they conceal any divergence 
among the various transcripts of the ‘circle of friends’ from which these Zusätze are 
composed. Thus any changes Hegel may have made over the course of his lectures on 
subjective spirit from the Summer of 1820 to the winter of 1829/1830 are also concealed 
in these Zusätze for the sake of achieving a speciously authoritative status. Recently 
however, new transcripts have come to light (viz. those of Erdmann and Walter from the 
Winter semester of 1827/1828): these were published by Felix Meiner Verlag in 1994. 
The editors Hespe and Tuschling confirm the unprecedented reliability of the Erdmann 
transcript, especially as it can be cross-checked with Walter’s version1 (both are 
published together but not merged into one version that glosses over the differences 
between them).  
                                                 
1 VPG pp.280-281. 
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However, any exegetical work on Hegel’s anthropology must begin by plainly 
acknowledging that Boumann’s Zusätze contain much more material on certain parts of 
the anthropology than do Erdmann’s or Walter’s transcripts. Accordingly, the presence of 
the Zusätze in some of what follows is often more pronounced. However, we must still 
make every effort to use the Zusätze critically: e.g. giving preference to remarks that 
appear both in Erdmann and Walter’s transcripts and Boumann’s Zusätze. We will rely 
more heavily on Boumann’s Zusätze only when Erdmann’s and Walter’s transcripts do 
not cover a certain aspect of the Haupttext or cover it minimally. Furthermore, whenever 
making use of lecture notes from any source, we will do so only for the sake of 
illustration of or elaboration on a point made in the Haupttext. 
Thus while the Zusätze should not be neglected, we must be very careful in 
making use of them to interpret Hegel: we must always allow Hegel’s published material 
to have the final word; and when a Zusatz makes a point on which his published material 
is silent, we must discount what is said in the Zusatz accordingly. The only writing of 
unimpeachable authenticity therefore are the twenty-five paragraphs and their occasional 
remarks that constitute the Encyclopedia’s anthropology “in outline.” Hegel wrote entire 
books which were expanded and more explanatory versions of some parts of his 
Encyclopedia (e.g. the greater Logic and the Philosophy of Right), but he died before he 
was ever able to do this for the anthropology. 
 Given these difficulties, it is best not to dive directly into the text. Rather, a 
preliminary overview of where we are headed, given in more plain language, will put us 
in a position to better understand Hegel when we turn later to the text in order to decipher 
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his terminology. This first chapter is intended therefore as an introduction to the 
problem with which we are concerned: viz. the human being’s relationship to his or her 
own body; or, the relation between the soul and the body.  
Preliminary examination of some preconceptions concerning the body and soul 
 The difficulty in understanding Hegel does not lie solely in the manner of Hegel’s 
presentation. The greatest obstacles to understanding what Hegel has to tell us about the 
human soul and body are the false preconceptions that the reader likely already has about 
what the soul is and what the body is. These preconceptions are so deeply rooted that one 
may not even be aware that one has them and that they are questionable. We can state 
these prejudices briefly thus: the soul is immaterial, radically different from and alien to 
the body; and the human body is simply matter, nearly identical with the body of an 
animal—and indeed, insofar as it is essentially just extension, the human body is not 
different in kind from the matter composing a block of wood, or a stone. The human 
being, as body and soul, seems thus to be a god in the body of an animal, spirit trapped in 
matter—in other words, a monster. Let us examine in greater depth the (un-Hegelian) 
interpretations of the human being as somehow an immaterial soul present in a body that 
is simply extension.  
For the rest of this chapter we will examine these two false conceptions of body 
and soul with the sole purpose of making clear that Hegel does not understand the body 
and soul in these ways. This dissertation will not be occupied with refuting these 
conceptions of the human body and soul. Instead, it will be an exegetical investigation 
into Hegel’s own conception of the human body and soul, which however must be 
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prefaced by an acknowledgement of the preconceptions many people already have on 
this subject, and a warning that Hegel should not be taken as endorsing these 
preconceptions. Without further ado, let us direct our attention to these false 
preconceptions so that we can have a good idea of what Hegel does not say, before 
turning our attention to what he does say in subsequent chapters. 
The human being as soul imprisoned in a body; and the human being as body only 
 Two definitions of the human being that Hegel rejects are: (1) that the human 
being is essentially incorporeal, not of this world, though it currently finds itself within a 
body; (2) that the human being is solely an extended, living body, that it does not 
transcend extension and biology in any way. Though Hegel rejects these definitions2  
(and he does so with cause), there is a reason why these definitions have the currency that 
they enjoy: neither is without its merits in explaining certain features of the human being.  
The first definition has the benefit of being able to account for some of the 
extraordinary and wondrous capacities of human beings, capacities that it seems could 
never belong to mere extended or living bodies. These capacities include what we might 
call pure thought (thought unmixed with sensible content or any influence of sensibility),3 
and pure will (willing an end without regard to any sensible inclinations).4 However, this 
                                                 
2 Hegel’s rejection of these definitions cannot easily be located in one paragraph: rather, it is spread 
throughout the anthropology. However, we can refer to EPW §387 (where Hegel says that the soul is “spirit 
in nature”) to show that Hegel rejects the idea that the human being is essentially immaterial, and to EPW 
§381-384 (on the concept of spirit) to show how Hegel understands the difference between spirit (even in 
corporeal form) and nature. 
 
3 Plato uses this as proof for an immaterial soul (Phaedo 65d-66a, Theaetetus 184b-185d). See below for 
details. 
 
4 Kant uses this as something resembling a proof for an immaterial soul (see Kritik der praktischen 
Vernunft pp.107-108, Ak. 4-5). However, for Kant it can never be proved that there actually is an 
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first definition has the drawback of being ill-equipped to explain how an immaterial soul 
can interact with a material body, or be present ‘within’ a body at all.  
 The second definition (viz. that the human being is an extended, living body only) 
does not admit that there is anything like pure thought or pure will, and so it has the 
benefit of not having to explain how something immaterial could interact with a material 
body. For proponents of this definition, all so-called ‘pure’ thought is only abstraction 
from previous sensible experience; and all so-called ‘pure’ will remains mere desire 
rooted in sensible inclination (but with the addition of self-deception, giving the 
impression of volitional purity). The drawback of this second definition is that it seems to 
contradict our experience of these ‘pure’ acts of the soul.  
We will say more about each of these alternatives, but first we should note that 
Hegel agrees with neither of these definitions. For Hegel, the soul is not simply 
immaterial (alien to corporeity), and it does not live on as a ghost when the body dies; yet 
nor is the human being mere extension, or mere biology. Indeed, Hegel devotes a good 
deal of effort to showing that the alternative accounts of the human being as either a mere 
animal (whose behavior is determined by stimuli), or as an immaterial, otherworldly 
ghost somehow at present inhabiting an earthly body, present us with a false opposition. 
We need not choose between these accounts of the human being, because, while each is 
partially true, each is only partially true (and thus partially false as well). The human 
being is neither merely a sophisticated animal, nor a ghostly specter. At this point it is 
                                                                                                                                                 
immaterial soul. Such a statement would belong to theoretical philosophy; yet something immaterial lies 
outside the bounds of all possible experience and so can never be confirmed (see the third paralogism in 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft pp.479-483, Ak. A361-366). Kant’s “proof” here has validity only as a practical 
postulate: we are justified in believing that we have a soul and are capable of free, moral, rational action, 
though we cannot affirm that we actually do have such a soul. 
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possible for us only to affirm that the human being is not simply either of those 
alternatives. Much more investigation and explanation will be required before we will be 
able to give a positive definition, i.e. to articulate precisely what the human being is. In 
order to reach the true definition of the soul, let us examine the partially false and 
partially true definitions on the assumption that close examination will reveal what in 
them is false and what in them is true.  
The Platonic thesis: the human being as a soul imprisoned in a body 
Before we begin to examine what I am calling “the Platonic thesis,” a word of 
warning: my account of ‘the Platonic thesis’ here is meant as a heuristic tool, to provide a 
sharp contrast with the materialist definition of the human being for the sole purpose of 
explaining the third, Hegelian definition. My purpose here is not to dwell too much on 
the nuances of Plato,5 but rather to present a version of Plato that best facilitates the later 
explanation of Hegel. 
There seems to be good reason to believe that there is something in us which is 
incorporeal: let this incorporeal part or capacity be called our “soul,” and let this 
definition be called “the Platonic definition” since Plato was one of its most prominent 
                                                 
5 There is some reason to believe that Plato was not defending a theory of the soul as radically distinct and 
internally unrelated to the body. For example, in the Timaeus, Plato articulates a myth in which the 
demiurge (the God, the creator of the world’s soul and body, as well as the bodies and souls of all living 
things) originally coexists with the intelligible order of forms (28a), the material or proto-material “traces” 
of what will eventually be built up into the four elements (fire, air, earth, and water) (30c-31a), and a 
mysterious “receptacle” whose churning will cause the combination and dissolution of elements in the 
created world (49e-51a). The demiurge creates the immortal part of the human soul from a mixture of the 
forms of sameness, difference, and being (41d), and leaves it to the gods to create the mortal (sensible) part 
of the human soul (42a-b, 69c-71e).  One the one hand, the fact that the world of forms originally coexists 
alongside the primordial chaos of material or proto-material “traces” of the elements would indicate that 
form and materiality (and by extension, soul and body) are indeed different in kind. However, the fact that 
the demiurge builds up these “traces” into the material elements by giving them shape and order, and that it 
is these already formed elements which will make up the human body, seem to indicate that the human 
body and human soul are not radically opposed. 
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advocates. As we will see toward the end of the chapter, Hegel and Plato are to a large 
extent in agreement. Yet in denying that the soul is immaterial (in the sense of being 
foreign to the body), Hegel signals a clear departure from Plato.6  
For Plato, the soul is independent of the body insofar as it is capable of activities 
which are independent of the body. For example, there are things that we are capable of 
knowing which are not sensibly perceptible (e.g. justice itself, beauty itself, other 
Platonic forms). But if we were mere bodies, then we would never have any inkling of 
something not sensibly perceptible. The inability of a mere body to have knowledge of 
something not sensibly perceptible, coupled with the fact that we do have such 
knowledge, allows us to conclude that there must be something in us which is not 
corporeal. Plato gives this proof that we have a soul (psyche) in the Phaedo.7  
He gives a similar proof in the Theaetetus, where he has Socrates argue that each 
of our sense organs is receptive to certain kinds of sensations (eyes to colors and shapes, 
ears to sounds, etc.). But everything that we perceive also exhibits identity, difference, 
and existence. Moreover, we somehow ‘perceive’ these non-sensible properties (viz. 
identity, difference, and existence), yet we do not do so with any of our sense organs. 
Therefore, since we do in fact somehow apprehend identity, difference, and existence, but 
these are unknown to our sense organs, we must have a mind or soul which is immaterial, 
and which apprehends these non-sensible properties.8  
                                                 
6 For a nuanced treatment of Hegel’s position on the so-called “immateriality” of the soul, see Michael 
Wolff’s remarkable book Das Körper-Seele Problem: Kommentar zu Hegel, Enzyklopädie (1830) §389 
(pp.114-155). We will have many occasions to discuss Wolff’s analysis in later chapters. 
 
7 Phaedo 65d-66a 
 
8 Theaetetus 184b-185d 
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In the Phaedo and the Theaetetus, Plato thus argues that there must be an 
immaterial part of the human being based on a general rule and an undeniable fact. The 
general rule has two parts: (1) that knowledge is or entails a relationship between two 
terms (the knower and the known); and (2) that this relationship is possible only if there 
is an affinity in the natures of two terms. Thus only a corporeal being can know bodies: 
an immaterial being could never know bodies (or at least that in bodies which is sensible) 
because bodies can only be experienced by material sense organs, i.e. other bodies. 
Likewise, an unintelligent brute (or an inanimate body) can never know an immaterial 
object (like the form of justice), because such an object is immaterial and hence has no 
affinity with what is a mere body and not at all incorporeal. The undeniable fact that 
constitutes the rest of Plato’s proof for the immaterial soul is the fact that we do know 
immaterial things. Even if we are uncertain as to their precise natures, we do undeniably 
have some inkling of the unseen, the immaterial—otherwise we would not even be able 
to conceive of the possibility of such a thing, and hence would not be able to question 
whether such a thing might actually exist. Even to deny that there are immaterial things 
belies an understanding of what the immaterial is, and hence an affinity between oneself 
(or something in oneself) and the immaterial—such that the immaterial therefore exists at 
very least in oneself. 
 Plato argues for a human soul that is immaterial, which is originally non-
corporeal, and is capable of once again detaching itself from the body. We may thus say 
that Plato argues for a human soul that is alien to the body. When I say that for Plato the 
soul is “alien to the body,” I mean that for Plato there is nothing in the nature of the soul 
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which necessarily brings it into relationship with a body. The fact that the soul does 
have a relationship with the body is therefore mysterious for Plato: no proper explanation 
can be given for it: only a myth can represent to us the fact that the soul is ‘in’ a body. 
The body’s foreignness to the soul is further shown by the fact that for Plato the body is a 
hindrance to the soul,9 which keeps it from attaining its desired object (a pure knowledge 
of and communion with the forms).10 Thus for Plato the body is a prison for the soul.11  
 That the body may be called a prison for the soul, and that it hinders the soul from 
attaining the end the soul has in virtue of the sort of thing that the soul is, seem to indicate 
that the human being (as an ensouled body) is a sort of monster, the combination of two 
incongruent elements. Yet in truth, the human is not a monster for Plato because for him 
the human proper is the soul, and not at all the body. The body is at best only a fairly 
accurate image of the human being (i.e. of the soul). For Plato if we want to know what a 
human being is, we should not look at this or that particular, actually existing human 
being. Particular, actually existing human beings can give us some indication as to what a 
human being is, but they can also mislead us. Rather, we should ignore what we see with 
our eyes. Our eyes are corporeal sense organs that can grasp sensible objects, but they 
cannot see immaterial forms; and it is immaterial forms, which we know only through 
our soul, which truly tell us what it is to be a certain kind of thing (such as a human 
being). Our soul is thus not only that in virtue of which we are able to know what a 
                                                 
9 Phaedo 65a-c. Other, equally mythical explanations are given in the Republic (613b-621d), the Phaedrus 
(246a-249d) and the Timaeus (42e-44d). 
 
10 Phaedo 65e-66d 
 
11 Phaedo 62b 
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human being truly is, it is the very thing which makes us human. Despite the 
differences between Plato and Hegel, there is prefigured here in Plato’s anthropology the 
thesis that Hegel will expound later: viz. that the human being is characterized by (the 
capacity for) self-knowledge. 
 The problem with the Platonic definition is that while it does manage to explain 
certain features of our experience (such as pure thought), it fails to explain other features 
which seem equally real: for example, involuntary feelings, adventitious impressions 
(impressions received from outside without effort on my part, or even my consent, for 
example, pain).12 The soul seems to be constantly awash in sensible content received 
through the body. Yet if the soul feels objects around it, that would mean that it has an 
affinity with particular, material objects. This affinity with particular, material objects 
would seem to contradict the soul’s previously established affinity with the immaterial.  
Furthermore, that the soul receives these sensible impressions through its body 
would indicate that the soul has a special, very intimate and very mysterious relationship 
with one material thing in particular: viz. its own body (whatever “own” might mean in 
this context). The very fact that the soul ‘has’ a body should be a bit shocking and 
incomprehensible given the nature of the Platonic soul.  
Moreover, the relation between body and soul which seems in fact to be the case 
allows not just for the body to influence the soul (by the body’s receipt of sense 
impressions and transmission of them to the soul), but also for the soul to influence the 
body: what we call voluntary movement can be nothing other than the soul directing the 
                                                 
12 Feeling may not seem to be in-itself spiritual insofar as it necessarily involves disturbance from without, 
by another. However, we cannot consider feeling to be utterly devoid of a spiritual dimension insofar as the 
feeling itself—if not its material ‘cause’—lies in the soul, and is not itself something material.  
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behavior of the body. Involuntary movement would only be another body acting on 
one’s ‘own’ body, possibly contrary to the directives being ordered by the soul. Yet how 
can the soul give an order to the body, with which it has ostensibly no affinity? And how 
can the body receive such an order?  
The materialist thesis: the human being as a body only 
The second definition is that of materialism.13 For materialists like Epicurus and 
Hobbes, the person simply is their body (which they understand as basically an animal 
body). The only thing these philosophers admit as real is what affects the senses, i.e. the 
receptive part of the body—and it is only other bodies that affect the senses. What is 
unable to be sensed is not real. Epicurus says: “death is nothing to us. For all good and 
evil consist in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation”14 and thus “so long as we 
exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist.”15 It is worth 
noting that for Plato, death is the separation of the soul from the body,16 and philosophy is 
“practicing death”17 because philosophy is the soul’s communion with immaterial forms, 
and thus is the expression of the soul’s independence from the body. Seen in this context, 
it is clear that Epicurus’ position that death is nothing to us, that it is beyond our capacity 
                                                 
13 I would like to state again that my purpose in this chapter is not to offer a refutation of the materialist 
understanding of the human being, nor to refute the ‘Platonic’ understanding. Rather, I only raise these 
conceptions in order to make clear that Hegel disagrees with them, and that we should be careful to allow 
Hegel to explain to us what he means by “body” and “soul” rather than imposing our own definitions on to 
these terms. 
 
14 Epicurus, “Epicurus to Menoeceus” p.85. 
 
15 Epicurus, “Epicurus to Menoeceus” p.85. See also Epicurus “Principle Doctrines” II p.95. 
 
16 Plato, Phaedo, 64c, 67d. 
 
17 Plato, Phaedo 64a, 67e, 81a. 
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to experience the separation of the soul from the body, is nothing short of a denial of 
the possibility of (Platonic) philosophy. (Again, despite their differences, Plato and Hegel 
are yet in agreement that what is distinctly human, the soul, necessarily involves the 
death of the natural body; and that this ‘death’ can be experienced by human beings). 
Accordingly, wisdom (knowledge of things immaterial18) is not prized by 
Epicurus. Rather, prudence is held to be the chief virtue.19 That is, proper calculation in 
seeking pleasure and avoiding pain—in other words, concern for what is material and 
sensibly experienced, i.e. concern for the organic body—is the crowning achievement of 
what is ‘intellectual’ in the human being. Epicurus accordingly makes sensation the 
criterion of truth.20 All of these Epicurean positions point to the underlying conception of 
the human being as a body only, and no soul (if by “soul” we mean something other than 
sensation, or the reckoning of sense data). For Hobbes as well, our mind receives all of its 
content from the sense organs,21 and admits reason only as a power of reckoning 
immediate sense data or its derivatives.22  
Never, according to these materialists, is the human being in touch with anything 
that is incorporeal, and thus it can never be admitted that the human being is itself wholly 
or partially incorporeal. Epicurus, Hobbes, and Plato all agree that we know that with 
which we have an affinity; i.e. the subject is of the same nature (e.g. either corporeal or 
                                                 
18 Plato, Phaedo 79a-d. 
 
19 Epicurus, “Epicurus to Menoeceus,” p.91; “Principle Doctrines” V p.95. 
 
20 Epicurus, “Principle Doctrines” XXIII p.101. 
 
21 Hobbes, Leviathan p.21. 
 
22 Hobbes, Leviathan p.41. 
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incorporeal) as the object. Epicurus and Hobbes however oppose Plato in denying that 
the human subject has any idea of anything incorporeal (which it did not fabricate itself, 
and hence which is not totally fictional); for this reason Epicurus and Hobbes deny that 
there is any need to admit of a soul in the human being. 
Atlas: an image of the human being (that Hegel would reject) 
The opposing views of the human being can therefore be presented as: (1) the 
view that the human being is an immaterial soul, only problematically related to a body; 
and (2) the view that the human being is a body only, with no soul. Both accounts have 
their merits and the drawbacks: both are able to explain certain parts of human 
experience, but both also seem inadequate to explain certain other parts. Because both of 
these accounts have their merits, we would like to affirm them both, and in this desire we 
are torn in different directions, like the sons of Iapetos, a mythical figure from whose 
sons (Prometheus, Epimetheus, Menoitios, and Atlas) the Greeks thought human beings 
descended.23 Accordingly, the characters and fates of these ancestors of humankind, in 
which they are always torn in opposing directions, displays what the Greek poets 
understood to be the human condition. 
For instance, as a pair, Prometheus (foreknowledge) and Epimetheus (knowledge 
after the fact) clearly illustrate the divine ability of humans to know before experience (a 
priori), and the animal need for experience in order to know (a posteriori). Menoitios (he 
                                                 
23 Apollodorus says both that Prometheus created humans from water and earth (Library 1.45) and that 
later, after the flood, Deucalion (the son of Epimetheus and Pandora) threw stones over his shoulder and 
thereby made men (the stones thrown by his wife Pyrrha became women) (Library, 1.47-48). 
 
  
15
who is awaited by oitos, mortal doom24) expresses the mortality of humans. However, 
the condition of Atlas provides the image that best represents this deficient understanding 
of the human being. As is well known, Atlas ends up at the far eastern edge of the world, 
forced to hold up the sky.25 Atlas has his feet planted on the earth and his hands raised up, 
touching the sky: he is therefore stretched between heaven and earth (the divine and the 
natural), with a share in both, but not belonging completely to either. Not only is Atlas 
(i.e. the human being in this poetic representation) the very point of contact of the divine 
and the natural, he is also that which keeps them separate, such that they can never be 
identified, and the human being can never be simply one kind of thing with one nature. 
Rather, the human being must (according to the poets) remain a monster: a god in an 
earthly, animal body.  
Atlas is placed at the eastern edge of the world perhaps because it is in the east 
that the sun rises: i.e. it is in the east that heaven separates from the earth. The pillars of 
Heracles on the other hand are located at the far western edge of the world26 (where the 
sun sets, and heaven and earth come together), because Heracles was a man who through 
his labors became divinized,27 living forever as a constellation in the heavens. Heracles 
thus represents the union of the divine and the earthly, as Atlas represents their 
opposition (even as both the divine and the corporeal are present in the human being). 
That being such a point of unbearable tension is the immutable human condition 
                                                 
24 The Hungarian classicist Karl Kerényi gives this as a translation of Menoitios in his Prometheus p.37. 
 
25 Apollodorus, Library 2.119-121. 
 
26 Apollodorus, Library 2.107. 
 
27 Apollodorus, Library 2.160. 
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according to the poets is further expressed by the fact that were Atlas to let go and 
allow the sky to fall toward the earth (i.e. were he to allow the two aspects of the human 
being to become identified), he would be crushed, destroyed. Thus according to the poets, 
the human being is a monster, or not at all. 
The image of Atlas accurately represents the human condition insofar as it 
presents the human as at once corporeal, and as having something that is denied to the 
rest of the corporeal world (viz. a soul); yet though both elements are present, this image 
fails to integrate the body and the soul of the human being, and is defective to that extent. 
It is instructive for us to reflect on the defects of this image because this image displays 
for us the presuppositions that many people had previously and continue to have regard 
the body and soul. It is these presuppositions which prevent some people from 
understanding what the soul and body are, and how they are related. We mentioned above 
that one presupposition is that the soul is immaterial, like a ghost inhabiting the body, 
which is for it something alien. Hegel objects to this image of the soul, asserting rather 
that the soul is necessarily ‘in’ a body, i.e. that corporeity (at least corporeity of a certain 
kind) belongs to the essence of the soul. This claim may sound ridiculous to someone like 
Plato, who conceives of the soul as immaterial: after all, how can something immaterial 
belong essentially to matter, which is its opposite?  
One might expect at this point an argument against the idea that the soul is able to 
transcend nature. Yet, Hegel would rather affirm that the soul, as a form of spirit, is 
indeed able to transcend mere nature—and here Hegel shows himself to be firmly and 
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unambiguously opposed to materialism.28 Indeed, Hegel tends much more toward the 
Platonic than the Epicurean understanding of the human being. However, for Hegel, the 
proponents of the immaterial soul have not given the human body its due: they treat it as 
a mere thing, an especially complex machine, or as an animal. Yet the human body is far 
from being a mere piece of nature: thus though Hegel affirms that the soul must be 
embodied, he denies that the human kind of embodiment is the same as other kinds of 
embodiment. It is true that Hegel wants to relieve Atlas of his burden, bringing the soul 
and the body together. Yet it is not that Hegel wants to drag the sublime soul down, to 
degrade it in the dirt of nature; rather, he wants to raise the human body to its proper 
place, above those material things which are merely bodies, with no souls. 
The aim of this dissertation is to explain what Hegel understands as the soul: this 
explanation will involve showing that the soul is not something immaterial and alien to 
the body. Yet since for Hegel the soul is at home in its body, we can best approach an 
explanation of the soul by first explaining what the human body is. To explain what the 
human body is we will have to provide an explanation of corporeity in general and 
contrast the different kinds of bodies. In this way we will be able to show the particular 
nature of the human body, its special dignity, which makes it an appropriate vessel for the 
soul. Thus to understand what Hegel means by the soul, we must disabuse ourselves of 
the notion that all bodies are essentially the same, and that the essential nature of all 
bodies is extension. In other words, to understand Hegel we must first rid ourselves of the 
understanding of corporeity we have inherited from Descartes.  
                                                 
28 Or, Hegel is opposed at least to materialism if this is understood to imply a naturalistic understanding of 
human beings, i.e. the contention that human beings are essentially animals. 
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Demonstration that extension and mechanism do not adequately or exhaustively define 
all bodies, especially not the human body 
The Cartesian understanding of the body as extension, determined by mechanism 
Descartes gives an understanding of the human being that in a sense combines the two 
definitions examined above (both of which Hegel rejects), insofar as (as we will see 
below) for Descartes the human being is at once extended (and in this respect essentially 
the same as any other body) and an immaterial thinking thing. It is appropriate therefore 
to move from a contrast between what I loosely called the “Platonic” understanding of 
body and soul and the “materialist” conception of body and soul to the Cartesian 
understanding, since Descartes tries to reconcile an immaterial soul with a material body 
(understood as mere extension). As we will see in subsequent chapters, Hegel’s 
conception of soul and body contrasts with Descartes’ insofar as Hegel rejects the idea 
that the soul is alien to corporeity, but also rejects the idea that human corporeity can be 
reduced to mere extension, or even mere biology. Let us now proceed to Descartes’ 
conception of corporeity. 
The Cartesian understanding of corporeity is that corporeity is quite simply 
extension, figure, and (the possibility of) local motion.29 In other words, to be a body is 
first of all to take up space (to have a certain length, width, and depth), i.e. a body is 
extended; that the dimensions of a body are certain means that the body has a determinate 
figure; a correlate to the occupation of a determinate space is the necessary expulsion of 
                                                 
29 Principles of Philosophy Part I, Principles VIII, XXIII, LIII; Part II, Principles IV, XI, XXIV, XXV. The 
connection of extension and motion is of course originally articulated by Aristotle (Physics IV: 219a10-12). 
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other bodies from the space occupied by the body in question (i.e. the putting of other 
bodies into motion through contact with them, or being so put into motion).  
For Hegel however, the human body however is not simply res extensa: i.e. it is 
neither exhaustively nor adequately defined by extension. Admittedly, it would be foolish 
to try to argue that the human body is not extended (i.e. that it lacks either length, width 
or depth). It would likewise be foolish to argue that the human body cannot communicate 
or receive motion from another body. Surely, the human body is extended; and there is a 
sense in which mechanical relations do hold between the human body and other bodies, 
and between the parts of the human body relative to each other. However, the possibility 
of using mechanism as a way to understand the human body is severely limited. Let us 
first clarify what is meant by “mechanism” before showing how the essence of the human 
body escapes this narrow conceptual framework.  
By “mechanism” we mean a certain relation that can hold between two or more 
bodies. When a body comes into mechanical relation with another body, the identity of 
each body before the relation remains the same after this relation is established, and also 
after it is ended. Moreover, the only influence one body may have on another in a 
mechanical relation is in changing the passive object’s spatial position, or changing the 
passive object’s direction or rate of movement through space. But the body’s position in 
space, its direction and rate or movement (or rest) seem to be wholly unrelated to what 
the body is in-itself. Therefore, as we said above, neither the entrance into nor the 
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termination of a mechanical relation alters or in any way conditions the identity of a 
body.30  
As an example of a mechanical relation we may think of any machine, such as a 
clock. A clock is a complex of parts that all work together to perform one task. The task 
of the clock is that the gears should turn each other at such a rate that the hands on the 
face of the clock will complete their revolutions at the appropriate rate, thus displaying 
the correct time to an observer. However, to remove a part of the clock, one gear, is 
neither to alter the identity of that part, nor to destroy it, or the remaining parts (though it 
would mean that the whole machine would cease to operate properly). Moreover, the part 
can be placed in a similar machine to the same effect.  
The combination of parts to make a machine is performed by a craftsman, as is 
their dissolution: the bodies themselves do not seek out these mechanical relations with 
other bodies, and when they are brought into or removed from such relations externally, 
they remain indifferent to the relata and the relation itself. The relation that one gear 
bears to others in a clock is therefore something completely external to the gear itself: the 
gear itself does not require the establishment or maintenance of this relationship in order 
to be what it is; and thus neither the establishment, nor the maintenance, nor the rupture 
of this relation alters the identity of the gear. 
To be sure, it is not our intention to denigrate the concept of mechanism: 
mechanism is appropriate for understanding certain aspects of corporeity. Indeed, the 
nature of some bodies (e.g. the parts of a clock) are entirely (or very nearly) exhausted by 
                                                 
30 See Hegel’s explanation of mechanism as such at EPW §195&A, and §§253-271 for his treatment of 
mechanics in the philosophy of nature.  
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mechanical relations. To take another example, let us consider billiard balls. A billiard 
ball seems to rest contentedly in itself: its interactions with other objects are limited to 
communication of movement, and this occurs when it strikes them. Such a strike occurs 
only as a result of the ball having been propelled down a slope by gravity, or from having 
been put in motion by having been previously struck by another object. The billiard ball 
does not need to come into relation with any other object; and unless it strikes or is struck 
by another body with considerable violence (so as to break it in half for example), the 
ball remains unchanged by the temporary mechanical relation foisted upon it.31 
It is entirely possible (indeed, inevitable) for the human body to have mechanical 
relations to other bodies: as I write this, my body is in a mechanical relation with the 
chair I am sitting in, and which is holding me up. However, the human body is unlike the 
billiard ball in that we would misunderstand the human body terribly if we concluded that 
its nature is exhausted by its mechanical relations. Recall, the billiard ball is merely 
extension: its dimensions along with its density completely (or very nearly) determine its 
nature and its possibilities.  
Other kinds of bodies; or, ways a body can be determined besides mechanism 
In order to understand what the human being is and what embodiment has to do 
with being human, we must contrast the human body with other kinds of bodies: bodies 
determined by mechanism, bodies determined by chemism, and organic bodies (i.e. 
vegetable and animal bodies). We may here introduce a scale showing the different kinds 
of bodies that there are in nature:  
 Human (or ensouled) bodies  
                                                 
31 EPW §264A. 
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 Organic bodies  
 Chemical bodies 
 Mechanical bodies 
We must however immediately acknowledge that these levels are not completely 
separate, i.e. that these different kinds of bodies are not utterly different. There must 
therefore be some overlapping between these levels: chemicals, plants, animals, and 
human beings can all also be determined mechanically. This overlapping must be 
acknowledged because, for example, there remains something merely mechanical and 
merely chemical about the plant or animal body.32 However, it is also true that the organic 
body of a plant or animal is best understood (indeed, it can only be adequately 
understood) by understanding it biologically, as a living body.33 Likewise, there remains 
something merely mechanical, merely chemical, and merely biological about the human 
body, but the human body can only be properly understood as an ensouled body.  
It is clear then that a body with a higher determination (according to the scale above) also 
has the lower determinations. A body with the lower determinations on the other hand 
                                                 
32 Indeed, Scheler notes in comparing the plant and the animal that the concept of mechanism is better 
suited (not more ill-suited) for understanding the movement of an animal (which is more developed) than 
the (less developed) plant. Scheler’s reasons are that the animal body’s greater sophistication entails the 
localization of organ systems into different parts of the body, while the plant body remains indifferently 
vegetable throughout (Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos pp.13, 21-22). Hegel likewise considers the 
differentiation of the animal into organs one of the most important ways in which it is different from the 
plant body (EPW §§343, 344, 345, 350, and their Zusätze). Hegel would agree that the animal body’s 
differentiation of functions and localization of organs in different parts of the body does make possible 
mechanical relations between the various parts of the animal body, but he would insist that these relations 
would be distinctly non-organic.  
 
33 Wendell Kisner does a fine job of explaining how a single entity is determined at once by the categories 
of life and mechanism in his article “The Category of Life, Mechanistic Reduction, and the Uniqueness of 
Biology” (Cosmos and History vol.4 no.1, 2008). 
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may, but does not necessarily, have the higher determinations.34 Thus like the human 
body, an animal body will be moved if another body of sufficient mass and acceleration 
strikes it35 (i.e. there remains something mechanical about these bodies); and the human 
body, like the animal body, contains chemicals that have the potential to react with other 
chemicals in the body’s environment if they are brought into close enough proximity (i.e. 
there remains something chemical about these bodies).36 However, there is something 
about the animal body in virtue of which it transcends the merely chemical (and a fortiori 
the merely mechanical); and the human body transcends even the merely biological 
(though this transcendence does not mean that the human body ceases altogether to be 
mechanical, chemical, or biological).  
When we say that some bodies, while mechanical, at the same time “transcend” 
mere mechanism, we mean that such bodies are determined in non-mechanical ways, i.e. 
that what it is to be such a body (in other words, the essence of such a body) is not 
exhausted by mechanical determinations and relations. We could also say that a body that 
transcends mechanism has capacities or possibilities that are not open to a merely 
mechanical body.  
This transcending of mechanism can also mean that the applicability of 
mechanical principles to the body is heavily qualified. For example, mechanical 
                                                 
34 Similarly, for Aristotle there are lower and higher capacities of the soul (psyche) such that the lower 
capacities sometimes exist without the higher ones (as in plants the nutritive faculty exists without any 
other capacity), but the higher capacities can only exist with the lower ones (as in animals locomotion and 
perception imply nutrition, and in humans thought implies perception, locomotion, and nutrition) (De 
Anima 413a25-413b15). 
 
35 EPW §265. 
 
36 EPW §§326-327. 
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principles state that a body (here it is assumed that the body is completely determined 
by mechanism) is moved (i.e. changes spatial position) only reactively: i.e. a body is not 
moved, does not come to occupy a different position in space, except through receipt of 
the action of another body37 (e.g. one billiard ball striking another, or one gear of a clock 
turning another). While it is true that in a certain sense all bodies remain determined by 
mechanism, and thus remain susceptible to local movement by the impact of a body with 
sufficient force, the applicability of mechanism to a body can still be qualified insofar as 
the possibilities for the local movement of such a body need not be limited to reaction to 
a collision with another body. Moreover, there are other types of movement (besides 
simply traversing space) that are possible for bodies that transcend mere mechanism.38 
Example of a body transcending mechanism: the animal desiring and consuming food 
Let us consider the way in which the applicability of mechanism to a body can be 
qualified. This will not show us how a body can have a soul, i.e. how a body can be 
spiritual, but it will show us how a body can be more than mere mechanism, and thus 
how there are in fact different forms of corporeity. We said above that if a body 
transcends mechanism—such as, for example, a living, animal body—then it has the 
possibility of local motion which does not have its principle in an external colliding body. 
To put it differently, such a body has the possibility of moving itself in a non-mechanical 
(or super-mechanical) way. To be sure, there is also a kind of ‘self-movement’ which is 
                                                 
37 EPW §§264-265. 
 
38 See Encyclopedia §392Z where Hegel relates how human beings (and even animals) are independent of 
influence by planetary motion (an influence incorrectly affirmed by astrology) not because these planets are 
distant, but because the animal is organic, and the human being (in addition to being organic) has a soul. 
Distance still expresses a merely mechanical relation. Thus if it were only distance that separated the 
human or animal from the various planets of the solar system, the former would remain under the influence 
of the latter tout court.  
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merely mechanical: e.g., if I use my right hand to push my left hand across the table. 
Insofar as this ‘self-movement’ is merely mechanical however, it is not the kind of self-
movement that we are talking about here. If I use one hand to push the other hand across 
the table, then the hand qua moved object has a merely mechanical relation to that hand 
that moves it. Such motion is called ‘self-movement’ only because both hands belong to 
me. Non-mechanical self-movement however requires that the principle of movement 
come from within the very body which is to be moved: this is what the animal displays 
when it walks, swims, or flies (in order, say, to satisfy its desire by reaching food,39 or a 
mate40).  
The animal is able to display self-movement in this way because the animal is not 
merely something material: first and foremost, the animal is an organized system of 
functions (e.g. respiration, nutrition, sexual reproduction) which take in matter from 
outside and transform this matter into energy, into the very activity of carrying out these 
functions.41 Admittedly, the matter taken in by the animal is first transformed into the 
organic material of the animal’s own body (e.g. muscle or fat),42 but this is only a way 
station: in the absence of new material from outside the animal, the animal (that is, the 
organized system of functions) will consume its own body, transforming its muscle and 
fat, i.e. its own body into energy for the continuation of its functions—thus it is these 
functions, this vital activity, which is the animal in the strongest sense. 
                                                 
39 EPW §§359-360. 
 
40 EPW §§369. 
 
41 “The living being only is and preserves itself as this self-reproduction, not as [merely] existing; it only is 
in making itself into what it is”(EPW §352). See also EPW §337 
 
42 EPW §364. 
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To be sure, we think of self-movement as freedom, but the self-movement that 
the animal displays when it sets itself in motion in order to satisfy an appetite is not a free 
act in the strongest sense of the term. There is an object outside of the animal (e.g. food) 
which arouses its instinct, and to that extent determines the animal to act.43 Yet this 
determination is not mechanical, and the animal’s movement is not mechanical: the 
animal’s movement toward the food is not a movement toward a mechanical force 
pulling it (as e.g. an engine mechanically pulls a train). The food affects the animal only 
by being present and answering a desire already within the animal.44 
To understand how animal movement is not mechanical, we need only look at the 
phenomenon of desire. Mechanical relations involve two terms, each of which is and 
remains simply different from the other.45 The animal’s desire however indicates that the 
food is not ultimately something different from or opposed to the animal: the food 
appears external to the animal, and so seems to be so opposed; but the animal’s 
consumption of the object, its factual transformation of the object into its own self, is the 
explicit proof for the fact (of which the desire is the implicit proof) that the food was 
always essentially the animal’s own self. Thus the animal shows itself to be in possession 
of the principle of its own movement by its appropriation of the object (which appeared 
to be the principle of the animal’s movement), and the transformation of the object into 
                                                 
43 EPW §360-362. 
 
44 “Instinct is a practical relationship to it [e.g. the food], an inner stimulus tied to the semblance [Scheine] 
of an external stimulus” (EPW §361). 
 
45 “It is an axiom for the body in physical mechanics that a body is only ever set in motion or comes to rest 
through an external cause, such that motion and rest are only states of a body”(EPW §264A). 
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itself.46 Therefore the identity of the two terms (the animal and the food) does not 
remain the same before, during, and after the establishment of the relationship (as would 
be the case were the relationship merely mechanical, such as the relation between the 
parts of a clock, or the engine and its train). The animal’s consumption of the food is not 
merely the alteration of the position or velocity of the object (the food): it is the 
destruction of the object (insofar as it is independent), and the transformation of it into a 
part of the animal’s own self. The two terms (animal and food) become one as the animal 
transforms the food into itself.47 
Furthermore, the animal itself is composed of parts, each of whose identity is 
conditioned by the others: the organs, the flesh, etc. cannot maintain themselves in what 
they are (or even ultimately maintain themselves in their physical integrity) apart from 
the other parts of the animal’s body.48 Insofar as the different terms here (whether animal 
and the food, or the different organs of the animal) each condition the other in their 
identities, and in their very existence, the relation between them cannot be understood 
mechanically.  
The animal body thus transcends mere mechanism insofar as its movement 
toward its food, spurred by appetite, is not a mechanical movement. In this movement the 
animal is not relating to something to which it remains essentially indifferent: rather, the 
animal is integrating into itself what was already essentially its own self. This sort of 
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47 Here Hegel is in agreement with the account Aristotle gives in On Generation and Corruption 321a17-
22, 322a10-13. 
 
48 EPW §356. See also where Aristotle says, “they [material parts] cannot exist if separated from the whole; 
for it is a finger of an animal not  in any manner whatsoever, since it is equivocally called ‘a finger’ if it is 
dead”(Metaphysics Z, 10: 1035b24-25). 
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movement, and everything belonging to it as such (hunger, consumption, and satiety 
for example) are possibilities unique to organic bodies (including ensouled, human bodies 
insofar as they are organic). Merely mechanical bodies (gears and billiard balls for 
example) are unable to consume; nor can they feel hunger or satiety—these forms of 
movement are not possible for them. Yet though the animal transcends mere mechanism, 
it does not transcend corporeity: the animal remains corporeal, though the corporeity 
proper to animal life is different from the corporeity proper to mechanism. Thus 
corporeity is said in many ways, and we should not understand all corporeity to be simply 
mechanism. Additionally, as we will see in subsequent chapters, there is a corporeity 
specific to humans, and this cannot be reduced to biology—and still less to mere 
mechanism (though for all that, it remains a form of corporeity). 
Someone might object that the animal is still in this case simply determined to act 
mechanically: the movement toward the food would then be understood not as a 
purposive act, but as the rhythmic tightening and relaxation of certain muscles in the 
animal’s legs. This tightening and relaxation of the leg muscles would mechanically 
propel the animal forward, and it would itself be explained by a prior mechanical cause 
(perhaps electrical activity in the brain of the animal which stimulates nerves in the legs, 
mechanically determining the muscles to tighten and relax in just the right way). Light 
reflected from the food on to the animal’s optic nerve (producing in the animal’s brain an 
image of the food) would be cited as a mechanical cause for the electrical activity in the 
brain which in turn stimulates nerves in the legs.49 
                                                 
49 See for example the mechanistic explanation of perception, locomotion, respiration, and circulation that 
Descartes gives in L’Homme (Oeuvres de Descartes 10:119-163). 
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Admittedly, it is possible for an animal body to be moved mechanically in this 
way and thus to carry out what for an observer would appear to be the same action. The 
movement of the animal’s legs propelling it forward and the movement of its jaws and 
throat chewing and swallowing the food can possibly be effects of mechanical causes. 
This account is not in principle impossible, but were it true then the animal would simply 
not be behaving as an animal. The animal body is indeed extended: as such, it can be 
divided into parts; and it is possible for these parts to act on each other mechanically in 
the way described above50—but this (viz. that an animal remains extended and can 
possibly be moved mechanically) is no proof against distinctly animal, organic 
phenomena. 
What the mechanist does not understand is that while the animal body does 
remain extended and retains certain mechanical determinations and possibilities, the 
animal body is not merely determined by mechanism, because, as we said, the animal 
body is not simply material. The mechanist takes the animal body to be a machine, like a 
complicated clock. However, a machine does not reproduce itself: yet an animal does 
precisely this when it consumes food. A clock is composed of material parts, each of 
which maintains its separate physical integrity throughout its operation. The living body 
on the other hand is a flux of ‘parts’ (i.e. cells), though we hesitate to call them that 
because the name ‘parts’ seems to imply mechanical relations. In this flux the ‘parts’ are 
constantly coming to be and passing away (as the cells making up the body are produced 
                                                 
50 The exceptions, which are impossible as far as a strictly mechanical explanation is concerned, are the 
roles played by light and electricity. Hegel of course recognizes that these phenomena cannot be 
understood merely mechanically (EPW §§317-320, 323-325). 
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and perish). What maintains itself in this flux are the functions of the animal, i.e. its 
form: respiration, circulation of blood, digestion of food, sexual reproduction.  
We are reminded of the ancient example of Theseus’ ship, which was kept by the 
Athenians as a relic of his triumphant return from Crete. Over time, its parts were 
replaced one by one, until none of the original parts remained.51 It was a question 
whether the ship with all new parts was the same ship as the original. There is good 
reason to hold that even for a body like a ship, the basis of its identity does not lie in its 
matter. When it comes to a living body however, there can be no doubt: it is the functions 
which are the animal, and the ‘parts’ may pass away without the animal passing away. 
The partisan of mechanism would like to present animal consumption as 
essentially one body (the animal) with two flat pieces connected by a hinge (i.e. with 
jaws) crushing another body (the food). However, the animal’s consumption of its food is 
not like the mechanical activity of a trash compactor crushing trash. A trash compactor is 
a mere extended body which through its local motion displaces another extended body 
such that the latter is made more and more dense: yet this other body (the trash being 
condensed) remains other to the compactor (indeed, the enduring otherness is a condition 
for its effective compaction). An animal however is not simply an extended body: it is an 
organized system of functions inhering in a body. The animal thus takes in matter (food 
that is consumed, or air that is breathed) and assimilates it, transforming it into energy for 
the continuation of its activities, the fulfillment of its functions (or, temporarily 
transforming it into muscle or fat, so that this organic matter may later be transformed 
into energy for the fulfillment of the animal’s functions).  
                                                 
51 Plutarch, Lives p.14. See also Plato Phaedo 96a-99d, and Aristotle Metaphysics Z, 10: 1035b13-23. 
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It is true that at any given moment the animal is composed of a certain number 
of cells; and that these cells are indeed ‘material bodies’ in a sense. However, the mere 
aggregate of these cells is not the animal; and the animal body simply cannot be 
understood by thus freezing it in one moment of time. This freezing of the animal in an 
instant would reduce the organized system of functions to a collection of cells, which 
would under these conditions be understood as mere bits of matter: yet the animal is first 
and foremost the life that maintains itself over time by using these cells up, then taking in 
more matter, transforming it into new cells, and using those up, and so on. A living body 
is a process, not a mere extended thing, and this must be borne in mind if the living body 
is to be understood. This process and this life must be understood teleologically,52 and 
mechanism is precisely the relation and causality that is not teleological. Mechanism is 
therefore inadequate to understand the living body, even though (as we have said 
repeatedly) there does remain something merely mechanical about the living body. 
Mechanism is inadequate for understanding the living body because life is not a 
‘property’ of extended matter: an animal body is not ‘alive’ in the same way that 
Descartes’ piece of wax is ‘white’ and ‘hard.’ To be sure, ‘white’ and ‘hard’ and other 
such qualities may be the properties of a living body insofar as it is merely extended, and 
related to other bodies merely mechanically, but not insofar as it is alive; and life does 
not belong to a body at all insofar as it is merely extended. 
If a mere mouse, as a living body, cannot be understood as simply extension, 
determined solely by mechanism, then how far is the human being, the ensouled body, 
from being understood as simply extension, determined solely by mechanism! The 
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human body has not only the functions of life that are shared with animals: the human 
body also has human sensibilities, reason, thought, language, a will! The debates53 that 
still rage in analytic philosophy about whether free will is or is not possible if mechanical 
causality of bodies is admitted will not be resolved until it is understood just how far 
from adequate mechanism is for understanding the human body, and human capacities 
like volition. Indeed, as we have seen, not even an animal body—not even the body of a 
plant!—can be understood as mere mechanism. As if we had to choose whether humans 
can be free, or the movement of a clock’s gears is determined mechanically! It is nothing 
short of shocking that anyone at all (to say nothing of philosophers!) could seriously 
maintain that desires, perceptions, memories (and still less, thoughts and volitions) are 
the ‘result’ of, and can be reduced to, atoms bombarding each other.  
Of course, it does not lie within the scope of this dissertation to give a proper 
Hegelian response to the issue of mechanical causation of human beings, or to refute 
materialist conceptions of human beings generally. But I would like to note that any 
criticism of Hegel that bases itself on a mechanical understanding of the human body and 
the human being would have to take into account that for Hegel even an animal body 
would be improperly understood by mere mechanism, and a human body would be still 
more gravely misunderstood as something simply mechanical.  
 
                                                 
53 See for example A.J. Ayer, “Freedom and Necessity,” Peter van Inwagen, “The Incompatibility of Free 
Will and Determinism,” Peter Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” Gary Watson, “Free Agency,” Daniel 
C. Dennett, “Mechanism and Responsibility,” John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and 
Control, Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, David Velleman, The Possibility of Practical 
Reason., Susan Wolf, Freedom Within Reason, Michael Smith, “A Theory of Freedom and Responsibility,” 
Derk Pereboom, Living Without Free Will, David Owens, Reason Without Freedom. 
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The human body: ensouled, yet still organic, chemical, and mechanical 
Now that we have had an illustration of how a body can transcend mechanism 
(while yet remaining extended), we are prepared to examine the body of the human 
being. Just as mechanism is no aid to us in understanding the movement of an animal 
toward the object of its bestial desire, it is completely useless in trying to understanding a 
properly human movement.  
The human being is, of course, an extended body, susceptible to mechanical 
movement initiated by other extended objects which strike it with sufficient force, as we 
have said. Yet the human being is also a chemical body: the epidermis of the human 
being has a certain chemical composition which is polar in relation to other chemicals in 
nature. That is, the human body is (as chemical) constantly determined in relation to other 
chemical bodies in nature, though this relation only becomes apparent when the human 
body and the other body (in relation to which the human body is chemically polar) come 
into contact or close proximity.54 For example, when sulfuric acid (H2SO4) comes into 
contact with the human body, it bonds with the exposed area of the skin in such a way 
that new compounds are formed: water, and sulfate. The water that results does not come 
from nowhere: it is produced from this reaction only through the sudden disappearance of 
all moisture from the part of the skin exposed to the acid. The disappearance of moisture 
in skin is part of the reaction by which the chemical composition of that part of the 
human body is instantaneously altered. A chemical burn is precisely this sudden loss of 
moisture in a part of the human body.  
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Thus even through its chemical nature, the body transcends mechanism. 
Chemicals are not indifferent to their relations to other bodies, as (merely) mechanical 
bodies are. Indeed, chemical bodies are nothing but relations to other chemical bodies55: a 
proton is simply a positively charged subatomic particle—i.e. it is wholly defined by its 
relation to electrons (negatively charged subatomic particles). There is literally nothing in 
the proton besides this relation. Likewise, more complex structures like atoms and 
molecules, which can appear stable and substantial, are essentially only the possibility to 
react with other atoms or molecules of the right kind. Let he who holds the human body 
to be mere extension, exhausted by mechanical determinations, dip his hand into sulfuric 
acid! Then we will ask him if his body related to that other body in the way gears in a 
clock relate to each other: each indifferent to the other, maintaining its own separate 
identity throughout the relation.  
We showed above that an animal is not solely determined mechanically, but we 
could have just as easily shown that even minerals like salt56 (or electricity,57 heat,58 
metals that can be magnetized,59 etc.) are not strictly mechanical bodies, i.e. they are not 
merely filled space, which is indifferent to any relations to other bodies. Yet the human 
being is of course not merely chemical: like plant and animal bodies, the human body is 
alive. We have already seen that life—while necessarily embodied—is the self-
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preservation of certain functions at the expense of the matter: i.e. that this self-
preservation is carried out by the destruction of matter through its assimilation to the 
form of the living body, its energy for continuing its life, its vital functions. The living 
body is thus not permanently bound to any bit of mere matter: every bit of matter 
somehow composing the living body (at any given moment) is taken from outside and in 
time used up (transformed into the energy of the living body, or discarded as waste) in 
the maintenance of the vital functions. Thus, chemicals are not merely extended bodies; 
and the attraction of polar chemicals is not the same as mechanical movement. Still less is 
the living body mere extension; and the movement of an animal in consuming its 
environment transcends mechanical movement even further than does the movement of 
chemicals. Yet the human, ensouled body can be understood least of all as mere 
extension; and the gait of a human being transcends the movement proper to mechanism, 
chemism, and animal life. 
The selfhood of a body 
Discerning the ‘self’ of a body 
To understand what it is to be an ensouled body we must see that the human is in 
possession of what the gears of a clock, chemicals, and animals all lack: viz. self-
knowledge.60 To see what self-knowledge means for human beings and the soul’s relation 
to the body, we must first ask what a body’s (any body’s) ‘self’ or identity is. Contrasting 
the different kinds of bodies in this respect will aid us in our investigation. We can tell 
                                                 
60 To be sure, the self-knowledge that the human being has in the anthropology (which is our object in this 
dissertation) is rather primitive compared to the self-knowledge at the culmination of the philosophy of 
spirit (viz., philosophy itself). Yet as we will see in chapter two, according to their concept, all forms of 
spirit are forms of self-knowledge. 
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what a thing is “in-itself” (i.e. what the thing’s self is) by stripping away the 
inessentials of the thing, and leaving only that which makes the thing what it is. We will 
examine the different kinds of bodies in succession, beginning with a merely mechanical 
body, continuing with a merely chemical body, followed by a merely organic body, and 
concluding with the human body. In our examination of mechanical, chemical, and 
organic bodies, we will identify what the self or identity of the body plausibly is, and then 
we will raise objections concerning the claim of such a body to selfhood. 
What we say here in anticipation of this investigation can only sound strange, but 
it will be justified in the investigation to follow. In this investigation we will find that 
neither the mechanical body, nor the chemical, nor the organic body is in unproblematic 
possession of its selfhood insofar as what makes the body itself, the principle of its own 
identity, is something that lies outside of it. In other words, the body’s own self lies 
outside of it. The body, for its part, ‘strives’ in some sense to reunite with, or to 
appropriate that other which lies outside of it, yet which makes it what it is (i.e. the body 
strives to reunite with its own self). (Of course the ‘striving’ here is metaphorical when 
the body is something without volition). In each case, this attempt is frustrated: the body 
is unable, for whatever reason, to seize and hold fast its own selfhood. Hence with the 
exception of the human body, as we will see, there is a sort of tragedy involved in these 
bodies, insofar as they lose themselves through their very ‘striving’ to secure themselves.  
The self of the mechanical body 
Let us turn now to examine the mechanical body with regard to its self. If we 
disassemble a clock and take one of its gears, we can ask: what is this gear? We may first 
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answer that it is grey, hard, and smooth. Yet while these sensible properties inhere in 
the thing, they are not the thing itself: these are the inessentials that we must strip away to 
get at the thing itself. The thing itself is what underlies and supports these properties, the 
substance. In other words, the self of the thing is extension: i.e. the gear’s self is the space 
that it takes up.61 The extension of the gear (what the gear is most fundamentally) is what 
allows the gear to be what it is in a derivative sense (i.e. to be its predicates: grey, hard, 
and smooth).62 
But to take up space means only to be present at different points, i.e. to take up 
different discrete spaces: thus the self of the gear would be divided into infinitely many 
selves, as the gear itself can be infinitely divided with respect to space.63 We may correct 
ourselves and say that the self of the gear is its precise figure, thus determining it as 
having certain limits: extending in diameter one inch, being present in this whole inch, 
but no farther. But to be limited is only to have a relation to that which is not oneself. 
Again, the self of the gear has multiplied: it is ‘in,’ or it simply is these dimensions; but 
its spatial determination makes its relation to its other (i.e. that which lies beyond its 
limit) not incidental to its identity, but rather necessarily constitutive of it.  
The self of this gear is thus both in these dimensions and outside of these 
dimensions. The self of the gear must be outside of its own dimensions because the self is 
the identity of the body, that which makes it what it is; and for a body to have a 
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determinate figure is only for it to be limited by another body, in virtue of which it has 
such a determinate figure. The selfhood of a mechanical body seems thus to be rooted in 
its relation to its other.  
We said earlier that a merely extended, mechanical body is indifferent to its 
relations to other bodies, yet now we are saying the opposite. A mechanical body seems 
to have its selfhood in itself without relation to others only because the concept of 
mechanism is so inadequate for understanding what things are: once mechanism is 
subjected to more scrutiny, as we have given it here, it shows itself to be the opposite of 
how it initially appeared. This change in our understanding of mechanism does not mean 
however that mechanism is adequate for understanding the human body after all. Rather, 
it shows that mechanism, taken on its own terms, disagrees with itself and is a valid 
concept only if we understand it in a qualified way, limited by the subordinate role it 
plays in a concept that more adequately grasps corporeity. 
The self of the chemical body 
Since chemical bodies explicitly derive their identities from their relations to 
others64 (as a proton is simply the contrary of an electron, and a positively charged atom 
is only the contrary of a negatively charged atom), we can say that chemism represents 
corporeal selfhood more adequately than mechanism, and thus that mechanism holds of 
bodies only in a qualified sense, within the confines laid out by the concept of chemism. 
The chemical body’s greater claim to selfhood lies in the fact that chemicals seem to 
overcome that which holds back merely mechanical bodies from entering on possession 
of their selfhood. The mechanical body has its selfhood mediated through its other, but it 
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is unable ever to appropriate its other and thereby unite with itself: whenever the 
mechanical body meets its other, the very meeting of the bodies, the contact itself, pushes 
the other away65—that is the tragedy of mechanism.  
The chemical, like the mechanical body, is determined by its other (a positively 
charged ion is nothing but the potential to bond with a negatively changed ion), but the 
chemical can actually accomplish this union (in bonding with its opposite),66 and thus 
seize its selfhood. The proof that the chemical has attained its selfhood is that the 
compound into which each constituent has been transformed is chemically neutral: 
positivity and negativity in chemistry only indicate that the atom in question is unstable, 
i.e. that the positive or negative ion is but one moment, abstracted from the rest of itself 
(i.e. its opposite). When the (positive or negative) ion bonds with its other, the result is a 
compound which is not externally determined by the polarity that determined its 
constituents relative to each other.  
However, the neutral compound is only relatively neutral, and therein lies the 
tragedy of chemism. The ‘neutral’ compound is neutral relative to the two poles that 
bonded to form it (i.e. it is neutral as a compound of its constituents). However, the 
compound is also a simple chemical body, which relative to other chemical bodies 
remains polar. That is, the ‘neutral’ product, in which each constituent chemical seemed 
to enter into secure possession of its selfhood, is still itself positive or negative in relation 
to another chemical, with which it is reactive: thus the chemical composition of our skin 
may seem stable and neutral; but contact with sulfuric acid shows that it was always only 
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one side of another possible compound. It is not simply that one more bond is 
necessary in order for the chemical(s) to finally acquire their selfhood: combination and 
dissolution continues indefinitely on the chemical level, i.e. chemicals will never reach a 
state that is totally stable. Thus whenever the chemical is on the verge of finally attaining 
its selfhood, it finds itself only with a new kind of polarity, with its selfhood remaining 
outside of it—that is the tragedy of chemism.  
The self of the animal body 
However, we can find greater stability and a better candidate for selfhood if we 
look beyond the chemical level altogether to the organic, biological level. The living 
body is (as we have seen) a system of functions that maintains itself throughout the 
combination and dissolution of chemicals that is its intercourse with nature (consumption, 
respiration, etc.).67 This is the animal’s claim to selfhood, which is a greater claim than 
that of either mechanism or chemism. The animal has a greater claim to selfhood than the 
chemical because the animal maintains itself in its identity throughout chemical 
combination and dissolution (which occur constantly within the animal): that is, the 
animal maintains its possession of itself even as the particular chemical loses itself.  
The animal is however not the summit. We have seen that while the animal 
requires nature to furnish it with certain things (food, air, etc.), the animal does not 
remain dependent: it takes these objects from outside and transforms them into its own 
self.68 To understand why the human being ultimately has the greater claim to selfhood, 
we would do well to examine closely the process whereby the animal assimilates nature 
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to its own self. The part of the process to focus on is the very beginning: the initial 
appearance of the object to the animal as something external.  
After this initial appearance, the animal cancels the apparent externality of the 
object in its consumption (or respiration), and thus shows that the object was always 
essentially its own self. However, it remains true that the object initially appeared as 
external. We are not disputing that the object turns out to be and always was essentially 
the animal’s own self. We are only pointing out that the initial appearance of the object as 
external is not nothing: it is a positive phenomenon worthy of our attention, and which 
requires an explanation.69 
After all, the object is not the animal’s own self simpliciter: if it were, why would 
it appear as external—even granting that this appearance is afterwards cancelled by the 
animal’s assimilative activity? The animal itself of course does not ask these questions: it 
apprehends this external object as somehow essentially itself, but what the animal does 
not know is that it is itself essentially external. The animal eats its food and breathes its 
air without realizing this,70 and thus represses the appearance of its own externality—but 
the repressed returns in the sexual partner.71 That is, sex and sexual desire (which are 
possibilities only for organic bodies—and humans insofar as they are organic) are 
phenomena that the animal can experience only because its own animal self can appear to 
it as something external—this is precisely what the sexual partner is (an external animal 
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self). An examination of the phenomena of sex and the accompanying emotions in 
animals and humans will elucidate the differences between humans and animals. 
The human condition: endurance of the loss of self 
Both the human being and the animal are bodies which are determined from 
without: i.e. the self of both the human and the animal lies outside of it. One phenomenon 
in which this externality of self is manifested is in sex, and the accompanying emotions. 
Sex for both humans and animals involves a feeling of attraction: this feeling is the 
apprehension on the part of the attracted that his self is outside of him, in another, with 
which he must unite sexually. To be sure, there are many reasons why the human feeling 
of love is not the same as animal lust, but let us begin by noting simply that unlike the 
human being, the animal simply lives its desire unreflectively. Thus the animal 
experiences the jarring situation of having its self outside of it,72 but it apprehends this 
externality of self as something to be immediately overcome (in union with its mate): the 
animal does not ask itself why its self should appear to it externally in this way, why it 
should have to factually appropriate what is in fact external but essentially its own self 
(or, why what is essentially itself should appear external to it at all).73 
The human on the other hand, apprehends everything contained in the 
phenomenon of sexual desire74: the human apprehends that this other is essentially its 
own self (i.e. the human sees through the apparent difference of the other)—this the 
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animal sees as well; but the human also sees and understands what the animal does not, 
viz. that its own self has appeared to it as something other (i.e. the human discerns the 
fractured state of its own selfhood). All bodies, as we have seen, have their selves outside 
of themselves, but neither the gears of a clock, nor chemicals, nor beasts know this 
(though beasts do feel it). The human being however knows itself as something which is 
other to itself—and it is this knowing which makes it human. In other words, the 
substance of the human being is subjectivity75: the very self of the human being is split 
such that the human being is other to itself, an object for itself. 
It is clear then what distinguishes animal lust from human love. Animal lust is 
only the animal’s sensory experience of another animal accompanied by the dim feeling 
on the part of the sensing animal that this other is essentially its own self. The animal’s 
appropriation of its ‘self’ in the act of sex is thus automatic and violent76; and after the 
satisfaction of the desire, no trace remains in the animal’s memory of the original jarring 
encounter of its own self as something external. In love the human likewise knows that 
this other is essentially his own self. Yet in contrast to animal lust, in human love the 
human knows very well that this other is not simply his own self, that an element of 
alterity remains even in the blossoming of love and the fulfillment of desire. The human 
also knows therefore that it cannot simply enter into possession of itself in a way that 
utterly excludes or eradicates one’s own alterity to oneself, precisely because the 
                                                 
75 Subjektivität is a technical term for Hegel, whose precise meaning we will make clear in chapter two. 
Here it should suffice to say that subjectivity is not simply the opposite of objectivity (i.e. objectivity does 
not constitute an impassible limit for subjectivity properly speaking). Rather, subjectivity embraces 
objectivity, its ostensible opposite, mediating its relation to itself through this very opposition.  
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otherness of the other (which is apprehended in the feeling of desire) is (as grasped in 
thought) a reflection of the self’s own otherness to itself. Thus the human is able to see its 
other as its own self in a deeper way: insofar as the self is other to itself, then the 
otherness of the other is not something that obscures or obstructs the self’s identity with 
the other; rather, the self is revealed to itself not just in the essential identity of the other 
with the self, but also in the very otherness of the other to the self.77  
The human’s appropriation of himself in his beloved is thus not automatic and 
brutally cavalier, as it is in the animal. On the contrary, the accomplishment of this union 
involves the utmost delicacy and nuance. It would be puzzling to an animal why the 
fulfillment of love should involve such restraint. After all, if my beloved is essentially my 
own self, then why would I hesitate at all in taking possession of her? The reason that a 
human is capable of such restraint, and why such restraint is part of what makes a sexual 
union human, is that a human is able to understand the very externality of the appearance 
of his own self to himself in its externality; moreover, the human is able to grasp this 
externality, this alterity as something yet belonging to his own self.  
The animal on the other hand strives immediately and unreflectively to eradicate 
this externality—and that is precisely why the animal remains subject to death in a way 
that the human being does not: in destroying the alterity of the other in an attempt to 
assimilate it to the animal’s own self (which is conceived unreflectively by the animal as 
something simple), the animal, in a very real sense, destroys its own self. That is the 
tragedy of merely animal life. A human being on the other hand grasps that it is other to 
itself, that the otherness (which is involved in the appearance of its own self as external to 
                                                 
77 See also System der Sittlichkeit pp.12-13. 
  
45
it) is not something alien to itself. Love between humans is therefore tender, because 
lovers treat each other not as objects to be seized and violently assimilated: this is 
possible because humans can attend both to the fact that the other is essentially oneself, 
and to the fact that there remains an element of alterity even in one’s relation to oneself. 
The human condition: knowledge of death 
We could express the same point differently by saying that the human being 
knows death. Bodies have a strange relationship to death: on the one hand, all bodies are 
mortal (and so must meet with death); yet on the other, the concept of death (as flight 
from the material world, the pure absence of anything sensible) is beyond the ken of any 
body as such. When we say that all bodies are mortal, we do not mean that even bodies 
incapable of life can “die” strictly speaking. We mean only that all bodies are subject to 
corruption, decay, dissolution, loss of identity. Most basically, to be corporeal means to 
be extended; and to be extended means only to be divisible,78 to be capable of being 
sundered, and ‘dying’ in that sense. But in a deeper sense, all bodies are subject to ‘death’ 
insofar as the body is not in possession of its own self, the principle of its identity. When 
we say that the concept of death is beyond the ken of any body, we are only echoing 
Epicurus.  
The reader will recall that for materialists like Epicurus, the person is simply a 
body with no soul, and that consequently for Epicurus “death is nothing to us”79 insofar 
as death is the cessation of sensation. Death does not exist for us according to Epicurus, 
                                                 
78 EPW §247. 
 
79 Epicurus, “Epicurus to Menoeceus” p.85. 
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because he would claim that the human being can apprehend only what is positive in 
phenomena, and not what is negative; only what is present and not what is absent. 
Epicurus conceives human beings in much the same way that Hegel conceives animals. 
For Hegel, the animal apprehends in its mate only that this other is essentially its own 
self, but it has no inkling of the otherness of the other (or, if the animal does somehow 
apprehend this otherness, it does not understand it, but feels only rage toward it80). 
Likewise, for Epicurus the human only knows what is sensibly present for it, viz. bodies, 
and not at all what is not present to the senses. 
Yet (and this is how both Plato and Hegel would respond to Epicurus) if there 
were a body which had a notion of death, a body for whom death was not nothing, then 
ipso facto such a body would not be merely a body: it would be a body with a soul. Plato 
offers a contrast to Epicurus in much the same way that Hegel does. For Plato, death is 
not simply the destruction of the body, but is the separation of the body and the soul81; 
and philosophy is “practicing death”82 because philosophy is the soul’s communion with 
immaterial forms, and thus is the expression of the soul’s independence from the body. 
Seen in this context, it is clear (as we noted earlier) that Epicurus’ position that death is 
nothing to us, that it is beyond our capacity to experience the separation of the soul from 
the body, is nothing short of a denial of the possibility of (Platonic) philosophy. Epicurus 
                                                 
80 EPW §365A. See also Hegel’s description of the animal’s desire for food in his lectures: “The bird of 
prey is immersed in desire, and in this desire it has no theoretical relation to the external world, i.e. it makes 
no difference to [the human being] whether the world continues to exist and is something valuable. 
[Animal] desire on the other hand is hostile to the existence of the external world, negates it, makes it 
nothing”(VPG p.61). 
 
81 Plato, Phaedo, 64c, 67d. 
 
82 Plato, Phaedo 64a, 67e, 81a. 
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would deny the possibility of philosophy because philosophy would be the experience 
of death: the experience of the limitations of the body. To experience the limitations of 
the body is however to transcend these limits (yet as we have seen, this is impossible for 
Epicurus). Yet it is this experience of death (i.e. the activity of philosophy, self-
knowledge) that constitutes the human condition, for Plato, as for Hegel (though they 
understand this in very different ways). 
Moreover, the experience of death (understood in this way as an experience of the 
limitations of the body) is the same as what we referred to earlier as the endurance of the 
loss of self. Recall, all bodies are determined from without in different ways, and for that 
reason are not in possession of that which gives them their identity, i.e. are not in 
possession of their own selves. Each body however seeks to unite with that which is 
essentially its own self but factually external in order to be in possession of its own self, 
or to be the principle of its own identity. To experience the externality of one’s self to 
oneself, and somehow to grasp oneself as self-differentiating in this way, an experience 
of which humans alone are capable, is precisely to know oneself as beyond one’s merely 
organic body—i.e. it is to know oneself as soul, to initiate the separation of the soul from 
the body (as an animal organism) and thus to ‘practice death’ in a sense analogous to the 
Platonic sense.83 Epicurus is correct therefore that for a mere body, death would be 
nothing. A mere body (i.e. a body without a soul, a non-human body) is precisely that 
                                                 
83 To be sure, the human soul is still the soul of a human body—but my point is that the human body is not 
the animal body: the experience of ‘practicing death’ (understood in the Hegelian way as knowing oneself 
in the appearance of oneself to oneself as something external) would be proof for Hegel that the one 
experiencing it transcends the body understood as something merely biological, though there is certainly 
still a corporeity proper to being human. 
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which is most subject to death, and least capable of grasping it.84 It is precisely in 
experiencing death, in making it ‘something for us’ that we transcend it. Prometheus, the 
foreknowing son of Iapetos, says “no torment will come unforeseen”85; but when it 
comes to death, the transcendence of the body, knowledge of this torment is what 
mitigates its power. 
Socrates as an image of the human condition that transcends tragedy 
Let us return now to the image of Atlas mentioned above, the poets’ image of the 
human condition. Atlas was born from the union of heaven and earth,86 but condemned in 
life to be tortured by their separation. We said earlier that Hegel would not have accepted 
this as an image of the human condition on account of the failure of Atlas to present an 
integrated picture of the human being. We see the same problem if we look at the fate of 
Atlas’ unhappy brother, Prometheus: we see that he ends up chained to a rock87 in 
Tartaros, which is “a gloomy place in the house of Hades as far from Ge [earth] as Ge is 
from Ouranos [heaven].”88 That is, there is a vast chasm between heaven and earth (an 
unbridgeable gap between the soul and the body), and the place of the human is in a 
                                                 
84 Philo tells of a myth according to which animals previously had speech, and thus were like humans. 
Emboldened by the enjoyment of this privilege, the animals demanded of the gods also to enjoy 
immortality, whereupon not only did they remain mortal, but they were stricken dumb as well (De 
confusione linguarum §6. See also Callimachus, Iambus II). The rational core of this myth is in the 
connection between the animal’s lack of speech (because it is not spirit, it has no soul), and its total 
subjection to death. 
 
85 Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound line 102. 
 
86 Iapetos (father of Prometheus, Epimetheus, Menoitios, and Atlas) was the son of Ouranos (sky, or 
heaven) Gaia, or Ge (i.e. Earth) (Apollodorus, Library 1.1, Hesiod, Theogony 134). Hyginus tells of Atlas 
being born directly from Earth and Ether, the heavenly element (Fabulae, “Theogony”).  
 
87 Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound lines 5-6. 
 
88 Apollodorus, Library 1.1. 
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world of torment, incalculably far from both the earthly life of beasts, and the heavenly 
life of the gods. 
We may contrast the image given by the poets with the image given by a 
philosopher (Plato), as the founding act of philosophy: viz. the death of Socrates. 
Accepting that Plato and Hegel reach different conclusions (because for Plato the soul is 
alien to all corporeity while for Hegel there is a specifically human form of corporeity 
that is appropriate to the soul), it is still worth noting that they bear a certain similarity: 
viz., in that for both the experience of ‘death’ (the communion with immaterial forms for 
Plato, and the knowledge of oneself in what is external to oneself for Hegel) signals the 
emergence of the soul. Thus for Plato the death of Socrates is an image of the ‘death’ of 
the body and the emergence of the soul: i.e. the human awakening to himself as a soul, 
transcending his body, while for Hegel the philosophy of spirit (whose first object is the 
soul) emerges from the philosophy of nature with the death of the animal, spirit’s 
transcendence of its merely organic body.89 Based on our foregoing analysis of corporeity 
and the human body in particular, we may propose this image, the dying Socrates, as 
what would be for Hegel the true image of the human condition (accepting also that for 
Hegel it would be an image of the transcendence of the animal body rather than 
corporeity generally). 
We have said that every body has its selfhood outside of it, and tries to transcend  
its own corporeity in order to appropriate its selfhood. The mechanical body, the 
chemical body, and the organic body all make this attempt, but all lose their selfhood in 
their very attempt to appropriate it—thus we said that each of these bodies is tragic. But 
                                                 
89 EPW §§375-376 
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in virtue of its soul, the human body escapes the tragic situation of other bodies, just as 
for Plato, the death of Socrates at first mimics the tragedy of the Greek hero, but 
ultimately dissolves it. 
The reader will recall that Socrates, in service to Apollo, questioned the men of 
Athens who purported to be wise, and made plain their ignorance (thereby arousing their 
hatred).90 He was brought up on charges of impiety and corrupting the young, convicted, 
and sentenced to death. When it becomes clear that the jury will likely convict him and 
sentence him to death, Socrates pleads with them to acquit him: not because he fears 
death, but because he does not want the jurors to mar their own souls (i.e. injure 
themselves) by doing something unjust.91 While awaiting execution, Socrates refuses to 
escape from his prison because escape would be unjust.92 He accepts his death with 
equanimity, drinking the poison himself, while comforting his weeping friends, and 
exhorting them to be brave.93 
Socrates’ situation mimics the situation of the tragic hero insofar as in order to do 
what is good and right, he must commit a crime: just as Agamemnon must kill his 
daughter in order to lead his army to war (and avenge the wrong done to his brother),94 
and Clytemnestra must kill her husband in order to avenge her daughter,95 and Orestes 
                                                 
90 Plato, Apology 20e-23b. 
 
91 Plato, Apology 30b-d. 
 
92 Plato, Crito 50c-54c. 
 
93 Plato, Phaedo 117b-e. 
 
94 Aeschylus, Agamemnon lines 201-247; Euripides Iphigenia in Aulis lines 49-113. 
 
95 Aeschylus, Agamemnon lines 1391-1444. 
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must kill his mother in order to avenge his father,96 Socrates must deny what the poets 
say about the gods (i.e. behave impiously) in order to obey the commandment of Apollo 
(to practice philosophy). Likewise, just as Achilles must bring death on himself in doing 
right by avenging his friend Patroclus,97 Socrates must bring death on himself in doing 
right by obeying Apollo and practicing philosophy, and in obeying the laws of Athens 
and not fleeing from his prison cell.  
However, the structure of tragedy breaks down in Plato’s account of Socrates’ 
death. Socrates is unwavering in his commitment to justice (as are both Antigone and 
Creon)—yet, unlike the tragic heroes, no harm comes to Socrates. Surely, Socrates dies, 
but he is not harmed.98 He is not harmed because Socrates proper, Socrates’ own self, is 
his soul, not his (merely animal) body, and he is in possession of his soul: indeed, he 
holds fast to his soul throughout his life, trial, and death. In virtue of the fact that Socrates 
throughout cares for his soul, the ‘harm’ that comes to him in the course of his righteous 
behavior is merely apparent, and the tragedy evaporates.  
As we have seen, the human self, the soul, is by its nature an object for itself: it 
knows itself as other to itself. The separation of the (animal) body and soul—which is at 
once philosophy and death—in which the soul knows the body as its other, and as its self, 
is therefore not an experience that is alien to the soul (i.e. it is not “nothing for us”). 
Socrates is prepared for death, and meets it bravely, because he has lived a human life. A 
human life is precisely a life lived in acknowledgement of and meditation on the 
                                                 
96 Aeschylus, The Libation Bearers lines 20-21, 275-281. 
 
97 Homer, Iliad XVIII:110-113. 
 
98 Plato, Apology 30c-d. 
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externality of oneself to oneself. That is, a human life is lived in what is from the 
perspective of what is merely natural, death, the loss of self. All bodies suffer this kind of 
death, this externality of their selves to themselves: but the human being, the soul, is able 
to endure this externality to itself.  
It is in virtue of his soul that Socrates was able to live justly. Living justly 
involves doing good to all and harm to none: i.e. it involves treating others as one’s own 
self. The animal body recognizes its other as itself; it is even true in a metaphorical sense 
to say that the chemical body recognizes itself in its other. Yet not only does the human 
being recognize itself in its other in the sense of seeing through the appearance of 
otherness, the human being further recognizes that it is other to itself, that its own self is 
split such that being external to itself (and immediately overcoming this externality by 
knowing this externality as oneself) is the human condition. The human being knows the 
objective world as the externality of its own self: far from being alienated from the world, 
human beings can thus take possession of the world in a way that a mere animal cannot, 
(for want of the ability to separate itself from the world). 
When discussing the animal we were careful to note that the animal as such is not 
that in its body which is purely material: rather, the animal is the organized system of 
vital functions which inheres in the body. What then is the human being? We have shown 
that the human being knows itself. Yet, it is not the case that the human being is a ‘self-
knowing animal.’ That is, the human being is not an animal which is essentially the same 
as any other animal, except with the specific difference that it knows itself, or can know 
itself. Self-knowledge is not just a capacity of the human being: spirit is not something 
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the human being can do; rather, spirit is what the human being is. The human being is 
not a ‘self-knowing animal,’ because by being self-knowing the human being proves 
itself to be not a mere animal, but rather to be spirit. Therefore the self that the human 
being knows (when it knows itself truly and correctly) is not an animal: it is precisely 
spirit, the self-knowing self. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THE CONCEPT OF SPIRIT 
Introduction 
In the first chapter we demonstrated that corporeity cannot be understood simply 
as extension; and that the human being, the ensouled body, can least of all be understood 
as mere extension. We gave a demonstration how in virtue of its soul, the human being is 
able to know itself as transcending its body (even as it identifies with its body, knowing 
this body to be its own). The human being, as we said, is an object for itself: it knows 
itself as an other, and hence the human being is able to relate to that which is external to 
it as to its own self. In fact, it would be better not to say that the human being is “able” to 
relate to what is external to it as to its own self, since having one’s own self appear to one 
as something external and finding one’s own self reflected back by the external world 
surrounding one is the inexorable human condition: it is not an “ability” which one might 
occasionally engage in, or perhaps never engage in. We will have an opportunity further 
in this chapter to examine in detail what is involved in this condition of identifying with 
(or to finding oneself in) what is external to oneself.  
We examined this condition in a preliminary way when in chapter one we 
contrasted animal lust with human love. We concluded that the human can treat its 
beloved with tenderness because it knows that as a body its very identity is determined 
from without, and thus it has its own self outside of it: therefore when its own self 
55 
 
 
appears to it as something external (in its beloved, the object of its desire), not only does 
it see through the appearance of externality, knowing the desired object as its own self 
(this even the animal accomplishes), but also it is able to understand that it belongs to the 
human being’s own essence to appear to itself externally in this way, such that the 
externality of this appearance is not necessarily apprehended as something disturbing and 
monstrous for the human being (though it is for the animal1). 
Insofar as the task of the first chapter was to show that corporeity cannot be 
understood simply as extension, we had occasion only toward the end of the chapter to 
discuss the human body and the soul. Consequently, our discussion of what is specifically 
human was brief, and the intricacies of the relation between the soul and the body—and 
indeed the essence of the soul itself—remain up to this point largely unexamined. In this 
chapter we will turn our attention more toward what is involved in what is distinctly 
human: i.e. we will here turn our attention toward spirit.  
That which is distinctly human eo ipso transcends mere nature. While it is true 
that the human body is extended and determined from without (i.e. while it is true that the 
human being remains in a certain sense a part of nature), it is equally true that in that 
which makes him human, the human being is not at all a part of nature; rather, the human 
being as such is spirit. It is terribly difficult to explain what spirit is. For this reason, we 
must devote no less than an entire chapter to its definition. Due to the severe difficulties 
                                                 
1 Recall, the animal also experiences the feeling of need, such that it perceives its own self as something 
outside of it: e.g. the hungry animal ‘knows’ in some dim sense that the piece of nature that can nourish it is 
essentially it (the animal’s) own self, though (inexplicably for the animal) this piece of food at that moment 
exists outside of it with a semblance of independence from the animal. It is because the animal has not even 
the beginnings of an understanding of why what is essentially only its own self should appear to it as 
something external, with a semblance of independence, that it reacts to this appearance not with wonder or 
comprehension, but only rage, and the destruction (e.g. through consumption) of the object (EPW §365A). 
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that cannot be avoided in the task we have set ourselves here, we must proceed 
carefully. Accordingly, in the first part of this chapter we will eschew technical 
terminology and limit ourselves to a description of the way the soul can relate to its body. 
This description will be ‘phenomenological’ insofar as we will be concerned only with 
describing different psycho-physical phenomena (i.e. phenomena concerning the soul-
body relation). Only later, after this description has given us some familiarity with our 
theme, will we move beyond the phenomena as such to examine the underlying 
ontological structures operative in them. Before we get to this ‘phenomenological’ 
description, let us briefly recapitulate chapter one, and give a more detailed preview of 
what will follow. 
A brief recapitulation of chapter one: that non-human bodies are not in possession of 
their own selves, i.e. the principles of their identities 
We saw in chapter one that there are grave inadequacies in the common sense 
understanding of the identity of a body. To clear up these misunderstandings, we 
examined in succession the nature of mechanical bodies (bodies determined solely by 
extension), chemical bodies (bodies determined by polarity, i.e. defined explicitly by 
their relation to other bodies), and organic or living ‘bodies’ (systems of biological 
processes in which inorganic nature is taken in and transformed into energy for the 
continuation of these very processes). Over the course of this investigation we saw just 
how abstract and inadequate the common sense attitude toward bodies is (viz. the opinion 
that a certain body is quite simply itself, and it is what it is without necessary relation to 
anything else).  
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The ostensible independence of a body seems most evident in a physical object 
with clearly defined boundaries (i.e. an object determined only mechanically). However, 
upon close examination we can see (as we did in the previous chapter) that the very 
principles of such a body’s ostensible independence (viz. its boundaries) are in truth 
nothing but relations to other bodies.2 Chemical bodies have a greater claim to 
independence insofar as they do not simply reach out to that which determines their 
identity as merely mechanical bodies do, only to be repelled on contact: rather, the 
chemical can bond with its opposite (which determined its identity), transforming itself 
and its opposite into a neutral substance.3  
However, it is impossible for a chemical to achieve absolute neutrality: every 
‘neutral’ substance is always really polar relative to another chemical which determines it 
(i.e. not neutral).4 Since in combination a chemical fails to enter on possession of itself 
(becoming not neutral, but instead only polar relative to another chemical), we could say 
(were we to speak metaphorically) that even in its bonding, the chemical sees its own self 
recede from its grasp at the very moment when it would take possession of it. Indeed, 
such independence is impossible on the chemical level: i.e. on a chemical level a body 
simply cannot be itself. However, the animal is neither a mechanical object nor a 
chemical: it is an organized set of functions or activities (e.g. consumption, digestion, 
                                                 
2 EPW §261. 
 
3 EPW §§326-329. 
 
4 EPW §326. 
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respiration, etc.) which maintain themselves throughout the combination and 
dissolution of chemicals.5 
Truly, the animal body is marvelous in its life, its organic transcendence of 
chemical relations. However, the animal too remains determined by an opposition, and to 
that extent it remains merely natural. The animal has the sophistication to feel that (in 
certain cases) what appears external to it is in truth its own self. Yet, unable to 
comprehend this externality as a consequence of the concept of nature and hence the 
inescapable fate of all corporeity (at least insofar as it is corporeal), the animal tries to 
destroy the appearance of externality6; in other words, the animal attempts to continue to 
exist in a merely natural, corporeal state, but to have no opposite. However, the animal’s 
destruction of the appearance of itself to itself as something external (in consumption for 
example) does not alter its essence as a living thing (its dependence on inorganic nature 
as the material on which its vital processes work). Even life is not independent of dead 
nature, but rather remains determined by this opposition. 
The human being on the other hand is not merely a living being, and thus does not 
remain determined by the opposition between organic life and death. Thus the human 
being knows not only that as natural and corporeal it will have its own self (the principle 
of its identity) outside of it (e.g. as object of desire, which it must appropriate), but also 
that it belongs to the very nature of the human self to appear to itself externally in this 
way. Therefore for the human being, externality (and the appearance of the human 
being’s own ‘self’ to it as external) is not something that must be destroyed. In other 
                                                 
5 EPW §337. 
 
6 EPW §365A. 
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words, the human being can bear the infinite pain7 of losing itself in externality; and by 
enduring this pain, the human being regains itself. For the human being, finding itself 
outside of itself, in another, is not death; or, if it is death, then this death is not the human 
being’s annihilation. Rather, it is life: specifically, it is the life of spirit, which is different 
from the life of mere nature for the reasons which we have intimated here, and on which 
we will elaborate further in what follows. 
A preview of the first part of chapter two 
The first part of this chapter will be occupied with giving various concrete 
examples to illustrate the way a human being ‘appears to itself as something external.’ 
We will draw on history, literature, mythology, psychology, and politics to provide these 
examples. The reader may judge that some of these examples are better than others; and I 
admit that none of the examples which will follow gives a completely clear and 
unambiguous image of spirit. This inadequacy is inevitable: there is likely no single 
concrete event, experience, or anecdote whose textual description presents spirit in its 
concept in a way that is completely clear. Accordingly, the Hegel expert will find 
something inadequate about each of these examples: but that is because the Hegel expert 
is already familiar with the concept of spirit, and would prefer to proceed directly to the 
deep analysis of Encyclopedia §§381-384 (which will occupy the second half of this 
chapter). My aim however is to present the material in such a way that is comprehensible 
even to the non-specialist: the non-specialist stands to benefit from the presentation of 
these images before the analysis of the concept of spirit (though after this analysis this 
non-specialist too would no doubt retrospectively find flaws in the examples I will give). 
                                                 
7 This is a technical term of Hegel’s. We will explain it at length later in this chapter. 
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I have therefore elected to provide such a wide range of examples because it suits my 
purpose at this stage of the dissertation: viz. to give my imagined non-specialist reader a 
familiarity with the structure of spirit before embarking on a thorough study of the 
concept of spirit presented in §§381-384. 
We will proceed according to the following schema 
(1) Property: first we will give property as an illustration of spirit that contains 
all of its moments, but for the sake of simplicity, in this initial example we will 
not isolate and explain these nuances separately. This first illustration of spirit is 
appropriate as an introduction because it comes from Hegel himself, and concerns 
a familiar phenomenon.  
(2) Natural pity: After this example we will be in a better position to isolate the 
different nuances of spirit: accordingly, we will then take some examples of 
“natural pity” from Rousseau’s writings. Our presentation here will illustrate one 
aspect of spirit (the human being’s identification with externality) apart from 
other aspects (such as the human being’s awareness of itself as something distinct 
from externality).  
(3) The ages of life (childhood and adolescence): Once we have been made 
aware of the aspects of spirit and their differences, we can turn to a phenomenon 
which illustrates these different nuances, but does so separately: the ages of a 
human life, in which the different aspects of spirit emerge in temporal succession. 
We will limit ourselves here to the examination of the human being’s immediate 
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identification with externality, and the conscious emergence for the human 
being of its distinction from the world around it.  
(4) Subjectivity: In the course of the foregoing illustration we will refer to the 
human being’s “subjectivity,” which is a technical term for Hegel. The discussion 
of the ages of life will be followed therefore by a brief interlude to explain the 
meaning Hegel gives to “subjectivity.” After this explanation we will be prepared 
for examples that show spirit in more depth, proceeding beyond the two 
previously examined moments of spirit (the human being’s immediate 
identification with externality and its awareness of a difference between itself and 
externality) to show their unity. 
(5) Absolute self-realization: Accordingly, we will begin to speak of “absolute 
self-realization,” which I will show is the very essence of spirit, uniting the two 
aspects previously examined separately. Several examples will be given of spirit 
highlighting its ‘absolutely self-realizing’ character.  
(6) The ages of life (maturity): Finally, we will be in a position to examine the 
culmination of the human life in maturity, the stage which unites the aspects of 
spirit that separately dominate the two previous stages. In maturity we have a 
phenomenon that illustrates spirit’s absolutely self-realizing character. After one 
final example to further drive home what we have seen, we will move on to the 
task which will occupy us in the second part of this chapter: viz. a close reading 
of Hegel’s presentation of the concept of spirit in §§381-384. 
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A phenomenological description of the way the human soul relates to its body 
A preliminary definition of human nature: knowing oneself in externality, as illustrated in 
the example of property 
We can characterize the human being in a preliminary way by saying that the 
human being knows itself in what is external to it: the human being knows that the 
externality of this appearance does not threaten to destroy it; and thus also the human 
being knows that he need not eradicate the externality of this appearance. Indeed, far 
from reacting to the appearance of itself as external with horror and fury, as the animal 
does, the human being characteristically strives to appear thus external to itself, i.e. to 
realize itself in externality. However, we must here add the following caveat: though it is 
human nature to appear to oneself in externality and to know this external appearance—
even in its externality—as belonging to oneself, this does not mean that the human being 
must always consciously or willfully identify with or see itself in what lies outside of it. 
Much of this identification may be ‘unconscious’ in the sense that the person need not 
even be aware that it is going on. It might be more accurate however to call it ‘pre-
conscious’ rather than ‘unconscious,’ since ‘unconscious’ may connote suppression or 
absence of consciousness, which should not be assumed here. 
Before giving my own examples, we can give one from Hegel himself8: the  
realization of a human being’s will in its property.  Hegel says:  
                                                 
8 That is, we can here give a second example from Hegel: the example from chapter one (which we 
recapitulated at the beginning of this chapter as well), viz. the contrast between the animal and the human 
experience of desire, also comes from Hegel. The animal’s experience of desire comes directly out of the 
philosophy of nature (especially EPW §§359-365 & 369). The human, spiritual experience of loving desire 
that I have given does not come directly from Hegel’s text: it can be found nearly everywhere in some 
form, but nowhere is it treated at satisfactory length. My account is therefore largely the product of an 
imaginative reconstruction drawing from several parts of the philosophy of spirit (e.g. EPW §§381-384 on 
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That I have mere external power over something, making of it my possession, 
just as if I make something mine in particular circumstances out of natural 
need, impulse, or fancy, belongs to the particular interest of possession. 
But that I, as free will, should be [something] objective in my possession, 
and only thereby becoming an actual will—this constitutes the true and 
rightful definition of property.9  
 
Property is therefore distinct from mere possession: I can possess something 
without it being my property, just as something can be my property without me being in 
possession of it. The difference between property and a mere possession is that my 
property is an object in which my will is invested, i.e. an object which reflects my own 
self back to me, the appearance of myself to myself as something external. 
Whether anything at all in fact belongs to me is not the issue: all that we must 
show here is that an external object can reflect my own will back to me—whether I have 
legal title to this object or not. A part of the material world which most of all seems to 
reflect myself back to me is my own home, my apartment. I have spent countless hours in 
my apartment; and it is I who have decided how the various objects it contains will be 
arranged—but these alone would not render the apartment the objectification of my will. 
What makes the apartment my will is that I experience it as an extension of myself10: the 
proof for this lies not so much in anything positive, but rather in the fact that most of the 
time I do not experience my apartment as something objective (standing against me, 
                                                                                                                                                 
the concept of spirit, §397 on the sexual relation, §§407-410 on self-feeling and habit, §§426-429 on desire 
in self-consciousness, §§518-522 on the family). 
 
9 GPR §45 
 
10 My own body is perhaps an even better example of an external object which an extension of myself, and 
from which I rarely even distinguish myself. Hegel touches on the extent to which my body can be 
considered my property (GPR §§47-48). See also Ludwig Siep’s worthy investigation into this topic 
(„Leiblichkeit, Selbstgefühl und Personalität in Hegels Philosophie des Geistes“ pp.203-226). 
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unfamiliar, resisting my will) or positive at all.11 Instead, I move through it easily, 
without having to consciously think about what I am doing or where I am going.  
The experience of one’s home as invested with one’s own will is so familiar to 
everyone, that it can perhaps be better clarified by noting how unusual it would be if my 
apartment were not to present itself to me as a mere extension of myself. I have heard that 
when the victim of a burglary returns home and finds his house ransacked, the most 
disturbing thing is not the expense of replacing any stolen items: rather, it is the feeling of 
having been violated, of having one’s own home (an extension of one’s own self) 
invaded by someone uninvited. I have never been burglarized, but I several years ago my 
home was invaded by a few mice, and this was enough to alter the way I experienced my 
home. Previously a place in which I could move around without thought or attention, my 
apartment now became something suspicious to me. While previously I had for a long 
time dispensed with any immediate perception of the various parts of my home, relying 
rather on compound representations built up in my mind habitually, now I began to look 
again as if for the first time at my apartment, searching every nook and cranny for signs 
of mice.  
Thus what makes something my property is if I interact with it with such a degree 
of familiarity that habitual representations replace immediate perceptions, and I am able 
to manipulate the object in the way I want to while my mind is occupied with something 
else. This sort of experience of an object is possible only because although a human being 
is spatially confined to the limits of its body, there is another dimension to human 
                                                 
11 To the extent that I have understood Heidegger, he seems to make much of this phenomenon (see for 
example Sein und Zeit §15, pp66-72).  
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experience that allows human subjectivity to be spread throughout the whole 
environment of the human being. The proof that property is something real is not in the 
piece of property insofar as it is extended, or has a certain chemical composition; indeed, 
it is not in the object taken alone at all. Rather, the proof lies in the ability of the human 
being to experience its world as its own. 
Rousseau and natural pity: an example of knowing oneself in externality that does not 
involve awareness of one’s distinction from externality 
As I mentioned above, the rest of these examples will be of my own selection: 
Hegel does not mention these. The legitimacy of these examples depends therefore only 
on whether they can be seen as concretions of the concept of spirit (which will be 
presented in the second part of this chapter)—I think that they can. The utility of these 
examples, and the appropriateness of their placement at this part of the dissertation lie in 
their merit in giving the non-specialist sufficient familiarity with what spirit is to make 
comprehensible the subsequent analysis of Hegel’s presentation of the concept of spirit 
(in Encyclopedia §§381-384). 
I will begin by offering an example of spirit in its immediate condition: that is, 
spirit which sees itself reflected in its object, without however knowing itself as in any 
way distinct from this object. Much of the anthropology concerns spirit in this condition 
of immediacy, so it is appropriate that we become familiar with it now. However, we 
should make clear at the beginning that it is the nature of spirit not only: (1) to know itself 
in the appearance of itself to itself as external; but also (2) to know itself as in some sense 
distinct from everything external (and so not simply identical with any of it). The first 
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example I will provide here will show spirit in the first aspect, but not in the second. 
Again, it is appropriate to examine spirit in this immediate state, immersed in its object, 
because, first, spirit in this condition is a major part of the anthropology and hence a 
major concern of this dissertation, and second, by beginning with spirit in its immediacy 
and only subsequently moving on to examples that show spirit in its more developed 
state, we will be better able to discern the different nuances of spirit. Let us turn then to 
this example of spirit knowing itself in its object but failing to know itself as distinct from 
its object: the example is the “natural man” that Rousseau describes for us in his Discours 
sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes.  
In Rousseau’s “natural man” (the man never exposed to the corrupting influences 
of “civilization” and all it entails) the power of the human being to find itself in 
externality shows itself to be unlimited: the self of the human being in its natural state is, 
according to Rousseau, unreflectively spread out over its whole environment, its whole 
world, with no cognizance on the part of the natural man of any difference between its 
own body and the various other bodies, animate and inanimate, which surround it.12 
Accordingly, for Rousseau, pity is natural for the human being: i.e. it belongs to the 
nature of the human being to pre-reflectively and spontaneously identify with other 
sensible creatures (or rather, it belongs to the nature of the human being fail to distinguish 
                                                 
12 We may suspend judgment about whether this phenomenon is probable. In the second Discours 
Rousseau is not describing a condition of human beings that is temporally prior to their present (civilized, 
corrupted) state. Rather, he is presenting what he considers to be a certain essential characteristic of human 
beings. Analogously, extension is essential to bodies, and in geometry’s investigation into this essential 
characteristic, it presents abstractions like points, lines and planes. The fact that we do not experience 
points, lines, or planes as such, but always only imperfectly represented as moments of a concrete object, 
does not invalidate the geometrical investigation into their essences. 
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itself from other sensible creatures).13 Consequently, the human being is naturally 
repulsed at the sight of another suffering: the repulsion here is due to the fact that the 
human being perceives and experiences the suffering of the other as if it were he himself 
who were suffering. Elsewhere Rousseau says: “[Even] the most perverse are unable to 
lose this inclination entirely. Often it puts them in contradiction with themselves. The 
thief who robs passers-by still covers the nakedness of the poor, and the most ferocious 
murderer still supports a fainting man.”14 
The man who reflectively plans and carries out the foul murder of his own 
brother, but who spontaneously thrusts out his arms to prevent a fainting stranger from 
injury displays (in the latter action) the pre-conscious identification with others in a way 
with clear relevance for ethics. But this unreflective identification with externality need 
not be of a sort with such clear ethical implications: it might rather simply be a matter of 
being transported into an ecstatic, mystical union with nature. Rousseau gives an example 
of this kind of pre-conscious identification with externality in the last work he published, 
Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire. In the second promenade of that work Rousseau 
describes his experience of the moments immediately after he regained consciousness 
after being knocked over by a large dog and sustaining serious injuries:  
It was nearly night when I regained consciousness. I found myself in the 
arms of three or four young men who told me what had just happened to 
me. The Great Dane, unable to stop in its tracks, collided with my legs and 
from its mass and speed, it caused me to fall forward on my head: my 
upper jaw, bearing the weight of my whole body, had struck the very 
                                                 
13 Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes pp.125-6. See also Émile tome 
premier pp.370-373. 
 
14 Émile tome deuxième p.57. My translation. 
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rocky pavement, and the fall was even more violent as I was facing downhill 
and my head ended up lower than my feet.  
The carriage to which the dog belonged followed immediately and 
would have run over my body if the driver had not restrained his horses at 
just that moment. Such is what I learned from those who picked me up and 
who still held me up while I returned to myself. The state I was in at that 
instant is too singular not to give a description here.  
Night was approaching. I saw the sky, some stars, and some 
leaves. This first sensation was a moment of delight. I felt nothing else. At 
that moment I was born into life, and it seemed to me that all the objects 
that I perceived were filled with my fragile existence. Absorbed in the 
present moment, I remembered nothing. I had no clear notion of my 
individuality; not the slightest idea of what had just happened to me; I 
knew neither who, nor where I was; I felt neither pain, nor fear, nor 
anxiety. I watched my blood flow as I would have watched a stream, 
without thinking that the blood belonged to me in any way. I felt in my 
whole being such a terrific calm that each time I recall it, I find nothing 
comparable in all of the pleasures that we know and engage in.15   
 
The sympathy Rousseau describes when he says “it seemed to me that all the 
objects that I perceived were filled with my fragile existence” is essentially the same as 
the natural pity of the savage, and the spontaneous kindness displayed even by the 
murderer: it is a pre-conscious identification with the objects of one’s experience, such 
that one does not distinguish between subject and object. This kind of sympathy is 
therefore quite different from the sympathy that moralists demand that we feel, and that 
we may consciously will ourselves into feeling. Rousseau’s natural sympathy is not a 
feeling which may be chosen or affirmed because it cannot even be thematized (without 
at once ceasing to be natural). Once reflection (my distinction of myself from others, my 
awareness of myself as distinct) becomes possible, then sympathy for Rousseau is 
artificial: the commandment to be sympathetic is then received as an onerous obligation, 
                                                 
15 Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire pp.1004-5. My translation. 
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and is obeyed only reluctantly and with resentment, or willingly but only for the 
insidious and unsympathetic purpose of currying favor and manipulating others.16  
For Rousseau (at least in the second Discours), reflection or awareness of oneself 
as an individual is the root of all evil, and the irreversible cause of the miserable state of 
human beings.17 For Hegel on the other hand, the disturbance introduced by such 
reflection is not the irremediable loss of human freedom and happiness. Indeed, for 
Hegel, the human being’s awareness of himself as different from others is a necessary 
part of being human (i.e. this distinction is a necessary part of spirit), and is not to be 
lamented.18 Moreover, for Hegel this awareness of oneself as a distinct individual does 
not hinder one’s identification with what is outside of oneself—in fact, such distinction 
makes possible the kind of identification with externality that Hegel considers 
distinctively spiritual, distinctively human.  
                                                 
16 Rousseau describes an example of this at the beginning of the sixth promenade. He was in the habit of 
passing a corner in Paris where a certain woman sold fruit. The woman’s son was always with her, and the 
young boy took to complimenting M. Rousseau each time he passed and asking for a bit of money. At first, 
Rousseau gave some money and was happy to do so. Yet as time went on, the boy came to take Rousseau’s 
generosity as a matter of course, and what was once an act based on his own generous sentiment became 
for Rousseau an obligation which ran counter to his sentiments (Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire. 
pp.1050-1). See also Émile: “How could one make a duty of the most tender caresses, and a right of the 
sweetest proofs of love?”(tome deuxième, p.406). 
 
17 Of course, Du Contrat social is a sustained argument that the alienation of humans from each other, 
which characterizes “civilized man” in the second Discours, is not the only shape that civilization can take. 
The ‘civilization’ described in the second Discours is thus only a half-civilization, which because it is not 
complete is worse than natural savagery. It is best therefore to have total civilization, total cultivation. One 
might say then that the sword that wounds (reflection, self-consciousness) is also the sword that heals. 
When one takes Rousseau’s works as a whole, he is not so different from Hegel: “It is thinking that both 
inflicts the wound, and heals it again”(Hegel, EPW §24Z #3); “Sin is knowing good and evil as separation; 
yet this knowing likewise heals the old wound and is the source of infinite reconciliation”(Hegel, VPGes 
p.391). 
 
18 “We can hold such a barbaric state as something lofty, and thereby fall into the error of Rousseau, who 
presented the condition of the savage Americans as the one in which man was in possession of his true 
freedom. To be sure, the savage is utterly ignorant of much that is unhappy and painful, yet that is only 
negative, while freedom must be essentially positive” (VPGes p.419).  
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For Hegel therefore, the unreflective dispersal of the self that Rousseau 
describes as the nature of the human being is indeed human, but primitively so: i.e. this 
unreflective identification of subject and object belongs to the concept of spirit, but it 
alone does not adequately express this concept. To put it differently, while this 
unreflective identification is a capacity of the human being and thus does in some way 
represent human nature, it does not represent humanity at its most developed.  
To be sure, in its most developed state the human being is neither alienated from 
nor indifferent to its world. Rather, the human being remains always invested in 
externality, it always in some way finds itself in the objective world confronting it; but 
unlike Rousseau’s natural man, it does not remain undifferentiated from the world, failing 
to attain awareness of its individuality because of its total and—let us be frank—bestial 
absorption in the world. For Hegel, it is human nature to know oneself in externality, to 
find one’s own self in the world one experiences outside oneself. Yet, for Hegel this 
identification is based on a prior differentiation; and only then is it spirit in the deepest 
sense. It remains no doubt unclear how such an identification based on a differentiation is 
possible: in other words, it remains unclear how spirit is possible. To aid in our 
clarification of spirit, let us take a certain phenomenon in which the different nuances of 
the structure of spirit are manifested serially: the individual human being’s stages of life. 
The stages of life: infancy/childhood and adolescence 
Hegel discusses the stages of life in the anthropology.19 We will have an 
opportunity to examine his treatment of this phenomenon more closely in chapter four, 
when we begin our detailed exposition of the anthropology itself. Here, as our purpose is 
                                                 
19 Hegel, EPW §396&Z. 
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only to explain spirit as such, let us simplify the stages of life into three stages: 
infancy/childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. In each stage, we will examine how the 
human being experiences the world around it, to what extent the human being identifies 
with its world and to what extent it differentiates himself from this world. However, in 
this section we will only consider the first two stages, leaving adulthood for consideration 
a bit later, after we have made some other points necessary to understanding the full 
flowering of spirit which adulthood illustrates. 
The infant is a human being who has not yet attained knowledge of itself as 
something distinct from the objects around it; instead, it is totally absorbed in (what are 
for us20) the objects of its experience, unable to distinguish itself from another (and by 
“another” we mean anything at all which is not the infant itself). Therefore though the 
infant might still have some awareness of its environment, it does not apprehend this 
                                                 
20 I must acknowledge here that the term “for us” has a meaning in the Jena Phenomenology where it refers 
to a difference in perspective that is necessarily confined to the phenomenological introduction to the 
Encyclopedia, and cannot be contained in the system itself. However, It is a fact that Hegel does use this 
locution many times in the Encyclopedia. The locution “für uns” or some variant thereof (e.g. “für unser 
Denken,” “für unser Erkennen,” “für unser praktisches Verhalten,” etc.) can be found in the main text of 
the Encyclopedia in the Preface to the second edition as well as in §§381, 398, and 470; it can be found in 
the Anmerkungen to §§60, 162, 195, 204, 387, 459, 464; in the Zusätze it can be found in §§36, 42 (#3), 45 
(three times), 115, 124, 163, 246 (twice), 247, 275, 314, 317, 330, 331, 369, 386, 387, 392, 399 (three 
times), 401, 402 (twice), 417, 424, 452 (twice), and 469. Additionally, when he uses this locution, it is clear 
that he is making a distinction in some sense between two perspectives. To consider a few examples: 
“Spirit has for us nature as its presupposition, whose truth and thus whose absolute first it is”(EPW §381); 
“Waking is not only for us or externally distinct from sleep; it is itself the judgment of the individual soul, 
whose being-for-itself is, for it, the relation of its determination to its being, the distinguishing of itself 
from its still undifferentiated universality”(EPW §398); “Practical spirit contains […] a double-ought. […] 
[viz. there is the distinction between practical spirit and the outside world which ought to conform to it, and 
there is also the distinction between practical spirit’s own inner immediacy and the universality which 
ought to characterize its form. The latter distinction however is] a distinction which is at first only for 
us”(EPW §470). Admittedly, the distinction in perspective here cannot be the same as it is in the Jena 
Phenomenology, but there is still a distinction between what has been posited at a certain stage and what 
will later become posited. Thus Hegel refers (in §§381 and 470) to what is clear “for us” though it has not 
yet been explicitly posited, and he notes (in §398) that it is not only “for us” that there is a certain 
distinction, but for the concretion of spirit under examination: he does this for heuristic reasons, to 
foreshadow steps that will come so that the reader will better comprehend them when they are presented 
later. I will use the term in this dissertation in the same way. 
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environment as its own environment (or indeed as an environment at all), because it 
does not realize that it is at the center—indeed, the infant does not realize that it is at all.  
In Freudian psychology this phenomenon (viz. the infant’s failure to distinguish 
itself from its environment) is called “symbiosis.”21 In other words, the infant’s life (bios) 
does not belong to the infant itself, or at least is not its firm possession. Instead, the 
infant’s life is (for it) spread out over everything he experiences: that is, the infant has its 
life or its self only together (syn) with the whole of its environment. The infant at this 
stage might see colors and feel textures, but it does not realize that it is something 
different from these colors and textures. Insofar as it fails to distinguish itself from these 
colors and textures, the infant is pre-reflexively identified with them (i.e. they ‘seem to be 
filled with’ the infant’s ‘fragile existence’). Of course, implicitly the colors and textures 
making up its environment are different not only from the infant, but from each other: 
black is not white, smooth is not rough—and still less is black smooth or white rough; 
and since the infant is identified with all of its perceptions, it would be, according to its 
own experience, different from itself. The experience of such a ‘contradiction’ (that it ‘is’ 
both white and not white) might be jarring enough to prompt the infant to take itself as an 
object: i.e. the experience of such a contradiction might be enough to propel the infant 
out of the state of symbiosis, of total sympathetic immersion in its environment. 
However, so long as the infant remains an infant (or perhaps even as long as it 
remains a child), it lacks awareness of its own self as something separate from the world. 
Accordingly, the infant simply lies in its crib with eyes wide open, eagerly taking in 
                                                 
21 Margaret Mahler, On Human Symbiosis and the Vicissitudes of Individuation pp.7-13; and Margaret 
Mahler, The Psychological Birth of the Human Infant: Symbiosis and Individuation pp.41-51. See also 
Freud, “Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning” pp.213-226). 
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impressions of the world. To be sure, for the infant these are not ‘impressions’ per se, 
since the concept of an impression already contains within it the concept of a perceptive 
self (a self which is distinct from objects, yet affected by them); and the infant lacks 
precisely this concept. This infantile self is (for us22) in possession of impressions (which 
are neither the subject itself nor the object itself, but rather the presence of the object ‘in’ 
the subject). However, for the infant to become aware of itself it would have to turn away 
from all of the things composing the world that it experiences, and focus instead on its 
own subjectivity—i.e. the infant would have to transform itself by distinguishing its own 
self from the world of objects, knowing itself in this distinction.23 
By thus turning away from the objects of its experience (thereby for the first time 
experiencing them as objects), the infant makes a distinction that brings itself into relief 
(as something other than these objects) as well. The making of this distinction signals a 
monumental change in the infant, insofar as it is no longer simply directed outward, with 
his selfhood dispersed in the world of objects; yet nor does the infant simply turn inward 
and lose all contact with objectivity. Rather, once the infant begins to know itself as a 
self, it is not necessarily merely directed outward, but can be always also reflected inward 
into itself; by the same token, the self-aware infant is not necessarily solely directed 
inward, but can be also directed outward, toward objects. The process by which the infant 
becomes aware of itself as something limited and opposed to other objects is called 
                                                 
22 See p.71n for a remark on the use of the locution “for us.” 
 
23 This distinction is the one that for Rousseau in the second Discours corrupts human nature. For Hegel 
however, it is a necessary moment in the full expression and flourishing of human nature, as we will see. 
Using the stages of life as a metaphor, this full flourishing is seen in adulthood, and neither in infancy nor 
adolescence. 
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“separation” or “individuation,” in Freudian psychology, and this process signals the 
end of symbiosis.24 Likewise, for Rousseau “it is at this [...] stage that the life of the 
individual really begins, [namely,] when he gains consciousness of himself.”25 
The infant (as thus self-aware) no longer loses itself in the objective world, but 
rather for the first time finds the objective world before it as something objective, 
resisting its subjectivity and throwing the infant back upon itself. Objects then present an 
aspect of otherness to the self which prompts the self to recall that it too has an 
independence, and resists penetration by (what it now knows to be) other objects. Of 
course, the resistance that the subject has as subject is not the same as the resistance that 
one’s own body (insofar as it is merely extended) has to other bodies. The resistance 
displayed by the subject as such is not a natural, mechanical resistance (such as one 
billiard ball displays toward another), but a spiritual resistance: it is the ability to 
withdraw into oneself and shield oneself (as soul) from external affection. This spiritual 
resistance is not developed to any significant extent until adolescence: thus the mere child 
retains the susceptibility to be transported at any moment in fits of unbridled elation, 
rage, terror, and despair (so little has he separated himself from what he experiences), 
while the adolescent for his part typically feels melancholy and alienated from the world. 
The adolescent knows that he is distinct from the world, not only physically as one 
material body is spatially distinct from other material bodies (awareness of this is 
                                                 
24 Mahler, The Psychological Birth of the Human Infant: Symbiosis and Individuation pp.52-120; Mahler, 
On Human Symbiosis and the Vicissitudes of Individuation pp.14-30.  
 
25 Émile tome premier, p.100. My translation. 
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achieved much earlier26), but also in properly human ways, e.g. socially. For example, 
the adolescent may feel alienated from his culture, from the conventions of his time and 
place. Yet despite the adolescent’s awareness of himself as so distinct, he still does not 
know what or who he is: to know that, he must continue turning inward. Let us try to 
replicate in broad strokes how such soul-searching might take place. 
The adolescent looks into himself with the intention of discovering his own self, 
focusing his attention on it. When he does this, he may at first be disappointed because all 
that he is able to focus his attention on is for him an object. Yet he is not an object, but 
rather a subject. He turned inward with the intention of capturing himself in his purest 
subjectivity—yet in doing so, he immediately transformed himself into an object. 
However, what Hegel would have us understand here is that the adolescent in our 
example has not failed to grasp adequately his subjectivity when he finds it to be 
something objective, something other to himself. Rather, in objectifying himself (turning 
inward and making his own abstract subjectivity into an object for himself), he has 
successfully glimpsed the very essence of subjectivity: subjectivity is other to itself, it 
differentiates itself from itself and immediately sublates this distinction. That is, 
subjectivity (as Hegel means it) is not something opposed to and limited by an object; 
rather, subjectivity is at once subject and object. 
Spirit and subjectivity 
Let us recapitulate what the foregoing examples have taught us about what it is to 
be human, or “spirit.” We can see first of all that being human involves making a 
                                                 
26 Typically the infant-toddler achieves this level of individuation by sixteen months (Mahler, On Human 
Symbiosis and the Vicissitudes of Individuation p.17). 
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monumental distinction, in which the self’s abstract subjectivity is placed in opposition 
to the entire objective world (which includes quite literally everything which can be an 
object for the self, everything toward which the abstract subject can direct itself 
knowingly).27 Second, we can see that what seem to be two sorts of relationship emerge: 
the relation between the self and external objects; and the relation of the self to itself.  
Yet, when examined more closely, these two sorts of relationships are hard to 
distinguish: their similarity lies in the fact that the second relationship, the relation of the 
self to itself, is also a case of the self relating to what is for it an object. This is due to the 
fact that when the self turns inward, it makes its own self into an object for itself. On the 
one hand, even as we admit that the self relates to itself as to an object, we must 
recognize that this ‘objective self’ is not the same as other objects (because even though 
it is an object, it remains the self itself, and the relation that the self has to itself is one of 
identification). Yet on the other hand, in a certain sense, this ‘objective self’ is not so 
different from other objects, since it is the fate of the human being to identify with 
external objects, to have his own self caught up in the world he experiences. The entire 
mystery of spirit is contained in this conundrum: the self relates to itself as to another, but 
even though this other is an other, it is the self itself; the self is only able to relate to itself 
at all—only able to identify with itself—by distinguishing itself from objects; and the 
self’s identification with itself is a matter of the self objectifying itself (taking itself as its 
object) and then identifying with what is for it an object. 
                                                 
27 We must call this the abstract subject because “subject” and “subjectivity” for Hegel can also mean—
indeed,  it properly refers to—that which encompasses both sides of this distinction. This will be explained 
below. 
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That it is even possible to make the distinction between the abstract subject and 
the world of objectivity is a vindication of Plato over the materialists,28 since making this 
distinction requires an awareness that when the entire world of objects is mentally 
gathered together, it can still be opposed to the abstract subject (i.e. to something which is 
not material, not determinate, not empirical, i.e. not an ‘object’ in the traditional sense). It 
must be admitted that there is such an abstract subject because the totality of the objective 
world is present to the abstract subject. Thus the abstract subject can express its 
independence from corporeity; and since the expression of this independence is precisely 
philosophy, the practicing of death, we can say that Epicurus was wrong.  
Epicurus is wrong because death is not “nothing for us” as he supposed it to be.29 
Indeed, that death is for us at all (that we are able to experience the soul’s withdrawal 
from the corporeal world) means that it cannot be nothing for us. But then what exactly is 
death for us? What are we to make of the manifest ability we have to distinguish 
ourselves from all corporeity, and thus to engage in philosophy and practice death? For 
both Plato and Hegel this ‘death’ is to be understood as a rebirth into a new life, the life 
of spirit. Yet for Hegel this new life, the life of spirit does not remain a flight from the 
material world, and here he parts with Plato. Rather, for Hegel the life of spirit permeates 
the material world, making the latter into an expression of itself. The making of the 
material world into an expression of spirit (i.e. the making of the body into an expression 
of the soul) is precisely what we meant above when we spoke of the subject ‘objectifying 
                                                 
28 See pp.7-18 in chapter one for my discussion of these alternative views of the human being. See also 
Phaedo 65d-66a, Theaetetus 184b-185d. 
 
29 Epicurus, “Epicurus to Menoeceus” p.85, Principle Doctrines II, p.95. 
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itself,’ and knowing itself in this objectivity; and it is what we meant when we said that 
spirit is an identification of the self with itself that includes and is based on a prior 
differentiation. 
We are now prepared to give an explanation for the different meanings of 
“subjectivity” for Hegel, to which we referred earlier. Subjectivity can mean abstract 
subjectivity, i.e. subjectivity removed from all objectivity; yet subjectivity is most 
properly understood not as excluding objectivity, but enveloping it. Thus subjectivity (in 
the latter, the truer sense) is characteristic of spirit, which has no (enduring) opposites. 
Accordingly, Walter Jaeschke has correctly pointed out that “subjectivity [Subjektivität]” 
for Hegel should not be taken in its everyday meaning of the consciousness of a singular 
person (which does have definite limits). Rather, subjectivity for Hegel in its technical 
sense means “the movement of the becoming of itself, thus a movement that mediates 
with itself through the negation of its other,”30 and this process “includes the aspect of 
[self-]knowing.”31 Jaeschke distinguishes “subject” (determined by its opposition to an 
object) from “subjectivity” which is, as the quote illustrates, that which returns to itself 
out of this opposition; or, “subjectivity” is the way of spirit.32 
Jaeschke is right in making this distinction. As a semantic matter, this distinction 
is contained in (indeed, it is central to) Hegel’s understanding of the “subject” or 
“subjectivity.” It is also true however that Hegel’s usage obscures this distinction. Thus 
                                                 
30 Jaeschke, “Absolute Subject and Absolute Subjectivity in Hegel” p.198. 
 
31 Jaeschke, “Absolute Subject and Absolute Subjectivity in Hegel”  p.199. 
 
32 The extent to which the individual “finite spirit” of the human being qualifies as subjectivity (and indeed, 
as spirit) will be treated in the third chapter, in which “subjective spirit” (the section which includes the 
anthropology) is explained in relation to “objective spirit” and “absolute spirit.” 
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Düsing notes that for Hegel, “subjectivity” can refer to the contingent and arbitrary 
(willkürliche) individual (the one championed by the romantics), or to the external 
reflection of the understanding (as seen in Kant and Fichte). It can also mean pure 
thought which thinks itself, yet still stands opposed to objectivity; or, it can refer to the 
idea that thinks itself and is one with objectivity (spirit, or absolute subjectivity).33  When 
in the Science of Logic Hegel calls the doctrine of the concept the “subjective logic,”34 as 
when he articulates the growing “subjectivity” of nature throughout the section on the 
organism in the Philosophy of Nature,35 subjectivity should be understood as Jaeschke 
describes it, as Düsing describes “absolute subjectivity,” and how we have described the 
subjectivity belonging to spirit (viz. subjectivity which envelops objectivity, realizing 
itself in objectivity, rather than excluding it). 
The body as the reality of the soul; or, the soul’s realization of itself in a body 
Subjectivity, my own self, is therefore not just the void that remains when all 
objectivity is abstracted (i.e. when I turn away from the whole corporeal world, including 
my own body). We call such abstract subjectivity a “void” because it is nothing definite: 
it is only the absence of all objectivity (since it is that which I distinguish from the 
objective world in turning away from it). It is because this abstract subjectivity is nothing 
definite that Epicurus denied it any reality: he declared that everything that is anything 
for us are material things, objects. Accordingly, for Epicurus death (the turning away 
                                                 
33 Klaus Düsing, „Hegels Begriff der Subjektivität in der Logik und in der Philosophie des subjektiven 
Geistes“ pp.201-202. See also Düsing, „Endliche und absolute Subjektivität: Untersuchungen zu Hegels 
philosophischer Psychologie und zu ihrer spekulativen Grundlegung“ p.43. 
 
34 WL p.241. See also EPW §215 & A. 
 
35 See for example EPW §§252 on the division of the Philosophie der Natur, as well as §§342-345, 349-
351, 353, 358A, 365 & A, 366, 373A, 374, 376. 
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from the material, objective world) is nothing to us because death would be the turning 
toward nothing, the subject without an object. Hegel’s understanding of this inward turn 
on the part of the self is much more delicate and sensitive than was that of the crude 
Epicurus. Unlike Epicurus, Hegel was able to see that even if death is nothing to us, this 
‘nothing’ (of which we have some inkling, some conception) is still something, i.e. that in 
this abstraction the abstract subject turns inward on itself, and transforms itself into an 
object, i.e. determines itself.  
We say that the self ‘determines itself’ because when the self turns inward and 
takes its own abstract subjectivity as its object, it grasps itself in two different ways: (1) it 
grasps itself first of all in opposition to the world of objects from which it differentiated 
itself by turning inward; yet (2) it also grasps itself as internally differentiated (insofar as 
this ‘other,’ its object, is nothing but its own self).36 The opposition of the abstract subject 
to the world of objects already renders it (in Hegelian terminology) “determinate in-
itself”: that is, determinate, limited in virtue of its own nature as abstract subjectivity, 
regardless of whether it knows itself to be determinate or not. Yet when the abstract 
subject turns back on itself and makes itself (in its abstract subjectivity) into its object, 
then it knows itself to be determinate and hence is “determinate for-itself.” When the 
subject takes the additional step of recognizing that it is insofar as it turned away from 
the material world and made itself completely indeterminate that it rendered itself 
                                                 
36 Recall in chapter one that what differentiated the human from the animal was that the animal is unable to 
know itself as internally differentiated: thus when its self appeared to it as something external, it 
immediately destroyed this appearance. The human being on the other hand, knows this otherness (even as 
otherness) as belonging to its own self. 
  
81
determinate, then the subject is “determinate in-and-for-itself,” in other words, self-
determining. The self-determining subject is one that realizes itself in objectivity.  
The terseness and familiarity of the phrases “determines itself” and “realizes 
itself” obscure the depth of Hegel’s meaning. We are so used to speaking of self-
realization or self-determination in a highly qualified way that we may not immediately 
appreciate what is involved in absolute self-realization or self-determination (which is 
what Hegel is talking about here37). In the familiar cases of relative self-determination 
(self-determination in a qualified way) a person makes a choice (say, between going to 
work or skipping work). The person, hitherto indeterminate in the sense of having either 
of those two and many other possibilities, determines himself by choosing one course of 
action (say, skipping work). We call this course of action a determination of the person’s 
self because it allows the person to exist in a specific way (viz. as not working), and 
reveals for us something about his character, i.e. about his own self (viz. a tendency 
toward indolence): thus we know this behavioral modification to be a modification of, a 
determination of the person’s own self.  
The lazy man in our example might object however that this one choice does not 
exhaustively define him—and he would be right: this action is only one modification of 
his character, and we cannot present it as an adequate and exhaustive image of his self. 
This man’s self may determine itself in many other modifications: some of these 
modifications may show diligence. A modification showing diligence would be contrary 
to the previously examined modification (the choice to skip work), though it would be a 
                                                 
37 This idea of absolute self-realization is implied in how Hegel describes the concept of spirit, e.g. as 
having an object identical with the subject, or as spirit having an externality which is the complete 
realization of it (EPW §381). 
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modification of the same self. The inappropriateness of the identification of the man 
himself with this one action (the decision to skip work) results from the fact that this is a 
case of self-determination only in a relative sense. On the other hand, what we are talking 
about here (viz. the self-determination of spirit), is a case of absolute self-determination: 
the self objectifies itself, but this objectification38 is not a mere modification of itself 
(with the substance of the self held in reserve, undetermined and amorphous); rather, this 
objectification is its very self itself.  
An example of absolute self-determination: national self-determination 
It is difficult to think of phenomena which meet the stringent criteria for being 
cases of absolute self-determination. In what follows we will give several examples 
illustrating this aspect of spirit. To make these clearer, recall what they are meant to 
illustrate:  
(1) spirit is the self’s withdrawal from everything that is for it objective,39  
(2) but in this withdrawal, spirit makes its own self into its object40;  
(3) thus spirit is at once subject and object, i.e. it determines itself in objectivity.41 
(4) This determination is not a mere moment of the self, but rather the self itself.42 
                                                 
38 “Objectification” here and in what follows should be taken as a noun, referring to the product, or result of 
the self’s realization of itself in objectivity (i.e. the determined, or actualized self), and not as a verb, 
referring to the activity that brings about this result. 
 
39 EPW §382. 
 
40 EPW §§381, 383. 
 
41 EPW §§381, 383. 
 
42 EPW §383. 
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We will be concerned here mainly to illustrate (3) and (4), though we should 
not forget (1) and (2) as their foundation. 
An example might be national self-determination. However, national self-
determination would only be absolute self-determination if the nation objectified its very 
self, and this is rare. The citizen merely voting for this or that representative, or a 
legislator passing this or that law are not cases of absolute national self-determination. 
That is, the U.S. Congress passing a law regulating the details of consumer bankruptcy is 
not national self-determination in the absolute sense. Renan famously defined the nation 
as “a daily plebiscite”43 such that a people are one nation only because each day they 
affirm this commitment. For Renan, the nation would therefore determine itself 
absolutely every single day. However, let us take some examples of national self-
determination whose character as absolute is less debatable. The assembling of the 
second Continental Congress in 1775, and the articulation of the constitution of the 
emerging American union (in addition to the drafting of the document outlining this 
constitution), or the Union’s declaration of war against the would-be secessionist states in 
1861, or the ‘tennis court oath’ taken by the members of the French Estates General in 
1789—these are cases of absolute national self-determination. The national self-
determination is absolute in these cases because the act of the nation is at once the 
                                                 
43 « Une nation est donc une grande solidarité, constituée par le sentiment des sacrifices qu’on a faits et de 
ceux qu’on est disposé à faire encore. Elle suppose un passé ; elle se résume pourtant dans le présent par 
un fait tangible : le consentiment, le désir clairement exprimé de continuer la vie commune. L’existence 
d’une nation est (pardonnez-moi cette métaphore) un plébiscite de tous les jours, comme l’existence de 
l’individu est une affirmation perpétuelle de vie. [A nation is therefore a great solidarity, constituted by the 
feeling of the sacrifices that one has made and of those one is prepared to make still. It presupposes a past; 
yet it is summed up in a tangible fact: the consent, the desire clearly expressed to continue a common life. 
The existence of a nation is (forgive me this metaphor) a daily plebiscite, as the existence of an individual 
is a perpetual affirmation of life.]» (Ernest Renan, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? p.241. My translation). 
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creation (or re-creation) of the nation; or, it might be more proper to say that in these 
instances the nation acts and realizes its own self in a state. 
Yet perhaps the best example of absolute national self-determination is provided 
by the Athenians, in their abandonment of their city during the second war with the 
Persians. When we say that the Athenians abandoned their “city,” we are actually 
speaking ambiguously: in a sense it is true that the Athenians abandoned their “city” in 
order to avoid annihilation by the Persians; yet in another sense, the Athenians never 
abandoned their city. The Romans understood the ambiguity here, and they accordingly 
distinguished between the urbs (“the city” in the sense of the physical territory and the 
buildings built on top of this territory) from the civitas (the city proper, i.e. the united 
citizenry, their customs, laws, and way of life).44 We will see in the case of the Athenians 
that it is very important to understand the difference between urbs and civitas.  
As the Persians overcame the Spartan three hundred at Thermopylae and 
threatened to besiege Athens,45 the Athenians sent a party to question Apollo at the oracle 
at Delphi as to what they should do to save their city. Far-seeing Apollo answered: 
“Athens will be saved by a wooden wall.” While some Athenians thought that this meant 
that the walls around the urbs would protect them, Themistocles (whose interpretation 
was the true one, and the one the Athenians ultimately accepted) argued that the “wooden 
                                                 
44 Alcaeus of Mytilene understood this as well: “Not hewn in stones, nor in well-fashioned beams,/ Not in 
the noblest of the builder’s dreams,/ But in courageous men, of purpose great,/ There is the fortress, there 
the living state”(fragment 22, p.69). 
 
45 Some historical background: Xerxes was leading the Persian empire in its second invasion of the Greek 
mainland in 480 B.C., having already subordinated the Ionian cities in Asia Minor. The Persians defeated 
and  killed all of the Spartans, Thebans and Thespians guarding the narrow pass at Thermopylae, the only 
natural obstacle keeping them from Attica (the Athenian homeland). Considering Attica (and Athens) 
already lost to the Persians at this point, Sparta decided to fortify the isthmus at Corinth, and thereby to 
defend the Peloponnesus. The Athenians were thus left to fend for themselves. 
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wall” was the Athenian fleet, and that the civitas should temporarily abandon the urbs, 
taking refuge elsewhere while the Athenian fleet should fight the Persians at Salamis.46 
Were this episode to be the only thing we knew about this nation and its history, it would 
still be enough to make Athens the most loved and admired city in history for thoughtful 
and noble-hearted people the world over. For in their time of crisis, the Athenians gave us 
what is perhaps the most perfect living image of the eternal structure of spirit. Let us 
recount what we see when we gaze upon this beautiful image. 
To understand what happened, we must see first of all that Athens, the city, was 
not a mere aggregate of people and objects. Rather, it was one self (the Athenians knew 
this because they had been educated by the poets, who sang of the city personified as the 
goddess Athena). Thus when Athens responds and acts, it does so in the manner of a self. 
This self has a ‘body’ (its urbs, the territory and buildings), and a ‘soul’ (the Athenian 
people, with their constitution and way of life). Now, we can identify a certain 
symbiotic47 tendency of Athens, leading up to the war with the Persians: viz., the 
tendency of the ‘soul’ to fail to distinguish itself from its ‘body’ (its urbs). Accordingly, 
the first response to Apollo’s prediction was to dig in behind the city walls: it did not at 
first occur to Athens that it was anything but the buildings within these walls. However, 
Themistocles was able to prompt Athens to turn inward on itself and differentiate itself 
                                                 
46 Herodotus, Histories VII.140-143. See also Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 1.73-74, 89; 6.82.4 and 
Plutarch, Lives pp.139-40.  
 
47 Recall, symbiosis is the psychological state preceding individuation: the naïve immersion of subjectivity 
in its environment, in which the distinction of itself from the objects it experiences is not explicit for it. 
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even from its physical presence (as urbs), to know itself rather as civitas. In this way, 
Athens (as civitas, as soul) was able to leave its ‘body’ (i.e. its urbs).48  
At this moment of infinite anguish, Athens showed itself to be devoted to Apollo 
not just in rallying behind the “wooden wall,” but in knowing itself, which was Apollo’s 
eternal commandment. In this self-knowledge, Athens grasped itself as not simply the 
rocky terrain of Attica, or the buildings comprising the urbs, but rather as the Athenian 
way of life, the Athenian spirit: to be cultivated and intellectual without being effeminate, 
and courageous in war without being barbaric.49 Enduring this separation of its deepest 
self, its soul from its urbs, Athens was able after the Greek victory to reappropriate its 
‘body.’ In this reappropriation, Athens did not live in its urbs, its corporeity in the 
manner of pre-reflexive absorption in externality. Rather, Athens reappropriated its urbs 
as the material in which it realized its soul: thus after the war with the Persians, the 
theater in Athens did not remain a mere part of the urbs, but rather echoed with the 
tragedies of Aeschylus; and the rocky terrain of Attica was taken up and transformed by 
Phidias into the statue of Athena in the Acropolis.  
 
                                                 
48 This happened in the second war against the Persians. But this theme, in which the city as constitution is 
distinguished from the city as buildings and land, or is conflated with it comes up again and again in 
Thucydides’s account of the Peloponnesian war. It is Themistocles (1.43.5) and Nicias (7.77.4; 7.77.7) who 
bring honor and undying fame on themselves by making this distinction, and allowing Athens’ soul to shine 
through its body, while it is the loathsome Alcibiades (6.92.4; 8.47.1-2) and his lackey Pisander (8.53.3; 
8.86.3; 8.91.3) who confound the city’s soul with its mere body, leading Athens to corruption and 
destruction. See also: 2.18 for Archidamas’ woeful misjudgment of the ability of the Athenians (in the early 
years of the war) to distinguish themselves from their mere ‘body,’ and 8.54.1-2 for the final, disgraceful 
capitulation of the Athenian spirit toward the end of the war, as Athens sells its soul to preserve its body, 
thereby terminating its career as the leading national embodiment of spirit. All that remained for Athens 
was to come to know in thought the form of spirit which previously it lived, but which now has grown old: 
thus Plato represents his philosophy as originating from a similarly heroic separation of the soul from its 
body (in the person of Socrates) (Phaedo 64a-c, 67d-e, 81a). 
 
49 So at least was the Athenian spirit represented by Pericles (Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 2.40). 
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Examples of absolute self-determination: Athena and Achilles 
It would have been truly glorious if some poet had articulated a myth in which 
Athena (Athens personified) removed herself from her body after a period of immediate 
absorption in it, only to reappropriate it, this time making it the expression of her divine 
soul. Since Athena was born from the head of Zeus fully armed and arrayed in battle 
gear,50 these trappings are as much a part of her body as her divine flesh and the ichor in 
her veins. A poet might therefore have sung that Athena suffered a kind of alienation 
from her armor, coming to view it as something strange and foreign. Subsequently she 
could have reappropriated her armor in such a way that henceforth it would be an 
extension and expression of her soul.51 In other words, a poet might have sung that 
Athena had suffered what was suffered by one of the mortal heroes dear to her heart: I am 
speaking of course of Achilles.52 
Achilles was the son of the Titanness Thetis and the hero Peleus.53 Thetis had 
submerged her son almost completely in the river Styx in order to make him almost 
invulnerable to death.54 Moreover, the smith god Hephaistos had made Thetis a present 
                                                 
50 The Homeric Hymns 28.4-6. 
 
51 In fact, Athena’s skinning of the giant Pallas, and subsequently wearing his skin as armor (Apollodorus, 
Library 1.37) (the feat which gave her the epithet “Pallas Athena”) might be interpreted in this way, as 
might her sporting of the gorgoneion, the countenance of the Gorgon on her chest (as she is depicted in 
certain statues, though Apollodorus says she put the gorgon’s head in the middle of her shield (Library 
2.46)). 
 
52 Indeed, in some instances, Athena and Achilles are indistinguishable. When fighting Hector, Achilles 
says “Athena will kill you with my spear” (Homer, The Iliad, XXII, 319). 
 
53 Apollodorus, Library 3:171. 
 
54 Or, according to Apollodorus, Thetis submerged Achilles in fire to destroy his mortality, until she was 
stopped by his fearful father (Library 3.171), just as Demeter did to Demophoön before his fearful mother 
Metaneira saw this and shouted (The Homeric Hymns 2.235-253). 
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on her wedding day of the armor that Achilles would wear.55 This armor also made 
Achilles nearly invulnerable (thus Achilles, like Athena, had divine armor). One might 
ask why Achilles needs a nearly invulnerable body and also nearly invulnerable armor. 
The answer is that he has both only because in his story his armor functions as a double 
for his body. We will see how this is so in our analysis below. What it is most important 
to attend to in this analysis is therefore Achilles’ relation to the external world, especially 
his armor (a double for his body, and in some sense, for himself).  
First, let us give a brief overview of the sequence of relevant events, then we will 
analyze them with an eye toward the illustration of the structure of spirit as absolute self-
determination in Achilles’ relation to externality in general, and his armor/body in 
particular. At the beginning of Homer’s Iliad, Achilles refuses to fight with the Achaeans. 
Rather, he skulks by his ship, as his countrymen are slaughtered by the Trojans. Achilles 
lends his armor however to his friend Patroclus. Patroclus is subsequently killed by 
Hector (the Trojan champion), who then strips Patroclus of the armor, and wears it 
himself. To avenge his friend, Achilles kills Hector (knowing full well from the prophecy 
related to him by his mother that once he kills Hector his own death is imminent), and 
takes back his own armor along with Hector’s body (depriving Hector’s relatives of the 
right to bury it). But when Priam, Hector’s father comes to Achilles to beg for his son’s 
body, Achilles relents and turns over Hector’s body. Now, let us turn to our analysis.  
When Achilles refuses to fight, i.e. when he refuses to be a hero, the 
invulnerability of his body and armor serve only to prolong his natural, corporeal life—
                                                 
55 Apollodorus, Library Epitome 4.7. 
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from which Achilles at this point symbiotically fails to distinguish himself.56 Achilles 
also however fails to distinguish himself from his friend Patroclus, to whom he freely 
lends his armor: this oversight will make possible his individuation and eventual spiritual 
reappropriation of his body. By wearing Achilles’ armor Patroclus becomes a double for 
Achilles: he is initially mistaken for Achilles by the Trojans, and Achilles lends him the 
armor only because he does not differentiate between himself and Patroclus. But because 
of this lack of differentiation, when Patroclus’ dead body is brought back to the Achaean 
camp, Achilles suffers tremendous grief and rage: it is as if he has experienced his own 
death. Yet this grief is the beginning of his “individuation,” his realization that this body 
(Patroclus’ body, which had been covered by Achilles’ own armor), a body with which 
Achilles formerly identified, is not himself: rather, this body, Patroclus’ body, is dead; 
Achilles himself however lives on to suffer the infinite pain of the loss of this body, with 
                                                 
56 Thus at this stage of the poem, Achilles famously denies that fame is worth dying for, preferring nostos 
(the return home) to kleos (fame) (IX 373-522). Some commentators have seized on this to claim that the 
Iliad is an anti-war poem, but nothing could be further from the truth: though Homer here does not flinch 
from depicting the horrors of war (and he depicts them as horrible), the fact remains that despite its horrors, 
the war is necessary (and therein lies the tragedy). The structure of the Greek universe is held together by 
the rule of Zeus: it is only with Zeus that the disorderly cycle of sons overthrowing their fathers (Chronos 
overthrowing Ouranos, Zeus overthrowing Chronos) is curbed. Zeus bears no children at all with his wife 
Hera to avoid an heir dispossessing him. It is because of the prophecy that Thetis will bear a son stronger 
than his father that Zeus avoids copulating with Thetis and marries her off to the mortal Peleus instead. It is 
at the wedding of Thetis and Peleus that Eris (strife) introduces the golden apple with ‘to the most fair’ 
inscribed on it, causing an argument between Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite as to who deserves it. Paris (the 
Trojan prince) is chosen to settle the dispute, and chooses Aphrodite in return for the hand of Helen 
(Menelaos’s wife)—thus sparking the Trojan war. Therefore for the coherence of the universe to be 
guaranteed, for Zeus not to be overthrown and everything to be thrown into chaos, Thetis and Peleus must 
be wed: this leads to both the outbreak of the Trojan war and the birth of Achilles. Achilles’ mortality (i.e. 
that his father be Peleus) is therefore necessary for the rule of Zeus to be preserved; and the particular event 
which causes Achilles’s death (the Trojan war) is equally necessary. Achilles was thus born to die. While 
for Christians it is God who suffers to redeem the sins of man, for the Greeks it is man who has the most 
glorious of all vocations: suffering to redeem the crime committed by the gods (viz., patricide) in founding 
the world. Achilles’s momentary doubt (in book IX) questioning whether death in battle is really glorious, 
is thus like Christ’s lament on the cross: “Father, father, why have you forsaken me?” (Matthew 27:46; 
Mark 15:34). The Iliad can therefore no more be an anti-war poem than Christianity can be an anti-
incarnation religion.  
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which had had identified. Achilles’ very feeling of grief is therefore the beginning of 
his individuation, and implicitly his transcendence of his unreflective sympathetic or 
symbiotic state. The process of individuation is completed when subsequently Achilles 
strides out to fight Hector. We must note that in facing Hector, Achilles is not simply 
fighting his enemy. Hector is wearing Achilles’ own armor (which is a double for 
Achilles’ own body). Achilles thus here gazes on his own self, which he now apprehends 
as something foreign, hostile—as an enemy (i.e. as something objective). 
What then, is the meaning of Achilles’ killing of Hector and his subsequent 
reappropriation of his own armor (i.e. his own ‘body’)? It can only be that Achilles has 
cancelled the alterity of this ‘objective self.’ Achilles’ armor, his body, is no longer 
something with which he identifies pre-reflectively, something whose near-
invulnerability serves only to prolong his corporeal existence. Rather, in killing Hector 
and reappropriating his own body (i.e. his armor), Achilles chooses undying fame (in epic 
poetry, a spiritual form) over unending (but merely natural) life.57 We should also note 
that in choosing undying fame, Achilles foregoes a return home: he will subsequently be 
buried in a foreign land, never returning to the home which was familiar to him, in which 
he formerly lived in unmediated immersion.  
In making this decision, Achilles’ body (and armor) serve no longer to prolong his 
natural existence; rather, they become the expression of his soul. Achilles’ body and 
armor are spiritualized by his heroic deeds, and the immortality conferred on him by the 
                                                 
57 This point is underscored (as Nagy remarks) by the fact that in killing Hector, Achilles penetrates his 
own armor (made by Hephaistos and given to Achilles’ mother, the immortal goddess Thetis) with his ash 
spear (given to him by his mortal father Peleus). Thus in the act whereby Achilles accepts his own 
mortality, he uses the emblem of his mortality to overcome the symbol of his immortality (Gregory Nagy, 
The Best of the Achaeans p.173n). 
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poets. This spiritualization of the body, its function as the expression of the soul and its 
invulnerability to natural corruption (even in death) is posited for us58 (though not yet for 
Achilles) first in Achilles’ shield, and second in Hector’s body. Achilles’ shield is a part 
of his armor, i.e. his body, which depicts various scenes illustrating the different aspects 
of the distinctly human life (city life, agriculture, the administration of justice, etc.)59—
that is, the ‘body’ here is the expression of the soul. The vanquished Hector’s body is 
dragged by Achilles in his chariot, but it does not suffer any disfigurement60: i.e. the body 
has been spiritualized by the soul and raised above the corruption endemic in nature. 
But the story of Achilles does not end as he kills Hector: as Achilles 
reappropriates his own armor (i.e. his own body), he also takes Hector’s body. The 
appropriation of Hector’s body, occurring as it does at the same time as Achilles 
reappropriates his own self, can only indicate that implicitly, Achilles’ spiritual return to 
himself has allowed him to begin to identify with externality. Despite the fact that 
Achilles still shows considerable rage toward Hector’s body, we must not fail to see that 
Achilles’ appropriation of Hector’s body—after it has been stripped of his (Achilles’) 
armor—is implicitly an identification with the enemy even as enemy, and not simply 
insofar as the enemy is in the guise (the armor) of one’s friend or one’s own self. In other 
words, the taking of Hector’s bare body (his body stripped of everything which had made 
him the appearance of to Achilles of his own self as something external) is an indication 
                                                 
58 See the remark on p.71n regarding my use of the term “for us.” 
 
59 Iliad XVIII.558-709. 
 
60 Iliad XXII.465-477; XXIII.209-220. 
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that Achilles has begun to identify with externality, to see himself in it even in its 
externality, even in its foreignness. 
This identification with externality as such becomes explicit as Achilles welcomes 
into his tent Priam, the leader of his enemy, and the father of Patroclus’ killer. Indeed, 
Achilles receives Priam more warmly than he had earlier received Odysseus, Phoenix, 
and Ajax, his own friends. Moreover, after receiving Priam, Achilles magnanimously 
relinquishes to him the body of Hector. Our Iliad reaches its climax as Achilles releases 
the body of Hector because it is only at that point that he finally explicitly identifies with 
externality in a human, spiritual way. Commentators typically argue that Achilles sees 
himself in Hector because he too has a mortal father (a fact of which Priam’s presence 
reminds him),61 or because with Hector’s death his own becomes imminent, or simply 
because Hector is another human being. Yet to properly understand Achilles’ 
identification with Hector we must see that Achilles identifies with Hector not despite the 
enmity and foreignness between them, but rather because of it. In releasing Hector to 
Priam, Achilles knows himself in what is external to him, opposed to him, in a way that 
does not require the suppression of the externality of this appearance, but rather tolerates 
its release. This is precisely what it is to be human, to be spirit. 
The stages of life: adulthood as subjectivity and self-determination 
From these examples it is clear that what is at stake in absolute self-realization is 
whether what is realized, the objectification, is truly the self (in its substantiality, and not 
                                                 
61 The currency of this interpretation far exceeds its merit. For, if this were true, if Achilles’ heart melts at 
the sight of Priam because of his memory of his mortal father, why did Achilles not cede to Phoenix and 
grant his request in Book IX? Achilles could not very well have forgotten that Phoenix raised him, and was 
a father figure to him, given that Phoenix delivers a long speech reminding him of it (IX.527-737). Indeed, 
far from forgetting Phoenix’s paternal relation to him, Achilles even calls him “old father” (IX 739). 
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a mere modification of it). That is, what is at stake is the healing of the chasm between 
the subject and the world of objects that opens up when the subject first begins to know 
itself as something distinct from the world. We noted above that an infant seems to lack 
awareness of itself as something distinct, but that the brooding adolescent, who knows 
the world as something alien to himself and begins to know himself as something alien to 
the world, knows the separation of subject and object all too well. Now that we have a 
more adequate introduction to spirit however, we can (making further use of the stages of 
life as our metaphor) see that the alienation of adolescence (i.e. of the abstract subject) is 
not interminable, i.e. that maturity, adulthood (which would be true, not abstract, 
subjectivity) is possible.  
Maturity would be precisely the re-establishment of the subject’s identification 
with the objective world, but not through regression to symbiosis, a state before the 
emergence of their differentiation. Rather, maturity involves the self’s objectification of 
itself in reality, its realization of itself in the world. If the self were irremediably alien to 
the objective, material world, then its ‘objectification’ or ‘realization’ would not be an 
objectification or realization of itself, but rather only another part of a coldly objective 
reality that would be for the subject inert and unresponsive. But Hegel’s analysis of spirit 
shows that the objectification in question is at once an object, and the self itself, and thus 
that the self does realize or determine its very self.  
Now, what is this self-objectification of spirit? It is the whole world of spirit: 
everything human and divine. In the anthropology Hegel is concerned with the soul’s 
realization of itself in objectivity as the human body, such that the human body is the 
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body of the soul. As such, the human body cannot be properly understood 
mechanically, chemically, or even organically. The human body is not mere res extensa, 
not inert matter that is alien to the soul (though the reunion of the soul and body 
accomplished in spirit is, as we have seen, dependent upon the prior sundering of the 
two). Hegel’s analysis of spirit is the scientific (in the sense of wissenschaftlich) basis for 
the impression we all already share that the human body is not simply a body in the way 
that a stone or a block of wood is a mere body, exhausted by its extension. The 
impression that the human body is not mere extension, or even mere living tissue is thus 
not a sentimental superstition that empirical science must root out; nor is it a ‘social 
feeling’ bred into us by evolution (and hence a vitally useful falsehood). Rather, this 
impression is more accurate than the contrary account empirical science would give; and 
the accuracy of this impression is confirmed by the proper understanding of the human 
being that speculative philosophy furnishes.  
The human body is thus the body of the soul: not as its property (of which it could 
dispose arbitrarily), but rather as its expression or externalization, for itself and for others. 
It makes a difference however whether the soul is infantile, adolescent, or mature: 
clearly, the infant, the adolescent, and the adult all have bodies, but the self in each case 
does not ‘have’ its corporeity in the same way. The self of an infant or a child is spread 
out over everything it experiences. Thus a child may burst into tears if a favorite toy is 
lost or destroyed. This reaction makes sense because the child has not yet differentiated 
itself from what it experiences: thus such a loss (of what is for us62 an object external to 
                                                 
62 See p.71n for a remark on the use of the locution “for us.” 
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the child) is experienced by the child as a loss of his own self (which is understandably 
traumatic).63 An adolescent on the contrary differentiates himself not only from his 
environment (which includes not only his physical vicinity, but also the mores and values 
of his time and place), but even from his own body. The strangeness of his own body to 
him is aggravated by the changes taking place during puberty. This alienation is evident 
to everyone in the awkwardness typical of adolescents, who are, as we say, not at home 
in their own skin. The adult on the other hand is at ease with himself, carries himself 
well, and is perhaps even graceful in his gait and mannerisms.  
We thus have in the analysis of spirit the germ of Hegel’s argument that: (1) the 
human body is material and objective64; yet (2) the human being cannot be exhaustively 
or adequately understood as something merely material (i.e. the human being has a soul, 
insofar as the human being is able to withdraw from the corporeal, objective world)65; 
and (3) the human body is the body of the soul, the soul’s manifestation in objectivity.66 
This self-determination, in which the self knows its identity with its other, and knows the 
identity of subject and object, is what Hegel means by “spirit.” 
A final example of absolute self-determination: the Karok, or Araar 
Spirit is very difficult to understand, and so another example may be in order. It is 
possible for an entire society to have or to lack a collective awareness of itself as a shape 
of spirit, as we can see by contrasting the United States with a certain Native American 
                                                 
63 This could be interpreted as a concretion of “self-feeling,” which we will examine in chapter five. 
 
64 EPW §387. 
 
65 EPW §382. 
 
66 EPW §§383-384. 
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tribe. There was in California in the 19th century a Native American tribe which the 
American government officials called “Karok.” The Karok however did not originally 
call themselves “Karok.” “Karok” was a word in the tribe’s own language meaning 
“upstream,” which the Americans used to distinguish them from those they called the 
“Yurok,” who lived further downstream.67 The American government was not in the 
habit of inventing names for the indigenous tribes it encountered, but in this case they 
found it to be necessary. The reason for this unique name was that when the government 
officials asked the Karok what they were called collectively (i.e. what their tribe or nation 
was called), the Karok, probably a bit puzzled, answered “Araar,” which in their 
language means simply “human beings.” The Karok (or Araar) thus showed that, as a 
tribe, they had no sense of their own collective identity. They were unaware that they 
formed a social unit which was distinct from (and limited by, opposed to) other such 
social units. 
The American nation on the other hand was at the time in the process of forming 
itself. Indeed, the aggressive expansion that brought Americans into contact with the 
Karok was part of this very cultural formation. The American identity had begun to be 
formed by the Revolutionary War (1776-1783), by which independence from England 
was won, and the subsequent War of 1812 (1812-1815), in which it was defended. These 
wars were the result, not the cause of the cultural differences between the Americans and 
the British; but it was not until after the military conquest of political and economic 
independence that the American people begin to self-consciously differentiate themselves 
culturally from the British. In the 1820s, Noah Webster composed the first American 
                                                 
67 Edward S. Curtis, The North American Indian vol. 13, pp.57-58. 
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Dictionary of the English Language (in which the spelling of many words was 
deliberately changed from the British style). At the same time, Washington Irving and 
James Fennimore Cooper, and later Walt Whitman, Edgar Allen Poe, Nathaniel 
Hawthorne, and Herman Melville developed the first uniquely American literary style, 
openly breaking with the English and semi-English American colonial style. Ralph 
Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau contemporaneously enunciated a 
“transcendentalist” philosophy, which, while remaining largely a German import, was 
vehemently opposed to the traditional British empiricism. The Karok (or Araar) however, 
for whatever reason (perhaps geographical isolation), had never had such an awakening 
of itself as a distinct nation, and so it had to receive passively a distinctly national name 
(Karok) from foreigners.  
Let us now ‘flesh out’ our metaphor. The ‘body’ of a nation (in this example) 
would be its culture: its customs, laws, religion, language, food, way of life.68 This ‘body’ 
is the manifold expression of the unitary ‘soul’ of the nation, the soul’s realization of 
itself. Before encountering the Americans, the Karok (or, those who would later be called 
the Karok) had such a culture, but it was not explicit for them: they did not consciously 
know themselves through this culture because they were unaware that anyone else 
anywhere else had a way of life that was in any way different from theirs. For these 
people, their culture was simply the culture. To put it in the language of Freudian 
                                                 
68 As Hegel says, “each nation has a time-honored [hergebrachte] national trait, its own manner of eating, 
drinking, and its own customs in the rest of its way of life”(Die Positivität der christlichen Religion p.106). 
In this early work which he left unpublished, Hegel tries to show how what I have called the ‘body’ of a 
people (its customs, etc.) can be something merely objective, merely positive, in which they do not 
recognize themselves and are not free. See also Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksal pp.274-
418). 
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psychology, the Karok lived in a state of cultural symbiosis. The original encounter 
with the Americans must therefore have shaken these people: they unreflectively 
identified their culture with being a human being; and in the Americans they encountered 
other people who did not share their culture (humans who were not human). This 
experience may have prompted them to turn inward, examining their own culture for the 
first time as something objective and to a certain extent arbitrary: i.e. this experience may 
have led them to become estranged, or at least ironically detached from their own culture.  
Yet, naiveté and estrangement are not the only two possibilities: if upon 
encountering the Americans this nation had undertaken to examine itself (its culture) 
through its own native cultural (e.g. artistic or religious) forms, then it would have 
become possible for it to arrive at spiritual maturity as a nation (and perhaps this is what 
happened). For example, in response to the encounter with the Americans, the Karok 
religion might have turned inward and taken itself as its object: myths might then have 
been enunciated not about the gods in relation to Araar, human beings generally, but of 
the gods in relation to the Karok specifically (these myths might for example have given 
an explanation for the intrusion of the Americans on their ancestral land, like a plague of 
locusts).  
In other words, the Karok might have done what the Greeks did after the 
encounter with the Persians. After the war the specifically Greek cultural form of tragedy 
(in Aeschylus’ The Persians) turned back to examine Greek culture itself as something 
distinct from Persian culture. The Greeks thus acquired national spiritual maturity just as 
the Karok might have (and perhaps did), since in the phenomenon which such cultural 
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introspection would produce, the subject (Karok culture) and the object (Karok culture) 
would be distinguished, yet identical. Likewise, in the case of Aeschylus’ play, the 
subjective form of national self-examination (viz. tragedy) was Greek culture, and the 
object too was Greek culture. That is, on the theater’s stage, the Greeks objectified 
themselves, determined and realized themselves as a nation. Had the Karok done this 
(and perhaps they did) they would have been happy: they would have lived in their 
culture as the Greeks of the 5th century lived in theirs, and as a human being lives in his 
body.69 
Now that we have had an introduction to spirit, and we have some familiarity with 
how the human being is spirit, how the human body is the realization of the soul, let us 
turn to the Encyclopedia for a close reading of some key notions from the paragraphs 
Hegel devotes to “the concept of spirit.” By studying these we will be in a position to 
begin a more rigorous investigation of the first concretion of spirit that Hegel gives, viz. 
the human body. 
The concept of spirit 
It would be worthwhile to go through the paragraphs in the Encyclopedia that 
Hegel devotes to elucidating the concept of spirit (§§381-4) not only line by line, but 
word by word. However, these paragraphs occupy such a pivotal point in Hegel’s system 
that a full explanation of what is contained in them would require a complete explanation 
of Hegel’s entire Encyclopedia (a task which for practical purposes is not feasible here). 
                                                 
69 In the same vein, Goethe is reputed to have said that he who knows only one language knows none. 
Friedrich Max Müller, the pioneer of comparative religion and mythology, added that he who knows but 
one religion knows none (Introduction to the Science of Religion p.16). To be properly at home in one’s 
language or one’s religion, one must know the nuances that color it, and make it different from other 
languages or religions. 
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We would do better then, to limit ourselves to explaining certain key points that 
Hegel makes in these paragraphs. To this end, the aim of the rest of this chapter will be to 
explain: infinite pain (unendliche Schmerz) or absolute negativity (absolute Negativität), 
and manifestation (die Manifestation) or revelation (das Offenbaren). The concept of 
spirit gives a basic definition of what spirit is in relation to what Hegel calls “the idea [die 
Idee]” and “nature [Natur].” Accordingly, to explain infinite pain, absolute negativity, 
and manifestation or revelation (i.e. to explain the concept of spirit) we will have to make 
a few remarks (which for practical purposes must remain brief) about the overall relation 
between the idea, nature and spirit.  
Hegel’s Logic: neither a transcendental logic, nor a formal logic of the understanding 
Hegel’s Encyclopedia has three volumes. The first volume is the Science of Logic; 
the second is the Philosophy of Nature; and the third is the Philosophy of Spirit. In this 
dissertation we are focusing on the third volume—indeed, only a small part of the third 
volume (the anthropology). Observe the following schema: 
  Science of Logic (§§1-244) 
  Philosophy of Nature (§§245-376) 
  Philosophy of Spirit (§§377-577) 
   Subjective Spirit (§§387-482) 
    Anthropology (§§388-412) 
    Phenomenology (§§413-439) 
    Psychology (§§440-482) 
   Objective Spirit (§§483-552) 
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   Absolute Spirit (§§553-577) 
To understand the anthropology we must be able to examine it from the 
standpoint of the whole. Yet, as we said, the explanation required to establish such a 
perspective and make it intelligible to the non-specialist would be interminable. Yet we 
cannot avoid placing the anthropology in some perspective, however quickly practical 
considerations obligate us to rush through our investigation of the relevant parts of the 
logic and the philosophy of nature.  
To state it briefly and roughly, the Science of Logic gives Hegel’s deduction70 of 
the various ontological categories that constitute everything in nature and in spirit (in the 
material world as well as in the human and divine world). Hegel’s logic is not a formal 
logic, i.e. not a logic of the understanding (Verstand). A logic of the understanding is 
concerned with abstract equations and formulae which express laws ostensibly governing 
formal relations which are valid no matter what the content. Thus a logician of the 
understanding might present the law of identity (A=A; or a thing—any thing—is itself, 
and is not other than itself) as valid for absolutely everything: material bodies, chemicals, 
living tissue, abstract concepts, products of imagination, human beings, God, etc. Hegel 
is not hostile to this type of formal logic as such, but he is scrupulous about keeping it 
                                                 
70 I use the term “deduction” because Hegel himself uses the term to describe the moves he makes in his 
system: see for example GPR §§2A, 141A. For Hegel, a deduction is a proof (Beweis) that begins not from 
empirical reality (and to this extent his meaning agrees with what most people mean by the term), but rather 
on the necessity of the concept in question (GPR §2A). For example, a certain concept being accepted 
(from having previously been deduced), it may be shown upon analysis of this concept that it has certain 
necessary implications. The analysis that brings these implications to light is the “deduction.” See for 
example the way the concept of chemism is “deduced” from the concept of mechanism, as shown in 
chapter one. It belongs to the necessity of the concept of mechanism that a body has relations to other 
bodies which are constitutive of its identity: the analysis that results in this insight is the deduction of the 
concept of chemism from the concept of mechanism. See also Peperzak, Modern Freedom pp.85-91. 
 
  
102
within its proper limits: as we have seen in chapter one and in our foregoing 
introduction to spirit in this chapter, it is not ultimately true that everything adheres 
purely and simply to the law of identity. Thus we saw in chapter one that a body is 
determined by its other, and so ‘has its very self outside of it.’ Insofar as the identity of a 
thing can be determined by its relation to another, it is not exactly true to say simply that 
each thing is itself and is not other than itself. Hegel therefore rejects the naïve 
application of such formal logical categories out of attentiveness to and respect for the 
things themselves, insofar as these things in some cases, simply because of what they are, 
reject these categories.  
 To this extent, Hegel takes his cue from Kant. The reader will recall that Kant 
replaced the formal logic of Aristotle and the scholastics with his own transcendental 
logic.71 Kant thus recognized that logical categories properly apply not to things 
themselves, but to phenomena (things as they appear to us, in the way that we are able to 
experience them); and that therefore we must restrain ourselves from applying the 
concepts of our understanding (Verstand) to those objects which transcend what are for 
us the conditions of possible experience, and hence cannot appear to us (even if we find 
ourselves obligated to think these objects when confronted with what does appear to us). 
Kant thus distinguishes phenomena which can be determined by our concepts (i.e. the 
categories belonging to our understanding) from ideas (contents generated by our reason 
                                                 
71 Kritik der reinen Vernunft Bxiii-ix. 
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[Vernunft] which we must think, but which cannot be determined by the concepts of 
our understanding).72 
“Ideas” (Ideen) for Kant include: the limits of the universe in space and time; the 
simple; free causality; and a necessary being.73 Were we to try to determine ideas by our 
concepts, we would find ourselves in an “antinomy”: i.e. the existence and the non-
existence of the object of the idea could be proven with equal validity.74 For Kant it is a 
“transcendental illusion” that we could apply the concepts of our understanding to what 
are properly seen as ideas of reason: such an illicit application of the understanding’s 
concepts would result in a “dialectic” which would be deceptive and unprofitable. Hence 
such a dialectic should be avoided.75 
Thus we find for example (in the first antinomy76) that the physical universe can 
be ‘understood’ (i.e. determined by concepts of the understanding) with equal 
justification as finite and as infinite. The whole of the physical world must be finite 
because whatever we can experience as material has certain limits. But it must be infinite 
because were it finite, that would mean that it is be bounded by something: this 
‘something’ would likewise have to be material—but if it is material, then it should have 
been included in our original account of the whole physical universe, and cannot be 
considered now to be outside of the physical universe, limiting it. Since each side of this 
                                                 
72 Kritik der reinen Vernunft Bxvi-xxii; A313/B374-A332/B389. 
 
73 Kritik der reinen Vernunft A333/B390-A338/B396. 
 
74 Kritik der reinen Vernunft A340/B398. 
 
75 Kritik der reinen Vernunft A293/B249-A298/B355. 
 
76 Kritik der reinen Vernunft A426/B454-A433-461. 
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antinomy can be defended with equal validity, Kant says, we should refrain from 
attributing to the totality of the physical world any determinate (finite or infinite) 
magnitude whatsoever. The totality of the physical universe is for Kant not a 
phenomenon which can be determined by our understanding’s concepts: rather, it is an 
idea which we can (indeed, must) think (denken), but of which we can have no cognition 
(Erkenntnis).  
When Hegel investigates corporeity, he encounters an antinomy similar to the one 
Kant discussed in his first antinomy (viz. that a body has a definite spatial extension, but 
that this determinacy brings it into necessary relation with its opposite, such that that 
which is not this body determines its very identity, and the body has its own self outside 
of it). However, when Hegel encounters this contradiction in the mechanical 
understanding of bodies, he does not conclude that we are ignorant of the nature of 
corporeity and must remain so. Rather, Hegel concludes that we are able to comprehend 
corporeity, but that the concept of mechanism is of only limited validity for this task. 
Moreover, Hegel concludes that in encountering the contradiction in this antinomy, 
reason encounters the limits not of its own cognition, but of the validity of the concept of 
mechanism; and further, that in encountering these limits, reason transcends them, 
revealing a new and more adequate concept by which to determine bodies (viz. 
chemism).77  
Corporeity is more adequately understood by chemism insofar as chemism 
recognizes what was operative but not explicit in mechanism: viz. that a body is 
                                                 
77 EPW §§195-200, 271. 
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determined by its opposite, that the identity of a body is determined by its relation to 
its other.78 The “contradiction” encountered in our “antinomy” is thus resolved (and 
hence shows itself to be “contradictory” and “antinomical” only in a limited sense). This 
resolution is not accomplished by the introduction of a higher concept which is alien to 
the object under investigation (viz. corporeity as it is determined mechanically). Rather, 
the resolution is accomplished by the “positing” (Setzen), or making explicit of what was 
already implicit. As mere filled space (i.e. as determined merely mechanically), a body 
has its self outside of it. However, though it is operative, this external determination is 
evident to us only through a deep analysis of the concept of mechanism. On the other 
hand, unlike merely mechanical objects, chemicals do not hide from us this aspect of 
themselves (viz. their determination from without); and thus dialectical thought is not 
required to tease this aspect out. In chemicals, this external determination is ‘on the 
surface’ as it were: it is posited, it is explicitly part of the concept of chemism. The more 
concrete concept (viz. chemism) integrates the various principles which together make up 
the concept of mechanism (viz. that a body is filled space, that the identity of a body is its 
spatial dimensions, and that a limit in space is a relation to another), placing them in their 
proper context so that they may be seen as not opposed to each other: i.e. the higher 
concept lifts (hebt) these principles up (auf) into a higher perspective so that they can be 
integrated in such a way that they do not destroy and undermine each other. The Hegelian 
Aufhebung thus avoids the outcome which Kant feared inevitably characterized 
                                                 
78 Mechanism held this other to be simply another extended object, internally unrelated to the first. 
Chemism on the other hand understands the other to be a body in relation to which the first is polar and 
reactive. 
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“dialectic.” Through a series of such Aufhebungen, Hegel presents his onto-logic, and 
subsequently, his philosophies of nature and spirit. 
Hegel and the early moderns: God as the principle of nature and spirit 
The summit of Hegel’s Science of Logic, i.e. the result of the series of 
Aufhebungen that constitutes his logic (and hence the most comprehensive determination 
of both thought and being), is what he calls the “idea” (Idee). Hegel does not mean by 
this term what Kant means however. Nor does he mean what Plato means. Least of all 
does Hegel mean what most people understand by “idea”: viz. any content of 
consciousness whatsoever, be it fabricated and unreal, or, at best, corresponding to reality 
as an image to the original. Rather, the idea for Hegel is by its very definition real: it is 
“the concept” (Begriff) as it is realized.79 The concept for Hegel is that thought-
determination (category of reason which governs both thought and objectivity) which 
underlies all natural and spiritual reality, realizing itself in various forms and drawing this 
variety back into the unity of itself.80 Insofar as the concept underlies all natural and 
spiritual reality, and the idea is precisely the reality of the concept, it is clear that both 
nature and spirit ‘are,’ in a certain sense, the idea.  
Hegel’s deduction of the idea places him at the summit and completion of early 
modern metaphysics. While Hegel’s debt to Kant (on which we remarked earlier) is 
undeniable, he also shows affinities with pre-critical rationalists such as Spinoza and 
Leibniz, and perhaps to a lesser extent Descartes. All of these early modern 
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metaphysicians were concerned with explaining the relation between the world of 
nature and the world of spirit (the problem which today is glibly referred to as ‘the mind-
body problem,’ and is reduced to the relation between the individual human ‘mind’ and 
body). 
Let us take Spinoza as an example. For Spinoza, the world of extended bodies and 
the world of thoughts (or, roughly, what Hegel would call “nature” and “spirit”) are of 
different orders: bodies affect only bodies, and thoughts likewise relate only to other 
thoughts.81 Interaction between nature and spirit seems inexplicable. However, there is in 
fact a remarkable correspondence between the order and relations among bodies and the 
order and relation among thoughts: thus it is only as a ball actually rolls across a table 
that I have a perception of a ball rolling across a table (i.e. the one natural phenomenon is 
mysteriously correlated with the other, spiritual phenomenon). For Spinoza this 
correspondence can be explained because of his deduction that there can only be one 
substance (viz. God, the substance of which every individual body and every individual 
thought is only a mode), and that this substance must have infinite attributes (i.e. an 
intellect as such can apprehend the essence God in infinitely many ways) of which we 
(finite intellects) can perceive only two (extension and thought, or, roughly, what Hegel 
would call nature and spirit).82 Thus the essence of the one substance, God, is manifested 
in the order and connection of bodies in the world of nature, and equally in the order and 
                                                 
81 Ethics part I, propositions I & II. 
 
82 Ethics part I, proposition XIV. 
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connection of thoughts in the world of spirit.83 God, for Spinoza, is therefore the 
fundamental reality underlying and realized in both nature and spirit.  
Indeed, this understanding of God seems to have been the convention among the 
early modern rationalists.84 Thus for Descartes it is by an appeal to God and God’s 
benevolent nature85 (whose existence he had previously deduced86) that we can be 
assured that the world of bodies in nature is in fact as we perceive it to be in our thoughts. 
Likewise, for Leibniz87 it is God who is responsible for the correspondence or harmony 
between nature and spirit. Even for Kant, God is brought into his philosophy as a linchpin 
to justify our hope that those who are good (who have a proper spiritual constitution) will 
be rewarded with happiness (i.e. that nature will be arranged according to their wishes).88 
God is thus for the early moderns that principle from which both nature and spirit 
proceed, and in which they are united. In this sense, Hegel too is an early modern: 
however, what the early moderns called “God,” Hegel calls “the concept,” and his name 
for the reality of God in nature and spirit is “the idea.”89 
                                                 
83 Ethics part II, proposition VII. 
 
84 Hegel notes in the remark to §389 of his Encyclopedia that the classical rationalists took God for the 
union of nature and spirit, and indicates briefly that he does not agree with the way they describe this 
unifying principle. 
 
85 Meditations VI; Principles part IV, CCVI. 
 
86 Meditations III; Principles part I, XIV. 
 
87 Discourse on Metaphysics XIV. 
 
88 Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft pp.124-132. 
 
89 God proper for Hegel is not simply the undifferentiated unity of nature and spirit. The divinity of God for 
lies depends on God’s self-knowledge: thus God is properly spirit, not an abstract, undifferentiated 
substance. 
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Hegel differs from all of the early moderns however in the way in which he 
deduces the unity of nature and spirit, and its realization or manifestation as nature and 
spirit. Hegel differs most sharply in this respect from Kant, who worked out a theory of 
nature (in the first Critique and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science) and a 
philosophy of freedom, or spirit (in the second Critique, the Groundwork, the 
Metaphysics of Morals, and Religion within the Limits of Reason alone), only at the end 
of which (in the postulates of practical reason in the second Critique and again in a 
different way in the Religion book) did he find himself compelled to bring in God to hold 
nature and spirit together. Hegel more closely resembles Spinoza insofar as both begin 
with a deduction of that which unifies nature and spirit (which Hegel calls the concept 
and Spinoza calls the substance) before proceeding to show why nature is (and why it is 
as it is) and why spirit is (and why it is as it is). Hegel differs from Spinoza however 
insofar as Spinoza begins straightaway with a list of definitions and axioms, and in 
eleven short propositions he deduces the existence of the substance. Hegel on the other 
hand begins with what is most immediately evident and commonplace (that there is 
being) and arrives at the concept only toward the end of his logic.  
An ontological category that is different from itself and the same as itself 
It may be of some help for us here to give a very brief and rough sketch of how 
Hegel arrives at the concept. This sketch is necessary because it is not immediately 
apparent how there could be deduced something like the concept, which as idea is at once 
different from itself (as nature)90 and the same as itself (as spirit).91 Our intention here is 
                                                 
90 Nature is defined as the idea in its externality to itself (EPW §247). 
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not to give a survey of the whole of the logic. All we intend here is to make more 
comprehensible the concept as both different from itself and the same as itself. For this 
purpose, let us turn to the very beginning of the logic, to see how the end is there 
prefigured. The first category of the logic is “becoming [Werden],” which is the 
Aufhebung of being (Sein) and nothing (Nichts)92: i.e. in becoming being and nothing are 
rendered “identical,” while still remaining different. If we can demonstrate here precisely 
how the first category of the logic can thus be different from itself and identical with 
itself, that should clarify somewhat how at the end of the logic the concept, as realized in 
the idea, is different from itself (in nature) yet identical to itself (in spirit). 
Hegel begins the logic proper with “being” (Sein), which can ostensibly be said of 
absolutely everything.93 In a sense, it is true that being can be said of anything and 
everything: no matter what precisely something is, it is; if it were not, then it would not 
be anything. Not yet having deduced the thought-determinations required for particular 
things, Hegel does not allow himself to speak of them at this stage. However, reference to 
such particular things would facilitate our explanation of Hegel. Our aim is a rigorous 
exposition only of the anthropology, and not of the entire Encyclopedia. Since our task 
here thus differs from Hegel’s task in the logic, we may beg the reader’s indulgence and 
grant ourselves liberties that Hegel does not take himself. Specifically, we will take the 
liberty of referring to what Hegel has not yet deduced in order to show in a more 
expedient way precisely how the category of being is inadequate. 
                                                                                                                                                 
91 Spirit, as we will see below, is defined as the idea knowing itself in its externality to itself (EPW §381). 
 
92 EPW §88. 
 
93 EPW §86. 
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The inadequacy of the category of being lies in the fact that even as being 
encompasses everything, it leaves something out, viz. non-being. The world is not simply 
pure being: if it were, there would be no determination, no distinctions, and thus no 
extension in space or passage of time (since both of these imply determination). In other 
words, if the world were pure being, it would be The Parmenidean One94; and all that we 
could say of it would be “it is.” In fact, we would not even be able to say that, since our 
utterance would then be something different from The One. But if difference and 
determination (and other such ‘negatives’) are, then non-being is in some sense.95 
Moreover, if there is determination, i.e. if one thing is not another, then being itself is not 
in some sense (since it is different from—i.e. it is not non-being). It is clear then that 
being is such an empty category that instead of expressing everything, it in fact expresses 
nothing: this is true first of all insofar as pure being is utterly indeterminate and so does 
not express anything in particular; yet it is also true insofar as its utter indeterminacy 
renders “being” indistinguishable from pure, empty nothing.96 Insofar as being and 
nothing are indistinguishable, they are “identical”; yet despite this “identity,” they clearly 
remain opposites (in a sense which admittedly remains mysterious). Being and nothing 
are thus absolute opposites, yet in a sense identical. 
                                                 
94 Hegel explicitly makes reference to the Eleatics in this connection (EPW §86A). 
 
95 The parallels with Plato’s Sophist are too striking to pass over in silence. Just as here Hegel shows that 
nothing itself must be in some sense, and that being itself must be determined and thus negated in some 
sense, so the Stranger in the Sophist shows that being must partake of difference (since it is different from 
other forms), and thus difference itself exists (i.e. partakes of being). ‘That which is not’ is thus not 
contrary to being, but only different from it (Sophist 257a-b). 
 
96 EPW §87. 
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In being and nothing (taken together, since they cannot strictly speaking be 
separated) we have an example at the beginning of the logic of a thought-determination 
which is at once different from itself and identical with itself. When we take being and 
nothing together in this way (as becoming, which both is and is not), we have performed 
the first Aufhebung of the logic; yet the tension in the ‘identity’ of being and nothing 
remains unresolved. Indeed, the interplay of difference and identity that we find first in 
becoming persists throughout the logic, even as higher and higher categories are deduced, 
giving an ever wider context and an ever more adequate determination and account of 
reality. It is this tension that drives the whole of the logic, and resolves itself ultimately 
into the concept.97 The concept however does not resolve the tension in such a way that 
either identity or difference is eradicated. The concept is neither simple identity with self 
to the exclusion of difference, nor total irreducible difference alien to all identity, even 
with itself. The concept is neither absence of determinacy, nor the random headlong 
dispersion in dizzying determinacy. Rather, the concept is self-determination98: the 
concept differentiates itself from itself (i.e. objectifies itself), realizing itself in various, 
opposing forms; and it maintains itself even in this opposition to itself, bringing these 
opposing realizations back into unity with itself.99 
The idea is precisely the realization of the concept (i.e. the concept itself as it is 
realized).100 Our discussion of ‘absolute self-determination’ in the first part of this 
                                                 
97 See EPW §§159-160. 
 
98 EPW §160. 
 
99 EPW §§159-160. 
 
100 EPW §§212-213. 
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chapter has prepared us to understand how the concept ‘realizes itself’ in the idea. 
The concept is not a flesh-and-blood person, but it is subjective in the sense we explained 
earlier: i.e. it does objectify itself, and in this objectification the concept realizes its own 
self as idea. 
As we indicated above, the concept retains in a more developed form the 
difference within identity that was expressed first and most abstractly in the 
indistinguishability of the opposites being and nothing. As the ‘identity’ of being and 
nothing at the beginning of the logic retains a difference, so the concept’s realization in 
the idea is likewise of a dual, differential character: that is, the idea is at once different 
from itself (i.e. the concept realizes itself as the idea in different, even opposing forms), 
and the same as itself (i.e. it returns to unity with itself, out of its difference from itself). 
The idea in its difference from itself is nature101; the idea as it returns to unity with itself 
is spirit.102 
The idea as nature and as spirit 
We saw in chapter one how what belongs to nature (i.e. what is corporeal) is 
determined as different from itself. Recall, every body, insofar as it is a body, is 
determined from without; i.e. the principle of a body’s own identity (its ‘self’) lies 
outside of it—a body is other than itself. This estrangement of a body from its own self is 
most characteristic of bodies which are determined merely mechanically (i.e. bodies that 
are the most ‘natural’ insofar as they are the furthest from spirit). The identity of such a 
body is quite simply its dimensions; yet it is other bodies outside of the body in question 
                                                 
101 EPW §247. 
 
102 EPW §381. 
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which give it these dimensions and hold it within its limits.103 Likewise for the 
chemical, it is its (polar) opposite which gives it its identity—but unlike the merely 
mechanical body, the chemical is able to bond with its opposite, thereby seizing its 
selfhood, as it were.104 
However, even the newly formed compound is relative to another chemical, 
which determines its identity.105 It is impossible for there ever to be an absolutely neutral 
chemical compound: each chemical is always polar relative to another, and hence it has 
its self outside of it. By its organic functions (digestion, respiration, etc.) the animal 
transcends mere chemical combination and dissolution.106 Yet the animal’s own organic 
nature leaves it also externally determined: in its desired object (food, or a mate) the 
animal feels its self outside of it.107 In summary, all of these bodies (the mechanical, the 
chemical, and the organic) are determined externally, and thus have their selves, the 
principles of their identity, outside of themselves: in other words, here the idea is opposed 
to itself, i.e. the idea here is nature. 
The idea returns to itself however as spirit. That is, the concept does not simply 
collapse into total dispersion in nature: in human beings (individually, taken together in 
cultures, and ultimately in art, religion, and philosophy), the concept comes to know itself 
as concept, and as idea, thereby reuniting with itself. Recall the contrast we drew in 
                                                 
103 EPW §261. 
 
104 EPW §§326-329. 
 
105 EPW §326. 
 
106 EPW §337. 
 
107 EPW §§365A, 369. 
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chapter one between human beings and animals. There is a phenomenon present in 
both human life and animal life which can be called “sexual desire.” In this phenomenon 
the subject of desire (whether human or animal) apprehends the object of desire (another 
human or animal) as his own self: that is, sexual desire involves for a human or animal 
the appearance of one’s own self as something external to oneself, specifically as another 
human or animal, with whom one must unite sexually. The phenomenon of desire always 
involves two moments: the identity between the subject and object; and a difference 
between the two. Were there no difference, the object would not possess anything which 
the subject lacks: the subject would thus feel sated (at least with respect to what the 
object is) and would not desire. Were there no identity however, then there would be 
nothing to draw the subject toward the object, with respect to which it would be 
indifferent: for there to be desire, the object must be that which ought to belong to the 
subject, but which in fact exists separate, as something external to the subject. –This is all 
we can say about sexual desire as a phenomenon common to humans and animals: 
beyond this, stark differences emerge between animal lust and human love. 
The differences lie in the extent to which the subject of desire knows the external 
appearance (the object of desire) to be his own self. What makes animal desire different 
from human desire is that for the animal, its self is properly confined to its body (i.e. for 
the animal, its self ought to be located only in its body), and so any appearance of its self 
outside of these limits must be immediately assimilated (brought into the natural limits of 
the body) or destroyed. The human however knows itself to be in some sense beyond its 
own body: because of this the human being can freely identify with and see itself in its 
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environment, including its beloved. If it sounds strange to hear that the human self is 
‘beyond’ its body, remember how we showed in chapter one that even though the human 
body does remain in some sense a mechanical object, the human being as such is not 
properly understood in the way merely mechanical objects are understood. What makes 
the human being human is that it knows its own self to be internally differentiated: i.e. it 
knows that it belongs to its very essence to appear to itself as something external. What 
this means is that the human being is not only a concretion of the idea (even an animal, 
even a mineral is a concretion of the idea), but it also knows itself to be the idea, and thus 
knows that the limits of its body are not the limits of its self. Indeed, the deepest self of 
not only the human being, but of everything in nature and spirit, is nothing but the idea; 
and what makes the human being human is that it can know itself as the idea, and thus the 
human being can know itself as not ultimately alien to anything in nature or spirit.  
It is only because human beings can know themselves as the idea that it becomes 
possible for humans to say “we,” i.e. to know themselves as collective subjects. Thus 
there can be formed communities of spirit (e.g. friendship, marriage, nationality) which 
bind their constituents in a way that is even stronger than the strongest stones and metals 
found in nature. Nations, churches, and other cultural institutions can sustain themselves 
even as everything merely natural decays and collapses. Today the Acropolis is in ruins, 
but Plato’s Republic (and thus in some sense Plato’s Academy) still thrives: it is read all 
over the world, and remains untouched by the ravages of time. 
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Infinite pain, or absolute negativity 
 Hegel wrote §§381-4 in the Encyclopedia under the heading “The Concept of 
Spirit,” placing this toward the end of the introductory paragraphs to the Philosophy of 
Spirit. Hegel is not haphazard in his use of the term “concept” (to which we have had 
some introduction in the foregoing material). When he entitles these sections Begriff des 
Geistes, the concept of spirit, he means that these sections will concern the essence of 
spirit without getting into how this concept realizes itself. We will have occasion to study 
the human body as an objectification of the concept of spirit in later chapters. Here, we 
are concerned only with what spirit is in its concept. 
In §381 Hegel says:  
Spirit for us has nature as its presupposition, whose truth and therefore 
whose absolute prior [or absolute first] it is. In this truth nature is 
vanished and spirit has resulted as the idea which has attained its being-
for-itself, whose object, just as its subject is the concept. This identity [of 
subject and object, both of which are concept] is absolute negativity, since 
in nature the concept has its completely external objectivity, yet this 
externalization is sublated and the concept has become identical with itself 
in this. It is therefore this identity only insofar as it is a return from 
nature.108 
 
Let us first consider what Hegel means when he says: “spirit has resulted as the 
idea which has attained its being-for-itself, whose object, just as its subject is the 
concept.” He means here that spirit is the idea which has succeeded in knowing itself, or 
                                                 
108 „Der Geist hat für uns die Natur zu seiner Voraussetzung, deren Wahrheit und damit deren absolut 
Erstes er ist. In dieser Wahrheit ist die Natur verschwunden und der Geist hat sich als die zu ihnen 
Fürsichsein gelangte Idee ergeben, deren Objekt ebensowohl als das Subjekt der Begriff ist. Diese 
Identität ist absolute Negativität weil in der Natur der Begriff seine vollkommene äuβerliche Objektivität 
hat, diese seine Entäuβerung aber aufgehoben und er in dieser sich identisch mit sich geworden ist. Er ist 
diese Identität somit zugleich  nur als Zurückkommen aus der Natur“(§381). See p.71n for a remark on the 
use of the locution “for us.” 
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as having itself as its object (that is what is meant by its having attained “being-for-
itself”); and that in this knowing, both the subject and the object are precisely the 
concept. The significance of this should be fairly clear at this point. The reality of the 
concept is the idea,109 but there are two aspects to the idea: the idea in its externality to 
itself (this is nature), and the idea knowing itself in its externality to itself, and thereby 
reuniting with itself (this is spirit).  
Thus spirit, like nature, is the idea, but what distinguishes spirit from mere nature 
is that spirit knows itself to be the idea. Spirit is therefore the self-knowing idea, which 
has itself for object; and since the idea is the reality of the concept, spirit can also be 
called the self-knowing concept (i.e. spirit is the concept which knows itself as concept). 
Thus although both spirit and nature are the concept, they are not the concept in the same 
way.  
An analogy might make this clearer: I (this individual human being) am both my 
soul and all of the diverse parts of my body—but my soul and the parts of my body are 
not me in the same way. The parts of my body are external to each other: my head is 
outside of my neck, both are outside of my torso, which is outside of my arms and legs, 
etc. Given the externality of my body parts to each other, it would seem that if one part is 
me, then the others cannot be me. However, my soul permeates my entire body, feeling 
and (in some sense) knowing in every part. My soul is not another part of my body, it is 
the unity that pervades my body, present in each part but not exclusive to any part. 
Through my soul, I know all the various parts of my body to be myself, despite their 
separation from each other. Likewise, all of nature is the concept, and spirit too is the 
                                                 
109 EPW §§212-213. 
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concept; but in nature the concept is outside of itself, while in spirit the concept 
knows itself and thus in some sense returns to unity with itself.  
It should be clear then why Hegel goes on to say (in the third sentence of §381): 
“This identity [of subject and object, both of which are concept] is absolute negativity, 
since in nature the concept has its completely external objectivity, yet this externalization 
is sublated and the concept has become identical with itself in this.” The inward turn of 
spirit is a turn away from all of external objectivity, all of nature, an introversion into the 
pure self, the ‘I’. Yet no sooner does the ‘I’ turn back on itself, away from all objectivity, 
than it objectifies itself: it makes itself into an object, an other for itself. In positing its 
deepest self as an other, the self posits its identity with external objectivity. Let us 
explain this step by step: there would be negativity if the self differentiates itself from this 
or that external object; there is absolute (unlimited) negativity when the self differentiates 
itself from all external objectivity (even its own).  
For Hegel, absolute negativity is the concept’s exclusion (and reinclusion) of all 
externality from itself—it even excludes its own externality from itself; but this exclusion 
requires that it turn back on to itself, taking itself as its object. In other words it requires 
that the concept objectify itself, that it make its own deepest self into something external 
(and this self-externalization is implicitly the reinclusion of externality generally, since 
this self-externalization is the identification of the concept itself and externality). This 
externalization (Entäuβerung) of the concept is not however its destruction. Rather, it is 
the concept’s realization, its manifestation in external existence. Recall: to exclude all 
externality from itself, the concept must turn inward and objectify its own self; this 
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means that it posits the identity of itself and externality. Far from losing itself, losing 
its selfhood, the concept thus extends itself out into nature, into external existence and 
posits this objective world as its world.  
The first step for spirit in claiming the world as its own is however to withdraw 
from it, to withdraw from all objective externality, as we have seen. This withdrawal is 
not sufficient however, and that is why Hegel calls it only the formal essence of spirit.110 
In §382, Hegel calls this withdrawal the submission to “infinite pain”: “It [spirit] can bear 
the negation of its individual immediacy, infinite pain.”111 This “infinite pain” should be 
understood in the same way as the “absolute negativity” that Hegel mentions in this and 
the previous paragraph. The submission to infinite pain is the withdrawal from all 
external objectivity: it is the turning inward by which spirit emerges from nature, and the 
human being shows himself in his distinctly human character. Athens submitted to 
infinite pain when it abandoned its urbs; Achilles submitted to infinite pain when he 
encountered Patroclus’ corpse, and subsequently when he fought against Hector, who 
was clad in his (Achilles’) own armor. 
When Hegel says that spirit can maintain itself as affirmative and be identical to 
itself even in this negativity,112 he does not mean (if we may, for the sake of illustration, 
speak of spirit as such in terms of the individual embodied finite spirit) that the spirit is a 
simple, immaterial soul which is separate from the manifold body and which, as a simple 
                                                 
110 „Das Wesen des Geistes is deswegen formell die Freiheit, die absolute Negativität des Begriffes als 
Identität mit sich“(EPW §382). 
 
111 „er kann die Negation seiner individuellen Unmittelbarkeit, den unendlichen Schmerz ertragen “(§382). 
See also VPR (1827) p.229. 
 
112 „ er [spirit] kann [...]  in dieser Negativität affirmativ sich erhalten und identisch für sich sein“(Hegel, 
EPW §382). 
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soul, remains the same throughout the corporeal flux, unaffected by it. Were that the 
case, then the negativity would not be absolute; the pain would not be infinite. What 
Hegel is saying is rather that spirit does not simply remove itself from all externality, 
because when it does withdraw from externality, it thereby also externalizes itself: spirit 
turns inward on itself and in so doing makes itself into an object. In this externalization or 
objectification spirit in a sense gives up its very selfhood (by ceasing to invest itself in 
any externality) and suffers a kind of death—that is the meaning of infinite pain. Spirit is 
able to endure infinite pain however because its self-objectification is not its annihilation, 
but rather its extension of itself into nature—as we said above, it is its manifestation in 
externality (thus spirit in a way ‘wins back’ its selfhood). 
Manifestation and revelation 
 Hegel says in the first three sentences of §383: “This universality is also its being-
there [Dasein]. As it exists for-itself, the universality is self-particularizing and therein 
self-identical. The determinacy of spirit is thus manifestation [Manifestation].”113 The 
“universality” Hegel is referring to is the indeterminateness that spirit has insofar as it 
submits to infinite pain, absolute negativity: it is the universality of withdrawal from all 
objectivity and externality. Hegel says that this universality is also spirit’s Dasein, spirit’s 
determinate being because through this withdrawal, this turning inward, spirit also 
externalizes, objectifies itself. Thus through its extreme indeterminacy spirit becomes 
determinate: i.e. spirit determines itself, gives itself Dasein.  
                                                 
113 „Diese Allgemeinheit ist auch sein Dasein. Als für sich seiend ist das Allgemeine sich besondernd und 
hierin Identität mit sich. Die Bestimmtheit des Geistes ist daher die Manifestation“(EPW §383). 
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In the second sentence of §383 (“As it exists for-itself, the universality is self-
particularizing and therein self-identical”) Hegel confirms the interpretation have offered 
above. Our analysis of spirit showed how turning inward is at once a flight from 
objectivity and a self-objectification, or a self-particularization. Moreover, we showed 
that in this self-objectification the difference between subject and object is sublated (since 
the deepest subjectivity into which the self withdraws becomes for it an object)—and 
thus that spirit in its universality remains identical with itself in its particularization. To 
say that this particularization is spirit itself, spirit in its universality yet in particular form 
(without for that ceasing to be universal), is to say that spirit’s determinacy is 
manifestation. –This is the third sentence of §383: “The determinacy of spirit is thus 
manifestation.”114 
The rest of §383 reads: “Spirit is not just any determinacy or content, the 
expression and externality of which is a form distinct from spirit itself; thus it does not 
reveal something, but rather its determinacy and content are this very revelation. Its 
possibility is thus immediately infinite, absolute actuality.”115 That what is revealed is 
nothing other than what does the revealing is clear from our examination of Spirit. This is 
the point we made when earlier we distinguished absolute self-determination from 
merely relative self-determination. Spirit turns inward toward its own deepest 
subjectivity. Yet, when spirit thematizes this subjectivity it at once objectifies it: spirit 
makes its deepest self into an object. A fissure is thus introduced into spirit’s very self 
                                                 
114 „Die Bestimmtheit des Geistes ist daher die Manifestation“ (EPW §383). 
 
115 “Er ist nicht irgend eine Bestimmtheit oder Inhalt, dessen Äuβerung und Äuβerlichkeit nur davon 
unterschiedene wäre; so das er nicht Etwas offenbart, sondern seine Bestimmtheit und Inhalt ist dieses 
Offenbaren selbst. Seine Möglichkeit ist daher unmittelbar unendliche, absolute Wirklichkeit”(EPW §383). 
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(insofar as spirit becomes an object for itself), at the same time as the breach between 
spirit and objectivity, or externality generally, is (or begins to be) healed (since it is spirit 
itself that is objective and external to itself). In the manifestation that is spirit, the 
manifestation is something particular, objective, external; yet for all that, this particular, 
objective externality is still universal, subjective, unified spirit.  
In §384 Hegel speaks not of manifestation but of revelation (das Offenbaren). It is 
unclear whether Hegel means to communicate some nuance that differentiates das 
Offenbaren from die Manifestation. In §383 Hegel does use the verb offenbaren when he 
notes that manifestation does not reveal (offenbart) something (Etwas), but rather only 
itself. Manifestation on the other hand (considering only §§381-384) appears only in 
§383. There seems to be no discernible distinction between the meanings of these two 
words, though some translators do imply a difference.116  
The use of Offenbaren is noteworthy however for another reason. The infinitive 
form of the verb “to open” is öffnen (as an adjective it is offen); -bar is a suffix used to 
transform nouns into adjectives (much like ‘-ness’ ‘-ity’ or ‘-ful’ in English); -en is the 
common ending for verbs in infinitive form. Offenbaren thus connotes opening. This 
connotation is appropriate insofar as spirit opens itself to its other, the natural world: it 
gives itself the world, making the world its own world.117 Spirit thus sets (setzt) the 
                                                 
116 The Wallace-Miller translation of the Philosophy of Spirit (which they render as “mind”) translates 
Offenbaren and Manifestation inconsistently, sometimes rendering Offenbaren as “revelation,” sometimes 
as “manifestation.” In §384 Hegel says Offenbaren three times, and Manifestation not once; Wallace and 
Miller render the first instance as “revelation,” the second as “manifestation,” and the third as “to reveal.”  
 
117 The rhetorical effect of the use of the term Offenbaren is heightened by the fact that the moment of spirit 
that precedes it seems to be a kind of closing off of the concept to all externality. Hegel’s point is that the 
‘closing off’ of absolute negativity is at once the opening of revelation. 
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natural world before (voraus) itself—i.e. spirit presupposes (setzt... voraus) nature.118 
The deeper meaning of spirit’s ‘presupposition’ of nature is thus that spirit posits nature 
before itself (i.e. presupposes nature) precisely in order to appear in it, to show nature to 
be spirit’s own world. That is, spirit ‘presupposes’ nature only to show that it (spirit) is 
the truth of nature. Spirit’s self-objectification and knowledge of itself in this 
objectification (which never ‘happened,’ but rather always is) is thus an opening up to 
objectivity, a free identification with its other. 
Likewise, the absolute negativity of spirit seems to produce its particularization, 
in which it is revealed. Absolute negativity as such (taking this moment by itself) is no 
revelation: it is simply absence of determination, a void which defies comprehension 
insofar as it can only be defined negatively (as not this or that determinacy). Yet what 
Hegel shows in the Encyclopedia §§381-4 is that this absolute negativity reveals itself in 
particular, immediate form; and moreover, what is revealed, despite being unfolded in the 
particular and the immediate, is yet also the absolute negativity itself. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
118 EPW §381. When we note as we have above how the construction of the German word for 
“presupposition” is well-suited to illustrate Hegel’s meaning, we run the risk of presenting the concept’s 
“positing [Setzung]” of nature before it as something spatial, as if the concept were in one place and it 
places nature in a place adjacent to it. Of course, spatially speaking, nature is not bounded by the concept—
moreover, the concept is not a spatial thing which could limit anything in this way. Likewise, we do not 
want to present these different moments of spirit as succeeding each other temporally (though objective 
spirit does imply a history of spirit in some sense, as we will see in chapter three): what we are presenting 
here as the different moments of the concept of spirit should be understood as always relating to each other 
in the way described, without having to be brought into this relation (as into something in which they 
would be essentially uninvolved). 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
SUBJECTIVE, OBJECTIVE, AND ABSOLUTE SPIRIT 
Introduction 
Now that we have obviated some misunderstandings about the human body and 
soul (in chapter one) and had an introduction to what spirit means, in accordance with 
Hegel’s presentation of the concept of spirit (in chapter two), we must here concern 
ourselves with the division of spirit: the principal moments into which it differentiates 
itself. First, we will say a few words about Hegel’s method and give a schematic 
representation of the entire philosophy of spirit. Next, we will give some introductory 
remarks on how the principal moments of the philosophy of spirit should be understood, 
before delving into the details. Once this introduction has been completed, we will 
proceed through the philosophy of spirit quickly but in a way that makes clear the basic 
trajectory, with special attention paid to the first part, which includes the anthropology. 
Finally, we will give some closing thoughts on how the different moments of the 
philosophy of spirit should be understood in relation to each other. This will prepare us to 
begin our examination of the anthropology in depth, starting in chapter four. 
Method and schema of the philosophy of spirit 
 It is part of Hegel’s method throughout his Encyclopedia to give first a 
presentation of the abstract or “formal” concept of the subject matter. This is followed by 
a short section on the division of this concept. Only after giving the division of the 
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concept into its principal moments does Hegel go on to examine in detail these 
moments in their own determinations, proceeding from one to the next by a continuing 
deduction, concluding with a more concrete definition of the (first) concept. Thus the 
Philosophy of Spirit begins (after a few general remarks) with four paragraphs on “the 
concept of spirit” (§§381-384), followed by two paragraphs on the division of spirit into 
subjective, objective, and absolute spirit (§§385-386). After this division comes the 
detailed examination of subjective spirit in its own determinations (the first of which is 
the anthropology).1  
We observed above that this was “Hegel’s method,” but in truth this is the method 
that belongs to the content itself: this is the way the absolute determines and reveals itself 
when it does so most perfectly (in the medium of thought, i.e. in philosophy). Hegel does 
not fashion this method for himself anymore than he fabricates the content: rather, he is 
only the happy man who dutifully records the absolute’s own comprehension of its 
revelation of itself to itself. It is important to note that this method belongs to the content 
itself, because were this not the case, we would not be engaged in properly speculative 
philosophy. Instead, we would have to bring a method to bear on a content foreign to it. 
As a result, we would be saddled from the beginning with a division between what the 
object of our investigation is in itself (apart from what would only be our method), and 
what it is for us (the content in the—possibly distorted—form our method allows us to 
                                                 
1 As we will see, each subsection unfolds according to the same method: presentation of the abstract 
concept; presentation of the division of this concept; presentation of each moment individually. 
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have it). Hegel disposes of this problem in the Jena Phenomenology of Spirit,2 i.e. in 
the introduction to the systematic Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. The 
relation between the Jena Phenomenology and the system proper is too complicated to be 
treated in detail here. Suffice it to say that within the system proper, the Encyclopedia, we 
can be assured that the method we use is the method of our content, the absolute itself.  
It is fitting then that we should use this method here as well. The first chapter of 
this dissertation was a prologue before the work proper could begin. In this prologue we 
removed certain obstacles that, left in place, would have thwarted from the beginning any 
attempt to understand Hegel. The second chapter was a presentation of the abstract 
concept of spirit (that is, a presentation of what spirit is as such, the essence of spirit in 
abstraction from its division into subjective, objective, and absolute spirit). This chapter 
will give the division of spirit into its principal moments, and explain briefly what they 
are and how they relate to each other.  
The philosophy of spirit can be schematically represented in the following 
manner: 
Philosophy of Spirit (§§377-577) 
Introduction (§§377-386) 
  The Concept of Spirit (§§381-384) 
  Division (§§385-386) 
Subjective Spirit (§§387-482) 
  Anthropology (on the soul) (§§388-412) 
   Natural Soul (§§391-402) 
    Natural Qualities (§§392-395) 
    Natural Changes (§§396-398) 
    Sensibility (§§399-402) 
   Feeling Soul (§§403-410) 
                                                 
2 PG pp.53-55, 59-61 (margin pagination). This, the Jena Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), should not be 
confused with the phenomenology of spirit as it appears in the Encyclopedia’s philosophy of subjective 
spirit. See p.71n for a remark on the use of the locution “for us.” 
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    Feeling Soul in its Immediacy (§§405-406) 
    Self-Feeling (§§407-408) 
    Habit (§§409-410) 
   Actual Soul (§§411-412) 
  Phenomenology (on consciousness) (§§413-439) 
   Consciousness (§§418-423) 
    Sensuous Consciousness (§§418-419) 
    Perception (or, taking to be true) (§§420-421) 
    Understanding (§§422-423) 
   Self-Consciousness (§§424-437) 
    Desire (§§426-429) 
    Recognitive Self-Consciousness (§§430-435) 
    Universal Self-Consciousness (§§436-437) 
   Reason (§§438-439) 
  Psychology (on spirit) (§§440-482) 
   Theoretical Spirit (§§445-468) 
    Intuition (§§446-450) 
    Representation (§§451-464) 
     Recollection (§§452-454) 
     Imagination (§§455-460) 
     Memory (§§461-464) 
    Thinking (§§465-468) 
     Understanding (§467) 
     Judgment (§467) 
     Syllogistic Reason (§467) 
   Practical Spirit (§§469-480) 
    Practical Feeling (§§471-472) 
    Impulses and Choice (§§473-478) 
    Happiness (§§479-480) 
   Free Spirit (§§481-482) 
 Objective Spirit (§§483-552) 
  Right (§§488-502) 
   Property (§§488-492) 
   Contract (§§493-495) 
   Right versus Wrong (§§496-502) 
  Morality (§§503-512) 
   Purpose (§504) 
   Intention and Welfare (§§505-506) 
   Good and Evil (§§507-512) 
  Ethical Life (§§513-552) 
   Family (§§518-522) 
    Marriage (§519) 
    Family Property (§§520-521) 
    Raising of Children (§522) 
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   Civil Society (§§523-534) 
    The System of Needs (§§524-528) 
     The Satisfaction of Needs by Work (§524) 
     Division of Labor (§§525-526) 
     The Estates (§§527-528) 
    The Administration of Justice (§§529-532) 
     Right as Law (§529) 
     The Positive Existence of the Law (§530) 
     The Judicial System (§§531-532) 
    Police and Corporation (§§533-534) 
   The State (§§535-552) 
    Internal Political Law (§§537-546) 
     The Power of the Sovereign (§542) 
     The Particular Powers (§§543-544) 
     The State’s Immediacy (§§545-564) 
    External Political Law (§547) 
    World History (§§548-552) 
 Absolute Spirit (§§553-577) 
  Art (§§556-563) 
  Religion (§§564-571) 
  Philosophy (§§572-577) 
 
 One reason Hegel divided the philosophy of spirit into precisely these sections 
and sub-sections (though there were some minor changes from edition to edition3) was to 
help his students to follow his lectures. Yet the divisions are not solely, or even 
principally, pedagogical in purpose. These are the divisions belonging to the content 
itself, i.e. to spirit itself. Were we to have from Hegel only free-flowing lectures, or 
writing with seamless transitions (as in the early essays which he wrote for the Kritisches 
Journal der Philosophie), i.e. text with no clearly established demarcation between 
sections, we would have to identify and articulate the structure ourselves. Hegel thus does 
us a great service in rendering his philosophy in the Encyclopedia in such a way that this 
                                                 
3 These changes do not concern our project. We are working with the third (1830) edition of the 
Encyclopedia. We will have occasion later (in chapter five) to note changes in terminology that Hegel uses 
between the different editions (e.g. from “träumende Seele” to “fühlende Seele”).  
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structure is so apparent. However, good writing still requires good readers: it is 
therefore our duty to reciprocate by paying close attention to this structure, and making 
sure we understand why spirit must be articulated in precisely this way.  
It is clear from the outline above that the principal moments are subjective spirit, 
objective spirit, and absolute spirit. Our ultimate object in this dissertation is the 
anthropology, which is the first moment of the section on subjective spirit. However, we 
can only obtain a proper understanding of the anthropology by first understanding its 
place in the context of subjective spirit, and the place of subjective spirit in the context of 
the whole philosophy of spirit. In this chapter we will explore the articulation of the 
concept of spirit in its three principal moments, and also the articulation of subjective 
spirit into its three moments.  
As we will see, the section on subjective spirit, the first moment of the philosophy 
of spirit, unfolds according to the same method as the philosophy of spirit as a whole. 
First there is a brief presentation of the abstract concept of subjective spirit, followed by 
its division (into anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology).4 Following this is a 
detailed examination of these moments separately. Likewise, the anthropology, the first 
moment of subjective spirit, begins with a presentation of the concept of the soul,5 
followed by its division (into natural soul, feeling soul, and actual soul).6 
 
 
                                                 
4 EPW §387. 
 
5 EPW §§388-389. 
 
6 EPW §390. 
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An outline of subjective, objective, and absolute spirit 
After a cursory reading of the philosophy of spirit, it may appear that the three 
principal moments can be summed up in the following way: subjective spirit concerns 
individual human beings; objective spirit concerns relations between human beings; and 
absolute spirit concerns certain lofty human activities. This explanation is not wholly 
incorrect, but it is crude, inadequate, and misleading. Its shortcomings will be clear if we 
consider: (1) that this explanation does not explain why the sections are named as they 
are; (2) that this explanation does not demonstrate why it is necessary to make the 
transition from the first stage to the second, nor the second to the third; (3) that this 
explanation does not clarify why the moments themselves have precisely the contents that 
they do (these contents are, apparently, an individual human being, many human beings, 
and the knowing of the absolute itself). We would do best therefore to look deeper for a 
structural or methodological reason behind the division into subjective, objective, and 
absolute spirit. 
The best place to look for such a reason is in the (abstract) concept of spirit, as we 
presented it in the last chapter. Let us briefly recapitulate this abstract concept. Spirit is 
the idea which has acquired being-for-itself, i.e. which knows itself in its other, knowing 
this other to be its own self.7 The idea is the concept (that which underlies all natural and 
                                                 
7 EPW §381. 
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spiritual reality) that makes itself real.8 There are two sides to the idea: nature, and 
spirit. Nature is the idea different from itself, opposed to itself.9  
For example, let us take nature in its most abstract determination: space. Space is 
extension, and hence implicitly divided into parts. Of these parts, each is in some sense 
space, though it is also true that each is different from and outside of the others. Thus 
nature (as space) is one determinate space; but it is also another space, which is different 
from the first. But since each determinate space is in some sense space (and nature has at 
this stage been determined only as space), it can be seen that the idea as nature is different 
from itself. The idea is spirit insofar as it overcomes this difference: not by annihilating it 
(spirit is not the collapse of the spatial world into a single point), but by knowing itself in 
this other. Nature is the merely existent, unthinking idea: and for this reason, the idea as 
mere nature disperses itself, and (insofar as it is merely nature) does not overcome this 
separation from itself. Only spirit overcomes this separation of the idea from itself, and it 
does so by knowing itself in its other. 
 Thus spirit overcomes the idea’s self-dispersion as nature, but not by rendering 
this difference somehow a pseudo-difference. Let us be clear: the idea remains different 
from itself as nature—this difference is not eradicated. Spirit is the idea’s reunion with 
itself not by the attenuation of its difference from itself, but by the aggravation of this 
difference, and the carrying of it to its most extreme point. The most extreme point of the 
idea’s externality to itself is what Hegel calls (in his explication of the concept of spirit) 
                                                 
8 EPW §212. 
 
9 EPW §247. 
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the suffering of infinite pain, or absolute negativity.10 Infinite pain and absolute 
negativity refer to the same thing: the moment in which the idea distinguishes everything 
which can be an object for its own (abstractly subjective) self; but this turning inward, 
away from all objectivity and toward the abstractly subjective self is at once the making 
of this self into an object. That is, infinite pain and absolute negativity involve the idea’s 
objectification of its own self. Since the turning away from all objectivity that 
characterizes “infinite pain” and “absolute negativity” necessarily involves the idea’s 
objectification of itself, it can be seen that the idea’s differentiation of itself from all 
objectivity is at once its intimate reunion of the most extreme subjectivity (absolute 
negativity) with objectivity. At this point the abstract distinction between subject and 
object (i.e. the pretense of a radical distinction of these two as if they were internally 
unrelated) collapses, and the self-determining subject (the idea) reveals itself as spirit.11 
We must here make three points about this self-revelation of spirit.  
(1) What is revealed is the idea itself. In the last chapter we discussed at length 
the difference between relative self-determination and absolute self-
determination. In the former, the realized determinacy is only a mode of the self, 
such that the self reveals something, perhaps something from which some 
conclusion about the self can be inferred, but the self does not reveal its own self. 
In absolute self-determination on the other hand, the self determines its own self, 
i.e. makes itself into something determinate. My point here is to convey that one 
moment of spirit is the idea’s determination of its own self. In addition, 
                                                 
10 EPW §382. 
 
11 EPW §§383-384. 
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(2) Spirit cancels the alterity of this determinacy, knowing it to be itself. It 
is not enough to note only that the idea thus “reveals” or “manifests” its own self 
in the way described above. We must also note that the idea reveals itself to itself: 
thus not only does the idea become something determinate in this revelation, but it 
also knows itself in this determinacy, thereby overcoming the radical opposition 
between itself and the world of determinacy which characterizes nature. My point 
here is to convey that another moment of spirit is the overcoming of the alterity of 
the self’s objectification of itself. However, 
(3) What is contained in the concept of spirit and related in the two points 
above (viz. that the idea reveals its own self, and it knows itself in this 
manifestation), is concretized in different ways in the philosophy of spirit. It is 
on the basis of these differences that we must understand the distinctions and 
relations between subjective, objective, and absolute spirit. 
In the philosophy of spirit Hegel deduces phenomenon after phenomenon which 
concretize the concept of spirit. However, there are three principal concretions of this 
concept, which together make up the axes on which the philosophy of spirit turns. These 
are: the soul, free spirit, and absolute spirit. A glance back at the schema will show that 
these belong to the beginning, the middle (roughly), and the end of the philosophy of 
spirit. Yet it is not the approximately even number of paragraphs between each of these 
that makes them the pivotal points in the text. Why they play such an important role in 
the philosophy of spirit will only become clear as a full explanation is given.  
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We can say first of all that all three of these, the soul, free spirit, and absolute 
spirit, concretize the concept of spirit. That is, in each of these the idea makes its own self 
into an object, i.e. realizes itself in determinacy (this is the idea’s “manifestation”), and 
knows itself in this objectification, thus cancelling its alterity. Yet these concretions of 
spirit can be distinguished according to that in which spirit manifests itself, the 
objective12 form in which spirit knows itself in each case. For the soul, it is nature, 
corporeity; for free spirit, it is the happy life attainable for spirit in its immediacy (i.e. the 
happiness of an existing individual); for absolute spirit it, is objective spirit (i.e. the state).  
In the philosophy of nature, nature is deduced as the idea’s revelation of its own 
self as something objective and determinate; but it is not yet posited that in thus revealing 
itself, the idea has revealed itself to itself, i.e. it is not yet posited that the idea knows itself 
in this objectivity, and is thus spirit (initially determined as soul). Likewise, in the section 
(in the philosophy of spirit) on objective spirit, objective spirit is treated as spirit’s 
revelation of its own self as something objective and determinate; but it is not yet posited 
that in thus revealing itself, spirit has revealed itself to itself, i.e. it is not yet posited that 
spirit knows itself in this objectivity, and is thus absolute spirit. To explain the course of 
the philosophy of spirit is to explain how the deduction proceeds from the first concretion 
of spirit (the soul, which in its initial form is spirit that is for-itself undifferentiated from 
nature) to its culmination as absolute spirit. Admittedly, we must understand the whole of 
the philosophy of spirit in order to fully grasp any part; yet insofar as the topic of this 
                                                 
12 The poverty of language forces me to make ambiguous use of the terms “object” and “objective.” All of 
the concretions of spirit are its ‘objectifications’ in which it knows itself, though not all belong to what 
Hegel denotes by the technical term “objective spirit [objektives Geist].” What specially distinguishes 
objektives Geist will become clear below. 
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dissertation is the anthropology, we are more concerned with subjective spirit than 
with objective and absolute spirit. Accordingly, we will spend the most time on 
subjective spirit. Furthermore, it is appropriate to give more attention to the section on 
subjective spirit because of the three parts of the philosophy of spirit, subjective spirit is, 
I believe, the most difficult to interpret and understand. 
Subjective spirit is spirit in its immediacy, as an individual, existing, embodied 
human being. But let us be clear: there is much in the human being which, taken in 
abstraction, cannot be simply identified as “spirit.” For example, a human being ‘is’ or 
‘has’ a body that takes up space, and has all manner of merely mechanical 
determinations; yet that which is merely mechanical is (to that extent) not spirit. The first 
chapter should have pre-emptively answered many objections of this kind: viz. those 
objections which raise characteristics of human beings which are manifestly unspiritual 
in an attempt to render problematic the very concept of subjective spirit. Spirit is the idea 
knowing itself in its externality to itself. Thus the individual human being is the 
immediate existence of spirit (or, subjective spirit) only in those respects which involve 
such self-knowledge.  
Yet in such a condition of immediacy, the individual human being is only 
implicitly (an sich) spirit. This means that the individual human being is spirit for us: here 
‘we’ are those who know what the abstract concept of spirit is, how it has concretized 
itself in individual human beings, and how individual human beings relate to the spheres 
of objective and absolute spirit. In other words, ‘we’ are the ones involved in this 
philosophical investigation. However, the object of our investigation (the human subject) 
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does not know itself as spirit in the same way that we know it as spirit.13 When we 
consider in the human subject only what we have deduced as belonging to it at this stage 
(viz. the level of subjective spirit), the human individual has only what Hegel calls 
“certainty [Gewissheit]” of itself as spirit.  
The “certainty” of itself as spirit that the human subject at this stage has is an 
immediate awareness of itself as spirit that does not involve knowledge of its own 
spiritual essence as an object. To say that the human being at this stage has only an 
immediate awareness of itself as spirit is the same as to say that in the individual human 
being, spirit exists immediately. What both of these mean is that at this level (viz. 
“subjective spirit”) spirit is considered apart from the relationships (i.e. the mediation) 
which its concept involves: this mediation is spirit’s mediation of itself with itself, which 
it carries out by objectifying its own self (i.e. distinguishing itself from itself) and then 
identifying with that objectified self from which it distinguished itself. Subjective spirit is 
thus not “subjective” in the sense of a subjectivity which envelops objectivity; rather, it 
                                                 
13 The reason why there is a distinction between what is ‘for us’ and what is ‘for’ the object of our 
investigation itself is that Hegel proceeds step by step in his Encyclopedia, deducing the various 
concretions of spirit one by one (see EPW §387A). (See p.71n for a remark on the use of the locution “for 
us” and p.101n for a remark on “deduction” in Hegel). He proceeds in this way to avoid having to adopt 
wholesale the ‘commonsense’ notions about what humanity is. Instead, he accepts only what he can deduce 
immediately from the previous stage. As an analogy, consider how in geometry one can consider 
abstractions like points, lines, and planes, which never actually exist on their own, but which can be 
examined and understood in themselves in thought. An exhaustive analysis of lines would reveal that lines 
cannot exist on their own, since a line is really only the limit of a plane (a moment of something more 
concrete). However, one can suspend this knowledge and simply investigate lines in their own right, 
discovering what necessary relations obtain when one simply regards lines as lines (and not as mere 
moments of something else). That is something similar to what Hegel is doing here: in truth, subjective 
spirit is an abstraction, as one discovers when they read through the whole philosophy of spirit. However, 
one can still investigate subjective spirit in its own right—indeed, it is through such an investigation that 
one deduces the sublation of (merely) subjective spirit from the very concept of subjective spirit. 
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excludes and is an abstraction from objectivity.14 It is called “subjective spirit” 
because spirit is in this section considered merely formally, i.e. apart from its self-
objectification. 
It may therefore appear that subjective spirit has essentially the same content as 
the introductory remarks on “the concept of spirit”: that is, it may appear that subjective 
spirit concerns only the abstract concept of spirit. Indeed, it is true that the section on 
subjective spirit does concern spirit in a state of abstraction, apart from its self-
objectification. Moreover, the section on subjective spirit culminates with a deduction of 
freedom as an abstract concept. This concept of freedom is presupposed at the beginning 
of the section on objective spirit, where it is concretized in the form of external, 
contingent historical existence, and fully realized in absolute spirit (which knows itself in 
this objectivity). Thus it can indeed be hard to distinguish between the purpose of §§381-
384 (on the concept of spirit), and the purpose of §§387-482 (the section on subjective 
spirit): both are meant to present spirit and its essence (freedom) in abstraction from its 
objectification (and the absolute identity of spirit with this objectification). Yet the 
difference is clear if we consider that while §§381-384 simply give the formal essence of 
spirit, the section on subjective spirit concerns the minimal concretion of this essence in 
immediacy (even if subjective spirit does not always know itself as self-objectifying). 
Nowhere in subjective spirit is spirit itself objectified—at least not until free spirit (but 
this is the transition out of subjective and into objective spirit)—and to that extent 
subjective spirit remains formal. Yet even if spirit is not (in its essence as spirit) an object 
                                                 
14 See chapter two for a discussion of the meaning of “subjectivity” for Hegel, including a review of some 
of the recent secondary literature on the topic. 
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for itself in subjective spirit, for us15 it is the immediate existence of spirit, and all that 
belongs to the concept of spirit can be discerned in subjective spirit implicitly. 
I would dispute Michael Wolff’s claim that the anthropology (the first section of 
subjective spirit) does not concern distinctly human phenomena, but rather “psychical 
and mental dispositions and activities in their dependence on material and physical 
conditions” which are shared with (non-human) animals.16 In fact, in chapter four and 
five, when we turn to the anthropology in depth, I will show for every phenomenon we 
investigate, how it should not be considered as something merely natural, but rather as 
something spiritual appearing in nature. My argument against Wolff will therefore be 
given in the following chapters. Here however we may point out a flaw in Wolff’s 
justification for his claim that the anthropology does not concern specifically human 
phenomena. Wolff argues that what is the conditio sine qua non for what is human in 
Hegel’s view is social life: 
Hegel gave an account of the non-occurrence of man in his ‘anthropology’ 
in the context of one place where the topic is the animal-human 
distinction. In §190A of the Philosophy of Right he says “the concretum 
of the representation that one calls man” can only be the theme “here from 
the standpoint of [social and socially produced] needs” and indeed “only 
[or first, “erst”] here.” Hegel clearly means that what it means that man 
begins and constantly progresses from an original state of savagery and so 
“leaves [hinauszugehen]” the animal kingdom can only be understood as 
including the more defined, social and population-theoretical aspects of 
animal life. Man can only come to satisfy his needs in a simply pre-given, 
limited “circle of means and ways” [by being] among a particular, 
determinate population ruled by social conditions. In the anthropology, as 
mental dispositions and activities of only the individual living being are 
considered. Therefore a conceptual explanation of the distinction between 
                                                 
15 See p.71n for a remark on the use of the locution “for us.” 
 
16 Das Körper-Seele Problem pp29-30 
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humans and animals cannot yet be expected here, insofar as this distinction 
shows a social aspect.17 
 
However, if we were to take everything before ethical life, the third part of the 
section on objective spirit as pre-human, i.e. as concerning phenomena which humans 
share with animals (and hence which are not distinctly spiritual), we would be relegating 
the bulk of the philosophy of spirit to the philosophy of nature: the whole of subjective 
spirit (not just the anthropology section) concerns human individuals. If all of the 
phenomena treated in the phenomenology and psychology sections are shared with 
animals, then we would have to attribute to animals not only self-consciousness and 
reason, but even intelligent, syllogistic thought and a will. Moreover, the foundations for 
the discussion of social life that occupies the third part of objective spirit are laid not only 
in the part on subjective spirit, but in the anthropology specifically: it is there that 
nationality is deduced.18 Are animals too organized into nations, then? 
But let us leave this objection for now and continue with our outline of the 
philosophy of spirit. What follows is by no means an exhaustive account. We intend here 
to focus our attention on subjective spirit. Accordingly, we will discuss objective spirit 
and absolute spirit only insofar as such discussion is necessary to understand subjective 
spirit; and even the discussion of subjective spirit will proceed by reducing large portions 
of text to summaries, giving just enough information to make the general thrust of the 
section comprehensible. 
 
                                                 
17 Das Körper-Seele Problem pp.30-31. 
 
18 EPW §394. 
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Subjective spirit 
The soul 
First, we will discuss the soul. We have already noted that nature is the idea in the 
form of externality, and that the idea is spirit when it knows this externality to be its own 
self. As spirit is initially deduced, it is nothing more than the idea knowing nature 
generally to be its own self. This is the soul: spirit steeped in (i.e. for itself 
undifferentiated from) nature. Hegel also calls the soul “the sleep of spirit,”19 likening it 
to the passive nous of Aristotle,20 which is potentially all things: similarly, the soul is 
spirit’s undifferentiated presence throughout all of nature. Insofar as the soul thus 
pervades nature thoroughly, Hegel cautions us not to take the soul as an immaterial 
entity, separate from and externally related to corporeal nature.21 Hence also we should 
not immediately think of the soul as an individual soul (bound and limited to a particular 
body): the individuation of the soul must be deduced. The soul’s individuation is deduced 
for us in §395,22 but it is not until the end of the anthropology that the soul really knows 
itself to be an individual, limited to a particular body. We are used to thinking of the soul 
as the interiority of the individual human being: the individual’s most private and 
exclusive refuge, the storehouse of an individual’s feelings and thoughts, inaccessible to 
anyone else. Indeed, for Hegel the section on the soul does concern feelings: but for the 
                                                 
19 EPW §389. 
 
20 Inexplicably, Kirk Pillow has identified the soul not with the Aristotelian passive nous, but with “prime 
matter”(“Habituating Madness and Phatasying Art in Hegel’s Encyclopedia” p.184). Of course, not only is 
prime matter devoid of spirit, it is the most debased form of nature—to the extent that it can be accorded 
existence at all. However, for Hegel the soul is spirit, its immediate existence ‘in’ a body notwithstanding. 
 
21 EPW §389. 
 
22 See p.71n for a remark on the use of the locution “for us.” 
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soul, these feelings are not ‘within it.’ Rather, until the deduction of actual soul, the 
soul knows itself in and as its feelings: it does not know itself in distinction from these 
feelings, and hence does not know these feelings to be its feelings, contents over which it 
has power.  
Not only does the feeling soul fail to know itself in distinction from its feelings, it 
also fails to have any inkling of ‘inner’ and ‘outer.’ This is another reason why Hegel 
calls the soul the sleep of spirit: for Hegel, sleep is precisely the loss of distinction 
between what is inner and what is outer.23 Thus Hegel notes in his lectures that to sense 
only a monotonous sound or motion puts one to sleep, because the lack of a new, fresh 
content obliterates the distinction for the soul between inner and outer.24 Hegel is 
concerned in the anthropology with hypnotism, madness, and various other sicknesses of 
the soul (some of very dubious credibility) because in these conditions the human subject, 
though normally much more complex and sophisticated, regresses to a soul-like state, 
where all distinction between inner and outer is effaced. Thus under hypnosis the patient 
is willing to divulge whatever information the hypnotist requires, though if awake, when 
the distinction between inner and outer is clear for the soul, the patient would refuse to 
‘externalize’ certain ‘inner’ contents (such as painful memories). 
 In cases of madness there is a similar regression to a soul-like state. Accordingly, 
the madman holds beliefs that reflect his own certainty of himself as soul, but also the 
absence or suppression of further spiritual developments (e.g. habit, consciousness, self-
                                                 
23 EPW §398. 
 
24 EPW §398Z. 
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consciousness, reason, will, etc.).25 Thus the madman is certain of himself as spirit, 
and hence as the truth of all of nature, which he considers to be under his control; or he 
takes himself to be in a distant land or time. Generally, the madman knows himself as 
soul (the self-knowing spirit indifferently present throughout nature) but does not know 
that (since he is, for us if not for himself,26 a particular, determinate human being) he is 
confined to a determinate time and place, living in a determinate body, and to that extent 
is not identical with the “universal soul.”27 
 The anthropology terminates in “actual soul.” Here the soul knows itself as 
existing immediately in individual souls, and thus knows that as individual soul it is not 
indifferently present throughout nature. Rather, the soul posits the particularity of its own 
body. The soul thus knows itself as present throughout its whole body (the distinctions 
between the parts of its body being nothing for the soul), but because of the necessary 
determinacy of any body, the soul has access to the rest of nature only by mediation of its 
particular body. Therefore the soul (the first concretion of the concept of spirit) is 
initially determined as the idea knowing itself in its objectification (viz. nature generally); 
as actual soul it is spirit knowing itself in a determinate part of nature (viz. an individual 
human body) as determinate. 
Consciousness 
Thus the actual soul is no longer spirit immersed in nature, unaware of the 
conflict between its unity and the diversity of nature. Rather, the actual soul posits itself 
                                                 
25 EPW §408&A. 
 
26 See p.71n for a remark on the use of the locution “for us.” 
 
27 EPW §391. 
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as realized in this particular body—in this way spirit reveals itself in immediate 
corporeal existence. Since the soul now knows itself as the soul of a particular, 
circumscribed body, and distinguishes this body from others (which it is not), it is no 
longer simply steeped in nature. Rather, it can take a part of nature (e.g. another body, 
which it is not) as its determinate object: i.e. the soul is consciousness.28  
 As the soul is initially determined as spirit knowing itself in externality without 
distinguishing itself from this externality, consciousness is spirit knowing an external 
object without knowing this object to be itself. Over the course of the phenomenology, 
spirit will come to know itself as “reason,” the identity of subject and object (insofar as 
both are ruled by the same rationality, i.e. insofar as the determinations of reason in the 
subject are the same as the determinations of reason in the object).29 The intervening 
stage between consciousness and reason is self-consciousness. Consciousness is already 
implicitly self-consciousness because spirit’s knowledge of itself is necessarily involved 
(if not in fact thematized) in the knowledge of the distinction between itself and the 
object. When spirit thus becomes conscious of itself as an object, it is self-
consciousness.30 We can see here the concept of spirit concretized in self-consciousness 
insofar as this concept involves spirit making itself into an object for itself (and this is 
precisely what self-consciousness does). The other moment of the concept is spirit’s 
recognition of this object as its own self, i.e. its recognition of the identity of subject and 
object: this is concretized as reason. 
                                                 
28 EPW §413. 
 
29 EPW §438. 
 
30 EPW §424. 
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To understand the transition from reason to the psychology section, we must 
understand two things: (1) subjective spirit generally is characterized as presupposing a 
world before it (Vorfinden einer Welt als einer vorausgesetzen), in contrast to objective 
spirit which creates a world as its own positing (als einer von ihm gesetzen), and absolute 
spirit which is the liberation in and from the world31; (2) reason is implicitly self-
determining. To fully grasp either of these points is to grasp the other as well. Let us 
begin by examining the first. 
Subjective spirit is characterized by its presupposition of a world before it. This is 
clearly true of the natural soul and feeling soul: only at the close of the anthropology does 
the soul even know itself as something distinct from the natural world as a whole. That 
the actual soul too presupposes a world before it is proved by the phenomenology. We 
have already remarked that spirit as actual soul is carried over into the phenomenology as 
consciousness. Consciousness is consciousness of an object: to be sure, consciousness 
distinguishes itself from this object, but even in doing so, it shows itself to presuppose it, 
insofar as consciousness remains only a relation to this object. Over the course of the 
phenomenology, spirit remains merely “subjective”: it even reproduces its relation to the 
object in its relation to its own self. Self-consciousness is not an immediate, relationless 
insight on the part of the self into itself: it is the self’s consciousness of its own self. 
Recall, consciousness is the self’s knowledge of what is for it objective: thus self-
                                                 
31 EPW §386.  Of course, this should not be taken to mean that subjective spirit is somehow worldless. 
Subjective spirit is always in a world, but insofar as it is merely subjective, it does not know that this world 
is something spirit ‘sets before’ itself only to realize itself in it (though again, this ‘setting before’ should 
not be taken in a spatial sense). 
  
146
consciousness is the self’s making itself (as consciousness) into an object for itself. 
This object is of course the self itself, and this (identity) is posited by spirit as reason. 
Insofar as consciousness makes its own self into a determinate object (as self-
consciousness) and knows this object as its own self (as reason), then spirit is here (as 
reason) determining itself, even if at this stage it does not know itself as self-determining. 
In other words, reason (Vernunft) is (for us, if not for itself) self-determining. It is 
hazardous to venture to draw a connection between one part of Hegel’s text and the work 
of a previous philosopher, since he so rarely mentions other philosophers: the two 
paragraphs devoted to reason are no exception in this respect. Yet if we attend carefully 
to what reason is in the context of the concept of spirit, and subjective spirit’s relation to 
objective spirit, it will be clear that in his understanding of reason, Hegel retrieves a 
certain aspect of Kant’s articulation of reason: viz., that reason is self-determining. 
Reason is explicitly only the identity of subject and object (the same rationality 
present in human consciousness and the natural world): but, familiar as we are with the 
concept of spirit, we are able to discern the self-determining character which is only 
implicit in reason as it is presented in §§438-439. By our reading of the consciousness 
and self-consciousness sections (guided by our grasp of the concept of spirit) we know 
that the subject (as consciousness) has objectified its own self (in self-consciousness), 
and (as reason) knows the identity of itself and the object: i.e. the subject knows its 
objectification to be its own self—but this means only that it is self-determining.32 In the 
                                                 
32 This is how we should understand it when Hegel says that “reason [...] is the substance as well as the 
infinite power, the infinite material of all natural and spiritual life, and the infinite form, the actualization of 
which is its content [die Vernunft ... die Substanz wie die unendliche Macht, sich selbst der unendliche 
Stoff alles natürlichen und geistigen Lebens wie die unendliche Form, die Betätigung dieses ihres Inhalt 
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psychology section this self-determination becomes explicit; and it is because this 
self-determination is posited in the psychology section that Hegel says that it concerns 
neither the mere soul, nor consciousness, but rather spirit (though still only finite, 
subjective spirit). That spirit as reason is implicitly self-determining and that in the 
psychology section spirit will become explicitly self-determining (i.e. self-determining 
for itself) indicates that in reason (implicitly) and in the psychology section (explicitly) 
spirit begins to cease to presuppose a world before it, showing itself rather as creating its 
own world as its own positing (i.e. its own determination of itself). That is, we begin at 
this stage to make the transition from subjective spirit to objective spirit. 
Thought, will, free spirit 
The first section of the psychology is theoretical spirit, which culminates in 
thought (Denken), which is spirit as explicitly self-determining. There are three moments 
of thought: understanding (Verstand), judgment (Urteil), and syllogism (Schluβ), the last 
of which is self-determining thought. The problem driving theoretical spirit throughout is 
how the general image that is the possession of intelligence (something like what Kant 
calls a concept) relates to the externally received intuition. This problem is inherited from 
reason as it is articulated at the end of the phenomenology insofar as there the rationality 
of the subject’s general representations are posited as ‘identical’ with the rationality of 
the many discrete, particular objects outside of the subject. The incongruity implicit in 
this ‘identity’ (viz. that subjective contents are general and indeterminate, while the 
                                                                                                                                                 
ist]”(VPGes pp.20-21). That reason is not only substance but infinite power means that this ‘substance’ 
realizes itself in determinacy. This determinate realization is “the infinite material of all natural and 
spiritual life.” That the infinite form’s actualization is its content likewise indicates that reason is not 
merely formal with its content outside of it: rather, it actualizes itself in its content. 
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objects are always this or that discrete object) is developed over the sections on 
intuition and representation. Thought resolves this incongruity by showing spirit to be 
‘self-determining as syllogism’ (the meaning of this will become clear below). Let us go 
through the moments of thought one by one. 
Mere understanding is the most inadequate form of thought: it accepts the external 
intuition only insofar as it agrees with the subject’s own general thoughts. Ostensibly, it 
is the subjective,33 general thought which is the criterion for the truth of the particular, 
intuited object: the former is ostensibly the essential, while the latter is inessential. Yet if 
this is accurate, then the bare particularity of the intuited object would fall outside of the 
subjective thought, which would thus be shown to be finite and incomplete. Accordingly, 
thought that remains on the level of the mere Verstand hardly deserves to be called 
thought at all. 
Judgment succeeds the mere understanding34 by expressing the relation of the 
subjective universal to the singular content itself, though this relation is represented as 
something merely immediate (e.g. “S is P”). Formal understanding in contrast would not 
state that a particular intuited object is a predicate: rather, the understanding and its 
general thought (the predicate) would only recognize in the intuited object what agrees 
with the general, subjective thought. The understanding’s subjective thought thus 
                                                 
33 “Subjective” here is of course meant in the sense that is opposed to objectivity, not as embracing it. See 
chapter two for an explanation of this term. 
 
34 To be sure, judgment can be seen as a form of understanding, insofar as both involve the opposition of a 
general, subjective thought and a particular intuition. The difference however (as I show in what follows) is 
that mere understanding takes the general, subjective thought recognizes only itself as the truth, and 
recognizes the intuited particular as legitimate only in its universality; judgment on the other hand is an 
explicit determination of the generality employed by the understanding, an assertion that this particular ‘is’ 
the general thought (as its predicate). 
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communes only with itself, and forces the particularity of the intuited object to fall 
outside of it. Judgment on the other hand unites the universal thought (as predicate) with 
the singular (subject), but due to its immediacy, judgment is unstable: it is a union 
between a subject and predicate, but it is also at its very heart a disjunction between the 
two. That is, judgment (Urteil) is an original (ur-) division (Teilung): the immediate 
union it asserts between a universal predicate and a singular subject does not overcome 
their enduring disparity. Thus while it is true that “S is P,” it is also true that “Q [another 
intuited particular] is P.” Yet the first intuited particular (S) is different from the second 
(Q): i.e. it is clear that “S is not Q,” and therefore (since Q is indeed P in some sense) that 
“S is not P.” Thus in judgment, subject and predicate are divided even as they are united. 
The instability of judgment, its self-undermining character, is resolved by 
syllogism (Schluβ), which we might say closes (schlieβt) the gap that is left between 
subject and predicate by their original division (ur-Teilung), or judgment. The syllogism 
effects this closure by positing an “objective particular”35: i.e. a determination that is 
internal to the universal predicate itself, and which is shared by the singular subject. To 
posit the objective particular here in the psychology’s “thought” section is to posit the 
universal, i.e. reason, as self-determining.36 As an example, Hegel gives a red rose.37 The 
                                                 
35 EPW §180. This citation and the term “objective particular” of course belong to the Wissenschaft der 
Logik. Judgment and syllogism are not only concrete psychological phenomena, but ontological categories. 
This will be addressed below. 
 
36 To be sure, reason in §§438-439 is not represented as self-determining: but we have already addressed 
how self-determination is implicit in it. Moreover, Hegel identifies the syllogism itself as formelle Vernunft 
(formal reason) and as schlieβender Verstand (syllogistic understanding) in §467. Thus the section of 
thought demonstrates that reason itself is self-determining: it is not as if the human mind is a hodge-podge 
of different faculties, a “soul-sack” containing reason, thought, will, memory, etc. The human mind is one 
(though it is internally articulated into distinct powers), and this single mind is self-determining (though 
this self-determination is more adequately expressed in some powers than in others). 
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individual plant is the singular term, while “colored” is the universal, such that to say 
“this rose is colored” would be to understand the rose in the manner of judgment.38 It is 
true that the rose is colored, and that color is present in the rose (i.e. the singular and 
universal are somehow united); indeed, the rose cannot but be colored, and color is 
nothing if it is not present in actual singular things like this rose. Yet despite this 
connection, there is certainly an incongruity between singular and universal as such: the 
singular has a determinacy that the universal seems not to have (insofar as the rose is not 
colored in general, but rather this particular color, viz. red). This incongruity becomes 
apparent in the following contradiction: this rose here is colored; that rose there is 
colored; but if the first is red, and the second is white, and we fail to posit this 
particularity in each, then we must conclude that the universal (color) is different from 
itself. This problem is irresoluble if one understands the rose only as a judgment, failing 
to see it syllogistically, i.e. failing to mediate the universal-singular relation by positing 
the particularity of the rose’s coloredness (that it is red), and positing that this 
particularity is immanent in the universal (coloredness).39 
The significance of this mediation is not that a new ‘thing’ (red) has been 
introduced in between the singular rose and the universal coloredness (as if these were 
two separate ‘things’), but rather the positing that the universal is determined within its 
                                                                                                                                                 
37 EPW §183Z. 
 
38 To be sure, judgment for Hegel (in these sections from the logic) is not a combination of words, but  
rather the ontological determination of a thing. For the purposes of explanation however, it is expedient to 
represent judgments linguistically (as a combination of words). Thus what we mean in saying “to say ‘this 
rose is colored’ would be to understand the rose in the manner of judgment” is that we would then be 
understanding this object as if it were a judgment (in the proper ontological meaning of the word). 
 
39 EPW §§179-180. 
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own self, such that its presence in a determinate singular is not an inexplicable, 
monstrous combination of incommensurate elements of different orders.40 Instead, Hegel 
wants to show that the universal ‘color’ already contains within it the particularity (of the 
various different colors), and that it is by the singular’s union with the particular (viz. that 
this rose is red) that the singular is united with the universal (i.e. that this rose is colored). 
It is not only red roses that are syllogisms. The terms of the syllogism are the 
moments of the concept itself41 and since everything in nature and spirit is the idea,42 the 
moments of the concept (which are also the terms of the syllogism, viz. universal, 
particular, and singular) are found throughout the Encyclopedia. Indeed, the whole of the 
Encyclopedia can be understood as one long parade of syllogisms. These syllogisms not 
only follow each other sequentially, they also supersede each other, with one syllogistic 
phenomenon constituting a single term for a more comprehensive syllogism. 
When we made three points above about the self-revelation of spirit, and said in 
the third that the concept of spirit is concretized in different ways throughout the 
philosophy of spirit, we meant that the philosophy of spirit exhibits a variety of 
syllogisms, which relate to each other in the ways just described. We will see how this is 
articulated in the anthropology in chapters four and five. At this point however it is clear 
that insofar as it is only soul, spirit does not know itself in its particularity, i.e. does not 
know itself as inwardly determined. As we will see, the distortions of spirit which are 
                                                 
40 For example, if we consider a universal to be a sort of ethereal Platonic idea, and a singular object to be 
mundane and corporeal, and hence of a different order, the inherence of the universal ‘in’ this singular 
becomes inexplicable. Hegel’s solution to this problem is to show that particularity is immanent in the 
universal. 
 
41 EPW §§164-166. 
 
42 EPW §§247, 381. 
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featured in the anthropology section (e.g. madness) are rooted in spirit’s failure to 
posit its own particularity, and the anthropology culminates in spirit’s positing of its own 
particularity for itself (in the form of its own determinate body).  
The consciousness of the phenomenology section thus presupposes the positing of 
this particular corporeity, but consciousness does not know this (objective) corporeity as 
its own (subjective) self. As self-consciousness, it turns its gaze toward its own self and 
(for us) makes itself into an object; and as reason it knows the “identity” of this subject 
and object, though it does not know that the subject determines its own self, i.e. that the 
subject realizes its own self in objectivity. Spirit posits itself as self-determining only as 
syllogistic thought: syllogism is thus given by name as a concrete spiritual phenomenon 
only when spirit knows its own self to be syllogistic. 
At the conclusion of theoretical spirit, what in reason was only a vague “identity” 
between existence and thought, has been posited as thought’s realization of itself, 
thought’s giving existence to itself—this is the will.43 However, the will, existing 
immediately, may have a content (a determinate end) that is different from itself. In 
thought spirit is deduced as self-determining, and as knowing this self-determination to be 
its essence; but the individual will still exists in a world which affects it in various ways, 
and thus this self-determinacy is initially only a demand that the will determine its 
content. In the first concretion of the will (as practical feeling), things are simply felt as 
pleasant or unpleasant (i.e. as agreeing or disagreeing with the thinking will’s own inner 
determinacy): that is, the will knows that the world ought to agree with it (to please it), 
but its own inward determinacy (in virtue of which things are experienced as pleasant or 
                                                 
43 EPW §468. 
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unpleasant) is at first accepted unreflectively as a matter of course.44 By positing its 
feelings as distinct, and not necessarily in agreement with each other (much less with the 
will itself), the will becomes aware of itself as something distinct from its own drives.45 
Here we can see a telescoping series of syllogisms. What in thought was an entire 
syllogism (finite spirit knowing itself as self-determining) is in practical feeling only an 
immediacy, a feeling of pleasure or a feeling of displeasure. This practical feeling still 
has a syllogistic structure: it is still thought knowing that it is self-determining and thus 
that the world ought to agree with it. Yet, in the practical spirit section, this whole 
syllogism (expressed as an immediacy in practical feeling) is brought into relation with a 
universal (Willkür, choice), with respect to which it is a mere singular impulse (without 
ceasing to be a complete syllogism in its own right from a narrower perspective).  
The chance agreement or disagreement between a practical feeling and the world 
is no longer the issue: what matters now is the agreement or disagreement between this 
feeling (here determined as impulse) and the will (here as Willkür). The will would find 
satisfaction in each impulse taken singly, though no single impulse would satisfy the 
Willkür totally, insofar as it is a universal. Each impulse is thus presented to the Willkür 
as something that may be adopted, or may be forsaken. But if each singular impulse is 
something contingent and arbitrary, then the Willkür (which has nothing but these 
impulses) is itself arbitrary: adopting one impulse and rejecting others for no good 
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45 EPW §476. 
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reason.46 The only thing the impulses have in common is their relation to Willkür. The 
Willkür, for its part, is itself nothing but a relation to these impulses: that is, the Willkür 
receives all of its content from these impulses, without which it would be totally empty. 
We might express the Willkür’s emptiness by saying that ‘it has no will of its own,’ being 
able to choose only from among the impulses furnished from outside of itself.  
It seems therefore that there is on one side a disorganized mass of determinate 
impulses, and on the other a completely indeterminate Willkür. However, since the 
Willkür is nothing in itself, but is only really a certain relation to its impulses, then the 
Willkür cannot without disingenuousness be treated as something separate from the 
impulses and their determinacy. The Willkür’s indeterminacy is only illusory: in truth, it 
must be recognized as inwardly determinate. That is, practical spirit must at this point be 
recognized as containing within it a determinate content; moreover, practical spirit does 
not relate to this content as it relates to its other impulses, i.e. it does not will this inner 
content only ambivalently. This recognition of the Willkür as inwardly determinate is the 
positing of an ‘objective particular’ immanent in the Willkür’s universality. This 
objective particular is happiness: the determinate organization of impulses that the will 
authorizes.47 That happiness is the ‘objective particular’ of the Willkür itself (and not an 
externally received impulse) means that no matter what particular impulse the Willkür 
finds satisfaction in at a given moment, it always wills its own happiness, and wills that 
particular impulse only insofar as it promotes a larger conception of the happy life. 
                                                 
46 EPW §478. 
 
47 EPW §§479-480. 
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Once we posit that the Willkür is inwardly determinate, we encounter the 
stylistic problem of whether we should continue to call it Willkür. On the one hand, the 
meaning of “Willkür” as the indeterminate, arbitrary faculty of choice has been 
conventional since Kant—and Hegel accepts this convention. Like Kant however, Hegel 
wants to show that the will properly speaking (the Wille) is not indeterminate or arbitrary 
in this way. Yet the way that Hegel goes about showing this, is by deducing the necessity 
of the will’s inward determinacy by analysis of the concept of Willkür itself: thus it 
would not be totally incorrect to say that the Willkür is inwardly determinate—but we 
should add that once we understand the Willkür in this way, it is customary to call it Wille 
rather than Willkür. 
When we understand the will as inwardly determinate in this way (i.e. as always 
willing the determinate goal of happiness as its objective particular), we can see that in 
willing happiness the will does not will an externally given end. That happiness is the 
will’s objective particular means that happiness is the particular term that was always 
immanent in the will, though it was not always so recognized; and in willing its own 
immanent end, the will wills only itself. Not only does the will will itself in willing 
happiness, but also in willing certain singular contents that fit into its conception of 
happiness: the singular content is united with the universal will by the particular 
conception of happiness (this is the syllogism between the three terms). Thus the 
determinacy of its particular conception of happiness belongs to the will itself; and to the 
extent that a singular impulse fits into this organization, it is united with the will (i.e. it is 
willed to that extent). When the will recognizes this conception of happiness (the 
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objective particular) as the determination of its own self, then it is free spirit,48 the 
will (self-determining thought) willing itself.49 
An example may help. Considered on the (more abstract) level of thought, a 
person simply knows himself as self-determining spirit, and thus has a demand that the 
world present itself as agreeable to him. Different things excite pleasure and pain in this 
person, and he accordingly finds himself with a variety of impulses which do not 
necessarily agree with each other, nor with the concrete situation in which he finds 
himself (his time and place, his financial means, the mores of his community, etc.). This 
person will likely find that, while taken singly, an impulse for living luxuriously 
(spending lavishly, eating fine foods, wearing expensive clothes, etc.) promises to be 
quite pleasant. Yet, supposing this person also has an impulse to go to graduate school 
and study philosophy, he will find that these two impulses cannot both be satisfied. 
Graduate study in philosophy requires an intense commitment that makes it impossible to 
hold a well-paying job (which is necessary for a luxurious life). This person must 
therefore fashion for himself a particular conception of happiness, which may include the 
satisfaction of one of these impulses but not of the other (though either is also compatible 
with the satisfaction of many other impulses not here listed). Only this organization of 
impulses (the happy life chosen by this particular person), and not any single impulse, is 
the proper object for the will: i.e. it is in a particular conception of happiness that the will 
determines itself, not in any one impulse.  
                                                 
48 EPW §480. 
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But the individual should also be at peace with the life he has chosen: if our 
graduate student pines away in his heart for a life of luxury, then though the objective 
conditions of his life (viz. that he spends his days studying philosophy) are enviable, he is 
not free. Moreover, he is probably a mediocre philosopher, since he has not understood 
what Hegel calls “free spirit.” As free spirit, the alterity of this determinate 
particularization of the will is cancelled, as the individual wills it as his own will. Our 
graduate student must therefore will not just the satisfaction of the singular impulse to 
study philosophy, but the whole life he has chosen (i.e. his particular conception of 
happiness), which includes living in modest circumstances. Or, he should fashion for 
himself another internally consistent conception of happiness and will that. 
Thus what was at the end of theoretical spirit a syllogism in its own right is 
integrated into a more comprehensive syllogism in free spirit. The syllogism of self-
determining thought becomes a singular term in the syllogism uniting the (universal) will 
with the (singular) practical feeling or impulse by mediation of the (particular) 
conception of happiness. At this point subjective spirit comes to its closure (Schluβ). This 
syllogism (Schluβ) however, the will willing itself, will be only the singular term of a yet 
higher syllogism, deduced in objective spirit: there the (universal) nation-state will be 
united with the (singular) free will through its (particular) family and work association. 
However, even this syllogism (the nation mediating its relation to the individual free will 
by the other ethical institutions) will be superseded and rendered only a singular term of 
the philosophy of spirit’s final syllogism: absolute spirit (the universal) united with the 
(singular) nation by realizing itself in the determinate process of world-history (in which 
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the nation-state has a role). Let us turn therefore to Hegel’s analysis of objective and 
absolute spirit. 
Objective and absolute spirit 
The course of objective spirit and absolute spirit 
 The function of the section on objective spirit is to deduce spirit’s 
objectification of its own self, the determinacy in which spirit realizes its own self and in 
which (as absolute spirit) it knows its own self: viz., the state. As we mentioned earlier, a 
cursory reading of the section on objective spirit may give the impression that while the 
section on subjective spirit concerned the individual human being, the section on 
objective spirit concerns the relations between many human beings. Yet the transition 
from the one to the other makes no sense if one thinks of it as involving simply the 
unprompted quantitative increase in the object under investigation. Rather, objective 
spirit must be understood as spirit’s positing of a world for itself, its realization of its own 
self in determinacy, knowing itself as an object.  
To be sure, throughout the section on subjective spirit, spirit objectified itself in 
some sense,50 and knew itself in this objectivity to a certain extent. Yet Hegel calls that 
section subjective spirit rather than objective spirit precisely because in subjective spirit, 
spirit’s objectification is not adequate to its concept. For spirit’s objectification to be 
adequate to its concept, spirit would have to give itself existence, and this determinate 
existence would have to be self-determining, and know itself as such. Only the state 
meets these criteria. In subjective spirit’s culmination as free spirit, spirit does know itself 
as thought giving itself determinacy and willing this determinacy as its own self. 
                                                 
50 For example, in habits (EPW §§409-410). 
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However, the individual human being is quite simply incapable of giving spirit itself 
objective existence, as the section on objective spirit demonstrates. 
The section on objective spirit begins with abstract right. Here, the individual 
person first realizes himself as spirit in the immediate form of a mere thing which is 
rendered his property. But by making spirit (here determined as personality) exist in 
externality, personality therefore takes on the characteristics of externality (viz. being 
outside of itself). Since in property spirit (or, here, personality) becomes other to itself, 
the relation between a person and his property is reformulated as a relation between a 
person and another person.51 This does not mean that one person owns another, but only 
that the concept of personality (and its realization in externality in the form of property) 
has been shown to have an unacknowledged determinacy. This determinacy first appears 
as simply a duplication of personality: the presence of another person. The transition 
from subjective to objective spirit thus involves a quantitative increase in the object under 
investigation only because: (1) spirit is deduced (in the psychology section) as self-
determining; (2) this self-determination initially involves the realization of spirit as an 
external thing; (3) such self-externalization means that personality is other to itself. 
 The aim of course is that personality should cease to be other to itself, i.e. 
that each of the different persons should know himself in the other, knowing the other as 
spirit of his spirit. On the level of abstract right however, persons relate to each other only 
through the medium of things (viz., their property). To be sure, the medium is not a mere 
thing, but rather property: a thing imbued with personality, a spiritualized thing. Yet 
insofar as it remains an externally existing thing, it has an irreducible ambiguity. As 
                                                 
51 EPW §490. 
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thing, it does not declare itself to be the property of a certain person. The thing has no 
personality in its own right, and thus cannot distinguish its own external existence from 
its spiritual aspect, its being-owned. Indeed, this inability on the part of the thing is 
precisely what justifies the person in taking possession of it. Yet the owned thing 
consequently requires another person to recognize it as the property of its owner.52 
However, because this other person may or may not recognize it as the property of 
another (and may even take possession of it himself), what is required is the 
objectification of spirit in a medium other than external thinghood.53  
The piece of property thus truly embodies personality insofar as it even reflects its 
inadequacy: both the property and the person are the merely immediate existence of right 
(or law, Recht). Yet the course of abstract right shows that the universal moment (the law 
as such) must be distinguished from the subjective will in which it has existence.54 In 
action, spirit is articulated into a universal moral standard and the moral subject who has 
this standard in himself as his own standard, which he intends. Because the moral 
subject’s end is something universal, the willing of this end is divested of the 
involvement in externality that characterized property. However, willing is only a part of 
action, which also requires execution. Thus action remains action in an external world 
with all sorts of contingencies and intervening factors. The moral will is involved in this 
externality (as far as the execution of its end is concerned), but even in the execution of 
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the act, the moral will recognizes only that in its act which belongs to his intention 
(which is in agreement with the universal standard).55  
There is thus a dichotomy between the intended pure moral end and the various 
externals of the act. Moreover, these two sides are not mediated: there is nothing in the 
command to will ‘the good’ and do ‘what is right’ that allows for a sure determination 
into concrete actions. Instead, this determination is left to arbitrary subjectivity (as 
conscience).56 Therefore spirit, in the form of the moral subject, is not able to determine 
its own self in an action (i.e. moral action is not an adequate objectification of spirit 
itself), and hence nor is spirit able to know itself in its deed (i.e. the reality of the act is 
not equal to the intention).  
What is needed is a better way to determine the abstract “good.” The moral 
subject is unable to introduce the not yet existent “good” into reality all of the sudden, 
like a traveler without baggage. Yet this is not a genuine problem, because such a heroic 
feat is not actually necessary: it is neither the responsibility nor the prerogative generally 
of the individual to bring what is right to bear on a world hitherto alien to all goodness. 
Rather, every individual is always already a member of a nation with its own national 
spirit (which is a particular concretion of the concept of spirit): this national spirit has its 
own history and its own standards of conduct, i.e. its own cultural stock of conventional 
responses to the diverse situations in which individuals typically find themselves.57 The 
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56 EPW §§508, 511; GPR §§115, 117-118, 123. 
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individual may thus adopt those responses,58 and thereby avoid having to determine 
the universal good on his own for the first time in history. While as moral subject the 
individual was helpless to bridge the gulf separating his intention, what he means in his 
act, from the reality of the act, as member of a national community the individual need 
not worry that the reality of the act will misrepresent his intention. The national culture 
and history have already established for all members of the nation which deeds reveal 
which intentions.  
Let us consider an example. The American spirit holds up self-reliance as a virtue 
(perhaps to an excessive degree). Thus if one American offers another a gift or favor, and 
the latter refuses and protests, the former will not be insulted: he will understand that the 
other is being polite according to American standards by showing a certain degree of 
reluctance to accept and thereby deprive him of something or inconvenience him. 
Likewise, the one who is offered the gift or favor understands that if the other insists and 
reiterates the offer, it would be impolite not to accept, even if he does not need what is 
offered. Another culture may have different standards of decorum regarding exchanges of 
gifts and favors. 
Indeed, there is wide variety between cultures on the meaning of such deeds, or 
how to appropriately determine intentions in reality: witness the difference in attitudes 
across cultures with respect to dress, food, displays of affection, physical contact and 
                                                 
58 The situation becomes more complicated when we bring absolute spirit into consideration: as 
philosopher, the individual can (indeed, must) take a critical stance with regard to the values and mores of 
his time and place. However, at the stage of spirit under examination here, it is necessary only to see the 
historical emergence of national cultures as the “objective particular” mediating between the universal good 
and the individual agent. We will deal with absolute spirit (and the obligations of the individual insofar as 
he concretizes absolute spirit) below. 
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personal space, etc. Yet within a certain culture, the gap between intention and deed 
(i.e. their ‘original division’) has been ‘closed (schlieβt)’: thus there is no serious threat of 
spirit failing to recognize itself in its objectification of itself.  
Let us take another example. A Japanese person would be insulted if someone 
entered his home without removing his shoes: the Japanese often sit on the floor, and to 
continue to wear one’s shoes in another’s home (i.e. this deed in its external reality) is 
interpreted as the failure to acknowledge that one has entered the home of another, i.e. it 
is to fail to respect the domain imbued with the personality of another. On the other hand, 
Americans rarely or never sit on the floor. Consequently, among Americans, wearing 
shoes is simply considered part of being fully dressed. Therefore an American only 
removes his shoes in his own home (and even wears shoes in his own home when he has 
guests over, as a sign of respect). To remove one’s shoes is for an American a sign of 
extreme informality; consequently, to remove one’s shoes in an American’s home 
(without having been invited to take this liberty) would be to fail to show due regard for 
one’s host.  
Thus in different cultures, the very same deed indicates vastly different things, i.e. 
reveals (offenbart) vastly different intentions. Yet in the absence of distinct cultures, 
intention and deed would remain in a tense state of judgment: the union between the two 
would thus be loose and unstable; the deed would be irreducibly ambiguous; 
consequently it would be impossible for spirit to recognize itself in its deed. The national 
culture (with its customs and traditions) is the objective particular which allows the moral 
subject’s (universal) good will to be realized in a (singular) deed.  
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Hegel discusses national culture in the final moment of objective spirit, which 
he calls “Sittlichkeit.” “Ethical life” is the generally accepted translation of Sittlichkeit. 
“Sittlichkeit” comes from “Sitten,” which are the customs and mores that constitute the 
social life of a people or a nation (though Sittlichkeit includes also the family and civil 
society). Sittlichkeit (which could thus also be translated as “convention”) denotes a 
culture into which an individual is born, and of which, through paideia or Bildung, that 
individual grows to be the expression. These Sitten can become objects of reflection for 
an individual; but even—and perhaps especially—if they are not, they are effective in 
shaping the behavior and outlook of the individual through his lifelong habituation to 
them. “Ethical life” is the preferred translation because it connotes the Greek ethos, 
which means both the shared life of a nation or a people, and habituation. The highest 
form of ethical life is the state (Staat). While Staat does refer to the particular, 
immediately existing nation-state, it most properly refers to world history: the 
transnational realization of freedom in the world over the course of several epochs. It is 
the state, above all as world history, which is spirit’s (i.e. the absolute’s, God’s) 
realization of its own self in determinacy. That is, the state is spirit’s revelation—not of 
something, but of itself.59 
A glance back at the schematic representation of the philosophy of spirit will also 
show that absolute spirit has three moments: art, religion, and philosophy. As absolute 
spirit, spirit grasps its self-objectification in determinacy (i.e. the state) as its own self. 
                                                 
59 „er [i.e. spirit] nicht Etwas offenbart, sondern seine Bestimmtheit und Inhalt ist dieses Offenbaren selbst 
[it does not reveal something, but rather its determinacy and content is the revelation itself]“(EPW §383). 
For our analysis of the abstract concept of spirit, including this passage describing spirit’s revelation of 
itself, see chapter two. 
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Art (which means fine art, not technical production) is spirit’s knowing of itself in 
intuition; revealed religion is spirit’s knowing of itself in feeling and representation; and 
philosophy is spirit’s knowing of itself in the form most proper to it, viz., thought. In 
absolute spirit, spirit thus reappropriates its objectified self: i.e. absolute spirit takes finite 
spirit (the state, objective spirit) back into itself. Indeed, absolute spirit reunites itself with 
finite spirit generally: therefore not only is objective spirit reunited with the absolute, but 
subjective spirit is as well. Individual human beings, though finite, have a role in absolute 
spirit: not insofar as they are finite, but insofar as they are spirit. Thus spirit proper (God) 
intuits itself in the (individual human) aesthete (the one who enjoys beautiful art). 
Likewise, in the religious feeling of the individual human believer, God feels and 
represents to himself his own self; and in the thought of the individual human 
philosopher, God thinks his own self, thereby completely and adequately knowing 
himself. In each of these forms (but most adequately in philosophy), spirit (by way of 
individual, human, finite, subjective spirit) knows its determination of itself in reality (as 
objective spirit) to be its own self. That is, absolute spirit is spirit’s comprehension that in 
its revelation of its own self as objective spirit, it has revealed itself to itself.  
We may note here that since absolute spirit is spirit knowing itself in its 
objectification of itself; and spirit’s objectification of itself is the state, above all as world 
history, it is clear that an individual’s obligations to his own individual nation-state are 
qualified. The perfect objectification of spirit is not this or that nation-state, but only 
world history. Seen from this perspective, the defects in one’s own nation-state may 
become apparent. Thus although morality (as it is articulated as the second form of 
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objective spirit) is inadequate to concretize spirit and must be understood as only a 
moment of Sittlichkeit (i.e. the moral will as it is conceived in objective spirit must be 
subordinated to national laws), it is possible for an individual to legitimately reject the 
customs of his time and place: viz., if this individual does so from insight gained through 
beautiful art, religion, or philosophy. 
We noted above that in distinguishing subjective, objective, and absolute spirit, 
Hegel says that subjective spirit presupposes a world before it, while objective spirit 
posits a world as its own creation, and absolute spirit is spirit’s liberation in and from the 
world. It is now clear that by knowing this objectivity (viz. the world which it posited for 
itself) to be its own self, and cancelling its alterity (spirit’s knowing of this object as its 
own self), spirit liberates itself from the world (insofar as the world then ceases to be 
something merely objective, standing against spirit); yet insofar as spirit does this through 
the feeling or thought of the individual human being, its liberation from the world takes 
place in and as the world. 
The interrelations of subjective, objective, and absolute spirit 
Now that we have given a basic outline of the philosophy of spirit, let us turn 
once again to subjective spirit in order to articulate its essence with greater precision. 
Thought, will, and free spirit are the culmination of the section on subjective spirit 
because they give the most full presentation of the concept of spirit possible in merely 
subjective spirit (i.e. spirit in abstraction from its self-objectification in reality; or, spirit 
insofar as it presupposes a world before it rather than positing a world of its own 
making). In syllogistic thought, the most developed form of thought, it is posited or 
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comprehended that the universal is not an empty concept of the understanding that 
requires singular content to be given from the outside; nor is it something merely 
immediately related to the singular in a judgment. Rather, thought is syllogism: the 
universal determines itself into particularity and exists in singulars.60 To grasp thought in 
this way is however to grasp it as self-realizing, i.e. as will.61 (Will is therefore never 
unthinking desire: it is the comprehension that spirit realizes itself, determining itself in 
reality, and that reality must therefore reflect spirit back to itself). The will however 
requires a content that is appropriate to its universality,62 i.e. to itself. The only content 
appropriate to the thinking will however is precisely the thinking will: i.e. the free will 
that wills the free will—i.e. free spirit.63  
Thought, will, and free spirit, are thus progressively more adequate forms of the 
concept of spirit (the subject turning inward on itself and determining itself), though 
without involving the actual determination (i.e. the objectification) of spirit in the world. 
One might wonder why Hegel is intent on denying that subjective spirit is merely 
subjective, i.e. why (since the human being is spirit) it does not involve the determination 
of spirit in the world. After all, does not the human individual have an empirical reality 
which expresses its inner character? Does not Hegel describe in the section on subjective 
spirit how the human individual makes real (e.g. in habits) its spiritual essence?  
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61 EPW §471. 
 
62 EPW §469. 
 
63 EPW §481. 
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Here I would like to offer an interpretation of the relation between subjective 
spirit and absolute spirit: in particular, between free spirit (will willing will) and 
philosophy (thought thinking thought). I will claim that as free spirit, the individual 
human being is an image of God, reproducing in itself (to the extent that it is possible) the 
self-realizing character of spirit. However, the difference lies in the finitude of free spirit, 
and this finitude is the reason why free spirit is only a will willing itself, and not thought 
thinking itself. I recognize that intelligence is presupposed by free spirit, but the 
intelligence of subjective spirit is, I will argue, not the same as self-thinking thought. 
It is true, then, that free spirit somehow resembles philosophy: i.e. that the 
individual human being does ‘determine itself’ in some sense. But as individual, it does 
not determine itself in the absolute way that spirit proper (i.e. the absolute) does. When 
the individual, finite spirit turns inward (i.e. when spirit in a human individual turns 
inward on itself) it discovers precisely that, though it is spirit, in its finitude and 
externality it is not identical with spirit as such. As free spirit the human individual 
knows that spirit wills itself and determines itself in a world. But the mere individual is 
not able to determine itself adequately on its own, as we see in the section on objective 
spirit. If it makes itself real as a thing (which is hence its property), its concretization of 
its personality still requires the recognition of another.64 If it makes itself real as 
(universally valid) moral action, the act still bears the mark of arbitrariness, having been 
initiated by this individual, with these needs, at this time and this place, to achieve these 
specific results. This kind of realization necessarily involves all sorts of contingencies 
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that are not only unintended by the individual, but that undermine and misrepresent 
the intention.65 The realization that is appropriate to spirit, in which spirit is able to 
recognize its own self, can thus only be a supra-individual realization (i.e. it must 
transcend its immediate existence as a human individual): the object here is Sittlichkeit, 
the institutions that are the product of an entire culture, or the world history that is the 
product of all nations of the world. That is, the object here does not need to be brought 
into existence by a zealous moral subject, but rather comes to be in its own right, as the 
absolute’s determination of its own self. 
Thus when spirit proper determines itself, it determines itself as objective spirit 
(ultimately, the state): and this is the determination of the absolute’s own self in the world 
(its positing of a world as its own creation), in which it subsequently knows itself and 
becomes absolute spirit. The human individual on the other hand is not the absolute itself. 
The human individual is merely the immediate existence of spirit, and hence (considering 
it in abstraction from the state), the individual “is spirit” always only as a judgment. The 
particular term that is lacking in this judgment is the state, the full flowering of objective 
spirit (i.e. of spirit itself in objectivity). It is the state that is the determinate reality of the 
absolute itself (i.e. God himself). Thus the (singular) individual ‘is’ spirit (i.e. the idea 
knowing itself in externality) insofar as it plays a part in the (universal) absolute’s 
presentation of itself to itself in the objective particular, world history. In contrast, the 
habits of an individual cannot mediate between the singular existence of spirit (the 
individual human being) and the absolute. Habits only mediate between a singular feeling 
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and the whole character of the individual human being66—and even this represents a 
very primitive stage of spiritual development. The human individual is (at best, as free 
spirit) only the implicit (an sich) idea, the (abstract) concept of absolute spirit.67 In other 
words, the individual human being is an image of God. The most a human being can hope 
to attain (considering him solely as an individual, apart from his social role in the state, or 
his cognitive participation in absolute spirit) is to exist as free spirit: a fully developed 
thinking will which determines itself in the proper syllogistic manner. That is, the most 
an individual as such can hope to attain is to be a very accurate image of God—but still 
only an image. 
To say that the individual human being is an image of God is to express 
metaphorically the speculative truth that subjective spirit bears within it the concept and 
its determinations (as Hegel says in §385). All of the determinations of the concept of 
spirit are present within free spirit—and moreover they are for free spirit, i.e. subjective 
spirit at this stage knows these determinations (even if this knowledge is only the person’s 
immediate certainty that he is free). What this means is that the individual human being 
can imitate God by concretizing the very structure of spirit (viz. the self turning inward 
and realizing itself) in its own, limited sphere: viz., syllogistic, self-realizing thought, and 
in the will which wills itself as free spirit.  
Moreover, the individual human being, like God, can come to know itself as 
spirit. Of course, this is true only if “know” is used analogically: the human individual (as 
subjective spirit) does not “know” itself as spirit in the same way that God does. God 
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knows itself by recognizing itself in the state, its objectification, in the medium of the 
intuition, feeling, or thought of the individual human being (i.e. in absolute spirit). The 
individual human being (considering it only as subjective spirit, and not in its role in 
absolute spirit) knows itself as spirit in a more abstract and finite way as free spirit. Free 
spirit has for one of its moments syllogistic thought: thus it knows that it is self-
determining, and therefore that the world ought to agree with it. In other words, free spirit 
is will. But merely being a will does not make it free spirit: as the finite, immediate 
existence of spirit, this will is susceptible to all sorts of singular contents which, in their 
bare singularity are contingent and inadequate to the will as such. The proper object for 
the will is a particular arrangement of these singular impulses that allows for a happy life. 
In willing this happy life as its own objectification, the will wills itself, and is free.  
To draw a distinction between the free will willing itself and thought (as absolute 
spirit) thinking itself is not to deny that the will in free spirit is intellectual: as we have 
seen, the will is not blind, brutal appetite, but rather subjective spirit’s understanding of 
itself as self-determining, and subjective spirit’s consequent insistence that reality reflect 
its own self back to it. As free spirit, the will has an object that is appropriate to its own 
universality: it wills its own immanent particularity, viz. happiness. Yet insofar as spirit is 
merely subjective, then it does not have its own self before it objectified. It is only 
absolute spirit that has its own self as its object (in world history), and is able to think its 
object (which is itself thought existing as an object), and thus to be thought thinking 
thought. Free spirit has as its object only an end, something which ought to be (viz. its 
own happiness).  
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Yet absolute spirit is not a will to bring into existence something that presently 
only ought to be: it is the complete satisfaction in what actually is. Thus God is not 
embedded in time, as free spirit is: rather, God has time (as world history) as its object. 
While free spirit wills itself in its object (happiness) which it intends to bring about, God 
does not will God’s self in God’s object (world history): rather, God thinks God’s self. 
God contemplatively grasps world history as the objectification of God’s own self (i.e. as 
thought, self-determining intelligence, in objective form). The essence of God as thought 
thinking thought is possible because God is outside of history, and views it not as an 
ongoing process but as a completed reality. Individual human beings like ourselves on the 
other hand are not outside of history: the objectification of spirit is for us an ongoing 
process in which we are engaged consciously or unconsciously, willingly or unwillingly. 
Thus as subjective spirit, the most we are capable of is free spirit, the will willing will 
(the will striving to objectify itself); we are not capable (insofar as we are subjective 
spirit) of thinking thought. Of course, we individual human beings (and above all we 
philosophers) are somehow involved also in absolute spirit: it is in our feelings, 
representations and especially our thoughts, that God knows God’s self. It is because we 
have this role in absolute spirit that we can legitimately call into question the mores of 
our time and place (i.e. the particular nation-state we happen to live in)—but this capacity 
should not, I would argue, be identified with thought as it is understood in the psychology 
section of subjective spirit, or the will and free spirit which proceed from this thought. 
The status of the individual philosopher as a concretion or moment of absolute spirit is a 
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terribly difficult problem. Fortunately for us, it is also a problem that we need not 
discuss further, insofar as it is only tangential to our topic.68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 We will limit ourselves to remarking that Hegel’s approach resembles Kant’s to a certain extent. For 
Kant, each person has made a choice (which takes place outside of time) to constitute his disposition 
(Hang) as either one of morality, oriented toward the moral law, or one of self-love, oriented toward 
gratification of one’s own inclinations. It is impossible for us to tell which we have chosen: a person’s 
disposition, even his own, is inscrutable to him; and one’s deeds are ambiguous insofar as an apparently 
good deed could be the result of a genuinely moral disposition, or an evil disposition coupled with prudent 
calculation (Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloβen Vernunft, pp.44-45). Only God can see the 
disposition of a person, and he does this by seeing the whole history of the person’s life in a single instant 
Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloβen Vernunft p.48). Likewise, for Hegel, the individual 
subjective spirit remains embedded in history, and can only will the objectification of spirit; it is the 
prerogative of God alone to see the whole of history as a realized end, and to think this objective thought. 
Yet it would seem that for Hegel the individual can, through philosophy or religion, transcend what would 
otherwise seem to be the inexorable human condition, i.e. the individual can think (or feel) thought, thus 
becoming a concretion of absolute spirit.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
THE NATURAL SOUL 
Introduction 
In this chapter we turn to the anthropology itself. The anthropology is divided into 
three sections (on the natural soul, the feeling soul, and the actual soul). These sections 
will be the objects of chapters four and five. Thus in this chapter we will confine 
ourselves to the first section of the anthropology, the natural soul. 
To understand any part of the Encyclopedia it is necessary to understand and refer 
to all of the other parts. It is for this reason that we took such great care in chapter two to 
trace Hegel’s argument in the paragraphs devoted to outlining the “concept of spirit,” and 
in providing a general overview of the course of the philosophy of objective spirit and the 
philosophy of absolute spirit in chapter three. Yet the necessity to understand the 
connections to other parts of the Encyclopedia seems to be especially pronounced 
regarding the twelve paragraphs on the natural soul.  
In the section on the natural soul we will be concerned with various phenomena in 
which spirit knows itself in and as nature, such that here spirit fails to distinguish itself 
from nature at all. These phenomena of the ‘natural soul’ include: racial distinction, 
which for Hegel is rooted in the division of the world into continents and the 
geographical features of these continents (both of which are covered in the philosophy of 
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nature1); nationality, which for Hegel is likewise rooted in geography (covered in the 
philosophy of nature), though nationality also receives its proper treatment in the 
paragraphs on “ethical life” in the philosophy of objective spirit (especially the 
introductory paragraphs2); the relation between the sexes, which as Hegel notes,3 only 
receives its proper spiritual significance in the parts of objective spirit devoted to the 
family,4 but which refers also to the sex relation in the philosophy of nature5; “character” 
as a natural quality of the individual soul,6 and as playing a role in sensation,7 which, as 
Hegel notes,8 presupposes free spirit9; the human senses, which are related both to the 
senses of the animal organism,10 and to the natural phenomena which are sensed, all of 
                                                 
1 EPW §§339-340. 
 
2 EPW §§513-516, GPR §§142-157. 
 
3 EPW §397. 
 
4 EPW §§518-522, GPR §§158-181. 
 
5 EPW §369. 
 
6 EPW §395&Z p74. 
 
7 EPW §399Z pp.111-112, and §402Z p.120. 
 
8 EPW §395Z p.74. 
 
9 EPW §§481-482. 
 
10 EPW §§357-358. 
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which are previously deduced in the philosophy of nature (e.g. light,11 sound,12 heat,13 
shape,14 weight,15 particularized airiness and particularized water16). 
It is therefore clear that the phenomena under discussion in the “natural soul” 
section have extensive connections to other parts of the Encyclopedia. However, if a 
study of Hegel is ever to be completed and not merely a perpetually unfinished project, it 
must be limited, and therefore in some sense one-sided and inadequately explained. 
Indeed, Hegel was fond of quoting Goethe’s dictum that he who would be something 
great must limit himself17—a sentiment which we could take as our motto for this 
chapter.  We can rest assured then that as we explain the natural soul in a mere chapter 
(restraining ourselves from getting lost in innumerable other sections for the purposes of 
this explanation), we have Hegel’s blessing. We will therefore severely limit ourselves in 
referring to other parts of Hegel’s work, though without abstaining completely. 
The natural soul 
The natural soul is the soul in its immediate existence in nature.18 Much of the 
content of the section on the natural soul is a retrieval of material from the philosophy of 
                                                 
11 EPW §§317-320. 
 
12 EPW §§300-302. 
 
13 EPW §§303-307. 
 
14 EPW §§310-315. 
 
15 EPW §293. 
 
16 These are smelled and tasted respectively (EPW §321). 
 
17 EPW §80Z p.170, §401Z p.116, §448Z p.251, & GPR §13Z. 
 
18 EPW §390. 
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nature, reinterpreted here to show its spiritual significance.19 Hegel’s 
“reinterpretation” is meant to show how the idea must be understood insofar as it is not 
merely external to itself (i.e. not merely nature) but rather knows itself20 and hence is 
spirit also—though to say that the idea is nature and “also” spirit gives the false 
impression that spirit and nature are two internally unrelated attributes of the idea, 
whereas in truth spirit contains nature within it as its presupposition, of which it is the 
truth.21 The individual human being is the immediate existence of spirit: that is, it is in the 
human being that nature (viz. a living, organic being) comes to know itself22 as the 
idea—thus rendering itself spirit rather than mere nature. As merely immediately 
existing, spirit at this stage knows itself as the idea and knows all of nature as the idea 
(i.e. as itself): thus it identifies immediately with nature, and does not know itself at first 
as anything distinct from nature. 
                                                 
19 Hans-Christian Lucas remarks that if the term “life” was not already taken, referring to a stage in the 
philosophy of nature, it would be appropriate to refer to the natural soul as the sphere of “human life” („Die 
‚souveräne Undankbarkeit’ des Geistes gegenüber der Natur“ p.278). 
 
20 When we say that both spirit and nature are the idea but nature is the idea in its externality to itself while 
spirit is the idea which knows itself in its externality to itself, we mean that both nature and spirit express 
the idea in its totality. Nature expresses the idea in the form of corporeal extension (and hence the 
externality of parts to parts). However, what in nature appear as objects external to each other are in spirit 
reduced to mere moments of the idea’s self-knowledge, in which the idea returns to itself. This will be 
illustrated and made clear in different forms throughout the various phenomena that for Hegel belong to the 
natural soul. 
 
21 EPW §381. 
 
22 The way an individual human being (i.e. finite spirit) ‘knows itself’ as the idea (and hence is spirit) is not 
the same as the way spirit proper (infinite or absolute spirit) knows itself, though nor are they unrelated. 
For an investigation into the relation between these two forms of self-knowledge, see chapter three, 
especially the last section. In the opening section of this chapter we will speak of spirit ‘knowing itself’ 
without going into the precise relationship between spirit proper (absolute spirit) and finite spirit’s self-
knowledge: this is partly because a fuller account of this relation was given in chapter three, and partly 
because the nuances in this relationship which are most relevant for us here in the natural soul section will 
be presented below, as we go through the sections in detail.  
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The individual human being of course takes up space, and excludes other 
extended objects from the space it occupies (i.e. the human being has mechanical 
determinations); and the human being is materially composed of certain elements which 
exist in polar relations with other elements (i.e. the human being has chemical 
determinations); and the human being is a combination of interrelated vital processes 
which take in and dispose of inorganic nature, as well as an individual of a species and a 
genus in pursuit of the prerogatives of which he expends his energy and his life (i.e. the 
human being has organic determinations). In all of these ways the human being is a part 
of nature, and resembles other mechanical, chemical, and organic objects. But 
humanity—even the immediately existing, individual human being—is ‘also’ spirit: this 
means that the human being is capable of determinations of which nothing merely natural 
is capable (e.g. thought, patriotism, philosophy); but also (and more importantly for us 
here), this means that “natural” determinations (such as space, time, sound, light, shape, 
heat, geography) are, for the human being, phenomena of spirit (i.e. in the soul’s 
knowledge of these natural phenomena the idea knows itself). Most properly of course, 
the idea as spirit knows itself in its own objectification of itself in world history (i.e. 
objective spirit in its most developed form).23  Our object in this dissertation is not quite 
as grand and exalted, but perhaps not less interesting, and still worthy of study: it is the 
way spirit knows itself in and as nature. 
 
 
                                                 
23 EPW §§548-552. 
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Natural qualities 
Natural qualities 
“Natural Qualities” is the first of three parts of the section on the natural soul. Its 
name prompts us to recall Encyclopedia §§86-98 in the first part of the science of logic’s 
doctrine of being: “Quality.” We must not dwell too much on the logic, but we can note 
that the section on quality begins with the most immediate determination, “pure being,”24 
and terminates with being-for-itself,25 i.e. that which has being in its own right, insofar as 
it is explicitly mediated through its other, having reduced that other to a mere moment of 
its being for itself. Likewise, the whole of the section on the natural soul (and not only 
the subsection entitled “natural qualities”) begins with spirit in its immediacy as existing 
nature, and terminates in sensation (and its transition into the “feeling soul”), wherein the 
soul knows its sensory content as its own self, and thus returns to itself from this other, 
and is for-itself.  
Within the section on natural qualities itself, we have only the presentation of the 
terms of the syllogism as they are determined as the immediate existence of spirit in 
nature. The universal is given in §392 as the “universal planetary life”; the particular is 
given in §393 as the “particular natural spirits [or, spirits of nature, Naturgeister],” viz. 
races, and in §394 as the further particularized “local spirits” or “nations [Völker]”; the 
singular is given in §395 as the “individual subject.” Let us go through these moments 
one by one.  
 
                                                 
24 EPW §86. 
 
25 EPW §§96-98. 
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The universal soul 
In examining the universal, we should not restrict ourselves to §392, but look also 
to §391 (though this technically precedes the “natural qualities” section), where Hegel 
says that the “universal soul [allgemeine Seele],” as “world soul [Weltseele]” should not 
be understood as subject; rather, it is a universal substance (allgemeine Substanz), which 
has actual truth only in the singular souls which are its accidents. This “substance,” Hegel 
continues in §392, is the universal planetary life. If we look back to the “geological 
nature” section of the philosophy of nature, we will see that the earth is a totality which is 
implicitly alive26: that is, everything necessary for life is contained in the earth (which 
connotes not just the land and the water, but also the atmosphere and meteorological 
processes), but only as separate forces. For us the earth is a totality therefore, but not for 
itself: this is the same as saying that the soul of the world (Weltseele) is not a subject.27 
The world has no center28 where it is for itself and knows its separate forces only as 
moments of its one global life. Instead, as we learn in the anthropology, the world soul is 
                                                 
26 EPW §338. 
 
27 Jan van der Meulen likens the universal soul to Carl Jung’s concept of the “collective 
unconscious”(“Hegels Lehre von Leib, Seele, und Geist,” p.254), which is a sort of intersubjective, perhaps 
transcendental structure determining all psychic life (Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious 
pp.42-53).  Meulen also credits Hegel with anticipating in his section on the feeling soul (which we will 
examine in chapter five) with some of the insights later to be expressed by “depth psychology 
[Tiefenpsychologie]” (“Hegels Lehre von Leib, Seele, und Geist” pp.260-261), the exploration of the 
relationship between the conscious and unconscious mind in both Freudian psychoanalysis and Jungian 
psychology. 
 
28 Obviously the earth has a spatial point that is roughly equidistant from the various points on its surface, 
but we do not mean “center” here in this spatial sense. Rather, we mean “center” as the spiritual interiority 
in virtue of which a subject is a subject and is for-itself. 
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only a substance, having its actual truth only in individual souls (i.e. human beings, 
for whom alone the earth is a totality).29 
To be sure, a scientist can know the earth as a totality insofar as he has studied the 
various forces of nature and knows their relationships, but this is not what Hegel is 
talking about when he says that it is in the individual soul that the universal (world) soul 
has its actual truth. As a mere soul, a human being is unable to undertake scientific 
research, because the soul is such a primitive stage of spirit that it does not even know 
natural objects in distinction from itself. Instead, the universal soul has its actual truth in 
individual souls insofar as the latter are unconsciously affected by geological phenomena 
such as the changing of the seasons, times of day, etc.30  
For example, many studies have been done to show that exposure to sunlight has 
consistently beneficial effects on people’s moods. Thus in the winter, when there is less 
sunlight, some people, who were happy in the summer, become depressed; indeed, rates 
of depression are consistently higher in places with less sunshine (which are comparable 
in other relevant respects). Accordingly, in Japan, a country whose overpopulation would 
require many to live crowded into buildings with no windows, or whose windows would 
be blocked by other tall buildings immediately beside them, there is a “sunshine law” 
which mandates that all children under a certain age live in conditions which allow 
                                                 
29 Michael Wolff shows in his book (Das Körper-Seele Problem) that Hegel conceived of the soul as the 
unity of thought and being in much the same way that Spinoza considered the substance to be such a unity 
(see pp.83-94, also pp125-133). And of course, part of being a mere substance for Hegel, is not being a 
subject, and this too holds of his account of the soul. 
 
30 EPW §392. See also VPG pp.35-36. 
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exposure to a minimum amount of sunlight—so important is this exposure to the sun 
thought to be for general human development. 
Now, the relationship between unconscious moods of human individuals and the 
earth (with its various geographical, climactic, and meteorological determinations) is 
such that the latter has its ‘actual truth’ only in the former because what for the earth is 
only the succession of seasons (i.e. merely a train of states which are never brought back 
to unity and thus never reduced to mere moments of a totality which is for itself) is (or 
can be) for the individual human soul only a moment of its return to itself (as either 
joyous or melancholy for example).  The individual human being does not need to 
understand the causal effect that the change of seasons has on his mood (indeed, if he did 
understand this, he would have all but freed himself from this influence), he needs only to 
feel himself in these geographical phenomena, thus reducing them—even if he does not 
know this as we do—to a moment of himself (while for the earth these phenomena 
remain outside of each other). 
However, it is important to note that Hegel is not giving a materialist account, in 
which nature determines human moods, as one mechanical object determines the 
movement or rest of another. The “natural soul” section invites this kind of 
misunderstanding throughout, insofar as one might assume the soul to be ‘natural’ in 
precisely this mechanical sense. However, I will try throughout this chapter to remove 
this misunderstanding every time it may arise. Though the anthropology concerns 
immediately existing, corporeal spirit, its object is still spirit, whose concept, given in 
Encyclopedia §§381-384 (which we examined in chapter two), stipulates that nature is 
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only its presupposition, that which it sets before itself as the material in which it will 
realize itself, such that it is spirit which is the truth of nature (and not vice versa). 
In reading Hegel’s discussion of the “universal soul” we should not therefore 
think of the earth exerting itself as an efficient cause on the human being (taken as 
something merely corporeal) such that a ‘mood’ is produced in the latter as an image of 
the terrestrial cause. Rather, the point of this paragraph is that as soul, spirit cancels the 
independence of nature (these geographical phenomena) and reduces them to a moment 
of its being-for-itself: the soul is “natural” only because it does not know that it is 
different from those natural phenomena (which are rather more like images of spirit). 
However, we know that the soul is different from these geographical phenomena, and if 
we fail to acknowledge this difference, then we misunderstand the soul. The soul is 
“universal” in the sense that, though it is always actually only this or that individual soul, 
it knows itself only in nature generally, and not as an individual (though again, we know 
and must acknowledge its actuality only in individuals). 
It is also important to make the point that while the human being can be 
unconsciously affected in this way by geographical phenomena, he need not be. Indeed, it 
is more proper to animals and plants to be determined in this way.31 Human beings on the 
other hand are capable of much more sophisticated development (and it belongs to their 
essence in fact to attain a much higher development), such that this unconscious 
attunement to nature is to be understood (like other anthropological phenomena we will 
examine in chapter five) as a disease to which the human being is susceptible, but to 
which, insofar as it is spirit, it will not succumb. 
                                                 
31 EPW §392A. See also VPG p.38. 
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The soul’s particularity 
It being established that on the level of the soul the individual human being can 
sink into a state of attunement with geographical and climactic phenomena, the question 
becomes what the structure of the world is, i.e. how precisely (or, how in particular) 
these phenomena are expressed in nature. In §393 Hegel asserts that “the universal 
planetary life [..] particularizes itself [besondert sich] in the concrete differences of the 
earth, and breaks apart into particular natural spirits [besonderen Naturgeister], which on 
the whole express the nature [Natur] of the geographical continents [geographischen 
Weltteile] and make up racial distinction [Rassenverschiedenheit].” 
These ‘parts of the world’ (Weltteile) are the continents Hegel deduced in §339. 
There Hegel distinguishes the “new world” (North and South America) from the “old 
world,” which is itself divided into its three continents (Africa, Asia, and Europe), each 
with their physical, organic and anthropological character (physikalischen, organischen 
und anthropologischen Charakter). In the Zusatz to §393 Hegel explains what he 
considers to be the relevant geographical features of these continents: Africa is 
surrounded by mountains (which Hegel assumed to mean that the population was kept 
from the coasts); Asia presents a contrast of inlands and great rivers (without the two 
terms reaching a unity); and Europe contains the diversity that Africa excludes and the 
unity Asia fails to achieve.32 The ‘anthropological character’ of the ‘races’ belonging to 
these continents ‘expresses’ the geography of each of these continents. 
                                                 
32 EPW §393Z p.58. In his VPG Hegel also discusses racial distinction but he only mentions that it has its 
roots in geography (p.39) without going into the details of the geography of the various continents. 
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These are for us today incendiary remarks. That they come from such a sober-
minded thinker should give us pause, and prompt us to ask ourselves whether we are 
really understanding Hegel correctly by attributing to him the meaning which lies on the 
surface of §393 and its Zusatz (viz. that there is a racial hierarchy into which the human 
species is naturally divided, in accordance with the immutable and undeniable division of 
the continents and their various characters). It is unfortunate that most commentators who 
broach this part of Hegel either delight in digging up racist remarks attributed to Hegel in 
his lectures with a glee that is unbecoming for a scholar, or hurriedly and with obvious 
embarrassment pass it over, dismissing it as a sign that Hegel too was a child of his 
time.33  
First, let us note that Hegel did not believe that some races or one race should 
have rights, while the rest should not.34 Moreover, Hegel unequivocally condemns 
slavery,35 and he held that Christianity was the most true religion partly because in 
Christianity it is posited not simply that one is free, or that some are free, but that all 
                                                 
33 For examples of the first approach, see Robert Bernasconi, “Religious Philosophy: Hegel’s Occasional 
Perplexity in the face of the Distinction between Philosophy and Religion,” “With What Must the History 
of Philosophy Begin? Hegel’s Role in the Debate on the Place of India Within the History of Philosophy,” 
“With What Must the Philosophy of World History Begin? On the Racial Basis of Hegel’s Eurocentrism”; 
Lewis Gordon, Her Majesty’s Other Children; Michael Hoffheimer “Hegel, Race, Genocide.” “Race and 
Law in Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion”; and Sûrya Parekh “Hegel’s New World: History, Freedom and 
Race.” For an example of the second see Hans-Christian Lucas, ““Die ‚souveräne Undankbarkeit’ des 
Geistes gegenüber der Natur“ pp.280-281. One exception to these two inadequate approaches is offered by 
Andrew Buchwalter (“Is Hegel’s Philosophy of History Eurocentric?”), who argues that Hegel is not 
Eurocentric or racist insofar as he opposes any contention that a single culture is intrinsically better than 
others (Bildung being constituted by self-examination and self-criticism). 
 
34 EPW §393Z p.57. 
 
35 GPR §57A. 
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human beings are in themselves free.36 Additionally, we should note that the 
continents (in their anthropological character) do not divide up along what seem prima 
facie to be the lines established by nature, and the way most people think of the 
continents today: thus in the Zusatz to §393 Hegel identifies both the inhabitants of North 
Africa and those of “Western Asia” (i.e. the Middle East) as Europeans.37 Similarly, in 
his lectures on the philosophy of history, he includes Muslims in the “Germanic world.”38 
This would seem to indicate that Arabs (and perhaps also Kurds and Turks) are European 
according to Hegel’s criteria. This, coupled with the fact that Hegel never in the 
anthropology or the philosophy of history sees fit to mention vast swathes of ‘Europe’ 
(such as Scandinavia, and only very rarely in the philosophy of history does he mention 
any of Eastern Europe), should show that by “race” Hegel did not mean what most people 
meant in the 20th century (viz. certain physiological characteristics such as skin color 
which are biologically inherited from one’s parents). Indeed, Hegel’s insistence that 
“descent [Abstammung] [...] gives no reason for granting or denying to people freedom, 
and dominating people like animals”39 shows that for him race is not a determination 
belonging to a person in virtue of biology, i.e. of physical, anatomical characteristics. 
Were race to be a biological determination, then it would belong in the philosophy of 
                                                 
36 VPGes pp.31, 134. 
 
37 VPG pp.39-40. See also EPW §393Z p.58. In his article “Race and Law in Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Religion” Michael Hoffheimer is incorrect in arguing not only that Hegel should be considered a racist, but 
also in his misrepresentation of the place of North Africans (p.197). 
 
38 VPGes pp.428-434. 
 
39 EPW §393Z p.57. 
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nature’s section on organics, not in the anthropology.40 We would thus do well to 
forget the 20th century notion of “race” when reading Hegel. That Hegel should never 
mention Scandinavia at all in the anthropology or in the lectures on the philosophy of 
history is even more striking when we consider that during the time he was composing 
the former and delivering the latter there were many in Germany (e.g. Fichte)41 who were 
singing the praises of the Nordic/Scandinavian ‘race.’ Hegel however had nothing but 
disdain for the ancestral culture of those who would in the 20th century be considered by 
the Nazis and their fellow-travelers as the most racially pure Europeans of all.42 
These caveats having been granted, Hegel’s theory of race can be summed up as 
follows. The world is geographically and climactically various; spirit is in its immediacy 
for-itself undifferentiated from this diverse natural world; thus spirit on the primitive 
level of the soul expresses the diversity that inevitably belongs to nature. This much, I 
think, can be accepted. In any case, to dispute it is to dispute not only a few superficial 
aspects of Hegel’s system, but his very concepts of nature, spirit, and the soul—and the 
concept itself in its moments (universality, particularity, and singularity). However, we 
can (and should) oppose Hegel in many of the judgments he made in identifying a certain 
phenomenon (or his misapprehension of a phenomenon) with one of his categories.  
                                                 
40 We would dispute therefore the contention of Errol Harris that for Hegel the “racial” is equivalent to the 
“biological” (“Hegel’s Theory of Feeling” p.81). 
 
41 See for example his Reden an die deutsche Nation. 
 
42 See for example his dismissal of Scandinavian (and indeed, German) mythology (EPW §80Z p.171, also 
in his Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik III p.347). 
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I leave it to others more conversant on the topic to say whether his defense of 
Goethe’s theory of color was well-advised,43 but it is clear even to me that his evaluations 
of certain religions in his lectures on the philosophy of religion amount to a shocking 
travesty. Certainly, someone who cannot read Sanskrit cannot in any meaningful sense 
appraise Hinduism.44 We can hold fast to the basic principles of Hegel’s speculative 
philosophy while making allowances for the fact (for which Hegel was not at fault) that 
his information on many subjects was limited and one-sided, and that this poor 
information led him to make errors in judgment (which need not tarnish the fundamental 
legitimacy of his philosophy). In this way, I would dispute that all of sub-Saharan Africa 
can be impugned as Hegel has done (describing Africans as being like children, happily 
accepting their slavery because they do not even know that as human they are implicitly 
rational and free), and likewise the Americas and East Asia. Hegel himself revised his 
own work in subsequent editions of the Encyclopedia and therefore we should feel free to 
depart from the words of Hegel if we do so in pursuit of his spirit, and still call ourselves 
Hegelians. 
In the name of posterity, we can therefore pardon Hegel these errors in judgment 
in light of the dearth of information he had on these places. Had he known that the 
Ethiopians have never once submitted to colonization in their entire history, or that the 
Zulus would in 1879, armed only with spears, obliterate an English army replete with 
                                                 
43 EPW §320&A. 
 
44 Moreover, the very pronounced and extensive parallels between Hinduism and Greek religion that were 
beginning to be discovered even in Hegel’s time make perplexing why he would esteem the Greek 
“religion of beauty” so highly, but Hinduism so lowly. Hegel even notes in his lectures on the philosophy 
of history (VPGes pp.177-178, cf. pp.199-200) that Sanskrit is the basis for European languages (he was 
aware also of the Indo-European status of the Persians (VPGes p.215)). This makes his disdain for India 
(and Persia) more striking and less forgivable. 
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rifles and cannons, or that the stories of West Africans passively accepting their 
enslavement were lies concocted to silence abolitionists (and that in truth African slaves 
in America resisted their captors in a thousand ways, large and small), he would never 
have based his understanding of Africans on what we know to be obvious falsehoods.45 
We could mount similar protests against what he says about the Native Americans and 
East Asians.  
However, the evidence I have just given perhaps only amounts to contingent 
historical facts: alone, they would not justify us in calling speculative principles into 
doubt.  It is therefore more important than raising these historical facts that we dispute the 
contention that each continent must be determined by one and only one moment of the 
concept. The necessity of assigning the concept’s moments in this way is never defended 
or justified. We can thus dispute that all of Africa is dominated by a single moment 
(interiority in abstraction from all difference) while still accepting that on the level of the 
soul, spirit is the expression of nature in its diverse variety. It could be that this 
expression is more complicated than the assignment of one moment to a single continent. 
Instead, all continents might exhibit all moments in different parts, and to varying 
degrees.  
For an example of how this might appear, we need look no further than the United 
States. The United States exhibits immense geographical and climactic variety, and can 
be basically divided into a few regions: New England, the South, the Midwest, the 
Southwest, and the West Coast. Not only is the country divided along these lines in terms 
of its natural geography, but its subcultures are also largely divided along these lines. For 
                                                 
45 VPG p.43. See also EPW §393Z pp.59-60. 
  
190
an expression of these cultures, we can turn to American art. The two greatest 
American novelists of the 20th century were William Faulkner (from Mississippi) and 
Ernest Hemingway (from Illinois). Each of these two artists expresses, consciously or 
unconsciously, his own distinctive regional culture (Faulkner the South, Hemingway the 
Midwest).  
Faulkner’s prose is long and languid, flowery on the surface, but shot through 
with an intense, even violent pathos at its core: it resembles the irrepressible vegetation 
that covers every inch of a southern home with its long, winding and intertwining vines 
of honeysuckle, which flourishes in spite of or because of the oppressive heat and 
humidity. The people in the American South likewise combine the most gracious 
formality and politeness with the most sudden, turbulent, and emotional upheaval, in both 
politics and religion. Hemingway’s prose in contrast is short, simple, bare, and yet 
imposing nonetheless, precisely because of its raw state: it resembles the Midwest, where 
the land is flat and covered in identical rows of corn, a land whose people are known for 
their authenticity and unadorned simplicity.46 Our remarks on race can be applied to 
nationality as well, since the latter is but a further particularization of the universal soul 
according to the same principle.47 
                                                 
46 It is said that a friend of Hemingway’s once made a wager with him, betting that Hemingway could not 
write a complete story in six words or less. Hemingway responded: “For sale: baby shoes. Never used.” His 
friend duly paid up. 
 
47 EPW §394. See also VPG pp.45-48. It is also worth mentioning that the “bioregionalist” movement in 
environmental ethics has in recent years championed precisely this kind of identification with one’s natural 
region as the proper way of living: “Even though our existence is dominated by sociopolitical 
demarcations, residents often describe their regions in natural terms. Midwesterners may feel a kinship to 
states in the short- or long-grass prairie agricultural heartland region, while Southwesterners may relate to 
the aridity of sagebrush, creosote bush, Joshua tree, or piñon-pine country. Appalachian-mountain dwellers 
may relate to similar mixed hardwood/softwood forest terrain, whether in Georgia, the Carolinas, Virginia, 
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The individual soul 
In §395 Hegel considers the final moment of this syllogism: the individual soul. 
§395 is hardly an exhaustive account of the individual soul (rather, §§395-412 will be 
this account): §395 concerns the “individual soul” only as the union of the moments 
given in the universal and particular soul, viz. attunement to nature generally, and variety 
according to the variety in nature. The main text of §395 says very little: the fuller 
explanation (which interests us) belongs to the Zusatz. The Vorlesungen from 1827/28 
transcribed by Erdmann and Walter and edited by Hespe and Tuschling have very little 
on the material from §395, but they lend credibility to Boumann’s Zusatz to §395 insofar 
as the Erdmann’s and Walter’s notes do not depart at all from it.48 See chapter one for a 
statement on the use of lecture material. 
As in §§392-394, in §395 natural determinations are here taken up immediately 
and endowed with spiritual significance. However, the natural determinations are not of 
geography or climate, but rather inborn talents and idiosyncrasies in an individual or 
family, the susceptibility to this or that temperament, and the tendency to develop 
character, which is likewise inborn. Of course, that these traits are “natural” can mean 
only that they are given rather than chosen and deliberately cultivated; it cannot mean 
that these can be reduced to merely mechanical, chemical, or organic determinations.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Tennessee, or Pennsylvania. North Americans have always related to natural dimensions of their home 
territories”(Thayer, LifePlace  p.19). 
 
48 Comprising less than two pages, Erdmann’s and Walter’s notes on the individuality of the soul concern 
the differences that Kant established between the temperaments (viz. that generally a person is not wholly 
dominated by any one temperament) (VPG p.48), and the fact that certain areas permit of talents (e.g. art 
and mathematics) and others (the essentially human activities, religion, reason, etc.) do not (VPG p.49). 
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Talent, temperament and character constitute a triad of phenomena which 
exhibit immediacy, mediation, and mediated immediacy respectively. A talent is an 
immediate determination of an individual insofar as it simply is: the individual simply 
finds himself with this or that talent, without mediation of education or training. The 
individual can have many talents, but each is external to the others, having nothing to do 
with it.49  
A temperament on the other hand is a mediated determinacy for the individual, 
insofar as (if we accept the traditional set of temperaments as Hegel does, viz. sanguine, 
phlegmatic, choleric, melancholic) the temperaments are each intrinsically related to the 
others, i.e. each is mediated through the others: what it is to have a certain temperament 
is only to have the contrary disposition of another temperament (as e.g. the sanguine is 
the most extreme opposite of the melancholic).50 That the temperaments are related to 
each other in this way and that the individual passes from one temperament to another 
(temperaments lacking the fixity of talents), indicate that the individual is able to 
establish some distance from any given temperament, insofar as he has been determined 
in the opposite way as well. Admittedly, the individual may also have various talents 
which differ from each other, but each talent is only occupied with a particular object 
outside of the individual, and not so much with the individual himself; and this particular 
object need bear no necessary relation to the object of another talent. In temperaments on 
the contrary (especially with the choleric and melancholic), the individual is occupied 
                                                 
49 EPW §395Z pp.71-72. 
 
50 VPG pp.48-49. See also EPW §395Z pp.72-73. 
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with himself, and thus in passing to a different temperament he knows that he himself 
is determined in a different way. 
Character unites the fixity of talent with the inward reflection of temperament51 
insofar as character is inwardly reflected (related to its opposite like temperament, and 
also cultivated) yet, if not impossible to change, at least resistant to change (i.e. ‘fixed’ 
like talent). Of course, as Hegel notes,52 character presupposes what will only be deduced 
in free spirit (viz. one’s willed creation of a conception of happiness for oneself, in 
accordance with which some impulses can be consistently pursued and others 
consistently rejected, i.e. one’s creation of a pattern of desires and actions that are 
characteristic of oneself). Here then, what we are concerned with is only the “natural 
foundation [natürliche Grundlage]”53 of character, i.e. that natural (unchosen, uncreated) 
determination in virtue of which some are more disposed to develop strong characters 
than others.  
This “natural foundation” of character (with which alone we are concerned in 
§395) seems however to be only an inborn talent that one may have for developing a 
strong character. Yet this natural disposition to character development is still the unity of 
talent and temperament at least implicitly, insofar as it amounts to being ‘naturally’ 
determined to supersede mere natural determination by the development of character, in 
which one wrests oneself from being the mere plaything of whatever impulses nature 
                                                 
51 EPW §395Z p.74. 
 
52 EPW §395Z p.74. 
 
53 EPW §395Z p.74. 
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chances to send one’s way, thereby subordinating what is naturally given to what is 
the product of the will. 
The moments of the individual soul (talent, temperament, and character) can be 
summarily presented as: (1) the immediate determination of the soul in a certain way that 
is given by nature (viz. in a certain talent); (2) the determination of the soul in a way (viz. 
a certain temperament) that is mediated by other determinations (i.e. other temperaments) 
possible for the soul, into which the soul can pass; (3) the soul’s determination of itself 
(in a certain character), i.e. the soul’s immediate existence in a determinate way that is 
mediated by a process whereby the soul gives itself this immediate existence.  
If we reflect on the moments of the individual soul in this way, we will see that 
these moments bear remarkable structural similarity to Hegel’s characterization of the 
“races” (i.e. the particularity of the soul): (1) Africans are described as immersed in their 
own natural simplicity to the exclusion of difference (similar to the soul as “talent”); (2) 
Asians are described as unproductively oscillating between inert indifference and sudden 
activity directed outward (similar to the passing from one “temperament” to another); (3) 
Europeans are associated with the unity of the two above determinations (similar to 
“character”). 
The course of the section on natural qualities has shown that the determinations 
which belong to the soul generally, the soul in its universality (and are exhibited in the 
various characters that Hegel with little knowledge and less justification assigned to the 
different “races”) are present also in the individual soul (insofar as it has talents, varies 
from temperament to temperament, and develops a character—or at least is more or less 
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naturally disposed to do so). The individual soul is thus a sort of microcosm of the 
universal soul: in some sense, all of nature is contained in the individual soul as its inner 
world.54 Indeed, the determinations of the soul given in the “natural qualities” section 
(viz. immersion in one’s own simplicity to the exclusion of difference, unproductive 
oscillation between inert indifference and sudden outward-directed activity, and the unity 
of these moments) are more adequately realized in the individual soul (as its talents, 
temperaments, and character) than in the geographical dispersion of what are at this stage 
apparently unrelated races and nations. This greater adequacy of the individual soul (with 
its interiority, and greater potential for being-for-itself) is the reason why the 
Encyclopedia shifts in §395 to consider the individual human being, only returning to 
relations between individuals in the philosophy of objective spirit (first in Encyclopedia 
§490), where the intervening sections have rendered the bonds between individuals 
objective spirit rather then the mere universal soul. These intervening sections (i.e. the 
course of almost the entire philosophy of subjective spirit) concern the deduction of the 
‘inner world’ within the individual, a world which contains all of nature in microcosm, 
and its relation to the world outside of the individual.55 
That the individual human being as such contains all moments of the soul should, 
by the way, further warn us against accepting at face value what Hegel seems to say in 
§393 and its Anmerkung and Zusatz (viz. that the continent on which one is born and 
                                                 
54 As Hegel will put it later: “The soul is in itself the totality of nature, as individual soul it is a monad; it is 
itself the posited totality of its particular world in such a way that this world, with which the soul is filled, 
is included in it, and the soul relates to it only as to itself”(EPW §403A). See also VPG pp.33-34. 
 
55 The point will not be to reach a point at which the inner world correctly corresponds to the outer, natural 
world, but rather to show that the world outside of the individual, including the whole natural world, is 
itself at bottom the product of spirit (albeit not of the finite, singular, corporeal subjective spirit). 
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lives determines one’s intellectual and moral capacities)—i.e. it should warn us 
against taking Hegel as a racist. We should understand Hegel’s protestation in the Zusatz 
to §393 that descent is no ground for granting or denying freedom to human beings 
because “[h]umanity is implicitly rational”56 in the context of the fact that the individual 
soul (be it African, Asian, or European) contains all of the soul’s moments. From this it 
would follow that the individual soul inhabiting a certain continent should not be 
understood as being simply dominated by one moment only, to the exclusion of others: 
thus Hegel says that “genius, talent, moral virtues and sentiments, piety, can be found in 
all zones, constitutions, and political states”57 Here we make the transition from the 
“natural qualities” section to the section on “natural changes.” 
Natural changes 
From natural qualities to natural changes 
That the individual contains all of the moments of the universal is thus posited in 
the transition from natural qualities to natural changes: it is this positing that all of the 
moments of the soul are present in the individual soul which justifies the move to a new 
section. Indeed, Hegel even says that what the genus (Gattung) was for the animal, 
“rationality [Vernünftigkeit]” is for the human being,58 though while the genus realizes 
itself only imperfectly in the singular animal, this imperfection is not necessary in the 
                                                 
56 EPW §393Z p.57. 
 
57 VPGes p.89. 
 
58 EPW §396Z p.76. See also where Hegel says that “that which is animalistic in the genus process 
[Gattungsprozesses] belongs to the consideration of life as such in the philosophy of nature”(VPG p.56), 
and “In the animal what it needs is good for it, existing in this felt way—instinct—, the human has no 
instinct, its instinct is reason [Vernunft]”(VPG p.72). 
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human being’s relation to its “genus” (i.e. rationality—its genus insofar as it is 
human, not insofar as it is a mere animal), because the relation is one of thought 
(Denken).59  
Thought (as we saw in chapter three) is self-determining,60 i.e. it realizes its own 
self in its determinations. The animal genus on the other hand is not self-determining in 
this way, being rather only a judgment61 and not a syllogism. The animal feels itself to be 
the genus (and thus essentially one with another animal which is of the same genus, 
though materially other62), but it has no awareness of the inner determinacy of the genus 
in virtue of which it particularizes itself. Insofar as the animal is unaware of the 
mediation between the genus and its own individuality, it simply takes itself to be the 
genus simpliciter, never grasping its own particularity, nor coming to see the genus as 
anything implicitly particular. For the animal, the genus (which it feels itself to be) is 
pure, abstract universality: for the animal, the moment of particularity thus only ever 
appears suddenly and incomprehensibly, as death interrupting its life. 
For the human being on the other hand, its “genus” (i.e. rationality), is self-
determining, giving itself existence in the particular individual; and, since for the human 
its ‘genus’ is not abstract, even this universal’s immanent particularity finds a place in 
the individual, who therefore possesses all of the moments of the concept within himself. 
Thus while the animal is always only a limited, singular being in an external world, 
                                                 
59 EPW §396Z p.76. 
 
60 EPW §467. 
 
61 EPW §367. 
 
62 EPW §370. 
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though it takes itself to be the power over everything, it is the human being, as spirit, 
who truly has this power, insofar as he has his own inner world, in which all of the 
determinations of nature are reproduced, and in relation to which he is a concrete, self-
determining universal. That the human individual contains all of the moments within 
himself (and all of the world in a microcosm) is shown clearly in the first shape of the 
“natural changes” section, the ages of life (Lebensalter). 
General remarks on the ages of life  
The ages of life are the various stages through which a human being passes, from 
birth (or perhaps conception) to death. In contrast to the animal, to which death is 
unknown and which is overtaken by it suddenly (such that death is the opposite of animal 
life), for the human being, death is present in some way throughout life. We should thus 
not consider “life” to be a universal term, with “plant life,” “animal life,” and “human 
life” as its differentiae. Human “life” is different in kind from animal “life.”63  
The “life” of a mere animal is the active, organic form which is stimulated by the 
inorganic matter surrounding it and impelled thereby to act, consuming this matter, 
reducing it to this “form”(i.e. these activities themselves, e.g. respiration, digestion, etc.). 
On the surface, these activities (i.e. the animal’s “form”) are opposed to the inorganic 
material which they constantly seize, pulverize, and assimilate as fuel for the continuation 
of these activities; yet in truth the animal’s form is an abstraction from this matter on 
which it depends for its continued operation. The animal does not understand this 
                                                 
63 For this and other reasons I disagree with Michael Wolff, for whom the anthropology concerns not 
phenomena which are distinctly human, but rather phenomena which are shared between humans and 
animals. See below for my criticism of Wolff’s position in detail. 
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dependence, but only sets about destroying inorganic nature (the condition of its 
existence)—thereby rendering it in the end self-destructive (without of course being 
cognizant of this fact).  
Of course, this all applies to the human being as well64 but only insofar as it is an 
animal, not insofar as it is human. Human life is not the physical seizure and destruction 
of nature, but the thinking appropriation of nature (its reduction to a representation 
belonging to the human being).65 To be sure, humans also need to eat and breathe—but 
not insofar as they are human: these are not distinctly human activities and hence do not 
(in their merely organic function) appear in the anthropology.  
The ages of life are not therefore biologically determined stages, but rather stages 
in the individual’s cognitive relation to the world. We should not be misled by the 
section’s title, “natural changes,” into supposing that the ages of life have to do merely 
with physiological changes in the body. Rather, these physiological changes are involved, 
but they are not the focus of the paragraph. As merely physiological changes, they belong 
to the section on the animal organism in the philosophy of nature. These changes are 
included here only to show that in the human being, there is a corresponding 
(“entsprechen[d]”) series of “spiritual appearances”66: i.e. in tandem and in agreement 
with the physiological changes the body undergoes (e.g. growth, puberty, maturation), 
there are spiritual phenomena (forms of cognitive relation to the world, or ways in which 
                                                 
64 VPG p.51. 
 
65 Of course, the life of spirit is ultimately the thought of  its own self, its objectification in objective spirit. 
Sensation of nature is only a preliminary stage, but still a part of the life of spirit. 
 
66 EPW §396Z p.76. 
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the idea knows itself) which more properly belong to and define the human being and 
human life.67  
One might object to the interpretation given here in the following way: if the 
“natural changes” section concerns mainly not physiological, organic changes, but 
instead such a succession of “spiritual appearances,” then why is the section called 
natural changes, and not spiritual changes? My response would be first to point out that 
if we are according authority to titles, we should not forget all of this belongs to the 
philosophy of spirit, not the philosophy of nature. Secondly, I would reiterate that 
physiological changes are indeed involved, and that a presupposition of the whole of the 
anthropology is that the soul is spirit that does not distinguish itself from nature—but we 
cannot understand the soul unless we notice that spirit is distinct from nature, and that the 
“spiritual appearances” that are the object of §396 are distinct from the physiological 
changes with which they are “correlated.” Thirdly, (as a corollary to my second point), I 
would point out that even the succession of “spiritual appearances” is not willed by the 
natural soul, and is thus experienced as if it were something given naturally, as if from 
the outside. 
Fourthly, the ‘ages of life’ belongs to the section called (at least in the second and 
third editions of 1827 and 1830) the anthropology, i.e. the study of human beings. Wolff 
argues that Hegel’s use of the term “anthropology” as a subtitle here should not be taken 
to indicate that human beings in their humanness are the object of investigation.68 In 
                                                 
67 Hegel does not therefore follow materialists like La Mettrie in explaining the emergence of reason in the 
soul by the growth and maturation of the body (L’Homme Machine. p.296). 
68 Das Körper-Seele Problem p.31. As we noted in chapter three, Wolff argues that social life is the 
condition sine qua non for a human life, and because the anthropology concerns only individual human 
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order to defend this position, Wolff is put in the awkward position of having to 
maintain that Hegel simply accepted the term “anthropology” and the field of study it 
denoted for 18th century philosophers like Kant, while arguing (here, correctly) that 
Hegel’s “anthropology” cannot be compared to Kant’s “pragmatic anthropology” because 
the latter is an empirical discipline concerned with the kinds of contingent characteristics 
that Hegel explicitly rules out of his own anthropology in §377.69 One wonders why 
Hegel would have used the term at all, unless he meant his anthropology to be the logos 
of the anthropos. 
The ages of life in their specificity 
Let us briefly introduce these stages before examining them in detail. There are 
three major divisions: childhood, manhood, and old age. Childhood however can be 
further subdivided into three (or perhaps four) substages: infancy (what Hegel simply 
calls the life of the Kind, using the general term for “child”); boyhood (the life of the 
Knabe); and youth (the life of the Jungling); Hegel mentions the unborn child 
(ungeborene Kind) as a possible stage of childhood preceding infancy, but leaves it 
unclear whether it is ultimately to be accepted as a stage of life.70 
                                                                                                                                                 
beings, it should not be taken as a doctrine of human nature, but rather a study of the physical conditions of 
human life, conditions which are shared with animals (Das Körper-Seele Problem pp.29-30). However, as 
we mentioned last chapter, Wolff overlooks both: (1) the fact that the phenomenology and the psychology 
also concern only individual human beings; (2) the anthropology in fact does not exclusively concern 
individuals, but actually contains the original deduction of the social life of humans (EPW §394). (See 
p.101n for a remark on “deduction in Hegel). 
 
69 Das Körper-Seele Problem p.31 
 
70 EPW §396Z p.78. 
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The life of the unborn child is life in a “vegetative state [vegetativen 
Zustand],”71 the “life of a plant [Leben der Pflanze]”72 insofar as the fetus has no notion 
of particular objects, or indeed of anything objective at all, anything standing against it. 
The fetus is in uninterrupted commerce with its environment, aware neither of subject nor 
of object. This is a “vegetative state” because according to Hegel’s account in the 
philosophy of nature, plants draw their nourishment from nature in an unbroken flow, 
never relating to inorganic nature in its individuality.73 
Birth is the physiological “natural change” which is “correlated” with the 
transition to a new stage: infancy.74 The life of the infant consists in growth: not in the 
production of new shapes, but in the quantitative increase in size and strength.75 The 
former sort of growth would be typical of plants (and unborn children), which produce 
new ‘parts’ (as e.g. the plant produces new leaves and buds, though each of these parts is 
simply the plant itself immediately existing): these ‘parts’ are not members which are 
reduced to moments for a subject which has being-for-itself.76  
                                                 
71 EPW §396Z p.78. See also VPG p.52. 
 
72 EPW §396Z p.78. 
 
73 EPW §344. Aristotle too holds that the embryo lives only a vegetative life (Generation of Animals 
736a27-736b13). 
 
74 The interpretation I am giving, that the ages of life are truly spiritual phenomena and not biological 
stages is confirmed in Hegel’s lectures, where he says of the birth of an infant “the physiological changes 
are not so significant”(VPG p.52), insofar as the vegetative state continues to a certain extent beyond this 
physiological change into infancy (p.52). This shows that what is relevant in the ages of life is the way in 
which the human being knows itself and the world, and not so much the traversing of biological stages.  
 
75 EPW §396Z p.79. 
 
76 EPW §343. 
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The infant in contrast does have a center for which its members are only 
moments (i.e. the infant is in some sense a subject), such that its growth is not the 
proliferation of new immediacies (each of which would be itself a potential infant), but 
rather an enlarging of what are only moments of the one infant. In its respiration and 
consumption the infant has dealings with singular objects, but insofar as it is only an 
infant, it has no appreciation of the fact that objects are separate and independent of it. Its 
cries are the expression of its immediate certainty that the objects before it ought to be 
reduced to moments for it, though also an implicit acknowledgement that they are not.77  
When the infant begins to sense these objects, then he begins to pass over into the 
next stage, boyhood.78 By sensing and perceiving objects, the infant comes to see that 
objects are out of its reach—and thus begins to see that it is itself an object, occupying 
only a determinate space. The boy knows the resistance of the world to his subjectivity, 
and can thus be thought of as a humbled infant. But it is by accepting that he is himself a 
limited being alongside others that the boy is able to exert the kind of real control over 
objects that the infant merely demanded. By walking, for instance, the boy—while 
remaining of a determinate size—still manages to conquer space.79 It is worth noting that 
while the infant extended itself through space only by unconscious growth (and felt itself 
entitled to all of space), the boy occupies determinate positions in space willfully—as a 
directive from his own determinate self of which he, unlike the infant, is aware. Indeed, 
                                                 
77 VPG p.52. See also EPW §396Z p.79. Compare this to Rousseau’s account of how a child learns space 
and extension by learning that objects differ from himself (Émile tome premier pp.75-76). 
 
78 VPG pp.52-53. See also EPW §396Z pp.79-80. 
 
79 VPG p.59. See also EPW §396Z p.80. 
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by speech, the boy is acquainted with universals, and begins in other ways to look 
beyond what is immediately present, e.g. by enjoying stories.80 The boy likewise begins 
to see that he is not what he ought to be (viz. a grown man)81—though the infant only had 
a dim awareness that other things were not as they ought to be (viz. at his disposal), but 
did not succeed even at beginning to differentiate himself from his immediacy. Yet 
though the boy does make this distinction, he still only knows what he ought to be in the 
form of an immediacy (viz. another existing individual, e.g. his father).82 
With the physical change of puberty, there is a corresponding spiritual change, as 
the boy enters the final stage of childhood, viz. youth.83 Of the youth, Hegel says “the life 
of the genus begins to stir within him and to seek satisfaction.”84 To be sure, as a 
physiological change, puberty involves the emergence of the sex drive which is in some 
respects a merely animal phenomenon in which the individual is driven to reproduce the 
genus; yet this is not what Hegel means here by the stirring of the “genus [Gattung]” in 
the individual. Recall, “[w]hat in the living being [Lebendignen] as such [i.e. the animal, 
                                                 
80 VPG p.53. See also EPW §396Z p.80. 
 
81 VPG p.53. See also EPW §396Z pp.80-81. 
 
82 VPG p.53. See also EPW §396Z pp.80-81. It is worth noting that here Hegel departs from Rousseau, with 
whom his entire corpus in some sense but EPW §396 in particular seems to be in dialogue. The departure 
consists in how adults should see to the upbringing of children. As is well known, Rousseau advises against 
lecturing children with abstractions they cannot understand. Instead, the educator should descend to the 
level of children, share their faults and their ignorance, experience what they experience and prompt 
children to learn the only appropriate way, from their own experience (Émile tome premier pp.416-417). 
Yet Hegel in his lectures has nothing but opprobrium for “the pedagogues of play”(VPG p.53, EPW §396Z 
p.81), i.e. those who “lower themselves” to the level of children for purposes of instruction. Hegel can only 
be referring here to Rousseau’s disciples in the field of pedagogy.  
 
83 VPG p.54. See also EPW §396Z p.83. 
 
84 EPW §396Z p.83. 
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whether human or beast] is the genus [Gattung], is rationality [Vernünftigkeit] in the 
spiritual being [Geistigen],”85 i.e. in the human being as such. 
Here we have still more reason to oppose Wolff in his judgment that all of the 
phenomena in the anthropology are of what is shared between humans and animals. 
Wolff makes this judgment regarding the ages of life in particular on the basis of what he 
sees as the distinction Hegel makes in this paragraph between vegetable or “external” 
growth (in which the plant is simply duplicated again and again in what are essentially 
new plants) to animal or “internal” growth (in which the one life differentiates itself into 
different members whose independence is cancelled in the activity and self-maintenance 
of the single life).86 As we have seen however, the difference between vegetable growth 
and ‘animal’ growth is limited to the difference between the life of the fetus and the life 
of the infant. The ages of life continue beyond infancy however, and the distinctively 
human aspect emerges unambiguously in adolescence, where the life of the genus (which 
is reason, not a biological classification) awakens in the individual. 
The stirring of the life of the genus in the youth is here not the drive to copulate, 
because the ‘genus’ is not the human species (as a biological classification). Rather, the 
genus is reason. As we saw in chapter three, reason (as the conclusion of the 
phenomenology of spirit) is the identity of subjectivity and objectivity87: this means that 
the subject at that stage can be assured that its subjective representations are of the same 
                                                 
85 EPW §396Z p.76. Again, this point (stated differently) belongs not only in Boumann’s Zusätze, but also 
in Erdmann’s transcription of the 1827/28 lectures (VPG p.56).  
 
86 Das Körper-Seele Problem pp.33-34. 
 
87 EPW §438. 
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order and connection as the materially existing objects in nature. Here, in the ages of 
life, the stirring of “reason” in the adolescent means that once the boy has become 
acquainted with universality in language (even calling himself “I”), he will not long be 
satisfied with any immediately existing man for his ideal, his image of what he ought to 
be. This universality is the ‘genus’ within the youth which now “begins to seek 
satisfaction,” by rejecting everything immediately existing in favor of the universality in 
his heart (as “an ideal of love and friendship, or a universal state [Weltzustand] of the 
world”88), a (subjective) universality with which he knows that the (objective) world 
ought to agree, and must be made to agree. However, just as reason (as the conclusion of 
the phenomenology of spirit) is an identity of subject and object that only ought to be 
actual89 (since it is not until thought reveals itself as syllogistic and hence as will that the 
universality actually determines itself in particularity90) so the reason that stirs in the 
youth’s breast is essentially “in opposition to the present [vorhandene] world,”91 and 
hence is an ideal that only ought to be.92 The abstractness of his ideal is what renders the 
youth only a youth, and not a man. 
Manhood for Hegel involves one abandoning the abstract ideals of youth, 
accepting the reality of the world which resisted those ideals, and setting oneself to work. 
                                                 
88 EPW §396Z p.83. 
 
89 EPW §441Z. 
 
90 EPW §§467-468 
 
91 EPW §386Z p.83. See also VPG p.54. 
 
92 For Rousseau, the love that emerges in the breast of a youth is the love of a generalized chimera, in 
comparison with whom no real woman can measure up (Émile, tome deuxième p.134). 
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While the youth knew only flighty abstractions, the man has become familiar with the 
details of the world, and in his work actually achieves ends (albeit less exalted ends than 
the ones championed by the youth). As the boy is an infant who has been humbled by the 
reality of the world outside of him, so the man is a youth who has been so humbled. 
Along with the revolutionary fervor of the youth, the man has lost the youth’s carefree 
joie de vivre, and feels the hard life of work imposed on him by necessity.93 
However, by occupying himself with the concrete reality of the world, the man in 
time transforms it to a certain extent, and transforms himself, such that by old age (the 
last stage) he is habituated to the world, which he henceforth no longer experiences as 
offering him any resistance. The old man can look back on his life and see not merely a 
series of particular, contingent activities; rather, he can see his activity as part of the 
realization of ends larger than himself, ends which are legitimate and which come to be in 
their own right. He is thus freed from the grief over the destruction of his ideals (the grief 
characteristic of manhood). As the world is no longer felt as something distinct, the 
vitality (Lebendigkeit) of the man is extinguished.94 —This is death, which is in a certain 
sense a physical event, but as the termination of a human life, has spiritual significance. 
This significance is that the opposition between his “genus” (i.e. reason) and his own 
singular existence has been overcome: the particular term mediating between these two 
extremes are the ages of life themselves. As a human being with these successive 
determinations (the ages of life), the individual has realized the genus, i.e. given reason 
                                                 
93 VPG p.55. See also EPW §396Z p.84. 
 
94 VPG pp.55-56. See also EPW §386Z p.85. 
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real existence in the world (insofar as by old age the opposition between subjectivity 
and objectivity is overcome).  
The death of the human being is thus not simply the cessation of the operations of 
vital organs: this manner of death belongs to the end of the philosophy of nature. There 
the animal (and indeed, the human as well, but only insofar as it is an animal) dies when 
the “life has become processless habit,”95 i.e. insofar as the vital processes no longer 
relate to inorganic, singular matter as an object opposed to it, which must be assimilated  
(or ‘processed’). Now, though in the ages of life each age has a physical event and a 
correlated change involving ‘spiritual significance,’ we should not assume that the 
physical event takes place first and the spiritual alteration is somehow a response or an 
epiphenomenon in relation to the corporeal change. Indeed, with old age, the physical 
event by necessity comes last: the physical death of a person is his destruction, even 
though most properly the person is not merely physical. Before the physical death 
however, it is possible (in ‘old age’) to reach a kind of spiritual death, which is not the 
annihilation, but rather the perfection of the human being: this death is the extinguishing 
of the opposition between reason (the ‘genus’) and particularity through a lifetime of 
labor and the consequent reconciliation to the course of the world and satisfaction with 
one’s place in it. In other words, the old man is able to see that the results of his work are 
the existence of what is essential—i.e. that they are actuality.96 This retrospective 
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cognition of actuality is of course wisdom, philosophy.97 Hegel’s famous “owl of 
Minerva” dictum (viz. that philosophy emerges only when a way of life has grown old98) 
should be understood in this context. 
We may remark at this point as well that Hegel uses the ages of life as a metaphor 
for the epochs of world history in his lectures on that topic. There he identifies the East 
(viz. China and India) with the world’s “age of infancy [Kindesalter],”99 central Asia 
(viz. the peoples of the Persian empire, which includes not only Persians as such, but also 
Assyrians, Babylonians, Hebrews, and Egyptians) with the “age of boyhood 
[Knabenalter],”100 the Greeks with the “age of youth or adolescence [Junglingsalter],”101 
Rome with the “age of manhood [Mannesalters],”102 and the “Germanic [Germanische, 
not Deutsche] realm” with “old age [Greisenalter].”103 That determinations which Hegel 
elsewhere assigns to distinct peoples are all already present (in some form) in the ages of 
life of the individual soul should, by the way, lead us to further question the appearance 
of racism and chauvinism in Encyclopedia §§393-394 and in other places. 
Additionally, we might say that one of the phenomena that make the difference 
between human beings and animals most clear is old age. The animal spends its life as an 
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rendered “age of infancy.” 
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individual in a state of unresolved (because unmediated) tension with its genus. This 
tension is resolved only in the death of the individual animal. The genus returns to itself 
through this death of the individual animal, but not in the feeling or activity of the 
individual animal while it is alive. All of the vital processes of the animal stand in 
opposition to dead, inorganic matter, which they try to assimilate. Thus animal life itself 
stands opposed to death. The life of spirit on the other hand does not have death as its 
opposite, because it has no opposite at all: spirit is the suffering of “infinite pain,”104 the 
complete emptying of subjectivity and its identification with or “manifestation” in its 
“opposite” (see chapter two). Therefore insofar as the human being is an animal (i.e. a 
living organism), ‘old age’ is only the decaying of the body, the phenomenal 
‘manifestation’ of the individual animal’s inadequacy to its genus: this is only a negative 
manifestation insofar as the genus itself is only ever actualized in imperfect individual 
animals, whose inadequacy becomes apparent not with the revelation of anything 
positive, but only with the death and disappearance of this individual creature (a process 
which is senselessly repeated ad infinitum). In spirit however, the genus (reason) attains a 
positive manifestation as the individual human being knows himself and his life to be the 
reality of this genus. Thus for the human being, old age is a time in which the human 
genus (rationality) attains singular existence, but the inadequacy of this singular insofar 
as it is an animal to its genus has not yet appeared (i.e. death has not yet destroyed the 
old man’s body).  
In the light of the difference between the life of spirit and the life of organic 
nature, the supposedly profound observation that each of us will inevitably one day die 
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(i.e. suffer the death proper to the animal) becomes rather trite. This observation, 
however true, is of little philosophical importance because insofar as the human being is 
human, it is not necessarily inadequate to its ‘genus’ (i.e. reason), and for this reason 
human life is not (as that ‘profound’ observation would imply) the meaningless cycle of 
birth, procreation, and death that animal life is. 
The sexual relation  
The ages of life show, in a sense, the entire philosophy of spirit, as reflected in the 
temporal span of the life of an individual soul. Yet this phenomenon is succeeded by the 
“sexual relation,” in which the individual soul feels itself as limited, and having to seek 
itself in another individual soul.105 This transition (from the whole of the philosophy of 
spirit ideally contained in the life of one individual soul to the individual soul’s real 
difference from another individual soul, the latter of which is the former’s own self) could 
be interpreted as an acknowledgement that the individual human being is somehow 
irreducibly limited, insofar as it is still an immediately existing corporeal being (with all 
the limitations this implies). However, I would argue against this interpretation: firstly, 
because the individual’s corporeal limitation was already raised in the boyhood stage of 
the ages of life, and will receive its proper treatment in the section on habit); secondly, as 
we will see below, both moments under examination in separate individuals in §397 are 
united again in one individual in §398 as alternating states of waking and sleeping.  
The sexual relation (Geschlechtsverhältnis) is not a ‘natural change’ in the sense 
of one and the same thing passing from one state to another, so much as it is a “natural 
                                                 
105 EPW §397. See also VPG p.56. 
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difference [Naturunterschied].”106 This “difference” here does not amount to the 
setting beside each other of two unrelated determinations. Rather, these differentiae are 
particularizations of the universal: i.e. it is by these particular determinations that the 
universal comes to actual corporeal existence. Another “sex relation 
[Geschlechtsverhältnis]”107  of course is found earlier in the Encyclopedia: viz. in the 
organics section of the philosophy of nature. There too, the relation is a particularization 
of the universal—though the universal in §369 is the (biological) genus, and not reason, 
as it is in §397. The terms of the sex relation in both cases are of course the sexes (male 
and female), but in §369 this is a merely natural difference, having to do only with the 
physical union of two animals in copulation (and the feelings drawing the participants 
thereto), while in §397 it is a difference immanent in spirit, having to do with the spiritual 
and ethical (sittliche) union of the two human beings in a family (and, again, the feelings 
drawing the participants thereto).  
To be sure, the family is a moment of objective spirit, and thus presupposes much 
that we cannot cover here (though see chapter three for a brief synopsis). Here in the 
anthropology, the full significance of the spiritual union of the sexes in family life cannot 
be presented, but we can see that the ‘genus’ here (viz. reason, or we might simply say 
spirit) has as its immanent differentiae the ‘male’ and ‘female’ (these being taken not as 
physiological determinations of the human species, but as anthropological determinations 
                                                 
106 EPW §397. The same term is used in the lectures (VPG p.56). 
 
107 EPW §369. 
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of spirit). Let us now turn to the examination of these two determinations in their 
specificity. 
The first determination is “subjectivity [Subjektivität] that remains one with itself 
in a sensation of ethical life, love, etc., not taking political, scientific, and artistic ends to 
the extreme of universality.”108 The second is “activity [Tätigkeit] which has within itself 
the tension [produced by] the opposition between the universal, objective interests on the 
one hand, and the present state of his own existence and that of the external world on the 
other, and which first actually brings about a unity of these two.”109 We may thus 
consider these two moments under the terms “subjectivity” and “activity,” provided that 
we acknowledge that Hegel also uses “subjectivity” in ways that are very different from 
its use here.110 
These determinations are assigned to different ‘genders.’ We must keep in mind 
first that ‘gender’ here is not merely something natural (constituted by having different 
reproductive organs, and other physiological differences), but principally something 
spiritual. Hegel notes in §397 that “[t]he sexual relation acquires its spiritual and ethical 
                                                 
108 EPW §397. In his lectures Hegel does not call it “subjectivity,” but he describes it in the same way: “one 
sex remains identical with itself, not proceeding to the opposition of universality and individuality”(VPG 
p.56). 
 
109 EPW §397. A literal translation would have made this phrase unpardonably awkward, so what I have 
given is a paraphrase. Yet I would still esteem my paraphrase higher than that of Wallace and Miller, who 
render “sich in sich [...] spannt” as “where the individual is a vehicle of.” It is true that the individual is in 
his activity a vehicle for the realization of universal ends, but the Wallace-Miller translation does not 
convey that the tension (Spannung) between the universal ends and the given conditions is present within 
(in sich) the individual. I have also made sure that my translation reflects the presence in §397 of a form of 
the term Wirklichkeit (viz. “verwirklicht”), a technical term for Hegel traditionally translated as “actuality.” 
Petry’s translation is much better than that of Wallace and Miller. Mine is no more accurate than Petry’s, 
but I think it is a bit less awkward. In his lectures Hegel describes the “male” determination similarly, and 
even calls it “activity [Tätigkeit] which first produces unity [of universality and individuality]” (VPG p.56). 
 
110 See my explanation of the term “Subjektivität” for Hegel in chapter two. 
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significance and determination in the family,”111 and if we look to the section in the 
Grundlinien on the family, we will see that there Hegel says “[t]he natural determinacy 
of the two genders [i.e. the physiological differences] receives intellectual and ethical 
significance through its rationality [Vernünftigkeit].”112 It is clear from this that the sexual 
difference in Encyclopedia §397 is not a particularization of the human species, whose 
differentiae remain merely natural, but rather a particularization of reason (as Hegel said 
earlier that what was the genus for the animal was for the human “rationality 
[Vernünftigkeit]”113), and thus the ‘genders’ here are spiritual determinations. 
Second, we must see that for Hegel, “activity” belongs to the male, while 
“subjectivity” belongs to the female. Hegel does not make this explicit in §397, nor in 
Encyclopedia §§518-519 where he returns to the sexual relation in the context of the 
family. Yet in the Grundlinien he does assign these moments to certain genders: to the 
male belongs “the spiritual that divides itself into personal independence which has being 
for itself and the knowing and willing of free universality, the self-consciousness of 
conceptual thought, and the willing of the objective end.”114 To the female belongs “the 
spiritual maintaining unity with itself as knowing and willing the substantial in the form 
of concrete singularity and sensation.”115 Obviously, these descriptions agree with the 
                                                 
111 See also VPG p.59 
 
112 GPR §165. 
 
113 EPW §396Z p.76. 
 
114 GPR §166. Likewise, in his lectures he explicitly assigns these moments to genders (VPG p.56). 
 
115 GPR §166. 
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determinations given in Encyclopedia §397 that Hegel calls “activity” and 
“subjectivity” respectively. 
What Hegel says in Encyclopedia §§397, 518-519 and Grundlinien §§165-166 
today invites the charge of sexism, just as Encyclopedia §393 invites the charge of 
racism. I would like to leave open the possibility that this charge can be refuted though I 
will refrain from offering an argument for its refutation here as it would take us too far 
afield, requiring a deep and intense study of Hegel’s philosophy of objective spirit, which 
is not our purpose here. Let it be enough to remark here that both “activity” and 
“subjectivity” reappear in the following section (§398) as waking and sleeping 
respectively (this will be shown below). For this reason, I would like to suggest that there 
is good cause to doubt that Hegel held (or at least cause to doubt that that he should have 
held) that the male sex is devoid of what he calls in §397 “subjectivity” and the female 
sex is devoid of what he calls there “activity.” Let us proceed then to §398. 
Sleeping and waking  
The transition from §397 on the ‘sexual relation’ to §398 on sleeping and waking 
can be summarized briefly as follows: what in §397 were understood as two opposed 
moments (viz. “subjectivity” and “activity”) are in §398 posited together as mutually 
determinative, appearing in the same individual soul as “alternating states”116 (viz. 
sleeping and waking). Indeed, Hegel even uses the same terms to describe these states: 
“[b]eing awake [Wachsein] generally includes all self-conscious and rational activity 
[selbstbewiβte und vernünftige Tätigkeit] of spirit’s distinctions in which it has being-for-
                                                 
116 EPW §399. 
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itself”117; while “[s]leep is the invigoration of this activity [Tätigkeit] not merely as 
negative rest from it, but rather as return from the world of determinacies 
[Bestimmtheiten], from the diversion and the focus on singularities, into the universal 
essence of subjectivity [allgemeine Wesen der Subjektivität] which is the substance of 
those determinacies and the absolute power over them.”118 
Waking is thus described as “activity.” Moreover, waking is said to involve the 
kind of tension or inner division that we know “activity” to involve: “[t]he distinction of 
individuality as being-for-itself from itself as mere being [...] is the awakening of the 
soul.”119 Furthermore, Hegel continues, “[a]wakening is not only distinct from sleep for 
us, or externally; it is itself the judgment or original division [Urteil] of the individual 
soul, whose being-for-itself is for it the relation of this, its determination to its [mere] 
being, the distinction of itself from its still undifferentiated universality.”120 The “being 
[Sein]” or “mere being [nur seiender]” from which the awoken soul distinguishes itself is 
precisely “the given conditions of its own existence and that of the external world” from 
which the soul in its “activity” distinguished itself in §397 (it being understood that in the 
transition to §398 activity and subjectivity are posited together in the same individual 
                                                 
117 EPW §398. 
 
118 EPW §398. Errol Harris also recognizes the presence throughout the natural changes section of these 
two alternating principles, though he associates them with sleeping and waking, rather than activity and 
subjectivity as I have: “Every stage of psychical life takes on these two alternating forms [viz. sleeping and 
waking] at all ages, thus they are an aspect of all other psychophysical conditions listed. Further, all the 
psychophysical differences characteristic of the life-periods of the individual are duplicated in the two 
sexual forms. So that all of these natural alternations are interrelated, all aspects of the same organic 
life”(“Hegel’s Theory of Feeling” p.82). Harris however does not explain precisely how (in what forms) 
these principles are present throughout the natural changes section, except to associate infancy and old age 
with sleeping and the intervening ages with waking (p.82). 
 
119 EPW §398. 
 
120 EPW §398. See p.71n for a remark on the use of the locution “for us.” 
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soul). Likewise, sleep is described as a withdrawal into “subjectivity.” And just as in 
§397 the moment of subjectivity was described as in unity with itself, so in §398 sleep is 
described as “closed up within itself [in sich verschlossenen].” 
As forms of “activity” and “subjectivity,” waking and sleeping are different forms 
of judgment. A judgment is of course an ontological (not merely formally logical) 
category in which a universal ‘predicate’ is immediately identified with an individual—
with no account being given of how a given individual ‘is’ a universal.121 Thus in a 
judgment the universal and singular are at once united and divided: those different 
moments (the judgment’s unity and its division) are represented by sleeping and waking 
respectively. Sleep is subjectivity in the same sense as in the sexual relation, viz. as 
“knowing and willing the substantial [i.e. the universal] in the form of concrete 
singularity”122 with no mediation between the two being posited, a return from the world 
of determinacy into the universal essence of subjectivity.123 Thus in sleep the soul cuts 
itself off from the sensed world of determinate objects, and sinks into immediate unity 
with its representations.  
Waking on the other hand involves being wrested from this state of unreflective 
unity and confronted by objects that merely are, and are opposed to one’s own soul in its 
universality. This opposition is unmediated however, and that is why Hegel says that in 
the judgment (Urteil) that is waking, the soul distinguishes itself from its “still 
                                                 
121 EPW §§167-169. 
 
122 GPR §166. 
 
123 EPW §398. 
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undifferentiated universality”124: that the universality is “still undifferentiated” means 
that it is un-particularized, i.e. its particular determination has not been posited as 
immanent within it. Thus as “activity” presents the contrast between universality and 
singularity, along with the mere demand that they be made equal, so subjectivity presents 
the identification of universal and singular, with no awareness of their incongruity. Taken 
together, “activity” and “subjectivity” present both aspects of judgment: the disparity 
between the universal and singular, and their jarring, unexplained union. 
Yet though the alternating states of sleeping and waking combine the moments of 
activity and subjectivity in one individual soul, it still remains the case that the soul shifts 
from absorption in universality to fixedness in singularities, without mediating the 
opposition between these two moments. Thus “activity” and “subjectivity” in §397, as 
well as “waking” and “sleeping” in §398 are all judgments. But in the passage from §397 
to §398 it is posited that since activity and subjectivity are each an abstraction from the 
other, each must be posited in the individual soul as such, though at this stage they still 
only exist alongside one another as alternating states.125 They are brought into a more 
concrete union in sensation, where the relation between the universality of the soul and 
the concrete singularities of existence are posited as mediated by the senses.  
Recapitulation of natural qualities and natural changes 
As the final section on the natural soul, the section on sensation is the culmination 
of the preceding sections (viz. those on “natural qualities” and “natural changes”). At the 
                                                 
124 EPW §398. 
 
125 Similarly, for Aristotle sleep cannot be explained as the chance disruption of one or another of the sense 
organs. Instead, it must be understood as the shutting down of sense perception generally, and thus must be 
understood as belonging to the perceptive soul as such (On Sleep 455b8-10). 
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beginning of the part on the natural soul, Hegel gives the terms of the syllogism (viz. 
universality, particularity, and singularity) as they are concretized at this stage: the rest of 
the part on the natural soul concerns how these terms relate to each other, and precisely 
what phenomena manifest these relationships. Let us review the course of the natural soul 
up to this point before continuing with sensation. 
In “natural qualities” the terms of the syllogism are concretized in the following 
way. The universal soul is the “universal planetary life”126: this refers the earth’s 
climactic and seasonal variation—not insofar as they are merely natural phenomena (to 
that extent, they belong rather to the philosophy of nature), but rather insofar as they are 
expressed in different ways in the moods of individual souls (within which alone the 
universal soul has reality). The particular term of the natural soul is likewise not the 
earth’s geographical variation (viz. the division of continents, and the specific 
topographical features of each) insofar as such variation is merely natural; rather, it is the 
expression of these difference in racial and national distinctions.127 The singular term is 
the individual soul, which is determined (we are meant to assume) by the characteristics 
of its race and nation, and also determines itself into its own talents, temperaments, and 
character (or the natural disposition thereto).128 
Already in the “natural qualities” section, there is expressed one of the most 
important features of the whole philosophy of spirit, and perhaps the single most 
important feature of the philosophy of subjective spirit: viz. that as spirit realizes itself in 
                                                 
126 EPW §392. 
 
127 EPW §§393-394. 
 
128 VPG pp.48-49. See also EPW §395&Z. 
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an external world which includes its immediate existence in individual human beings, 
each of these individual human beings in turn becomes at the same time a universal with 
respect to the contents of his own inner world.  
This inner world is poorly represented by the phenomena given in §395 and its 
Zusatz. However, these phenomena (talent, temperament, and character) do show: (1) that 
the individual soul is determined within itself (e.g. it has various talents); (2) that the 
soul’s determinations are determinations of its own self, and thus cannot exist 
indifferently beside one another, but must be related, passing into one another (as do the 
soul’s temperaments); and finally (3) that despite being variously determined, the soul 
remains an individual, and thus that the soul must realize itself in determinations in which 
it is fixed, and which are explicitly determinations of the soul’s own self (e.g. in 
character).129 
As we proceed to the section on “natural changes,” we further draw out the 
implications of there being an individual soul, which has determinations which are at 
once its own, and yet “natural” in some sense. The “natural changes” section will only 
achieve something resembling stability at its end, in sensation. Initially, in the ages of 
life, the individual soul has temporally successive determinations which display its 
essence serially, but developmentally (unlike the universal soul’s changes of seasons and 
the individual soul in natural qualities which passes from one temperament to another 
with no development or inner purposiveness). 
                                                 
129 These features of the soul are still less adequately represented in the ‘racial characters’ that Hegel 
deduces. (See p.101n for a note on “deduction” in Hegel). 
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Each age is a determination belonging to the essence of the soul; yet the soul 
remains outside of itself (and hence merely natural) insofar as until old age the soul’s true 
essence is present only as a future possibility. I have tried to show however that the 
natural soul is not “natural” in the sense that its ages are mere spiritual epiphenomena 
with respect to organic changes in the body: thus it is not that the physiological process of 
puberty that makes the youth seek to ‘propagate’ the universal proper to spirit (viz. 
reason). Rather, this physiological change is a less adequate expression of the idea; the 
idea is more adequately expressed by the life of the spiritual universal stirring within the 
youth.130 
In the sexual relation, the essence of the soul is reduced to its two principal 
moments (viz. “activity” and “subjectivity”), existing simultaneously, but in two different 
individuals (thus the individual’s externality to itself in the ages of life is here made 
explicit). In these individual souls there is: the distinction of the universal from the 
individual (as activity and its “tension” which is equally the striving to overcome this 
distinction); and the immediate unity of the two in sensation (Empfindung) (as 
“subjectivity”).  
In sleeping and waking these two moments are posited as transitory states in one 
and the same individual. This is indeed a re-temporalization of the universal-singular 
                                                 
130 In Michael Wolff’s analysis of the ‘body-soul problem’ in Hegel’s anthropology, he explains that “spirit 
relates to external nature [...] in a teleological way, such that it relates itself to the things and events of 
external nature [...] as an end relates to a means”(Das Körper-Seele Problem p.112). Wolff presents his 
entire book as an analysis of EPW §389, though he uses the Science of Logic for support on this point; yet 
this point is, I think, best explained by reference to EPW §381, where Hegel explains that spirit sets (setzt) 
nature before (vor) itself as its presupposition (Voraussetzung), as the material (the means) in which it will 
realize itself (the end). –See chapter two for my full discussion of §381. Thus it is not that the physiological 
process of puberty is the cause of the stirring in the youth of his universal ideal; rather, the latter is the 
cause of the former (as spirit is the final cause of nature). 
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relation, but it is not a step back to the ages of life—still less to the universal 
planetary life (with its changing seasons). First of all, waking is a state that contains 
within it the difference between universal and singular: the waking soul knows itself in 
opposition to its sleeping nature—this is not the case with the universal soul’s seasonal or 
daily changes. It could be that the ages of life do have this feature, depending on how 
they are interpreted (arguably, the old man knows himself in opposition to his middle-
aged status, as the middle aged adult—i.e. the “man”—perhaps knows himself in 
opposition to youth). However, in the ages of life all ages before old age seem 
superfluous: if one could be born already with gray hair (as Hesiod says we will be one 
day131), there would be no reason to suffer through the previous ages. Yet in sleeping and 
waking it is posited that, though these are alternating states of one and the same 
individual soul, each is mediated through the other: thus activity produces rest, and rest 
activity. 
Therefore throughout the section on natural changes, universal and singular are 
related to each other, now immediately identified, now starkly distinguished; and even 
the immediate relation of the two becomes related to their distinction. Yet never in this 
section does the particular term show itself in order to mediate between these extremes, 
and relate them to each other in a stable way. Only in sensation does this happen: i.e. only 
in sensation is it shown how precisely the universal (the soul) can ‘be’ an individual 
(determination). 
 
 
                                                 
131 Works and Days line 181. For Hesiod of course, this is something lamentable. 
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Sensation 
Hegel devotes more paragraphs to sensation than to any other moment of the 
natural soul. Likewise, in this dissertation sensation is the most important moment of the 
natural soul (chapter five will be largely devoted to spelling out the precise relation 
between sensation, feeling, and habit). Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter will be 
devoted to sensation. First, we will introduce the five senses and explain how Hegel 
understands each of them. Subsequently, we will isolate certain nuances of Hegel’s 
treatment of sensation generally, discussing them in turn. The first of these will be the 
relation of each sense to those phenomena deduced in the philosophy of nature which are 
its object(s). We will examine briefly the object(s) of each sense in our initial 
presentation of the five senses, but subsequently we will have occasion to examine the 
object of sensation in greater depth and to draw conclusion about what precisely in nature 
is sensed. The second nuance we will examine is what I have called (following 
Aristotle)132 the “mixing” of the soul with the body, which characterizes Hegel’s 
understanding of sensation. This ‘mixing’ makes it that the soul possesses certain 
determinations in the same way that merely natural objects do (since the body with which 
the soul is mixed is in some sense natural), and the soul’s possession of these 
determinations will render the soul insensible to them, thereby limiting what the soul can 
sense. We will pick up on the soul’s insensibility to certain determinations again in 
chapter five, where we will contrast sensation to feeling in precisely this respect. Finally, 
we will examine the corporealization of the emotions, which for Hegel is a phenomenon 
                                                 
132 See De Anima 429a18. 
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of sensation insofar as it is this corporealization of a spiritual content (e.g. anger) 
which allows it to be felt. 
Sensation: the five senses 
Sensation (generally) is the form of mediation between the soul and its content 
that is provided by nature. Specifically of course, there are five different forms of 
mediation between the soul and its content—viz. the five senses: sight, hearing, smell, 
taste, and touch. These five are grouped in three classes in accordance with the moments 
of the concept. The first class is that of “physical ideality”133: this includes sight and 
hearing, and is characterized by the fact that in it “difference appears as variety,”134 i.e. 
the object’s unity is sensed in abstraction from its diversity from itself (i.e. its materiality, 
its externality to itself). The second class is that of “real difference”135: it includes smell 
and taste, senses in which an object’s difference from itself receives its due (insofar as the 
object is broken down in the very sensing of it). The third class is that of “earthly 
[irdischen] totality,”136 or “concrete [konkreten] totality”137: it includes just the sense of 
touch, the only sense which senses its object as a totality (and not ideality abstracted from 
difference or difference with no unity).  
                                                 
133 EPW §401A.; or “simple ideality [einfachen Idealität]”(VPG p.76). We will explain what this means 
below.  
 
134 EPW §401A. 
 
135 EPW §401Z p.103. See also VPG p.76.  
 
136 EPW §401Z p.103. See also VPG p.76. 
 
137 EPW §401Z p.104. 
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It suffices to reflect a bit to see why Hegel understood the senses this way. Let 
us first examine the senses of physical or simple ideality: sight and hearing. These are 
called the senses of physical or simple “ideality” because in sight and hearing the 
differences an object has in relation to itself (its externality to itself, or the spatial 
separation of its parts from each other) are rendered merely ideal differences.138 That is, 
in sight and hearing these differences are subordinated to an overarching unity (and are 
thus not real, i.e. unsublated differences).  
To be sure, if I am too close to a massive object I do not see the whole thing: I see 
only a part, and it would seem that the unity of the object, its ideality, escapes me. 
However, this failure to see the whole has to do with the particular circumstances 
involved (my position relative to the object and the object’s massiveness), and not with 
sight as such. Additionally, the fact that when I see something I see only the side of it 
presented to me does not alter the character of sight as physical ideality. The ideality of 
the seen object does not consist in seeing in an instant the entire surface area of the 
object—and still less does it consist in seeing every material part, including those internal 
to the object. Rather, this ideality consists in the object’s presentation of itself to the 
sense of sight as a certain color through the medium of light. 
                                                 
138 See Michael Wolff’s meticulous analysis of what Hegel might mean by calling the soul “the universal 
[or general, allgemeine] immateriality of nature” (Das Körper-Seele Problem pp.39-45). He concludes that 
the soul’s “immateriality” must be taken to mean that the soul is the particular way that the world (of 
nature) exists in a non-material, non external way—in other words that the soul is the “ideality” of nature 
(p.45). 
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Light for Hegel is a sort of universal element,139 shining on all bodies and 
illuminating them. As visible (i.e. in relation to light), an object presents itself as one, a 
single phenomenon. In Hegel’s discussion of light in the Philosophy of Nature he says: 
“In shaped corporeity the first determination is its self-identical selfhood [mit sich 
identische Selbstischkeit], the abstract self-manifestation of it as indeterminate, simply 
individuality—light. But shape as such is not luminous; rather, this property is [...] a 
relation to light.”140 
Just as shape is not by itself luminous, but must be brought into relation to light, 
light by itself illuminates nothing: it requires the presence of matter. Bodies as such are 
outside of themselves: but in relation to light, the externality of a body’s parts is rendered 
ideal, and it manifests itself in a single phenomenon, its color. Thus what is seen is 
indeed light: but it is not pure, unadulterated light. Rather, it is color: the effect of light’s 
interaction with matter,141 i.e. light’s idealization of the asunderness of matter and 
matter’s ‘darkening’ of light. Were light to relate to something immaterial, no visible 
phenomenon would be produced: such a thing would have no color, being instead 
completely transparent.142 When light relates to something material, the self-externality of 
the body’s parts to each other is sublated in the manifestation of the body’s color through 
the medium of light.  
                                                 
139 Hegel calls light “universal physical identity”(EPW §277), “immaterial matter”(VPG p.77). See also his 
discussion of the Persian religion of light in the VPGes pp.215-216 and the VPR (1827) pp.504-506. 
 
140 EPW §317. 
 
141 EPW §320. See also VPR (1827) p.510. 
 
142 A crystal most closely approaches this transparency (EPW §317&A). 
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We need not concern ourselves with how in its relation to light the precise 
material structure of this object, results in precisely this color: Hegel does not explain 
this. It is enough to explain what is seen (color) as the expression of a body’s “physical 
ideality” (the unity of its parts with each other). Of course, the visibility of an object (its 
manifestation in color) is not only the expression of its unity with itself: it is also the 
manifestation of its difference from other objects. Yet this differentiation is contingent: 
another body may be the same color as the first, and to that extent the two bodies can be 
indistinguishable.143  As visible, an object is only unified with itself; visibility does not 
guarantee the manifestation of the objects difference from other objects (this occurs only 
in the tangibility of objects, as we will see below). 
Just as sight presents to us an object’s unity with itself as a single visible 
phenomenon, so in hearing we sense a body’s unity with itself in a single sound: and just 
as in sight the determinate color of an object distinguishes it from other objects, so in 
hearing a determinate pitch and timbre of an object differentiate it from others. Likewise, 
just as in the object of sight (viz., color), a body’s physical ideality emerges only through 
a body’s relation to something outside of it (viz. light), so in the object of hearing 
(sound), a body’s physical ideality emerges only in relation to another object which 
strikes it, producing the sound.  
                                                 
143 To be sure, we know that two objects can be distinct even though they have the same color: but we must 
remember that two such objects are not distinct for vision. If the color is the same, then for vision the 
objects are indistinguishable. Of course, we also see shape, and can, using only vision, distinguish objects 
which are distinct but chromatically identical based on their spatial determinations (their precise figures 
and positions in space). However, this does not constitute an objection to Hegel: the fact remains that we 
see only colors, and always only in the medium of light. We can distinguish shapes by sight only on the 
condition that there is a difference in color. 
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An explanation of sound requires an explanation of gravitation. As we have 
said, nature is the idea in its externality to itself,144 i.e. extension, corporeity. All bodies 
are extended; and this extension means that the body is composed of different parts, each 
of which is external to the others. Any single body is thus at the same time many 
(smaller) bodies, since each of its parts is a body in its own right. The concept of 
corporeity (i.e. the concept of nature) thus implies a system of particular bodies governed 
by relations of gravitation.145 
That is, each body is one body, but each is also determined by determinate, 
communicable measures (e.g. motion, weight) such that each body attracts and repels all 
other bodies: the space a body occupies (i.e. its mere extension) and its weight determine 
its ability, when in motion, to repel other bodies; but bodies are at the same time set in 
motion by forces of (gravitational) attraction (forces which belong to other bodies)—
which is equally a function of weight (or more precisely, mass) and its distance from 
other objects. 
Now, this would appear to give us a stable, balanced world of corporeal 
interaction and mutual influence. However, when we consider the fact that any single 
body whatsoever is still a multiplicity of smaller bodies, each of which must have the 
same determinations (attracting and repelling all other bodies)—i.e. when we consider 
that gravity is not a monopoly of immense planets, but that even the tiniest body has its 
                                                 
144 EPW §247. 
 
145 For the sake of simplicity and brevity, in what follows I am combining the account of gravitation given 
in §269 & its Anmerkung (as the culmination of the section on mechanics) and the deduction of specific 
gravity in §293 (in the second part of the physics section). (See p.101n for a note on “deduction” in Hegel). 
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own specific gravity—the concept of the body itself threatens to break down. For, a 
condition for a single body to be a body at all is that it maintain unity with itself; but this 
maintenance of the body’s corporeal integrity is at once the violation of the corporeal 
integrity of its parts, insofar as the latter must cease to repel each other.146 
That is, a body—any body—must cohere with itself in order to repel other bodies 
and maintain its independence, but this coherence of the whole body with itself is for its 
parts (which, recall, are themselves bodies in their own right) adherence to another body, 
the failure to repel this foreign body. The criteria for corporeity thus seem to contradict 
each other, yet (and this is the important part), each of these criteria has been legitimately 
deduced from the concept of nature.  
The result of this is sound: “a body’s inner oscillation within itself.”147 In sound, it 
is posited that the body’s repulsion of all foreign bodies is an abstract independence, 
since every body is itself a union of foreign bodies, which violates their abstract 
independence. In being sonorous, the parts of a body lose their foreignness to each other 
(at least for a time) in their vibration, and the whole body itself is stimulated to this 
vibration of its parts by being struck by a body which is foreign to the whole. Sound is 
thus the expression of the ‘ideality’ of the differences among the parts of a body, the 
qualification of this difference in the expression of the overarching unity of the body. 
                                                 
146 Thus the contradiction that was apparent on the level of the mechanical universe as a whole (viz. that 
each body at once attracts and repels every other body) here finds its way into the core of the most 
miniscule body, and thus is posited of the corporeal as corporeal. 
 
147 EPW §299. In his lectures Hegel describes sound in the following way: “What is called hearing is the 
vibration of bodies in themselves. The body vibrates, i.e. each part [of the body] is displaced [sich verrückt] 
into the place of the others, and is immediately once again pushed out by the others which assert 
themselves”(VPG p.77). 
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Taste and smell on the other hand, are the senses of difference: that is, the soul 
in taste and smell senses a body’s real difference from itself. Accordingly, the natural 
phenomena of odor (i.e. “particularized airiness”)148 and taste (“particularized water”)149 
involve the sensed body literally breaking apart, becoming a gas or a liquid 
(respectively).150 Given that in his deduction of the elements in the mechanics section of 
the Philosophy of Nature Hegel calls air the element of “undifferentiated simplicity”151 
(as opposed to the “elements of opposition,” viz. fire152 and water153), it seems unclear 
why in the physics section he locates particularized airiness (i.e. odor) as a “property of 
opposition.” It makes sense however when we consider that odor is the result of a body’s 
combustion, or catching fire (Brennlichkeit).154 Indeed, Hegel notes in his paragraph on 
                                                 
148 EPW §321. 
 
149 EPW §322. 
 
150 Alison Stone for some reason considers the objects of sensation to be only “light, air, and 
earth”(Petrified Intelligence p.108). She briefly discusses sound (p.121) but does not explain how sound’s 
apparent unrelatedness to the three “fundamental natural elements”(p.108) as she calls them. In discussing 
smell and taste she claims that both are related to air (p.121), though Hegel is very clear that the object of 
the sense of taste is “particularized water,” the liquification of a solid body. Presumably she takes light, air 
and earth as the ‘fundamental natural elements’ because each is associated with one of the three major 
divisions of the senses: light is the object of (one form of) the sense of physical ideality, air is the object of 
(one form of) the sense of real difference, and earth is the object of the sense of concrete totality. But why 
she would exclude the natural phenomena of sound and particularized water from her list of ‘fundamental 
natural elements’—especially given that Hegel mentions them explicitly in the Anmerkung to §401 when 
he deduces the senses—is anyone’s guess. (See p.101n for a remark on “deduction” in Hegel). 
 
151 EPW §282. 
 
152 EPW §283. 
 
153 EPW §284. 
 
154 EPW §321. Similarly, Aristotle says that the sense of smell consists of fire (Sense and Sensibilia 
438b20-21), since odor is a smoke-like evaporation, and smoke-like evaporations arise from fire (438b24-
25). 
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fire that air is implicitly fire (as shown in its compression),155 i.e. the power to 
decompose matter. As air is the element of matter’s combustibility, so water is the 
element of its solubility.156 In both cases, a body’s difference from itself, the material 
externality of its parts to each other, is rendered a real difference when the body is 
brought into relation with these elements: the body physically breaks apart. This breaking 
apart of a body, the real manifestation of its opposition to itself, is at once an event in 
nature and a sensible phenomenon for the soul (either as odor or taste).  
Hegel hardly mentions the sense of touch in the Haupttext: he merely lists it along 
with the others and gives its objects (weight, heat, and shape).157 In the Vorlesungen from 
1827/28 Hegel has little more to say about it. As far as the different senses are concerned, 
he seems mainly concerned in these lectures to demonstrate how the different senses vary 
with respect to the extent to which the soul feels itself in its feeling of other objects: “In 
hearing and seeing we do not feel [empfinden] ourselves, in smell and taste we begin to, 
and in touch [Fühlen] as such the return [to the self] is completed, when I feel something, 
I feel it resist me.”158  
We will not place much emphasis on the fact that the soul is able to feel itself 
more in touch than in the other senses because, as we will see below, the soul’s ‘mixing’ 
with its body (i.e. the fact that the soul feels through corporeal sense organs) has as a 
result that despite the relatively greater degree of self-feeling in touch, all sensation is 
                                                 
155 EPW §283. 
 
156 EPW §322. 
 
157 EPW §401A. 
 
158 VPG p.76. 
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characterized by a certain failure to feel certain natural determinations, namely those 
of one’s own body—i.e. a failure to feel oneself (this will become clear below). Instead, 
here we will focus on how touch unites the ideality peculiar to sight and hearing with the 
difference peculiar to smell and taste. As sight and hearing sense a body’s unity with 
itself, and smell and taste sense a body’s difference from itself, touch senses a body’s 
unity with and difference from itself: this is precisely how Hegel understands solidity and 
gravity (the objects of the sense of touch).  
What is solid and has weight and seeks its own center, holding itself together and 
repelling other bodies: thus it has a unity with itself that is mediated with its difference 
from other bodies.159 The visible body was also determinate (i.e. it was a certain color, 
different from other colors), but this determinacy was only implicit in the visible body: 
only when it is juxtaposed with a body of another color does its determinacy appear (and 
even then, its determinacy is only for us).160 The same can be said of the sonorous body: 
it has a determinacy (of pitch and timbre), but this determinacy is only manifest when the 
body sounds simultaneous with other bodies, and it is only we who recognize its sonorous 
determinacy. Conversely, smell and taste explicitly display a body’s difference from 
                                                 
159 Since sound is also derivative of the cohesion of bodies, it may be unclear why touch is the sense of 
concrete totality while hearing is a sense of only physical ideality: i.e. it may be unclear why sound, is not 
an expression of a body’s being-for-itself just as much as solidity and weight are. However, sound is 
essentially an transient phenomenon: the vibration which produces the sound subsides and the parts of the 
body return to their mutual externality, their mere corporeity. The body then once again returns to silence, 
no longer expresses its ideality. Solidity on the other hand is an expression of a body’s ideality (perceptible 
for touch) that the body has in its own right: an object’s solidity does not require an outside object to strike 
it as its sonority requires. Thus solidity is not ephemeral like sound is. Sound is ephemeral precisely 
because it is an abstraction from the material separateness of its parts. This unsublated separateness 
eventually overcomes the sonorous expression of unity, imposing silence on the body. Solidity and weight 
on the other hand are expressions of a body’s unity with itself that is mediated through its opposition to 
other bodies. 
 
160 See p.71n for a remark on the use of the locution “for us.” 
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itself, but the unity of the body in these phenomena is only for us: as a body disperses 
into a gaseous haze or dissolves in water, we are able to tell that the whole body (now 
really separated from itself) is unified in its odor or its taste, but this unity is not for the 
body in either case (the body itself simply flees from itself). In touch on the other hand, 
the body itself has a sort of “being-for-itself”161: it has its unity by mediation with its 
other (i.e. it has reduced its other to a mere moment of its return to unity with itself). By 
concentrating in on itself, the solid object repels other objects, thus maintaining its 
identity and exhibiting what we might call a differentiated rather than a simple ideality. 
Before moving on to the next section, let us briefly note in passing that Hegel’s 
deduction of the various senses can be compared to the cosmogony and anthropogony 
given in Plato’s Timaeus. There Plato explains how the world soul and the human soul 
are both created by mixing the forms of identity, difference and being: that both the world 
soul and human souls are made from the same stuff (the mixture of these forms) accounts 
for the affinity between the intelligent human soul and the intelligibility of nature, i.e. for 
how human beings can know these forms as they exist concretely in the world. Similarly, 
in his philosophy of nature Hegel deduces natural phenomena which express a body’s 
identity with itself (viz. light/color and sound), natural phenomena which express a 
body’s difference from itself (odor and taste), and natural phenomena which express a 
body’s being-for-itself, i.e. its unity with itself mediated with its difference with itself and 
other objects (solidity, weight). These natural phenomena are the determinations of ‘the 
                                                 
161 EPW §96. 
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world’s soul’162 as it were, which is ‘made of the same stuff’163 as the human soul. 
Thus the human senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch are able to perceive the 
various natural determinations of the world. 
Sensation: what in nature is sensed 
Now that we have had an introduction to the five senses and their objects, we can 
see that sensation is grossly misrepresented by many of those who imagine themselves to 
be its champions: viz., the materialists. Our investigation into the soul and its senses 
makes it clear that the sensing soul and the body cannot be likened to a spider in its 
web,164 any disturbance to the latter of which (which could only be produced 
mechanically) is materially communicated to the former (itself considered as something 
material). To be sure, sensation involves corporeal objects, and a subject which is in 
some sense corporeal as well: but a sensation is not a physical event occurring in the 
brain. Hegel is not opposed to the idea that the body is materially affected in sensation; 
he is only opposed to the contention that this physical affection is the sensation.  
Sensation is a form (albeit a crude one) of spirit: i.e. it is a way in which the idea 
knows itself. It is the idea (as nature) which is sensed (in e.g. a sound), and it is the idea 
(as spirit, specifically the soul) which does the sensing. We should not conceive of 
sensation therefore as the chance meeting (or even the mechanically necessary meeting) 
of two internally unrelated bodies, such that one leaves its imprint on the other as a signet 
                                                 
162 Of course, this analogy is complicated by the fact that Hegel uses the term “world soul 
[Weltseele]”(EPW §391) as well, but color, sound, odor, taste and solidity are not determinations of the 
Weltseele as Hegel understands it. 
 
163 The affinity of the soul with nature for Hegel lies not in the actions of a demiurge, but rather in the fact 
that everything in nature and spirit is only one and the same idea. 
164 Diderot, Le rêve de d’Alembert pp.46-47. 
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ring leaves its imprint on wax,165 and take this imprint for the sensation. This 
materialist account fails as much in its explanation of nature as in its explanation of spirit: 
for, not only is spirit in itself receptive to nature (i.e. to its own self, viz. the idea, though 
in a different form), but also, nature according to its own essence sublates its externality 
to itself, and offers itself up as an ideality to be known by spirit.166 To see how this 
occurs, we must look back to the philosophy of nature, concerning the indispensability of 
which for understanding sensation, Hegel leaves no doubt.167 
We have already discussed the natural phenomena which each sense perceives in 
the foregoing section. To illustrate our claim here (viz., that the sensing soul does not 
receive the sensation as a bare given), let us return to our account of sound and hearing. 
A sound is the expression of a body’s ideality, its unity, in opposition to the differences 
between its parts. Since nature is defined as the externality of parts to each other,168 and 
sound is precisely the momentary cancelling of this difference, it seems that sound is in 
some sense not a natural phenomenon—or at least not merely a natural phenomenon. 
                                                 
165 Plato, Theaetetus 191b-e. 
 
166 Thus although Hegel says that everything in the intellect is first in sensation (EPW §§8A, 400A), we 
should not take this to mean that we receive sensations of natural objects as characters are imprinted on a 
blank slate, and that even in thought our contents retain the arbitrariness and positivity that would belong to 
such an origin. On the contrary, even in sensation, our contents are not foreign articles thrust into the soul 
from an alien nature. Rather, it belongs to the essence of nature to make itself known to spirit. Thus we 
would say that Halbig goes too far when he describes Hegel’s account of sensation as a “concession” to 
sensualism that supports a “foundationalist [fundamentalistischen]” theory of knowledge (Objektives 
Denken, p.55). To be sure, spirit must still go to work on its sensible contents, negating them and working 
them up into thoughts (pp.55-56), but one must recognize that even before it is sensed, a natural 
determination (e.g. a sound) is in-itself comprehensible. 
 
167 Hegel says: “The general forms of sensations are related to the various physical and chemical 
determinacies of natural objects (which are proved as necessary in the philosophy of nature), and are 
mediated by the various sense organs”(EPW §401Z p.103); also “we accepted the content of external 
sensations from the foregoing philosophy of nature as having been proven there in its rational 
necessity”(EPW §401Z pp.110-111). 
 
168 EPW §247. 
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Indeed, Hegel’s philosophy of nature shows that in the phenomena which are the 
objects of sense (color/light, sound, odor, taste, shape, weight), nature in some sense 
spiritualizes itself, makes itself into something that is perhaps more proper to spirit than it 
is to nature.  
Empiricists typically explain the presence of abstract ideas in the mind by arguing 
that these ideas are the products of the mind’s activity on the sense data received 
materially from nature (by some action of nature on our sense organs).169 In light of 
Hegel’s analyses of the phenomena in nature which we sense and our senses themselves, 
it cannot be the case that nature forces itself materially on the sense organs (by physically 
bombarding them for example), violently introducing ‘sense data’ into the mind, and the 
mind is subsequently somehow able to alter the essential nature of this data by 
transforming it into immaterial ‘ideas.’ On the contrary, it is not ‘in the mind’ that the 
boundary between nature and spirit is traversed. Rather, it is nature which works itself up 
into certain quasi-spiritual phenomena which can be sensed by the soul.170 
                                                 
169 Hobbes, Leviathan pp.21-27, 41-46; Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding book II 
chapter 1 §§1-4; Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature book I part I §§1-7, An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding §§1-3.  
 
170 Thus while Hegel does speak of nature in the following way: “Nature is spirit alienated from itself, it is 
that in which spirit lets itself go, a Bacchic God, who does not restrain himself or hold himself together; in 
nature the concept’s unity is hidden,” he goes on to say: “The thinking consideration of nature must 
consider how nature is in itself this process of becoming spirit and sublating its otherness—and how in each 
stage of nature the idea is present; alienated from the idea, nature is only the corpse of the understanding. 
Nature is however only in itself the idea, therefore Schelling called it petrified intelligence, and others have 
even called it frozen intelligence; however, God does not remain petrified and dead, rather the stones cry 
out and raise themselves [or, sublate themselves, heben sich... auf] to spirit”(EPW §247Z p.25). This seems 
to be a reference to Orpheus, the mythical poet who, it is said, gave the Greeks their religion (Pausanius, 
Guide to Greece 9.30.5) in songs which drew birds in the sky and fish in the sea toward him, and even set 
the trees and the stones in motion (Apollodorus, Library I.14, Apollonius Rhodius The Voyage of Argo 
I.23-34). Yet Hegel is saying that the stones themselves sublate themselves to spirit, that nature itself offers 
itself up to be known as an ideality, that Orpheus is not necessary. Hegel’s previous reference to Dionysos 
(i.e. “the Bacchic God”) makes sense therefore, given that it is said that the maenads, wild devotées of 
Dionysos were the ones who killed Orpheus (Pausanias, Guide to Greece 9.30.5). 
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Thus when Hegel says that sound is “the negation of materiality”171 he means 
that sound is the negation of a body’s externality to itself, or that in it which is merely 
natural. That is why while a silent body is simply parts outside of parts, when struck and 
made sonorous, it expresses its unity (the physical ideality of its parts to the whole) in a 
single tone. Accordingly, as the negation of materiality, sound is the negation of the 
naturalness of a body, its transmutation into something more akin to spirit—thus Hegel 
refers to sound as “the soul of matter,”172 and the “abstract soul”173 of a body. He also 
calls sound “soul-like” (Seelenhaftigkeit, Seelenhafte, Seelenhaftes, Seelenhaften) several 
times.174 
Certainly, dead matter, whether sonorous or not, has no soul in the proper sense: 
sound remains in some sense a natural phenomenon, insofar as even in being sonorous, a 
body does not know itself to be the idea. However, if we consider the way Aristotle used 
the term soul (psyche) (and recall how highly Hegel regarded Aristotle’s books on the 
soul175), we will be able to see what Hegel meant in calling sound matter’s ‘soul.’  
For Aristotle, a body’s soul is what makes the body what it is: i.e. it is the body’s 
logos.176 For this reason, the soul is distinct (for our thought) from a body’s matter, which 
                                                 
171 EPW §401Z p.103. 
 
172 EPW §307Z p.196. 
 
173 EPW §323Z p.273. 
 
174 EPW §300&Z, §316Z. 
 
175 EPW §378. 
 
176 Aristotle, De Anima 412b10-12. 
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does not make a body what it is177 (though the soul may be inseparable from the body 
in fact). In other words, the soul of a body is a body’s actuality,178 but ‘a body’s actuality’ 
can mean either: (1) the possession of knowledge; or (2) the contemplation, or the 
exercise of knowledge. In other words, the soul of a body can be either the body’s passive 
possession of a certain rationality, or its active cognition of a certain rationality. After 
explaining actuality in this way, Aristotle says that the soul of a body is actuality as the 
possession of knowledge.179  
Likewise, for Hegel, for a body to be an actual body (i.e. a single, internally 
coherent object) it must overcome the self-externality characteristic of everything 
material: but this overcoming of its externality (the condition of a body’s actuality) is (to 
take one example) the body’s sonorousness. Sound can therefore be seen as the soul of a 
body—and Hegel calls such. Of course, sound is the ‘soul’ of a body only in the sense of 
possessing a certain intelligible character, not in the sense of actively knowing or 
contemplating this intelligible character (which is the sense of “soul” when it refers to the 
human soul). However, it is (in some sense) sonorousness which makes a body a body, 
fulfilling Aristotle’s criterion for a soul (given at 412b10-12): i.e. sound is the rationality 
that a body possesses, its knowability, and thus in some (analogical) sense, a body’s 
“soul.”180 
                                                 
177 Rather, matter is only a thing’s potential to be this or that (and equally its potential not to be this or that) 
(Metaphysics 1032a20-23). 
 
178 Aristotle, De Anima 412a21-22. 
 
179 Aristotle, De Anima 412a23-27. 
 
180 See also Michael Wolff’s incisive analysis of Hegel’s evocation of Aristotle’s passive nous in EPW 
§389: “The sensing soul is the same as the one that is sensible [empfindbar] (αισθητόν) of things; it is 
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It is worth restating that sound is not the soul of a body in the same way that 
the human, sentient soul is. Sound is merely a body’s possession of a logos or concept: by 
being sonorous, a body is intelligible, but not for that reason intelligent. The human soul 
on the other hand is not merely the human body’s possession of a logos or concept 
(except insofar as the human body too is physical and can emit sound when struck, but 
then we are not talking about the soul of this body insofar as it is human), but rather its 
exercise, the actuality of this logos in the sensing of it. Thus a bell for example presents 
its logos, its ‘soul’ to the human sentient soul in its sound. The human soul in its 
sensation of this sound communes with the sonorous body in its (sonorous) form, but not 
its matter: but it is not because of an inability or defect in the sentient soul that it does not 
commune with the sonorous body’s matter; rather, it is because in sounding, this body 
has temporarily cancelled its own materiality.  
Thus though the sensation is not the same as the body in the body’s materiality, 
the sensation is not for that reason only a defective copy of the real object existing in 
external reality. What the body is most truly is how it presents itself as something capable 
of being sensed (here, a sound). The sensation of the bell’s tone is in fact more, not less 
adequate to the concept of what the bell is most properly, because the sensation is not 
                                                                                                                                                 
indeed not itself identical with sensible [empfindbar] (material) things (“for, the stone is not in the soul”), 
but with the sensible form (τα ειδη τά αισθητά) of things. Sensation (αισθησις) is nothing but the form of 
those sensible things (431b27-432a3). Hegel’s conception of the soul as “ideality” takes up the matter as 
one sees here clearly, after and even terminologically directly from the Aristotelian conception of the ειδος 
ειδων. […] The actuality of the sensible [Empfindbaren], i.e. the form, which the sensible thing first makes 
actually sensible, and the actuality of sensation [Empfindens], thus the form in which the actual sensing 
[Empfindung] consists, is one and the same; “the being [das Sein]” however is not the same for the sensible 
[Empfindbare] and the sensation [Empfinden]” (Das Körper-Seele Problem p.54). 
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burdened with materiality as the bell is.181 To be sure, the body’s externality to itself 
is real, just as its unity is, but this externality does not escape sensation: it is apprehended 
in smell and taste, as we saw above.  
This account agrees with Aristotle’s broader theory of sensation as the soul’s 
apprehension of the form presented to it materially (i.e. in an informed material object), 
and becoming this form alone, leaving the matter behind.182 The materialist, supposedly 
the champion of nature, thus does not even give nature enough credit: for, the materialist 
fails to see that even nature is dignified enough to sublate its own self-externality and 
render itself intelligible. To truly honor nature requires recognizing this, and rejecting the 
materialist explanation as a patent absurdity.  
We should also note that Hegel also calls other natural phenomena the “soul 
[Seele]” of the a body or matter, such as specific gravity,183 heat184 (as well as fire185), 
                                                 
181 That sensation is of a higher order than the mere possession of rationality (as e.g. in nature) should lead 
us to dispute the poets when they said that after being blinded by Oinopion, Orion had a boy lead him to the 
place where the sun rises (and thus the place where the sun’s rays are the brightest), and by standing before 
the sun at such close quarters, Orion’s sight was restored (Apollodorus, Library 1.25-26). Light, no matter 
how strong, only possesses passively a sort of intelligibility, and hence is of a lower order of actuality than 
sight, the active knowing of the intelligibility of something illuminated. Light, for Hegel, is nothing without 
(dark, formless) matter which it illuminates, producing the phenomenon of color (EPW §320). Sight 
however, is not burdened with a relation to matter as light is: sight simply takes on the intelligible form of 
that which is illuminated, and discards the matter. It is sight therefore that liberates the intelligible form 
from its material prison in nature; it is not light that brings sight into being (light is necessary only as 
sight’s presupposition). Greek religion redeemed itself however in esteeming Apollo (the “far-seeing” god, 
associated with the active knowing of prophecy) more highly than his grandfather Helios (the sun, the 
passive intelligibility of light). Despite his protestations to the contrary, Plato is the philosopher who would 
be found in this case squarely on the side of the poets, insofar as he says that sight is not the sun, as 
thinking is not the good, but the sun allows us to see as the good allows us to think (Republic 508d-e). 
 
182 Aristotle, De Anima 424a17-23. 
 
183 EPW §318Z. 
 
184 EPW §303Z. 
 
185 EPW §336Z. 
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light,186 and shape generally187 (as well as specific determinations of shape: 
magnetism,188 and crystal189). It is no coincidence that these natural phenomena are called 
soul, insofar as these are the logoi that nature possesses without contemplating them; i.e. 
it is by these phenomena that nature offers itself up (as possessing reason) to be known 
(contemplated) by the sentient soul, through sight (which sees light) and touch (which 
feels weight, heat, and shape). 
Moreover, for Aristotle it is clear that both possessing knowledge and 
contemplation are ways a body can be actual (i.e. can ‘have’ a soul) because, as Aristotle 
says, both sleeping and waking depend on the existence of a soul, and waking is 
analogous to contemplation, while sleeping is analogous to the mere possession of 
knowledge.190 We could therefore give the metaphor that a sonorous object is a sleeping 
sentient soul, while a sentient soul is an awoken sonorous object. The emergence of 
sentient life is thus the awakening of matter or of nature in some sense, when matter (in 
the form of the body with a sentient soul) begins not merely to possess the forms of 
nature, but rather to contemplate them.  
But though the human soul differs from what we might analogously call the 
“soul” of another body (viz. its sonorousness) insofar as the former thinks the 
intelligibility that the latter only passively possesses, we should not lose sight of the fact 
                                                 
186 EPW §325, and in the Zusätze to §§317, 324, 341. 
 
187 EPW §307Z. 
 
188 EPW §314 
 
189 EPW §315Z: here it is called both soul (Seele) and soul-like (Seelenhafte). 
 
190 Aristotle, De Anima 412a23-27. 
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that there is a moment of mere naturalness even in the human soul: the soul cannot 
sense except by being embodied, i.e. except by being in some sense material and natural. 
Let us examine now the implications of this embodiment and what it means for sensation. 
Sensation: the soul as ‘mixed’ with its body 
The embodiment of the sensing soul is not insignificant: it is only because the 
sensing soul is embodied that it has some way to mediate its relationship to its contents 
(and this is what separates sensation from the forms of “natural changes”). This 
mediation allows the universal (the soul) to be determined (in a singular sensation) and 
yet still remain universal. That the senses perform this mediating function for Hegel 
means that: (1) individual contents of the soul are ‘in’ the soul in virtue of sensation (this 
is the connection between particular and singular, or P—S); (2) the soul has as its own 
immanent determinacy the division into the senses (this is the connection between 
universal and particular, U—P, thus making possible the syllogism, U—P—S).  
Hegel uses two examples to show how in sensation the soul maintains itself as 
universal even as it is determined. He says first that colored water is not sentient because 
in the water, the determination (the color) permeates it completely; it is only for us that 
the water (as universal) is distinct from its determination.191 Later he explains that the 
soul is sentient because it knows itself to be capable of being determined in various, even 
contrary ways, while remaining itself. If the soul could see only blue, Hegel says, then 
                                                 
191 EPW §399Z p.96. See p.71n for a remark on the use of the locution “for us.” 
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this determination would be a limitation of it: yet it senses because it knows blue as a 
particular color among others.192 
Hegel’s point here is familiar because it is also Aristotle’s point in De Anima (III, 
4): viz., that the intellect must be “unmixed [αµιγη],”193 i.e. must be distinct in its 
universality from any determination (i.e. for Hegel, any sensation). Were the soul to be 
‘mixed,’ determined in such a way that the soul’s universality would lose itself in this 
determinacy, then nothing would be sensed, and the soul would be rather like colored 
water: completely penetrated by its determinacy. The soul senses only because it is at 
once determined in a certain way (e.g. sensing blue), and it knows itself as something 
distinct from this determinacy. However, because the soul is corporeal, it is always 
necessarily ‘mixed’ in some way, though this mixing only limits without eradicating its 
ability to sense. 
For an example, let us consider the sense of touch: what we call “room 
temperature” is simply the temperature to which we are insensible because it is felt as 
neither cold nor hot (and thus is not felt at all). We are insensible to a certain (range of) 
temperature because we sense corporeally, such that unlike Aristotle’s intellect, our skin 
(the part of our body in which our soul senses heat and cold) is not “unmixed,” since as 
corporeal, it is always already a certain temperature. In other words, our soul is always 
already (as far as sensation of heat and cold is concerned) thoroughly penetrated by this 
determinacy. As a result, the soul does not know itself as distinct from this 
determinacy—i.e. does not maintain its universality in the face of this determinacy, and is 
                                                 
192 EPW §401Z p.103. 
 
193 De Anima 429a18. 
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as colored water is with respect to its chromatic determinacy. The soul instead only 
feels heat or cold when a temperature varies from the temperature by which it is 
determined.  
Thus because the soul is mixed with its body, it senses only determinations which 
vary from its own—i.e. the soul at this stage does not feel itself. Yet in his lectures Hegel 
says that while in the senses of sight and hearing one does not feel oneself at all, in smell 
and taste, self-feeling begins, and in touch the return to oneself is completed, insofar as 
when I feel an object, I feel it resisting me.194 This is true, and does not contradict the 
interpretation I am giving here. What I am saying is that in all sensation the soul is mixed 
with its body, i.e. senses through material sense organs which are already determined in 
certain ways. This prior determination of the sense organs renders the soul insensible to 
certain determinations in nature (room temperature is the best example). The self-feeling 
the soul has in touch is only present when the ensouled body touches something that 
differs from its own natural determinacy.  
Were the soul to sense incorporeally, it would not have such limitations because it 
would be “unmixed.”195 Since however the soul is embodied (and this body is always 
already determined in certain natural ways), the soul is limited in what it can sense, and 
its determinations (e.g. the temperature of its skin) determine for it how it will sense 
things (e.g. what will be felt as cold and what will be felt as hot). We must note however 
that the section on sensation concerns the senses, and only derivatively the (material) 
                                                 
194 VPG p.76. 
 
195 Of course, spirit does know things incorporeally, but such kinds of knowing are not under examination 
here. 
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sense organs. The examination of the sense organs as features of merely natural life 
belongs rather to the philosophy of nature. 
The significance of the senses is that they mediate between the soul (as the 
universal) and its (singular) contents. What this means of course is that it is in virtue of 
the senses that the soul (which is one) is able to relate cognitively to its contents (which 
are many). The senses are many as well, to be sure; and it is not simply because the 
senses are fewer in number (numbering only five) than the infinitely varied possible 
contents that they act as a mean between the soul and these contents. Were that the case, 
then we would still require some mediation between the (one, universal) soul and these 
(many, individual) senses: even if we reduced the mediation to two particular terms, these 
would still be many and hence in a certain sense incommensurate with the one soul; or, if 
we arrived at a single particular term, this would be perhaps commensurate with the soul, 
but not with the manifold content. 
However, the mediating function of the senses is not based on their being 
quantitatively in the middle of the soul and its sensible content, so the foregoing 
objections fall flat. Rather, the multiplicity of the senses and the unity of the soul are 
incommensurate only for the understanding, but not for reason: for, reason is able to 
grasp spirit as self-determining, and thus to grasp the sensitive soul as determining its 
own self into five senses (grouped into three kinds of senses). We saw above the logic 
underlying the determination of the soul into its senses (viz. that this determination of the 
soul is a spiritual concretion of the ontological structures196 which are concretized in 
                                                 
196 It would take us too far afield to delve into the Science of Logic to show precisely which ontological 
structures are being concretized in the sensed natural phenomena and the senses of the soul. Allow me 
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nature as the phenomena which are sensed). That the soul is self-determining in this 
way means that the distinctions between the senses are contained within the soul itself, in 
its concept.197  
Sensation: the corporealization of emotions 
However, sensation concerns not only the mediation which allows a singular 
sensation received from external nature to be felt by the soul, but also the mediation 
which allows determinations of the soul to be expressed corporeally.198 In both cases, 
sensation is the mediation in virtue of which the abstract distinction between what is 
external and natural on the one hand and what is internal and spiritual on the other 
collapses. When a spiritual content is thus corporealized, it is felt.199 In order to 
understand what we might call the ‘spiritualization’ of a natural content (e.g. a sound) we 
had to look back to the philosophy of nature in order to see how such natural phenomena 
were deduced. Likewise, it would be appropriate here to see how, if certain spiritual 
contents are to be ‘naturalized’ in sensation, such spiritual contents are deduced. These 
spiritual contents are emotions such as anger, sadness, shame, grief, joy, etc. A study of 
                                                                                                                                                 
simply to propose here without argument that these structures are identity, distinction and ground (EPW 
§§115-122), i.e. identity in abstraction from difference (concretized in light/color and sound as well as in 
sight and hearing), difference in abstraction from identity (concretized in odor and taste as well as in the 
senses of smell and taste) and the mediated unity of identity and difference (concretized in the tangible 
phenomena and the sense of touch). 
 
197 Of course, the soul is self-determining only in a qualified way. The sensitive soul does not know itself as 
determining itself in its senses, it simply finds itself this way, as it finds its sensible content given to it. Yet 
for us those determinations can be deduced from the soul itself in its universality; and even for the soul, it 
returns to itself in its sensation of a singular content (though this return presupposes material we have yet to 
deduce, e.g. self-feeling and habit). (See p.71n for a remark on the use of the locution “for us,” and p.101n 
for a remark on “deduction” in Hegel). 
 
198 EPW §400Z p.99. 
 
199 EPW §401. See also VPG p.75. 
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sensation should be able to refer to what these emotions are, and also show how and 
why they are corporealized in precisely the way that they are (as e.g. shame is 
corporealized in the reddening of the face, anger in the burning in the chest, etc.).  
Of course, to give such an explanation is not to deny that a causal series can be 
traced back by listing only “natural” terms: a dermatologist (who understands the human 
being as a mere biological organism) would say that the reddening of the face for 
example is caused by rushing of blood to capillaries in the face, and this is itself caused 
by hyperactivity of the nervous system, perhaps as a result of stress (stress of course 
being understood as something physical and empirically observable for an outside 
observer). One could propose such a ‘naturalistic’ explanation for hearing a sound as well 
(making the sound into a disturbance in the air, and the sensation into a physical affection 
in the inner ear). Hegel would not deny that such a series of causes and effects do occur, 
but he would deny that the phenomenon of sound can be reduced to merely material 
causes (since a sound is a body’s momentary sublation of its materiality). Likewise, 
Hegel would not deny that the dermatologist’s explanation of blushing does refer to 
genuine natural facts. However, he would deny that the phenomenon of blushing can be 
reduced to merely organic causes. The proof for this takes a different course from that of 
the spiritualization of nature: it cannot be the demonstration that the phenomenon in 
question must be understood as the overcoming of materiality, because the phenomenon 
in question is rather the materialization of spirit, spirit’s overcoming of its mere or 
abstract ideality, its determination of itself in physical reality. The demonstration that this 
must occur generally is of course the deduction of spirit itself, as outlined in the 
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paragraphs devoted to the “concept of spirit.”200 There it is deduced that spirit must 
“reveal” or “manifest” itself in determinacy.201 The whole of the philosophy of spirit is 
the deduction of the specific ways in which spirit thus reveals itself, and of spirit’s 
knowledge of itself in its revelation. The anthropology concerns the way spirit reveals 
itself in what would otherwise be the merely natural or organic body of the human being, 
and this includes phenomena such as blushing, whereby spiritual contents like shame are 
given material expression. This ‘material expression’ of an emotion is an expression for 
another (who can perceive the reddening of the ashamed person’s face) and for the 
ashamed person (for whom the phenomenon of blushing is also the feeling of his or her 
shame). We do not have the luxury of a separate section to which we can look for a more 
intensive treatment of such emotions in themselves (apart from their ‘naturalization’ or 
manifestation in sensation), as we have the philosophy of nature where are deduced the 
natural phenomena, the account of the ‘spiritualization’ of which is given later in the 
section on sensation. We have therefore to be content with the four paragraphs (along 
with their Anmerkungen and Zusätze) that Hegel devotes to sensation in the 
anthropology. 
The importance of the materialization of the emotions is the very fact that they are 
materialized, i.e. that a distinctively human, spiritual idea like shame should be 
corporealized, and felt (rather than merely being an object of reflective thought). A 
complete account of these emotions would require a systematic deduction of the various 
emotions themselves, apart from their manifestation in sensation. I suspect that such a 
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deduction would have to be integrated into the practical spirit section of the 
psychology. The idea of such a deduction is certainly exciting, but it would be such a 
complicated project (involving going into the details of the psychology section) that it is 
impossible to attempt it here. Once the various emotions are deduced and understood 
systematically, in relation to each other and the concept of practical spirit, the precise 
ways in which emotions are corporealized would have to be systematically justified. 
Perhaps a more able student of Hegel than myself will take up this project.  
Though he does not venture such a deduction, Halbig does argue for a relationship 
between the corporealization of the emotions and another part of the psychology, viz. 
“attention [Aufmerksamkeit]”202 in the section on theoretical spirit. Halbig presents 
attention as a sort of inverse of the corporealization of the emotions in sensation: whereas 
in sensation mediated, spiritual contents are made to appear corporeally, or immediately, 
attention involves spiritual training that enables one to do the reverse, seeing beyond 
what is immediately present (as for example a botanist not only knows more about the 
plant, but actually sees more than does the person unschooled in botany).203 It is thus as if 
natural phenomena (e.g. a plant) were the ‘corporealizations’ on the part of the idea of 
what are properly understood as spiritual contents, and it is spiritual development that 
allows us to see what the idea ‘means’ in its expression in nature. Halbig likewise relates 
the corporealization of emotions in the section on sensation to the role of “feeling” in the 
                                                 
202 EPW §448. 
 
203 Halbig, Objektives Denken pp.98-99. See also Hegel, EPW §448Z p.250. 
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philosophy of religion,204 but we will discuss this in the next chapter (on the feeling 
soul).205 
In closing let us note that at the end of the section on sensation, as the 
anthropology makes the transition from the natural soul to the feeling soul, the individual 
soul is posited as a world-soul (Weltseele),206 a soul with its own (inner) world. It was of 
course originally the universal soul which was called a Weltseele.207 The significance of 
designating the individual soul in this way is that it is posited that the individual soul is a 
universal with respect to the contents of its own inner world: these contents are its 
sensations, which are the collected logoi of all of nature. It remains ambiguous at this 
point what it means that the individual soul is somehow lord over all of nature, yet also 
corporeally limited (to its own particular body): the resolution of this ambiguity will be 
the object of the next part of the anthropology (and our next chapter) on the feeling soul. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
204 Objektives Denken p.100. 
 
205 Barbara Merker correctly argues that the corporealization of the emotions in the sensation section must 
be understood in relation to habit (which belongs to the feeling soul section and which we will discuss in 
chapter five) („Über Gewohnheit“pp.232-233). 
 
206 EPW §402Z p.120. 
 
207 EPW §391. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
THE FEELING SOUL AND THE ACTUAL SOUL 
An overview of the chapter 
In this chapter we will conclude our study of Hegel’s anthropology with an 
explanation of the feeling soul section as well as the short, two paragraph section on the 
actual soul. The nature of the material makes necessary recourse to transcriptions from 
Hegel’s lectures. As mentioned in chapter one, Hegel published his Encyclopedia only in 
outline (im Grundrisse), and this text was always intended to be supplemented by his 
lectures. We will make use of all pertinent lecture material in our investigation into the 
feeling soul and actual soul: both Erdmann’s and Walter’s transcripts from 1827/28 and 
Boumann’s Zusätze. (See the beginning of chapter one for a statement on the use of this 
material).  
However, before beginning let us give an overview of the chapter, including the 
conclusions of the dissertation as a whole. What I set about to show in this dissertation is 
that corporeity is more than mere extension, that spirit itself exists in immediate, 
corporeal form as the human body and soul. In analyzing the soul and the distinctly 
human body I have tried to show (in chapter four, continuing this chapter) how the 
various phenomena that Hegel calls “anthropological” cannot be understood as belonging 
only to organically determined animal experience of the world: rather, they must be 
understood as at once corporeal and distinctly human. The project of uncovering that 
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which is specifically “anthropological” in Hegel’s meaning of the term (i.e. that which 
concerns the specifically human type of embodiment) culminates here in chapter five as 
we explain the difference between sensation (Empfindung) and self-feeling 
(Selbstgefühl), the difference between self-feeling and habit (Gewohnheit), and the 
relations between all three phenomena. Let us briefly outline these relations. 
Sensation, self-feeling, and habit are all concretions of spirit, and thus forms of 
knowledge. In sensation the soul knows the natural world surrounding it through 
mediation of its body and corporeal sense organs. However, this mediation introduces a 
certain wrinkle: because the human body and its sense organs are material (i.e. because 
the soul is ‘mixed’ with a body), they always already bear certain natural determinations 
(e.g. the skin is always already a certain temperature); as a result of this prior 
determination, the soul in sensation is unable to sense precisely those determinations 
which its body bears passively. For example, the precise measure of heat which already 
inheres in the skin is something which cannot be sensed by the soul, even in other 
objects: thus to say that a certain object is “room temperature” is only to say that in 
sensation the soul is unable to sense any temperature in that object at all (because the 
temperature of the object is the same as the body’s own temperature). Thus the mediation 
in virtue of which sensation is possible (viz. the body and its senses) also restricts the 
scope of sensation, rendering certain natural determinations insensible, viz. the 
determinations belonging to the body itself. In other words, the sentient soul is able to 
sense all of nature except for its own corporeity: it can sense everything but itself. 
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Feeling is distinct from sensation insofar as feeling dispenses with the form of 
mediation proper to sensation: i.e. feeling is a form of affective knowing unmediated by 
the body and its sense organs—an immediate form of affective knowing. What stands out 
most clearly in Hegel’s account of feeling is its aberrant nature and the disastrous effects 
that come from a soul being stuck in this form of spirit. However, we must not fail to see 
that the form of mediation proper to sensation (the abandonment of which characterizes 
feeling) has its own drawbacks: sensation of most of nature was purchased at the price of 
insensibility to the determinations of the human body itself (as well as any other objects 
with like determinations). By circumventing sensation’s form of mediation, and allowing 
itself the be affected without the mediation of the body and its sense organs, the feeling 
soul acquires the ability to feel its own self (which the soul in sensation cannot do)—
though with the disadvantage of being able to feel only itself, i.e. being unable to 
distinguish itself from anything felt (thus as we will see, all feeling is implicitly “self-
feeling”). Such is the consequence of the feeling soul’s foregoing of any form of 
mediation at all.  
Habit is the reintroduction of a form of mediation: one that is different from the 
one belonging to sensation. Rather than relying on the naturally given mediation provided 
by the body and its sense organs (as the soul in sensation does), habit is spirit’s creation 
of its own mediation between itself and its contents (i.e. its feelings). As a mediated form 
of experience, habit differs from (unmediated) self-feeling: its mediation allows the 
habituated soul to keep itself from becoming absorbed in any random feeling which 
presents itself—i.e. habit allows the soul to maintain its distinction from what it 
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experiences. However, habit differs also from sensation insofar as the soul’s 
mediation of its relation to its contents through habit does not involve the foreclosure of 
the possibility of affective awareness of itself: habits are not a natural body (where by 
“body” we mean a form of mediation between the soul and its contents), but rather a 
spiritual ‘body,’ the body that spirit fashions for itself. Because habits are not natural, 
they are not subject to prior natural determination in the way that material body parts are: 
as a result, habits do not make themselves unknowable even as they make other contents 
knowable (as sensation through sense organs does). In fact, habits are created by the 
repeated experience of certain contents, and the consequent intimate familiarity that the 
soul acquires with these contents. Thus while the natural body (the form of mediation 
proper to sensation) relays sense data to the soul at the price of withholding any sensation 
of itself, the spiritual body (habit) is a form of mediation that puts determinacies which 
vary from it (i.e. the uncanny, atypical) in starker relief (and here it resembles sensation), 
but habit does so only through the thorough knowledge that the soul retains of the 
determinacies to which it has become habituated.  
In sum: habit and sensation are both forms of mediation between the soul and its 
content (the one a spiritual body, the other a natural body); both habit and sensation allow 
for vivid affective knowing of contents which vary from the determinate character of the 
mediating form in question (whether the habit or the material sense organ); but while in 
sensation the soul is utterly ignorant of the natural determination of its own (natural) 
body (e.g. the temperature of its skin), in habit the soul is very familiar with the 
determinacy of its own (spiritual) body (i.e. the contents of its habits), since habits are 
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actually acquired through repeated experience of (and thus the thorough acquaintance 
with) such contents.  
Armed with this overview, let us examine in a bit greater detail what the transition 
from sensation to feeling involves before we proceed to unfold the particular forms of 
feeling. 
From sensation to feeling 
We are translating as “feeling soul” what Hegel calls “die fühlende Seele,” which 
is to be distinguished from the soul as sensation (Empfindung). For common parlance in 
English there is no clear distinction between the meanings of “feeling” and “sensation.” 
Nor, as Hegel notes, is there in German.1 However, Hegel does give his own particular 
meanings to these terms. We would thus do well to review what special meaning Hegel 
gives to “sensation [Empfindung]” in order better to understand how it is different from 
what Hegel means by “feeling [Gefühl].” 
As we saw in the last chapter, sensation is the final form of the natural soul. That 
sensation is a form of the natural soul means that it is spirit failing to distinguish itself 
from nature. It may help to recall other examples of such a failure on the part of spirit (as 
natural soul) to distinguish itself from nature. One example is how the individual soul 
feels itself immediately in the geographical and climatic conditions of nature.2 For such a 
soul, gloomy weather is matched by its own gloomy mood: i.e. this soul unreflectively 
                                                 
1 EPW §402A. See also VPG p.69. DeVries argues that Hegel did not differentiate between Empfindung and 
Gefühl until the third edition (1830) of the EPW (Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity p.71). What I have just 
cited from Hegel’s VPG comes from the winter semester of 1827/1828. 
 
2 EPW (1830) §§391-392. 
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sees all of nature as its own self, sympathetically feeling melancholic for example 
when the world grows dark. Take for example what we might call “reverse-
anthropomorphic” expressions, expressions which take characteristics of natural 
phenomena and unreflectively transfer them to human beings: e.g. a person’s “gloomy 
mood” or “sunny disposition.” Expressions such as these, which pervade our language 
(and probably all languages), are visible protrusions of the largely submerged level of 
spirit which Hegel calls “the natural soul.” 
To be sure, in some sense sensation is characterized precisely by its successful 
differentiation of itself from nature. Recall Hegel’s example of colored water3:  the 
colored water lacks sensation because in it the universal (i.e. the water) is thoroughly 
pervaded by its (chromatic) determinacy; we are sensible on the other hand because we 
are able to distinguish a determinate sensation we have from our own souls. However 
because the soul is ‘mixed’ with its body (i.e. because the soul senses corporeally), it is 
insensible to natural determinations which are the same as the determinations of the 
corporeal organs with which it would sense such a natural determination.4 Thus we are 
insensible to “room temperature” because it is the same as the temperature of our skin, 
the organ with which we sense heat. Our souls are in this case thoroughly pervaded with 
this tactile determination (viz. heat at approximately 70° F) because the corporeal organ 
                                                 
3 EPW §399Z p.96. 
 
4 As we mentioned in chapter four, in his lectures Hegel says that in the senses of “simple ideality” (viz. 
sight and hearing), one does not feel oneself at all, while in the senses of difference (smell and taste) self-
feeling begins, and in touch the return to oneself is completed, insofar as when I feel an object, I feel it 
resisting me (VPG p.76). This is true, and does not contradict the interpretation I am giving here. What I am 
saying is that in all sensation the soul is mixed with its body, i.e. senses through material sense organs 
which are already determined in certain ways. This prior determination of the sense organs renders the soul 
insensible to certain determinations in nature (room temperature is the best example). 
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of tactile sensation (the skin and its nerves) bears the same determination in the 
merely passive way that all natural objects bear certain determinations. In other words, in 
this case the soul does not maintain its universality with respect to this determinacy. As a 
result, the soul is unable to distinguish itself as a universal (capable of a wider range of 
heat-sensations) from this particular determination (70° F), just as colored water is 
thoroughly pervaded by its chromatic determinacy. 
To understand the difference between sensation and feeling, it is as important to 
understand what sensation is not as to know what it is: i.e. it is as important to know what 
the sensing soul does not sense as to know what it does sense; to put it still another way, 
it is as important to understand how the sensing soul is merely natural as to understand 
how the sensing soul is spirit. This is so because it is precisely in what sensation is not, in 
what the sensing soul does not sense, and in how it is merely natural that it differs from 
the feeling soul. What the sensing soul does not sense is that in virtue of which it remains 
a form of the merely natural soul: viz. its own corporeal determinacy. –This is precisely 
what the feeling soul feels. Thus while the sensing soul “maintains itself as a universal 
even in its determinacy,” it does so only in its sensation of a determinacy which differs 
from its own corporeal determinacy; it fails to maintain its universality with regard to its 
own corporeal determinacy.  
Admittedly, the feeling soul too fails to maintain its universality in this way: it 
identifies immediately and wholly with its particular feeling. However, the difference 
between sensation and feeling lies in the fact that in sensation the soul senses only 
determinations which vary from its own: the sensing soul never takes its own natural 
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determinacy (e.g. the temperature of its skin) as its object, and thus is not even aware 
that it is determined in a particular way. On the other hand, feeling is the soul’s 
awareness of itself as particularized in a certain affection: i.e. feeling is the soul’s 
awareness of itself as something determinate. 
The contrast between sensation and feeling can thus be superficially represented 
in the following way: sensation concerns the soul maintaining its universality while 
feeling concerns the soul knowing itself as a determinacy. Since the soul is the ideality of 
the whole body, and hence something universal, it can appear that feeling is somehow a 
defective form of spirit, insofar as in feeling the soul ‘forgets’ in some sense that it is 
something universal. However, we should not lose sight of the fact discussed in chapter 
four and recapitulated above, viz. that the sensing soul maintains its universality only in a 
restricted way (viz. with regard to natural determinations which vary from its own). Thus 
feeling is not a step back from the (ostensibly) more advanced psychic state of sensation. 
On the contrary, in feeling the soul begins to become aware of that of which the sensing 
soul remained ignorant: viz. its own corporeal determinacy.  
A basic definition of feeling would be that it is the soul relating immediately to a 
certain content, such that the sense organs (which in sensation mediate the soul’s relation 
to its content) are bypassed, with the result that the soul is unable to distinguish itself 
from its content. For example, under hypnosis a certain perception can be transmitted to 
the person under hypnosis without mediation of that person’s sense organs. Thus if the 
hypnotist suggests to the person under hypnosis that the latter is standing on the African 
savannah observing a group of elephants bathe in a lake, the hypnotized person will 
  
259
perceive such a scene, though she may be far from the African savannah and any 
elephants. The perception the hypnotist introduces into the hypnotized person’s mind is 
real in the sense that it is really perceived, though it does not correspond to any real 
natural object(s). A person can have a perception that is ‘real’ in this sense (really 
perceived though without being the effect of real natural object) because the mind can 
have certain contents (feelings) to which the mind relates without mediation of its sense 
organs. If this kind of immediate feeling were impossible, then hypnosis would be 
impossible, and the hypnotic suggestion would be simply doubted or laughed at by the 
intended subject of hypnosis. 
One might object that we need not posit such an extravagant explanation: after all, 
we ‘perceive’ things in some sense even when they are not present. In memory for 
example, I call to mind perceptions of objects which are no longer present physically. 
However, this objection conflates different kinds of ‘perceptions.’ The kind of feeling 
Hegel is talking about in the “feeling soul” section is an immediate feeling, which simply 
confronts the mind in the way that objects of sense perception are immediately perceived: 
if I open my eyes I am simply presented with many objects of sight. In contrast, to call to 
mind a previous perception stored in memory often requires an act of will; and even if the 
memory arises spontaneously (as can happen), it is not experienced in the same way as 
what Hegel calls a “feeling” is experienced.  
For example, I may have seen a lion at the zoo, and subsequently returned home. I 
can then remember the lion, but in my remembering the lion is not immediately presented 
to me as a physically present object. If in my remembering I perceived the lion—now in 
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my apartment—in the same way as I perceived it earlier at the zoo, I would leap out 
of the window in terror of the lion apparently in my apartment. In fact, if memory 
operated in this way (presenting contents to the mind in the same way as immediate 
perception), I would not even be aware that there was such a thing as “memory,” because 
every time my memory presented a content to my mind, I would think that object (which 
in truth belongs to my past experience) was really present then and there. This should 
serve as an introduction to what “feeling” means for Hegel: viz., a content to which the 
soul relates immediately, without mediation of the sense organs. 
Because the soul relates to any feeling it has immediately, it does not have the 
distance from its feelings that would allow it to distinguish even one feeling from 
another, and a fortiori the soul cannot integrate all of its various feelings into one 
coherent order. Accordingly, the feeling soul ‘has’ an indistinct mass of feelings (or, the 
soul is this indistinct mass of feelings, since it does not even distinguish itself from its 
feelings), with no order or mediation between them or between any one of them and the 
soul itself. Thus in the introductory paragraphs of the section on the feeling soul Hegel 
speaks of an “indeterminate pit”5 into which are deposited all of the soul’s feelings. This 
pit is not in the feeling soul; rather, this pit is the feeling soul. In its initial definition, the 
feeling soul is thus only a hodgepodge of sensible determinations that we (concrete 
human beings whose experience is not limited by the moments in play in the soul’s 
sensation) know to have come from the mediation the various senses provided between 
the soul and external nature. Since however the senses do not function to mediate the 
soul’s relation to feelings of which it is already in possession, the ordering the senses 
                                                 
5 EPW §403A 
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provided in the soul’s original reception of the determinations is not maintained. This 
storehouse may be called the soul’s unconscious, since it contains feelings of which the 
soul is in possession, but to which it has problematic and irregular access, and over which 
it has yet to exert effective control.6  
We will see examples of this when we analyze the second moment of the feeling 
soul: self-feeling, or madness. Here it will be enough to establish the necessity of such a 
common “pit” in which all of the various senses bury their feelings. This common 
storehouse of feelings is necessary because, as Plato said, it is not the eyes which see, or 
the ears which hear, but rather the human being (i.e. the soul) which sees and hears 
through these organs.7 Thus despite the soul’s differentiation into the different senses 
(and the mediation these senses provide), all of the differentiated content it receives in 
sensation is still gathered together as the content of the single (and in some sense still 
undivided) soul. This common pit must be indeterminate because no particular term has 
been deduced to mediate between the soul (as universal) and the indistinct mass of 
singular feelings, i.e. no determining principle has been deduced for the feeling soul.8 
                                                 
6 “When we have forgotten something, we are divided [into] the one, which we are in ourselves [an uns], 
and the other, consciousness, the power over us”(VPG p.88). This division is clearly the one which we 
today would call that between the conscious mind and the unconscious mind. Daniel Berthold-Bond argues 
that Hegel anticipates Freud in this respect. (Hegel’s Theory of Madness p.135). Van Der Meulen too 
agrees that in the feeling soul section Hegel is concerned with what we today call the unconscious (“Hegels 
Lehre von Leib, Seele, und Geist” p.260). Of course, consciousness (Bewuβtsein) as Hegel conceives it has 
not been deduced yet. (See p.101n for a remark on “deduction” in Hegel). The contrast here is thus more 
between the awoken mind and the mind which sleeps even in its waking state. 
 
7 Theaetetus 184b-d. 
 
8 As here Hegel discusses feeling as an abstract moment of subjective spirit, so Rousseau discusses a 
similar form of experience as an abstraction, a stage to be surpassed temporally in an individual life: 
“Suppose an infant had at its birth the size and strength of a grown man; that he emerged, so to speak, fully 
armed from his mother’s womb like Pallas emerged from the brain of Jupiter; this man-child would be a 
perfect imbecile, an automaton, an immobile and nearly insensible statue: he would see nothing, he would 
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At this stage, it is only this single storehouse of feelings which makes an 
individual human being an individual human being. To be sure, the spatial limits of his 
body make an individual human being an individual in some sense: but only 
mechanically, not insofar as he is human. Even the one life toward which all of his organs 
work does not make the individual an individual insofar as he is human: rather, this only 
makes him an individual with regard to that in him which is merely animal. In contrast, 
the individuality of the human being lies at this stage in the unique collection of feelings 
which are in the “pit” of his feeling soul (we will see how this is so further on in this 
chapter).  
In recent analytic “philosophy of mind” there has been some discussion about 
whether the mind is “modular,” i.e. whether the mind is composed of separate faculties 
which operate independently of each other and potentially at variance with each other.9 
That Hegel would be hostile to what is today proposed as “modularity” of the mind is 
clear from his disdain for the faculty psychology of his own time.10 However, it could be 
argued that Hegel articulates a “modular” theory of the soul (or “mind”11) in his 
                                                                                                                                                 
hear nothing, he would know no one, he would not know how to turn his eyes toward what he needed to 
see: not only would he not perceive any object outside of him, he would not even relate anything to the 
sense organ which made him perceive it; colors would be nothing in his eyes, sounds would be nothing in 
his ears, bodies he touched would be nothing for his own [body], he would not even know that he is one: 
the contact of his hands would be in his brain; all of his sensations would form around a single point; he 
would only exist as a common sensorium; he would have only one idea, that of himself, to which he would 
relate all of his sensations; and this idea, or rather this feeling [sentiment] would be the only thing that he 
would have in addition to what an ordinary infant has” (Émile tome premier pp.71-72). 
 
9 See for example Jerry Fodor, The Modularity of Mind, especially pp.23-38. 
 
10 See for example EPW §§379, 445A. 
 
11 I hesitate to identify Hegel’s anthropology with what in modern analytic philosophy is called 
“philosophy of mind” because what analytic philosophers generally mean by “mind” is what Hegel would 
call “consciousness [Bewuβtsein]”: an empty subjectivity relating to external, corporeal objects. 
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deduction of the senses: is this not the splitting of the soul into different sensible 
faculties? Christoph Halbig correctly answers this question in the negative: even in its 
sensation (which would involve a determinate sense and an ostensibly ‘modular’ soul), 
the soul brings with it the “categorical determinations of thought.”12 That is, even in 
sensation there are structures of subjectivity that undergird the differentiation into distinct 
senses, thereby guaranteeing the more fundamental unity of the soul as sensation. 
However, while it is true that lower faculties like sensation must be understood in 
the context of the higher ones such as thought,13 there is a simpler response to the 
objection Halbig raises (and one that does not give Hegel the appearance of a Kantian): 
viz., that feeling (which is clearly non-modular insofar as it bypasses the mediation of the 
senses and thus effaces all distinction of ‘faculties’ in the soul) and sensation (which can 
appear modular) are two sides of the same coin. While sensation concerns contents 
insofar as they are received and can be differentiated from the soul, feeling concerns 
contents immediately related to the soul, contents with which the soul identifies 
completely. Thus despite the apparent ‘modularity’ of the soul insofar as it is divided into 
distinct senses, these sensations are all simply deposited into the one ‘indeterminate pit’ 
of the feeling soul. Thus even the apparent modularity of the soul in sensation 
presupposes a deeper non-modularity. The examples we will examine of the feeling soul 
                                                 
12 Objektives Denken p.129. 
 
13 We saw in chapter three how more abstract forms of subjective spirit, such as those given in the 
anthropology and the phenomenology, are only truly understood when one is able to place them in the 
context of the forms of spirit given in the psychology section. Thus for example the affectivity of the 
human being is represented much more abstractly in the anthropology’s sections on sensation and feeling 
than it is in the psychology section. 
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will further show the ‘anti-modularity’ of the soul. Let us proceed now with the first 
stage of the feeling soul: the feeling soul in its immediacy. 
The feeling soul in its immediacy 
We said above that as feeling soul, the soul feels itself in its contents, identifying 
with a determinate feeling. However, in its immediacy, the feeling soul does not 
consciously identify its content as its own self (as it will later, in self-feeling): the feeling 
soul in its immediacy has not even achieved the minimal separation from its content that 
such a conscious identification would require. By describing the soul at this stage as 
“immediate,” Hegel means precisely that between it and its content there is no relation 
properly speaking, but only a naïve identification which is simple (i.e. distinctionless and 
thus relationless). 
What ‘genius’ means 
One phenomenon which for Hegel concretizes very well the identification of the 
soul with a determinate feeling, is the relation the feeling soul can have to its “genius.” 
Such a phenomenon can have various forms, but to understand any of them, we have to 
understand what “genius” means for Hegel. The term “genius” is most commonly used 
today to describe someone who is especially bright or talented, an innovator in a certain 
field. This usage is not wholly unrelated to what Hegel means, but much explanation is 
still required.  
First of all, it is not appropriate to call someone a genius if this person simply 
follows a rule, applying it mechanically. Instead, a genius is one who inaugurates a 
completely new rule, in, say, painting or music: this is the way Kant describes the genius 
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in the third Critique.14 Because genius is not a matter of grasping a general rule and 
applying it to particular cases, the activity of a genius can be seen not to be the result of a 
clear, intellectual and communicable grasp of, say, what is beautiful. For that reason, one 
cannot become a genius, either through study or technical practice: one simply is a 
genius, or one is not. That a given person should be a genius, that his work should be the 
result of such an uncanny power is thus fortuitous and inexplicable: indeed, even the 
genius himself cannot explain his work. Accordingly, geniuses are often said to be 
“inspired” (perhaps by a god), rather than “scholarly.” A scholar wills to understand 
something, and then puts in long hours of study to bring about this understanding, at 
which point he can communicate this knowledge to others. A genius on the other hand 
seems not to be in control, but rather to be subject to his “passion,” or “inspiration,” 
which drives him, perhaps involuntarily or even unconsciously, to create. The kind of 
person we are used to calling a “genius” is thus not very different from his tools: both the 
painter and his paintbrush are only instruments for the painter’s “inspiration,” which 
controls the painter, and through him, the paintbrush. The true “genius” in this picture is 
thus not the painter, any more than it is the paintbrush: rather, it is the powerful force that 
takes control of him, when “he” creates his art. Thus we should not say “Beethoven was a 
genius,” but rather “we owe these sublime pieces of music to Beethoven’s genius.” 
This sketch puts us in a better position to understand what Hegel means by 
“genius” in the feeling soul section. By this term Hegel means the element within or 
outside of a person which controls him. The person under the control of a ‘genius’ is in 
no position to resist this control since he is often unaware that this ‘genius’ is different 
                                                 
14 Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft 5:306-310. 
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from his own self (this will become clear when we have a chance to examine some 
examples). Accordingly, Hegel defines genius as “the particularity of a man which, in 
every case, decides his action and destiny.”15 This “particularity” is the man’s 
“fundamental interests, essential and particular empirical relations in which he stands 
regarding others and the world.”16 
In other words, a man’s “genius” is that in him which controls his destiny and 
decisions (his “oracle,”17 as Hegel calls it) in the same way that an artist’s activity is 
dominated by his genius. The man’s “genius” is his “feeling totality,”18 i.e. the sum total 
of his experiences, temperaments, relations, etc. which make up the “indeterminate pit” 
which Hegel speaks of in the Anmerkung to §403, and which we mentioned above—i.e. 
the unconscious.19 We used above the example of creative, artistic genius to explain how 
                                                 
15 Hegel, EPW §405Z p.131. 
 
16 EPW §406A. See also EPW §405A, and §406Z p.144. 
 
17 EPW §405Z p.132. See also VPG p.37 (as well as EPW §392Z pp.56-57) where Hegel contrasts the 
ancient Greeks and Romans with the people of modernity. The ancients relied on oracles to give them 
direction regarding what to do in this or that situation. Moderns on the other hand use their own subjectivity 
to prudently consider all of the circumstances and make their own decision. Of course, the mere feeling 
soul (whether of a person of the last few centuries or not) is not such a prudent calculator, and only obeys 
an internal oracle where the ancients obeyed an external one. Hegel refers to the ancient use of oracles in 
the context of his discussion of the universal soul, and the tendency of the individual soul (in its capacity as 
the actuality of the universal soul) to identify immediately with nature: thus the flight or innards of birds 
can be taken as a sign of the course one should take. Even when Hector chided Polydamas (who argued that 
an attempt to capture the Argive ships was inauspicious at the time because a serpent had just escaped the 
clutches of an eagle flying overhead), repudiating him by saying “Bird signs!/ Fight for your country—that 
is the best, the only omen!”(Iliad XII 280-281), Hector advocated pressing on only because of trust in 
another, prior sign given by Zeus (Iliad XII 272-273, 278-279), not because of the strength of his own 
independent subjectivity. For the universal soul (in the individual soul, its actuality), the whole of (external) 
nature is its genius, its oracle, just as the “feeling totality” of the individual feeling soul’s inner 
“indeterminate pit” of feelings is its oracle and genius. 
 
18 EPW §405A. 
 
19 Thus Hegel defines the genius as “sensation without consciousness [der bewuβtlose Empfindung]”(VPG 
p.89 note #92). Some have argued that Hegel anticipates Freud in his deduction of this level of spirit (e.g. 
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Hegel uses the term “genius,” and noted that genius in this sense is often thought of 
as simply possessed or not possessed (but not acquired in any case). We should not rely 
too heavily on this example however, since Hegel also understands “genius” to include 
the unconscious, i.e. the residue of experiences that the soul somehow still possesses, but 
to which it is not presently attending, and perhaps to which it may have difficult access: 
for example, mundane details that are experienced, ‘stored away’ as it were, and 
forgotten, without exclusion of the possibility of their recall at a later time. The 
experiences that lie obscure in one’s unconsciousness, and which together constitute 
one’s “genius” for Hegel are certainly acquired, unlike artistic genius. However, we can 
say that in both cases genius is an active force in a person, the arbiter of many of a 
person’s decisions, but one which is not under the control of the person: either because 
the person was simply born with this or that “genius” (e.g. creative capacity), or because 
the “genius” lies inaccessible (or problematically accessible) in (or rather as) the person’s 
“unconsciousness.” Taking the latter example, we could say that this “feeling totality” or 
“genius” constitutes the person’s “character,” provided that we also include the caveat 
that “character” here should not be understood as something deliberately cultivated (as in 
the case of free spirit20), but rather as something acquired haphazardly as a result of the 
unique combination of experiences that an individual happens to have had. Thus different 
individuals respond differently to the same circumstances because of their different 
‘geniuses.’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
Berthold-Bond and Van der Meulen), as we will see below. (See p.101n for a remark on “deduction” in 
Hegel). 
 
20 EPW §481. 
  
268
How such a displacement of the self (as in a genius) is possible 
That the soul is controlled by its genius means that the soul is susceptible to being 
controlled by something in some sense outside of it. To be sure, a human being can be 
subject to external force in many ways which have nothing to do with the feeling soul and 
its ‘genius’: e.g. insofar as a human is extended, it can be dislodged from its position in 
space by another extended body, the product of whose mass and acceleration exceeds the 
product of the mass and acceleration of the human body in question.21 The chemical 
composition of the human body can also leave it at the mercy of other chemicals, just as 
the body’s organic determination (its drives and instincts) can control its behavior. Yet 
the kind of control we are investigating here is only extrinsically related to the 
mechanical, chemical, and organic determinations of the human being. The possibility of 
being dominated by the genius belongs to the soul as such, insofar as it involves (indeed, 
is constituted by) spirit knowing itself immediately in its feelings.  
The genius here can either be the soul’s own unconscious (its “indeterminate pit” 
of feelings that constitutes its ‘character,’ and the total context of its relationships and 
worldly concerns),22 or another person. Insofar as this ‘genius’ then controls the passive 
soul (i.e. the rest of the person or soul, apart from its “genius”) without the slightest 
resistance (because there is not even so much as a relation between the two), the latter in 
a very real sense relinquishes its own self, displacing it into its ‘genius.’ We know that 
the soul is in principle susceptible to such external control because the difference and 
                                                 
21 EPW §261A. 
 
22 See the VPGes p.38 where Hegel says that “Character [Charakter] comprises all inner particularities, the 
way one behaves in private relationships, etc.” 
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externality of nature are nothing for the soul23: just as the healthy, fully developed 
soul permeates its entire body (the material separateness of its parts constituting no 
obstacle for it), so the soul at this primitive stage is able to be extended over bodies that 
are different spatially, and even biologically.24 In such a condition, the person is not in 
possession of its genius: the latter lies rather outside of it, in another (even if this other is 
its own unappropriated unconscious).  
We have seen in chapter four (and again in the introductory sections to this 
chapter) this kind of extension of the life of the soul to encompass what is separated from 
it in a merely natural way. For instance, in the “natural soul” section, we saw how an 
individual soul can unreflectively take itself to be the soul of all of nature, such that 
geographical phenomena are reflected in its mood.25 Thus for the natural soul, the 
darkness enshrouding the world at night, or the shortened hours of daylight in winter can 
lead to a morose, somber, i.e. dark disposition.  
How are we to understand the relation between the natural soul’s unreflective 
sympathy with all of nature (in the “natural qualities” section), and the feeling soul’s 
relation to its genius? Why should they be structurally so similar given the wealth of 
textual material separating them (viz. the ages of life, the sexual relation, sleeping and 
waking, sensation)? It is clear that the course of the text from the “natural qualities” 
section to “the feeling soul in its immediacy” involved going from trying to understand 
                                                 
23 EPW §389&A. 
 
24 It is insofar as the feeling soul extends over bodies without regard to difference on any merely natural 
level (mechanics, chemism, biology), that Van der Meulen characterizes it as the sphere of formal 
intersubjectivity (“Hegels Lehre von Leib, Seele, und Geist” p.260). 
 
25 EPW §392&A.  
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the relation between the diversity of nature on the one hand and the “universal soul” 
which is the ideality of this diversity (but which has actuality only in individual souls) on 
the other, to trying to understand the relation between the diverse feelings making up the 
‘feeling totality’ on the one hand and the (individual) feeling soul which is the ideality of 
this diversity (but which has actuality only in individual feelings) on the other. See the 
Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Comparison of §392 with §§405-406 
 
Thus one result of the course from §§392-405 is that it has been posited that the 
individual soul is not only a singular moment of the universal soul, the “soul of the 
[external] world,”26 but that it is in fact the universal of its own diverse inner world (and 
only in this respect does it really deserve to be called “soul”). In fact, looking back again 
                                                 
26 EPW §391. 
 
(1) 
Enzyklopädie 
paragraph(s) 
(2) The soul’s 
determination 
as ideality to the 
diversity given 
in column 4 
(3) That in 
which the 
soul as 
universal 
has 
actuality 
(4) That 
diversity to 
which the soul 
is related 
immediately 
(5) The 
distortion 
resulting from 
this immediacy 
§392 The universal 
soul 
Individual 
souls 
The diversity of 
the natural world 
The animalistic 
sympathy with 
nature 
§§405-406 The feeling soul 
in its immediacy 
Individual 
feelings 
The diversity of 
the soul’s feeling 
totality, its 
particular world 
The control of the 
soul by its genius 
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to the “natural qualities” section, we can see the deeper meaning of the fact that the 
universal soul (the ideality of all of nature) has actuality only in individual souls.27 
Recall, there Hegel explained that the soul’s first determination was as “universal soul,” 
existing indeterminately as the ideality of all of nature, but noted that this universal soul 
has actuality as spirit (i.e. as a form of self-knowledge) only in individual souls: i.e. 
nature is only known in its ideality in the unreflective sympathy that individual souls 
have with the natural world. With the added context of the intervening paragraphs, we 
can now give a fuller and more precise articulation of what was first expressed as the 
universal soul having actuality only in individual souls. These intervening paragraphs 
have shown that each individual soul has its own ‘inner world,’ as its own ‘indeterminate 
pit’ in which the whole variety of nature is reproduced: i.e. all of nature is reflected 
ideally in the simplicity of each individual soul. It is for this reason that Hegel calls the 
feeling soul “monadic”28: a monad29 is at once a part of all of nature,30 and internally a 
mirror of nature, reflecting ideally all of the diverse relations of nature.31 Thus while in 
the section on the natural soul we were concerned with the individual soul’s relation to 
the ‘external’ world and the universal soul, in the feeling soul we are concerned with the 
individual soul’s relation to its own ‘inner’ world. (Of course, we must note here that at 
this stage the soul has yet to become aware of the difference between inner and outer: it is 
                                                 
27 EPW §391. 
 
28 EPW §405. 
 
29 In other words, a “simple substance,” or a “soul”(Leibniz, La Monadologie, §19).  
 
30 Leibniz, La Monadologie §3. 
 
31 Leibniz, La Monadologie §56. 
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only we who are able to see the difference). In both cases, the soul (as the universal 
ideality of its inner or outer world) has actuality only in its individual moments (either 
individual souls in the case of the universal soul, or individual feelings in the case of the 
feeling soul in its immediacy), with which it is identified immediately. Thus the feeling 
soul up to this point has not resolved the instability that characterized the natural soul: in 
fact, it has aggravated it, reinscribing it in the individual as such. 
But if the feeling soul identifies immediately with an inner content, then how is it 
able to have its ‘genius’ outside of it, in an other? This is possible because the feeling 
soul does not make the distinction between what is “inner” and what is “outer.” In the 
second edition of the Encyclopedia (1827) Hegel called the feeling soul “the dreaming 
soul [die träumende Seele]”32: this makes sense if we recall his account of sleeping in the 
section on the natural soul. There he says: “We defined sleep as that state which 
distinguishes itself neither within itself, nor in relation to the external world. This 
definition […] is justified by experience. For, when our soul senses or presents itself with 
always only one and the same thing, it becomes sleepy.”33 Sleep is thus the condition of 
the soul in which it fails to distinguish itself from the outer world. Because of this, the 
soul can identify immediately with something external to it, taking this externality to be 
its own self (rendering this content equally ‘inner’ and ‘outer’), i.e. relinquishing its 
selfhood utterly to this externality (viz. its ‘genius’). 
                                                 
32 As he also does in the lectures on the philosophy of spirit from 1827/28 (VPG p.87). 
 
33 EPW §398Z p.92. See also VPG where Hegel defines sleeping as that condition in which “The condition 
of being divided [viz. waking] is negated, sublated, such that the natural individual, which was divided, is 
identical with itself”(p.61). 
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Examples of the feeling soul in its immediacy from the Haupttext 
Hegel gives three types of this relation to one’s ‘genius.’ The first example is 
“dreaming [das Träumen].”34 Now, in a certain sense, every shape of the feeling soul is 
the soul ‘dreaming’ insofar as it is the soul failing to distinguish inner and outer; yet it 
turns out that besides dreaming, there are other phenomena that concretize the failure to 
make this distinction. Thus it could be that Hegel changed the name of this section from 
“the dreaming soul” to “the feeling soul” in order to avoid the confusion that is caused by 
naming a genus by one of its species.35 In any case, we have already acquired some 
familiarity with the idea of dreaming as precisely this immediate absorption of the soul in 
its content. Yet we should not think of waking as occupation with the external world and 
of sleeping and dreaming as absorption in one’s internal world. Instead, we should recall 
(again, from the discussion of sleeping and waking in the section on the natural soul) that 
the true distinction between waking consciousness and dreaming is that the soul’s 
contents in its waking life are mediated through each other in an orderly and coherent  
way, while in dreams this is not the case.36 Accordingly, in his discussion of dreaming as 
a form of the feeling soul in its immediacy, Hegel speaks of the individual soul as being 
loosened from its determinate place in nature, experiencing things impossible to 
experience in waking life (e.g. phenomena which defy the causal order of nature, natural 
laws, etc.), and “attaining a profound and powerful feeling of its total individual nature, 
                                                 
34 EPW §405Z p.130. 
 
35 Moreover, it was probably this terminological change that prompted Hegel finally to explicitly 
differentiate Empfindung from Gefühl. 
 
36 EPW §398A. See also VPG pp.62-63. 
 
  
274
of the complete context of its past, present, and future.”37 The soul’s “genius” here is 
thus the whole world of its waking experience, disordered and condensed into a point. 
The second form is the relation between the unborn child and its mother.38 The 
child here is separate from its mother spatially, but this spatial asunderness is nothing for 
the soul. Hegel was convinced that a pregnant woman was a single self spread over two 
bodies such that the fetus has its self only in its mother. To be sure, the fetus has no 
being-for-itself: as we saw in our examination of the ages of life (§396) in the last 
chapter, the fetus has only a vegetative life, and knows no opposition. Whether the 
examples Hegel cites in his lectures (of the mother’s emotions being transmitted to her 
unborn child) are to be believed is less important than his argument that spatial separation 
is nothing for the soul, and that one human can have its self in another. This principle is 
better illustrated in dreaming, or in the third example, which Hegel calls simply “the 
relation of the individual to his genius.” Here is where Hegel gives one of the accounts of 
what “genius” means that we used for the explanation of the term above (viz. that the 
genius is one’s character, the totality of one’s experiences which shapes one’s decisions 
and acts—and hence one’s destiny). The relation between the feeling soul and its genius 
is still better presented however in cases where the genius is another person (though 
perhaps not in the relation already examined between an unborn child and its mother). 
Instead, I would like here to present some examples that Hegel does not use, but which I 
think demonstrate his point rather well.  
 
                                                 
37 EPW §405Z p.130. 
 
38 EPW §405A. See also VPG pp.89-90. 
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Proposed examples of the feeling soul in its immediacy 
Consider for example sympathy pains, or the development of sympathy symptoms 
(which are empirically verifiable by a third party). It is well documented that sometimes 
in cases involving two people or more people who are very close emotionally (e.g. a 
husband and wife), when one is sick or injured, the other will feel his or her pain. Of 
course, if the illness in question is a communicable disease, then the second person may 
simply have caught the illness. But such a biological explanation is impossible when 
considering something like Couvade syndrome.39 This well-documented phenomenon 
involves men feeling symptoms of their wives’ pregnancies, including food cravings, 
hormonal shifts, nausea, labor pains, and, in at least one case, “a swollen abdomen 
resembling that of a fairly advanced pregnancy.”40 Studies of the incidence of Couvade 
syndrome among men with pregnant wives range from a low 11%41 or 22%42 up to 
79%.43 There is also the case of what is called Folie à deux (double madness, or Folie à 
plusieurs if more people than two are involved), in which delusions (often paranoid 
delusions) can be transmitted from one person (the “inducer” or “principal,” i.e. the 
genius) to another merely by close emotional association.44 It has been suggested that 
                                                 
39 See Enoch and Ball, Uncommon Psychiatric Syndromes pp.95-108. 
 
40 Uncommon Psychiatric Syndromes p.100. 
 
41 Trethowan, W.H. & Conlon, M.F. “The Couvade Syndrome.” p.57. 
 
42 Lipkin, M. & Lamb, G. “The Couvade Syndrome: an Epidemiologic Study.” p.509. 
 
43 Clinton, J.F. “Physical and Emotional Responses of Expectant Fathers Throughout Pregnancy and the 
Early Postpartum Period.” p.59. See also Munroe, R.L. & Munroe, R.H. “Male Pregnancy Symptoms and 
Cross-Sex Identity in Three Societies.” p.11. 
 
44 Enoch and Ball, Uncommon Psychiatric Syndromes pp.179-206. 
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cases of mass hysteria, shared religious fanaticism (as for example in murderous or 
suicidal cults), and St. Vitus’s Dance (which Hegel also mentions45) are properly cases of 
folie à plusieurs.46 Phenomena like this are inexplicable for a biologist, i.e. one who 
considers the human being to be simply a form of organic life: they can only be explained 
by an account of the soul, i.e. of a form of spirit which remains indeterminate with 
respect to natural (including biological) distinctions. 
We can consider also other cases of very close spiritual bonds between people 
that engender the displacement of the self of one person or the selves of many people into 
a “genius”: for example, the relation between a leader and his followers in a social or 
political context. Here we have a word for that which makes one person a genius, the self 
of others who are in his thrall: charisma. To be sure, leadership does not always involve 
charisma: some men become leaders by soberly making the case for a certain course of 
action; in such cases however, people consciously follow the policy rather than the man, 
considering the latter only a more or less effective instrument for accomplishing the end 
(which alone captivates them). In other cases however, it is the man himself, and not his 
policies which command a following: such a man exercises a curious control over others, 
which can appear inexplicable to an outside observer who is not under his sway (as for 
example in the case of an observer from a different time or place). We should mention 
that the emotional hold a good orator can have on his listeners is not necessarily perverse. 
It can be a noble, and indeed socially necessary bond. Yet in some cases (as for example 
                                                 
45 Hegel, EPW §406Z p.139. St. Vitus’ Dance was one of the “dancing plagues” of the middle ages, in 
which manic, ecstatic dancing in one person would spread to dozens or hundreds. 
 
46 Enoch and Ball, Uncommon Psychiatric Syndromes p.201. 
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in the case of the leader of a cult, or a demagogue like Hitler or Mussolini) it is 
certainly perverse; and even when this relation is properly political and more appropriate, 
it arguably still has its roots in the soul, and hence concerns us here.  
For instance, the modern reader may be puzzled when reading about how the 
Athenians were enchanted by the speeches of Pericles and Demosthenes, or how they 
were spellbound even by Alcibiades, who more than anyone else led them to ruin. To 
understand this, one must realize that the power of an orator is not based on the logical 
cogency of his argument, or the prudence of his suggestions, but rather on his charisma: it 
is what Hegel called a “magical relation,”47 i.e. an immediate relation that a genius is able 
to establish between himself and another. This relation does not take place on the level of 
the abstract understanding, and does not consist in offering propositions in support of a 
conclusion: it takes place on the level of the soul.  
The sophists famously claimed to be able to teach this kind of rhetorical sorcery, 
though it is doubtful (as many at the time recognized) that such a thing can be taught. 
Admittedly, there do seem to be certain general rules to effective rhetoric, rules which 
one could teach: alliteration, the stirring use of meter, building up to a phonetic and 
semantic cadence, etc. Yet these techniques cannot make a person a great leader any 
more than the similar mechanical application of musical rules can make one a genius 
composer. The speech of a charismatic leader must resemble what Kant considered the 
beautiful object: it must be purposive without purpose, i.e. it must strike and appeal to the 
very heart of one’s audience, without seeming contrived to do so.  
                                                 
47 Hegel, EPW §405A. This is perhaps an unfortunate phrase to use, as it seems to indicate some occult 
phenomenon, an implication which is inaccurate. 
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Indeed, Hegel’s description of the hero in his philosophy of objective spirit 
agrees with this completely: the hero does not think up an abstract constitution and then 
try to apply it to the world; instead, he in some mysterious sense feels what needs to be 
done, and brings it about without reflection or total awareness of what it is that he is 
accomplishing.48 What makes him a hero (and not, say, a madman) is not so much a 
property that he possesses in himself, but only that his actions really are in tune with the 
needs of the time, and that the population as a result does come under his sway, 
assembling around him and following him, even to their deaths.49 
I would suggest therefore that the hero, the charismatic national leader, exercises 
the power of a “genius” over his followers. Indeed, in his lectures on the philosophy of 
history, Hegel refuses to go too far in discussing the role of the hero in founding a state, 
or the constitution of a nation before it has been organized (by a hero) into a state, 
because, he says, such a topic belongs to the poetry of history, not its prose,50 i.e. it 
belongs to mythology rather than history proper (which concerns only the succession of 
nation-states). Just as a state has its origin in the immediate relation established between 
a charismatic hero and the populace,51 an association which however should go on to 
develop into a well articulated state52 (which has no room for such heroes53), so the 
                                                 
48 VPGes p.46. Hegel even calls heroes here “the soul-leaders [die Seelenführern]” of their peoples. 
 
49 For Kant as well, an artist qualifies as a genius only if an audience experiences his work as beautiful. 
 
50 VPGes pp.83-84, 142. 
 
51 VPGes pp.282-283. 
 
52 EPW §549A. 
 
53 GPR §150A. 
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individual is susceptible to coming under the sway of such a genius, but this is not the 
normal, developed human condition.54 
More examples of the feeling soul in its immediacy from the Haupttext  and the lectures 
In discussing this kind of diseased condition in the section on the feeling soul in 
its immediacy, Hegel has much to say about “magnetic somnambulism” and “animal 
magnetism.” These include various phenomena, some almost certainly legitimate, some 
almost certainly illegitimate. Aside from dreaming, and the examples I have provided of 
sympathetic pain and charisma, other cases that I would be inclined to accept as 
legitimate include sleep-walking (i.e. somn-ambulism), hypnotism (which is closely 
related to sleep (hypnos) as its Greek name indicates), and various other mental disorders 
in which one may have hallucinations amounting to the disruption of the relation between 
their senses and their proper organs. I am inclined to reject some of the other examples, 
viz. clairvoyance, and metal and water divination (of which Hegel himself was rather 
dubious55). I am not bothered in opposing Hegel by refusing credence to what he 
apparently found credible (at least in some instances), because all Hegel really need be 
committed to is: (1) that the lowest, most abstract level of spirit is the soul; and (2) for the 
soul natural division is nothing. These positions are not at all incredible. Indeed, it would 
be foolish to claim otherwise: how else would one explain that a single living, feeling 
subject is present throughout the whole body? When it comes to admitting other 
                                                 
54 We could add that since Hegel does not consider it beneath the dignity of philosophy to take the 
individual feeling soul as its object, nor should it be beneath the dignity of philosophy to take as its object 
the pre-political, “mythological” origin of states, the poetry of history. 
 
55 Thus he recognized that a so-called clairvoyant may simply be deceiving himself about what he sees 
(EPW §406A). 
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phenomena as concretions of this form of spirit, I would judge each case individually, 
deferring when appropriate to experts in the relevant fields.56 Dreams belong to 
everyone’s experience, and thus need no proof. Sleep-walking, hypnotism, and various 
kinds of hallucination are well-documented and are accepted as legitimate by the 
American Psychiatric Association. On the contrary, the preponderance of evidence seems 
to rule against clairvoyance, metal and water divination, etc. Before moving on to the 
next section, on self-feeling, let us say a few words about hypnotism. 
Hypnotism, as its name suggests, is a form of, or at least something resembling 
sleep (hypnos): the collapsing of the distinction for the soul between inner and outer. 
Hypnosis is best known for its role in treating neuroses. For instance, Freudian 
psychoanalysis relies on hypnosis for the exploration of the “unconscious”: for a patient 
who displays neurotic symptoms resulting from a past trauma which has been repressed, 
hypnosis is used to gain access to this repressed content. Hypnosis can be therapeutic 
only if the patient has such a repressed content that needs to be brought to light. Hypnosis 
is then effective in inducing the patient’s regression to the level of the soul (which under 
normal circumstances would be undesirable), in order to efface the distinction for the 
patient between inner and outer, such that the patient will willingly divulge to the 
therapist the repressed memory he was concealing even from his conscious self. The 
patient is ‘willing’ to divulge this content under hypnosis precisely because for the 
                                                 
56 That once the two speculative principles given above are accepted the admission of instances as genuine 
cases of the feeling soul in its immediacy is strictly a matter of judgment should prompt us to take the 
feeling soul section seriously (despite the incredible accounts it contains). Hegel’s errors in judgment do 
not at all besmirch the principles of speculative philosophy. We should also note that Hegel should be 
forgiven these errors, insofar as his articulation of the principles of speculative philosophy was, I would 
argue, flawless, and the mistakes he made in judgment are perfectly understandable given the information 
that was available to him at the time. 
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patient under hypnosis, nothing is being divulged: in hypnosis the patient loses the 
distinction between inner and outer; thus, in (what is for the therapist) the expression (i.e. 
externalization) of the repressed memory, the patient recognizes no boundaries (and thus 
nor does the patient recognize the crossing of a boundary). If, as we said earlier, the 
genius is the same as the unconscious, then the expression of the content that has been 
repressed to the unconscious would amount to the liberation from the control of the 
genius. For the artist, it is the very creation of his art, the objectification of the content of 
his unconscious, or genius, that liberates him.57 
Not only do I propose accepting hypnotism as a form of the feeling soul in its 
immediacy, I would propose understanding it in a sense broad enough to include 
phenomena Hegel considers under other names. Accordingly, I propose amending what 
Hegel says of such phenomena (the details of which are given below), in order to 
understand them as instances of hypnotism, rather than ostensible forms of the feeling 
soul in its immediacy whose claim to authenticity we are here rejecting. For instance, 
Hegel asserts that in “somnambulism” or “animal magnetism,” the passive soul and its 
genius can share the same feelings.58 In addition to being possible in cases of Couvade 
syndrome (discussed above), this sharing of feelings would be possible under hypnosis, at 
least insofar as the hypnotist would be able to induce certain feelings in the patient 
through suggestion. Under hypnosis, the patient would be in such a state that there is no 
distinction between inner and outer: for this reason, a suggestion from the hypnotist is not 
                                                 
57 See EPW §448Z p.251, where Hegel describes Goethe as doing precisely this in his literary creation. 
 
58 EPW §406A&Z p.150. See also VPG p.97. 
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grasped as coming from another, but rather is thought to come from oneself. As a 
result, the patient can be made to do or to feel what the hypnotist suggests (within certain 
limits). Not only can the hypnotist thus ‘share’ his feeling with the patient, but also the 
patient’s private feelings can be ‘shared’ with the hypnotist by the kind of divulging of 
private contents described above.  
Now, in his lectures, Hegel seems to think that it is possible for one person to 
immediately intuit the feelings of another59: hypnotism does not allow this, and we would 
not accept that such a thing is possible. Yet what we have described as being possible 
through hypnosis still meets Hegel’s own criteria for being concretions of the feeling soul 
in its immediacy. These criteria do not require the immediate intuition of one person’s 
feelings by another, but only that the proper mediation of the senses deduced in the 
section on the natural soul (§§399-402) be bypassed in favor of an ‘immediate’ feeling of 
the private feelings of another person’s soul. The proper mediation deduced in the section 
on sensation involves the corporealization of an emotion in one person (e.g. a person’s 
corporealization of shame through the reddening of the face), and another person’s 
apprehension of this corporeal manifestation through his own sensation (viz. sight of the 
first person blushing). This is not how a feeling is communicated in hypnosis. 
Admittedly, through hypnosis the feelings of one person are transmitted to 
another through some mediation: viz., that of language (the hypnotist’s suggestion to the 
patient, or the patient’s verbal expression of a repressed content). However, this is not the 
mediation that was deduced in §§399-402, and so hypnotism does constitute a disruption 
of the proper form of mediation. Of course, feelings are also transmitted via language in 
                                                 
59 VPG p.105. 
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more commonplace ways (as one person can simply describe an emotion, and perhaps 
thereby evoke it in another), but this requires the hearer to actively interpret the verbal 
signs of an emotion, and voluntarily reproduce the emotion in himself. The use of 
language in such a case would not amount to a disruption of the mediation deduced in 
§§399-402: sounds known to be external are in this case simply heard and interpreted. In 
hypnotism on the contrary, the hypnotist’s suggestion is not sensed as an external sound, 
and it produces the feeling in the patient without mediation of the understanding or will. 
Thus there is good reason for holding hypnotism to be a genuine form of the feeling soul 
in its immediacy, and moreover to interpret Hegel’s description of other less credible 
phenomena to be more properly examples of hypnotism. 
Additionally, Hegel finds credible the idea that there could be a “common feeling 
[Gemeingefühl]”60 i.e. a generalized sensation that operates either through a different 
organ than the one normally used (such that one sees with one’s fingers and tastes 
through one’s abdomen), or through the body generally. I propose that it is possible for 
hypnotic suggestion (and perhaps also psychosis) to produce such disordered sensations: 
that is, by such means feelings for the patient can be induced, such that, say, chocolate 
would be tasted at the same time as a chocolate bar is placed on the patient’s abdomen. 
However, there is no reason to believe (and every reason do doubt) that anyone (even in 
such a hypnotic or psychotic state) could actually be stimulated in this way by natural 
objects, and through another body part acting as a sense organ, such that he would be 
able to tell what an object was merely by placing it on his abdomen and ‘tasting’ it: the 
sensation of the taste of chocolate would be in truth produced by the hypnotic suggestion 
                                                 
60 EPW §406A&Z p.141. See also VPG pp.94-95. 
  
284
(or by his psychosis), not by the chocolate bar; nor would the abdomen be acting as a 
mediating sense organ. Here I would add the same point as above: the feeling here is 
mediated through language (in the case of hypnosis), but this phenomena of disordered 
senses is still possible, and still qualifies as an example of the feeling soul in its 
immediacy. 
Finally, let us turn to a kind of case to which Hegel does not give a general name, 
but which we might call excessive attachment. Hegel mentions this in the Anmerkung to 
§406, but it is the kind of manifestation of madness that we will treat more extensively in 
our discussion of self-feeling. In this phenomenon, the soul identifies immediately with a 
certain limited, contingent content: e.g. a certain person or a certain place—or more 
properly speaking, the feeling the soul has regarding this person or place. Because of this 
immediate identification, the soul can suffer a terrible trauma when deprived of this 
feeling (since, for the soul, this feeling is its own self, and in such a deprivation the soul 
suffers the loss of its own self). As examples, Hegel gives the grief one can suffer as a 
result of the death of a loved one, the suicidal grief that Cato (the younger) felt when 
faced with the collapse of the Roman republic,61 as well as homesickness generally.62 
This is a case of the feeling soul in its immediacy, insofar as the soul here does not 
distinguish itself from what is for us63 only its content; but by this same token (viz. the 
                                                 
61 See Plutarch’s Lives vol. VIII p.403. 
 
62 Hegel, EPW §406A. See also Hegel’s remark that an Italian woman can become so absorbed in a love 
affair, that when it ends badly she can die “in a single instant”(EPW §394Z p.66).  
 
63 See p.71n for a remark on the use of the locution “for us.” 
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lack of distinction for the soul between its content and itself) this is a case of self-
feeling (Selbstgefühl). 
Self-feeling  
Introductory remarks 
It would seem from the section headings (viz. “the feeling soul in its immediacy” 
and “self-feeling”) that the difference between these two forms of the soul must involve 
the latter being mediated in some way. By “mediated” we mean that the soul (as a 
“universal” with several feelings) is identified with each singular (feeling), but not 
simpliciter: rather, the ‘universal’ is identified with a ‘singular’ only through a 
‘particular.’ We saw in the section on sensation how the soul was ‘mediated’ with respect 
to its sensations through its senses: thus the soul (the ‘universal’) senses a certain 
measure of heat (a ‘singular’ sensation) through the sense of touch and its organ (the skin 
and its nerves). It is this mediation through a determinate sense and a corporeal sense 
organ that allows the soul to distinguish itself from any given sensation: recall, corporeal 
sense organs passively bear certain natural determinations, as the skin passively bears a 
certain measure of heat. But because the skin already has a certain temperature, it is 
insensible to precisely that temperature: thus the sensing soul senses only what varies 
from its own determinations, and knows its singular sensations as distinct from itself in 
its universality. Thus as we saw in chapter four, the sensing soul ‘maintains its 
universality’ in the face of its sensations, always knowing itself as distinct from what it 
knows to be a determinate sensation.  
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In contrast, as we saw in the first part of this chapter, feeling first appears as 
an immediate relation between the soul and its content: this lack of a mediation between 
the soul and its content is the result of the circumvention of the senses and the sense 
organs (which were the mediating particular in sensation) that characterizes feeling. To 
be sure, although the feeling soul experiences its content in an immediate way and hence 
is unable to distinguish itself from that content, we are able in our analysis of the feeling 
soul to distinguish the feeling soul from what we know to be its content. Indeed, it is only 
because this distinction is clear for us64 that we were able to see the feeling soul in its 
immediacy as a disruption of the sensible mediation the soul attained at the end of the 
section on the natural soul, i.e. that we are able to see that the distinction between 
universal and particular is not clear for the soul at that stage.  
We said above that the transition from “the feeling soul in its immediacy” to 
“self-feeling” would seem to involve the introduction of some form of mediation (at least 
this is what the section titles seem to indicate). However, we should not fail to see that 
self-feeling is still in some sense an immediate relation (of the soul and its content) 
insofar as the soul in self-feeling simply takes itself to be (what we know as) its content, 
i.e. the soul here is ‘immediately’ related to its content. How then, is “self-feeling” 
different from “the feeling soul in its immediacy”? They differ insofar as in self-feeling 
the soul knows itself (in its content) as something particular and as a result feels (without 
understanding) a certain incongruity between itself (as universal) and its (singular) 
content—an incongruity of which the soul as sensation is totally unaware, precisely 
because it is mixed with its body and hence senses only other things but never itself, and 
                                                 
64 See p.71n for a remark on the use of the locution “for us.” 
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thus never knows itself as something particular. That the soul feels this incongruity is 
clear for us (as we will see in this section) in the desperation with which the soul in self-
feeling clings to its feeling. That such desperation is felt at all indicates that a minimal 
separation between the soul and its content has been achieved (since without this 
separation the soul would have no inkling that it—i.e. its content—is particular at all, and 
nor would it feel the resulting discomfort). It is because of the achievement of this 
minimal separation between the soul and its particular feeling that we may distinguish 
self-feeling from the feeling soul in its immediacy.  
This is all rather complicated, so we will be well served by articulating again how 
sensation, the feeling soul in its immediacy, and self-feeling differ from each other. 
Sensation involves the soul relating to its content (i.e. its sensations) by mediation of its 
senses and the body in which these senses inhere: i.e. the soul (as a universal) is able to 
have a (singular) sensation because the soul is itself immanently determined into the 
(particular) senses of physical ideality (sight and hearing), real difference (smell and 
taste), and concrete totality (touch). Thus by §402 we have a well articulated picture of 
how the soul (which is one) relates to the natural world (which is manifold). However, 
though the senses mediate between the soul and certain natural phenomena (light, sound, 
odors, tastes, weight, heat, etc.), they do not mediate between the already received 
sensations (i.e. the feelings) and the soul: these feelings simply exist ‘in’ the soul, 
gathered together in the one common “indeterminate pit.”65 That this “pit” is 
“indeterminate” means that as inner content, the feeling is not mediated by the senses 
deduced in the Anmerkung to §401. That is, there has been deduced no other way for the 
                                                 
65 EPW §403A. 
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soul to relate to these feelings except immediately: this is what occurs when for 
example a long-forgotten content (a feeling buried deep within the “indeterminate pit”) is 
inexplicably brought to the surface (as when someone in the grip of sickness 
spontaneously speaks in a language long-forgotten,66 or recites a story or poem heard 
only once long ago67). In such cases the mediation deduced in sensation (viz. the five 
senses) is bypassed, and a content emerges in a way that appears ‘magical’ if we consider 
the natural order to be defined strictly in terms of such sensible mediation. 
However, though at this stage there is not, there ought to be some mediating 
particular that regulates the relation between the soul (as universal) and these singular 
inner contents in the same way that the senses regulate the relation between the soul and 
its outer contents: this mediating particular will be posited as habit in §409. Before habit 
is posited however, we have the section on self-feeling. Though in the last section (viz. 
the feeling soul in its immediacy) there appeared to be an immediate relation between the 
soul and its content, in self-feeling it is posited that the soul is in truth related to its own 
self in its particularity, i.e. the soul (as a universal) feels its own self (in its singular 
feeling). The difference between the two sections is subtle but important: in both its 
immediacy and as self-feeling, the feeling soul identifies with its content, taking this 
content to be itself; yet in self-feeling, the soul knows this content (and hence itself) to be 
something particular, i.e. something felt.  
Clearly, in its immediacy the feeling soul is subject to many problems: its 
experience of the world is disordered as a result of its withdrawal from the body and its 
                                                 
66 VPG p.88. 
 
67 EPW §406Z pp.144-145. 
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senses; it has in some cases relinquished the control of itself to another, i.e. to its 
‘genius.’ Hegel does not in “self-feeling” introduce the nuances that will make possible 
the correction of these distortions. Rather, self-feeling is an aggravation of the aberrant 
state first seen in the feeling soul in its immediacy. However, this aggravation brings 
closer the feeling soul’s resolution, i.e. the resolution of the immediate relation between 
the soul and its feelings. It is only in habit that the problems that characterize the feeling 
soul will be resolved by the introduction of a form of mediation for the soul’s feelings, its 
inner contents. A form of mediation for the soul’s externally received contents was of 
course already deduced in §402: this mediation is provided by the senses. However, the 
anthropology cannot conclude at §402 (after the sensation section), with the senses 
posited as the mediating particular, because at §402 the distinction between inner and 
outer has not yet been posited for the soul. Because this distinction has not been posited, 
it is not yet clear that sensation has only partially mediated the relation between the soul 
and its content: sensation mediates between the soul and external, natural contents, but 
not between the soul and its internal feelings. Thus the soul is initially related to the latter 
immediately, and is hence subject to all kinds of distortions and aberrations. In self-
feeling it is posited that there is some disparity between the soul and its feeling, insofar as 
the feeling is particular, and hence is in a certain sense incongruous with the soul as 
such.68 
                                                 
68 To be sure, the soul’s particularity is real, but the soul is not merely particular. Feeling generally 
constitutes an advance on sensation because in sensation: (1) the soul was mixed with its body, and 
consequently passively possessed certain particular determinations (e.g. having its skin at a certain 
temperature); (2) the soul (because of this mixing) sensed only what varied from its own unacknowledged 
particularity—thus the sensing soul knew itself as universal (in distinction from the particular 
determinations which it sensed), but was ignorant of its own latent particularity. Feeling on the other hand 
bypasses the mediation of the senses, and thus feels itself in particular contents from which it is (because of 
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Our understanding of what Hegel means by self-feeling can be further 
augmented by reference to what he says about “feeling [Gefühl]” in his lectures on the 
philosophy of religion. There he makes it clear that all feeling is—at least implicitly—
self-feeling: “This is what feeling is: the place where my being and the being of my 
object [i.e. what is felt] exist as one. Here my being and the being [of the object] are 
posited as one”69; “‘having [some content] in feeling’ is nothing other than having it as 
mine, and indeed mine as this particular individual—that it belongs to me, that it is for 
me, that I have and know it in its determinacy, and equally have and know myself in this 
determinacy. It is feeling of a content, and equally self-feeling. The content is such that 
my particularity is bound up with it.”70 It appears therefore that if it was not until 1830 
that Hegel differentiated between Empfindung and Gefühl,71 he still had worked out an 
understanding of Gefühl as early as 1824, and until his death this understanding remained 
basically consistent (including with the text and lectures of the anthropology). 
What the lectures on the philosophy of religion contribute to our understanding of 
feeling is thus that in feeling something, one is also feeling oneself. If we are talking 
about a religious feeling (as Hegel of course is in the lectures on the philosophy of 
religion), then this means that whenever I have a feeling of God, I am not simply 
                                                                                                                                                 
this immediacy) unable to distinguish itself—i.e. the feeling soul knows itself as particular—but equally 
because of this absorption the feeling soul cannot recognize that it is not simply identical with its feeling, 
that it is (as a universal) equally associated with other, opposite feelings. 
 
69 VPR (1824) pp.175-176. The same idea appears almost verbatim in the 1831 lectures (VPR (1831) 
pp.123-124). 
 
70 VPR (1827) pp.285-286. 
 
71 As DeVries says (Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity p.71), and as is suggested by the change of the 
section’s title from “the dreaming soul” to “the feeling soul” in 1830. 
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apprehending God, but always also enjoying my own particularity (i.e. I am feeling 
God in God’s relation to me, as a particular empirical individual72). Additionally, we can 
learn that feeling as such for Hegel has as a defining characteristic that consciousness 
(which represents the felt object as something objective and distinct from the subjective 
sensation) is not operative.73 We should not therefore take self-feeling to be a relation 
between a feeling subject and a represented felt self, mediated by consciousness. Instead, 
self-feeling is simply feeling where it is posited for us that in feeling a determinate object, 
the subject itself is determined and felt. To be sure, in sensation there was something like 
self-feeling: viz., the corporealization of the emotions, in which determinations of spirit 
which are in themselves incorporeal (e.g. anger) can be felt (as a burning in the chest).74 
Yet self-feeling is different insofar as sensations which we know to have originated in 
experience with external objects are in self-feeling identified with the soul itself: thus any 
such feeling whatsoever can be invested with the significance of the soul’s own self. This 
condition (unlike the corporealization of the emotions) is the sickness of the soul, i.e. 
madness. 
Self-feeling as sickness of the soul 
According to Hegel, self-feeling is madness, sickness of the soul. Accordingly, 
there are important parallels with the other kind of sickness, viz. sickness of the 
                                                 
72 VPR (1831) p.124. 
 
73 VPR (1824) pp.182-183. He also says this in the 1827 lectures (VPR (1827) pp.287-288) and in the 1831 
lectures (VPR (1831) p.135), though he there says “I” instead of “consciousness.” Of course, das Ich and 
das Bewuβtsein are one and the same (EPW §§412, 413). 
 
74 EPW §401A. Indeed, Halbig likens the corporealization of the emotions in the section on sensation to 
religious feeling: as the soul in sensation realizes an emotion corporeally and therein feels its own emotion, 
so the absolute realizes itself in the world of objective spirit (see chapter three for a review of this), and in 
religion feels itself in the state, its own objectification of itself (Objektives Denken, p.100). 
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organism. It will be instructive to examine these parallels. The organism, the living 
being (recalling our discussion of it in chapter one) should not be thought of as simply an 
extended body operating mechanically like a machine. Even a chemical is more than an 
extended body exhausted by mechanical determinations. A living being should instead be 
understood as a complex of assimilative processes which, far from being simply material, 
are actually the destruction of matter: in their operation these processes take in matter and 
transform it into energy for the continuation of precisely these assimilative processes, 
evacuating the rest as waste.75 The very presence of this waste, as enduring, 
unassimilated corporeity, is a sign that natural life is subject to disease and death. Disease 
for Hegel occurs when one part of the living being (this or that organ or process) begins 
to operate independently of the whole, thereby subverting the self-reproductive activity of 
the whole.76 In natural life, it is the aforementioned inability of the organism to assimilate 
nature completely that precipitates its disease and the death.77  
Likewise, insanity is a sickness of the soul, such that the relation between the 
sphere of the soul (das Seelenhafte) and the “objective consciousness” (the more 
developed spiritual capacities whose deduction follows the anthropology) is one of 
“direct opposition.”78 That is, in insanity the sphere of the soul, or the soul-like element 
(das Seelenhafte) begins to operate independently of the rest of spirit just as for the 
animal, disease involves one organ system operating at variance with the rest of the 
                                                 
75 EPW §365A&Z  pp.489-492. 
 
76 EPW §371. 
 
77 EPW §§375-376. 
 
78 EPW §408Z p.164. 
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animal’s organic functions. Similarly, just as organic disease is provoked by the 
failure to completely digest inorganic nature, the sickness of the soul is prompted by the 
“moment of corporeity” which has not been fully assimilated by spirit:  
Because self-feeling is still determined immediately, i.e. because of the 
moment of corporeity that is still undetached from spirit, and because the 
feeling also is itself something particular [ein besonderes] (here, with a 
particular [partikuläre] corporealization), it follows that though the subject 
has developed to the point of intellectual consciousness [verständigen 
Bewuβtsein], it is still susceptible to disease, remaining as it does in a 
particularity [Besonderheit] of self-feeling which it can neither overcome 
nor assimilate to its ideality.79 
 
It is clear then that there are many structural similarities in Hegel’s account 
between the disease of the living body and the disease of the soul. To understand the 
disease that is self-feeling, we must understand what the unassimilated “moment of 
corporeity” is (quoted above). To understand this, let us recall a key feature of sensation: 
viz. that as sensation the soul is “mixed” with the body (see the discussion of this in 
chapter four). As “mixed,” the sensitive soul is in a sense corporeal, natural: i.e. the soul 
passively has certain sensible determinations in the way natural objects do. For example, 
the sensitive soul is (since it is a human individual) covered with skin; and this skin, like 
everything material is necessarily a certain temperature. That is, this skin passively 
possesses a certain measure of heat. But by being this determinate measure of heat (i.e. as 
a result of this ‘mixing’ with corporeity), the sensitive soul becomes incapable of sensing 
precisely that determination: thus other objects which possess the same measure of heat 
are likewise not felt at all by the sensitive soul (at least not with respect to their 
temperature). In other words, the sensitive soul is ‘mixed’ with a body, and whatever 
                                                 
79 EPW §408. See also Hegel’s lectures: “In illness, that which is not under the control of our conscious 
actuality emerges”(VPG p.109). 
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determinations the sensitive soul has (in the natural, corporeal sense of merely 
passively possessing it), it does not sense; therefore the sensitive soul senses what varies 
from its own particular, determinate condition, but it never senses or feels itself, and 
indeed is unaware that it is particular and corporeal in this way (i.e. the sensing soul 
knows itself as universal, but not as particular, as we said above). The “moment of 
corporeity that is still undetached from spirit” is thus the soul’s own body,80 i.e. that 
which mediates between the soul and its content. It is only when the soul manages to 
detach itself (at least minimally) from this corporeal moment (i.e. its own body) that the 
soul begins to feel itself; but in thus circumventing the body and its forms of mediation, 
the soul leaves this ‘corporeal moment’ unassimilated—i.e. the soul has not provided a 
more adequate form of mediation in the place of the body and its sense-organs. As we 
will see when we reach the discussion of habit and actual soul, the significance of “the 
body” here and “the unassimilated corporeal moment” is simply that of the mediator 
between the soul and its sensation/feeling. The task of the soul is to lose, or detach itself 
from the body given to it by nature, and to fashion its own ‘body’ (i.e. form of mediation) 
for itself. 
We must make clear that we are of course not talking about the soul “detaching 
itself” from its body absolutely: we mean only that in order to feel itself the soul must 
bypass its corporeal sense organs (the form of mediation belonging to its body, and given 
by nature), making itself into its own object, identifying something which it knows as 
particular to be its own self. Thus the feeling soul in its immediacy circumvents the 
senses and feels its content immediately. We saw in chapter two that this kind of self-
                                                 
80 “As self-feeling, we are identical with our corporeity”(VPG p.109). 
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particularization belongs to the concept of spirit. It also belongs to the concept of 
spirit however (as we further saw in chapter two) for spirit to know this particularity as a 
determination of itself (as universal): this should not be done in such a way that spirit 
holds any contingency whatsoever of its self-objectification to be simply identical with its 
(spirit’s) own self, but this is precisely what the feeling soul does (hence it is precisely in 
this sense that the feeling soul falls short of its concept, and is false81). The feeling soul 
has many feelings, and it lives in some sense in each of them; yet it cannot be identified 
with any of them in their immediacy, because each feeling in its immediacy is contingent 
and excludes other feelings, yet the soul is involved in the totality of its feelings, not with 
one only. 
We called attention earlier to a parallel between the feeling soul and the universal 
or world soul from the natural qualities section (see the Table 1 above). Just as the 
universal soul is present throughout nature, in all individual souls and not only in one to 
the exclusion of the others, so the feeling soul is present in all of its feelings and not in 
one only to the exclusion of the others. Hegel does not pursue this point in the natural 
qualities section (or indeed, anywhere else), but we could say that just as the immediate 
relation between the feeling soul and each of its feelings allows for madness, an aberrant 
state in which one feeling lays claim to the feeling soul as such, to the exclusion of all 
other feelings, so the sympathy with nature that Hegel describes in §392 is an aberrant 
state in which a single individual soul takes itself to be the universal soul simpliciter, 
seeing all of nature as an expression of its own inner condition. Or, madness can be 
                                                 
81 Hegel defines truth as agreement between concept and existence, and falsity as the disparity between the 
two (EPW §213A).  
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likened to one race or nation (the particular terms given in §§393-394) which takes all 
of nature to be the expression of its own particular spirit: e.g. what for one nation might 
be a meaningless event, for another is an oracular sign of the favor of the gods for its 
nation to the exclusion of others; or two opposing nations each might interpret a natural 
event as an oracular sign of their nation’s right to dominate the other. The same 
ontological configuration of the terms of the concept which in the feeling soul is an 
individual’s madness, would then in a nation be chauvinism: a deformity to which each 
nation is subject, but which does not agree with its concept, being rather a kind of 
collective madness. 
Returning to the case of the individual feeling soul, because there is no mediating 
particular term between the soul and its feelings, each feeling clamors for the attention of 
the soul, which feels compelled to identify simpliciter with each feeling singly. It is not 
only that the soul is torn between conflicting feelings: the soul has no power over any of 
its feelings, but instead is controlled by them. That is, the soul is not the substance that 
has its feelings as its accidents; rather, the feeling (each feeling) is the substance, and the 
soul is its accident.82 The soul thus recognizes its feeling as something particular, and in 
taking this feeling to be its own self, recognizes its own particularity; but in identifying 
with any given feeling simpliciter, it fails to recognize that it is not limited to this 
                                                 
82 “The soul is always the subject in this judgment (Urteile), its object is its substance, which is at the same 
time its predicate. This substance is not the content of its natural life, but rather the content of the individual 
soul filled with sensation”(Enzyklopädie (1830) §404). This quote does not belong to the section on self-
feeling in particular, but it comes from the introductory paragraphs to the feeling soul section generally, so 
it is applicable. Wallace and Miller have mistranslated this passage by reading noch for nicht. Thus they 
render the second sentence quoted above in the following way: “This substance is still [!!] the content of its 
natural life”—as a result of this error, they must introduce the following locution into Hegel’s text 
(indicated in italics): “[…] but turned into the content of the individual sensation-laden soul.” 
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particular feeling. Thus it is perhaps false, but at least misleading, to say that in self-
feeling the soul knows itself as particular: the soul here identifies with a particular 
feeling, but it fails to grasp precisely how it is particular, and thus identifies completely 
with any and all feelings, no matter how contingent or mutually incompatible. 
Hans-Christian Lucas has made the interesting observation that the logical basis 
for Hegel’s understanding of the sickness of the soul must be in the quality section of the 
doctrine of being.83 Lucas makes much of a certain Zusatz in which Hegel says that 
quality is a determinacy that is identical with being: if something is defined by its quality, 
then its loss of this quality entails the loss of the thing itself.84 Thus Hegel says, quality is 
a determination that belongs to nature rather than spirit; or, we might say in light of what 
we understand the feeling soul to be, quality pertains to nature and to spirit in its 
immediacy. Lucas’ thesis that self-feeling is a concretion of “quality” is plausible insofar 
as madness does involve the soul’s identification with a determinate particular content, 
and the resulting instability (such that with the loss of this content the soul would lose 
itself). Let us examine how this is so. 
Madness 
Hegel deduces three types of madness (the first being further subdivided into 
three kinds): (1) the spirit sunken into itself, which can either be (1a) idiocy (simple self-
absorption in a state of spiritual paralysis),85 (1b) distraction (inability to attend to the 
                                                 
83 ““Die ‚souveräne Undankbarkeit’ des Geistes gegenüber der Natur“ pp.284-285. 
 
84 EPW §90Z 
 
85 VPG p.114. See also EPW §408Z pp.172-173. 
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immediately present),86 or (1c) rambling (the inability to attend to anything at all, 
inability to hold one’s representations together)87; (2) madness proper (in which the 
indeterminate self-absorption of the first type acquires a definite content, on which the 
soul then fixates, according to it objective reality)88; (3) mania or frenzy (where the soul 
becomes aware of the disruption of itself, but cannot rid itself of its fixation).89 
We will not go through each of these in detail. We will merely point out first that 
these three moments give madness in its concept, and in its properly conceptual 
articulation: the absorption within oneself in abstraction from determinacy (idiocy, 
distraction, and rambling); the fixation on a particular content, which implies some 
minimal differentiation (madness proper); the soul’s awareness that it is internally 
divided, that it is diseased, though it has yet to assert control over its complex of feelings 
overcoming this difference (mania or frenzy). In what follows we will focus on madness 
proper (eigentliche Narrheit): in fact, in describing self-feeling and madness thus far, we 
have been describing it as madness proper. 
Madness, as we said, involves the soul becoming totally absorbed in a particular 
feeling, identifying with it completely (feeling itself in this feeling). Such absorption is 
possible only because in feeling the normal mediation between the soul and its contents 
deduced in sensation has been set aside: as we saw in the feeling soul in its immediacy, 
feeling is characterized by an immediate relation between the soul and its feeling. For 
                                                 
86 VPG p.115. See also EPW §408Z p.173. 
 
87 VPG p.115. See also EPW §408Z p.174. 
 
88 VPG pp.115-117. See also EPW §408Z pp.174-175. 
 
89 VPG pp.117-118. See also EPW §408Z pp.176-177. 
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example, in hypnotism, the soul can be made to feel certain things without mediation 
of its sense organs. Moreover, bypassing the mediation of sense organs means also 
avoiding the limitations of sensation (viz. that the soul senses what differs from its 
determinations, but does not sense itself). For this reason it can be said that all feeling is 
(at least implicitly) self-feeling,90 i.e. that the soul enjoys its own particularity in its 
feeling (i.e. this content, which as a mere sensation could be sensed by anyone, is as a 
matter of fact mine, and I feel it as mine).  
Madness thus seems to be a form of the phenomenon which we earlier called 
“excessive attachment,” which Hegel first introduces in the Anmerkung to §406 (still in 
the section on the feeling soul in its immediacy). The soul here identifies with (what we 
know to be) a limited, contingent feeling, which because of its limitation and contingency 
cannot be stably identified immediately with the soul. The healthy, “self-possessed 
[besonnen]” subject on the other hand is able to order all of its feelings into a coherent 
whole, qualifying its identification with each in accordance with the organizing principle 
of this whole.91 This ‘self-possessed’ subject is not the sensing soul with its mediated 
relation to the sensible determinations of natural objects (a mediation that is itself given 
by nature), but rather the more developed soul (in the deduction of which we are 
currently engaged) which has itself fashioned its own mediated relation to its inner 
feelings. The madman fails to do this precisely because he lacks such an organizing 
principle, i.e. a way to mediate his feelings.  
                                                 
90 VPR (1827) pp.285-286. 
 
91 EPW §408A. 
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As an example let us take a madman with an unhealthy fixation on a woman. 
This fixation is an illness because the madman is completely absorbed in his relationship 
with this woman.92 This obsession disrupts the man’s family life, friendships, and work. 
The feeling cannot be integrated into the rest of his life, the other relationships he must 
maintain. Yet, it would be foolish for this man’s friends to exhort him to abandon or even 
temper his obsession with this woman: this exhortation would belie a failure to 
understand the structure of self-feeling. In self-feeling the self feels itself in its feeling. 
The feeling is not an object for the soul, it is a mode in which the soul is. To implore the 
madman to abandon the object of his fixation in the name of ‘being reasonable’ is 
therefore clearly a hopeless endeavor: nothing could be more unreasonable for the sick 
soul. The healthy person who fails to grasp the structure of self-feeling may see the sick 
man’s obsession as one aspect of his life, a particularly harmful one that should be curbed 
or eradicated; but to the sick man, the object of his obsession is quite literally his entire 
life. The rest of his life and the world are for him only a distraction. 
A political analogue may be helpful. In a nation, each member of the nation is in 
some sense the nation itself, immediately existing: each can speak for the nation, act on 
behalf of the nation, exercise the authority of the nation.93 The nation here is ‘universal’ 
(in the sense that it includes many singulars and communes only with itself) though each 
                                                 
92 We said above that in madness the madman ‘accords objective reality’ to his fixed idea. This does not 
imply however that the object of a mad fixation must not exist, but only that it does not exist as the 
madman think it does. The object of the madman’s obsession in this example can thus be a real woman, but 
perhaps one who does not share the madman’s devotion, or have the qualities he attributes to her. 
 
93 At least this is how the classically liberal state (or what we today would call the libertarian state) is 
organized: in Locke’s view, each individual has the inherent right to execute the laws of natural right 
(Second Treatise of Government §7). 
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member is only a determinate, contingent singular (which is not, at least in some 
sense, the other singulars). If the universal and the singular are identified immediately, 
then each member of the nation arrogates to himself the sole right to represent the whole 
nation: but the singular citizen obviously has limitations, contingencies (e.g. particular 
interests at variance with those of other citizens), and inadequacies that the nation as such 
(as universal) does not have. As a result, the immediate identification of universal and 
singular is unstable. Thus during the Terror of the early 1790s, each citizen identified 
himself immediately with the nation: consequently, any difference between one citizen 
and another was held by each to be treason against the nation itself, and the ‘traitor’ was 
put to death.94 
What is needed are institutions that are particular, and differentiate the nation (as 
universal) from itself, but do so according to a principle immanent in the nation itself: 
then a difference in opinion between two singular citizens does not necessitate the 
destruction of the nation (in the person of one citizen) in order to preserve it (in the 
person of another). Instead, each citizen would be identified with the nation only in a 
qualified way; and there would be a clearly defined rationale for determining the extent to 
which a given citizen acts within the law. In other words, in a case of the universal and 
singular relating immediately, what is needed is a mediating particular. For a nation, this 
mediating role is filled by its customs (Sitten), which are the social habits of a people95: 
                                                 
94 PG pp.386-389. Another political analogue would be the kind of national chauvinism that we described 
above, in which each nation (each particular form of the universal) takes itself to be the universal soul 
simpliciter, denying other nations any legitimacy whatsoever. 
 
95 GPR §151. Patriotism too, the disposition to trust the state, is called habitual for the citizen (GPR §268). 
Barbara Merker traces the reappearance of habit in later parts of the EPW and GPR in „Über Gewohnheit“ 
(pp.233-243). 
  
302
these may be formally expressed in laws which mediate between individual citizens, 
qualifying the claim of each to represent the nation in accordance with the degree to 
which his actions are informed by the national customs. Here, in the feeling soul, as we 
mentioned, the particular term that mediates between the soul and its feelings is the habit 
(Gewohnheit) of the individual: habit is a particularizing principle immanent within the 
soul, which qualifies the soul’s identification with each singular feeling to the extent 
required for all feelings to be integrated together as a totality. 
Habit 
Habit as a cure for madness 
But is not habit the process of becoming accustomed to something previously 
alien, e.g. an unfamiliar feeling? If so, then its succession of self-feeling appears 
nonsensical. After all, is self-feeling not characterized by the soul’s complete absorption 
in feeling? Does the soul not commune with its very self in its feeling? In self-feeling the 
soul is involved too much, not too little in its feeling: indeed, the soul is terrified of the 
loss of this feeling, as this would be the loss of the soul’s own self. The lunatic holds fast 
to his fixed idea even as the rest of his life falls apart around him. However, illness brings 
with it the possibility of its supersession, insofar as insanity involves the soul identifying 
completely with what is essentially contingent, transient, and will almost certainly be 
lost. In the experience of this loss, habit is cultivated.  
Thus since the feeling is contingent and its object or satisfaction is easily lost, we 
can see the negation of the fixed idea, its absence as that experience to which the soul 
must become habituated. To put it differently, therapy requires the soul to identify with or 
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feel itself in that which is negative in a feeling (its limitations, contingency) as well as 
that in the feeling which is positive. Madness is therefore not merely the soul’s morbid 
absorption in a singular feeling, but also as the soul’s utter lack of acquaintance with the 
limitations or absence of this feeling. The singularity of the fixed idea, its determinacy, 
entails its relation to its opposite, the absence of such a feeling. As the soul endures this 
loss it overcomes illness.96 What makes self-feeling a susceptibility to illness is the 
determinacy of this feeling (and its consequent incompatibility in a sense with the soul, 
its inability to be immediately identified with the soul in a stable way); yet this 
determinacy also makes the cure in habituation possible. Thus habit succeeds self-feeling: 
habit grows out of self-feeling naturally, while still solving the problem of insanity. 
To make this more clear, we may turn to an analogy Hegel gives: the habituated 
soul is to its individual feelings as the pure intuition of space itself or time itself is to 
particular spaces or particular times.97 This makes sense if we consider that any particular 
space is indeed space; but no particular space is space itself simpliciter: each particular 
space is limited on all sides by other spaces, which the first space is not, but which are 
equally spaces in their own right. Likewise, each particular feeling has a claim on the 
soul (the soul does feel itself in each feeling); but no feeling is the soul simpliciter: each 
particular feeling is limited by other feelings which it excludes, but which have an equal 
                                                 
96 Thus no insanity is incurable aside from what Erdmann records as “idiocy as such [der Blödsinn 
überhaupt]”(VPG p.114) and Boumann has recorded as “natural idiocy [natürlichen Blödsinn]”(EPW 
§408Z p.172). From Hegel’s descriptions, this seems to be what we would today call mental retardation, 
and which is incurable because it stems from physiological causes. 
 
97 EPW §409A. 
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claim on the soul. In habit, the soul identifies with the totality of its feelings, taking 
each as limited. 
To cure madness, Hegel advocates cultivating in the madman feelings that the 
actual world, its relationships and obligations, have value, and are not just an impediment 
to his (perhaps unrealizable) obsession.98 An alternate treatment still in keeping with 
Hegel’s understanding of illness and habit as its cure would be that illness is overcome by 
the experience of the loss of the feeling with which the soul identifies in self-feeling (i.e. 
the experience of the loss of self).99 The initial experience of this loss may plunge the 
madman into the darkest despair. However, that this loss of the self is experienced 
indicates that the self has somehow endured (as that which experiences the loss). The loss 
of self is integral to habit because this loss is the experience of the limitations of the 
singular feeling (that in it in virtue of which it may not be simply identified with the 
soul). This limitation is phenomenally revealed in the trauma of the perishing of the 
singular feeling with which the soul was identified. By “the perishing of the feeling” I 
mean the bitter frustration and disappointment of the soul which loses that feeling with 
which it identified. The very cry of despair can reveal this to the sick man: “I have lost 
myself.” This statement shows that which has been lost to be an object, “myself,” which 
is different from that which has lost it, “I.” Of course I am not claiming that the structure 
                                                 
98 VPG p.120. See also EPW §408Z p.179. 
 
99 It could be that the cultivation of an appreciation for the value of the actual world and its conditions 
would be easier on the patient and preferable to that extent; however, my purpose is not actually to promote 
any change in clinical practice, but only to elucidate Hegel’s account of illness and what habit does to 
overcome it. 
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of language makes insanity curable, but only that this cry of despair can indicate to 
the sick person that his suffering of infinite pain is already his transcendence of it.100  
One way that this trauma could be induced (and which Hegel describes) is for the 
person administering the madman’s treatment to enter into his delusion101 (“in ihre 
Einfälle [or Vorstellung, Verdrehtheit] einzugehen”). Thus Hegel gives the example of a 
madman who claimed to be the Holy Spirit: to cure him, another simply had to enter into 
his delusion (viz., that any person whatsoever can simply be the Holy Spirit), saying 
“How can you be the Holy Spirit? I am it.”102 This technique demonstrates to the 
madman the absurdity of his delusion by bringing it into open contradiction with itself: 
thus while the belief that any individual whatsoever can be the Holy Spirit can in some 
sense justify the madman’s contention that he is himself the Holy Spirit, it can just as 
easily justify the opposite contention (that he is not, because another person is). 
Therefore it is possible to cure someone of madness simply through dialectic. Indeed, this 
is precisely what Socrates does to his interlocutors in Plato’s dialogues: when 
Polemarchus claims that justice is helping one’s friends and harming one’s enemies,103 
Socrates does not present an opposing position. Instead, Socrates simply enters into 
                                                 
100 Hegel often notes how the bare expression of a problem can point to its solution: “Nothing is known, or 
even felt as a limit or lack until one is above and beyond it”(EPW §6A); “Insofar as we know something as 
limited, we are already beyond it”(VPR (1827) p.317); “the very fact that we know our limitation is 
evidence that we are beyond it, evidence of our freedom from limitation”(EPW §386Z p.36); “Even when 
finite reason is spoken of, it proves that it is infinite simply by determining itself as finite; for negation is 
finitude, lack only for that which is the existing sublation [das Aufgehobensein] of it, the infinite relation to 
itself” (EPW §359A). 
 
101 Erdmann (VPG pp.121-122), Walter (VPG pp.119-120 and p.122n line 845), and Boumann (EPW 
§408Z pp.181-182) all describe this. 
 
102 VPG p.122n line 845. See also EPW §408Z p.182. 
 
103 Republic 332a 
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Polemarchus’s delusion, and shows that if he is right, then the ‘just’ person may just 
as likely end up hurting his friends and helping his enemies.104 
The logical comprehension of this phenomenological experience of the loss of 
self is that the singular feeling passed into its opposite (thus revealing the singular feeling 
in its determinacy and its distinction from the soul) while the soul itself persists, and by 
suffering infinite pain proves itself to be not merely this singular feeling, to be as much 
the absence of this feeling as its presence. Over time and through these experiences the 
soul becomes inured to the feelings in which it was formerly absorbed, beginning to 
know itself as something distinct from the random, arbitrary singularity of its feelings. 
The soul identifies instead with what is common to all of them, i.e. it identifies with them 
as a totality, as a particular world.105 
To see how this occurs, let us take as an example the one already referred to, of a 
man obsessed with a woman, his fixation on which eclipses everything else in his life. 
His fixation is based on his total identification with one feeling. Yet, this feeling is 
essentially something contingent and limited. Thus to lose the favor of this, the object of 
his affection is something that this man may very well suffer (indeed, it is something he 
very likely will suffer, if for no other reason than as a result of the erratic behavior that 
would follow from his demented state). What occurs when this man is deprived of what 
he feels to be his own self? He does not disappear in a puff of smoke: instead, he persists. 
He persists not only as an extended body, a chemical compound, and a living being, but 
also as a form of self-feeling, self-knowing spirit, feeling itself now not in a positive 
                                                 
104 Republic 334b-d 
 
105 EPW §§403A, 404, 409 
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phenomenon as before (the object of his mad fixation), but in a negative one: the 
absence of this object (which for him is his own self), an absence in which he now feels 
himself no less than he earlier felt himself in the presence of his idée fixe. The man 
therefore feels himself in the very collapse and death of his selfhood—and thereby he is 
resurrected. The ‘resurrection’ here is the emergence of a new ‘body’ (i.e. form of 
mediation between the soul and its contents): this ‘body’ is habit, a spiritual body, created 
by the soul for itself. In this way the life of spirit can endure the passing of its body (i.e. 
its circumvention in feeling’s immediacy) and the destruction of its own self (i.e. the loss 
of the feeling with which it was immediately identified). For natural (animal) life on the 
other hand, death is its final, unredeemed and unredeemable fate. It would be difficult to 
overstate the significance of this unique aspect of human life, as this is the aspect which 
differentiates the human (ensouled) ‘body’ from all other bodies. Let us examine what 
has been deduced here more closely. 
The soul and the loss of oneself 
When the human soul identifies with the absence of its feeling along with the 
feeling’s presence, then it has become habituated to this feeling such that the feeling 
comes and goes without any tremendous upheaval in the soul. This habituation means 
that the soul qualifies its identification with any merely singular feeling, identifying 
instead with the totality of its feelings as a totality (i.e. not with each one singly and to the 
exclusion of all others, as the madman does). Thus the man in our example would have to 
integrate his feeling for this woman into his larger life, limiting and qualifying this 
singular feeling to make room for his other feelings and commitments. However, we 
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should not conceive of the transition between self-feeling and habit as the slackening 
of the emotional intensity of human life.106 Instead, it is the positing that: (1) as a form of 
the idea, the human soul is self-diffusive, self-differentiating, overflowing into its 
other107; (2) as a form of spirit (the self-knowing idea), the human being knows itself as 
idea, recognizing even at the primitive level of the soul that it belongs to its essence to be 
outside of itself in the way characteristic of nature, that this self-externality is not 
something that must be corrected or destroyed, but rather is only to be qualified (and in 
this qualification preserved) by the reunion of spiritual self-knowledge. Thus spirit is able 
to recognize what is external to it, even in its externality, as its own self.  
Indeed, everything in nature and spirit is the idea. Thus everything in nature and 
spirit overflows itself in this way, being essentially determined by another, and thus in 
some sense having its own self in another. However, everything merely natural strives to 
stem this overflow, to preserve what we know to be its merely abstractly independent 
selfhood (its selfhood abstracted from the other by which we know it to be determined), 
though the loss of this abstractly independent selfhood is inevitable. Spirit on the other 
hand (including human beings insofar as they are spirit) strives rather to lose its abstract 
independence, freely positing itself in another, and knowing itself as essentially self-
differentiating (and therefore identifying not only with its opposite, but even with the 
very opposition of its opposite). To see how this is so, see Table 2 below, and the 
                                                 
106 When habit has been condemned by other philosophers, it is usually this slackening of the intensity that 
was meant. For instance, Rousseau has nothing laudatory to say about habit (Émile tome premier pp.258-
259). Herder (Journal meiner Reise im Jahr 1769 pp.454-461) and Nietzsche (Also Sprach Zarathustra  
pp.13-15) were no less kind.  
 
107 The idea is defined as the realized identity of subjectivity and objectivity (EPW §212): it is equally the 
externality to itself that characterizes nature (EPW §§244, 247), and the knowledge of itself in its 
externality (i.e. spirit) (EPW §381). See chapters two and three for a fuller explanation. 
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subsequent review of the nature of the different kinds of bodies, which will explain 
the material given in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Comparison of different kinds of bodies 
 Selfhood 
constituted 
by 
Has its own 
self 
external to 
it in the 
form of 
 
Strives but 
fails to 
attain 
 
Selfhood’s 
opposite 
contained 
within it 
 
Does this 
sublate its 
opposite? 
 
Mechanical 
body 
Spatial 
extension & 
figure 
Another 
mechanical 
body 
spatially 
external to it 
Total spatial 
extension 
(bad 
infinite) 
Spatial 
limitation 
No 
Chemical 
body 
 
Neutrality 
 
Another 
chemical, 
with respect 
to which it 
is polar 
Absolute 
neutrality 
Polarity No 
Organic 
body  
 
Life Inorganic 
nature, 
which must 
be 
assimilated 
to its 
organic 
processes 
Total 
assimilation 
of all 
inorganic 
nature, 
everlasting 
life (bad 
infinite) 
Death No 
 
 
 
Human, or 
ensouled 
body 
Feeling 
itself in its 
content 
Its genius, 
or its feeling 
Unending, 
immediate 
absorption 
in one 
feeling 
Trauma or 
despair at 
the feeling’s 
loss 
No 
Being the 
ideality of 
its body 
Its particular 
world, or its 
habits 
x Trauma, 
despair at 
the feeling’s 
loss 
Yes, through 
habit 
 
We said that habit emerges when the soul in self-feeling suffers a loss of self: i.e. 
the loss of the feeling with which it identified as (the substance of) its own self. If we 
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recall what was stated in chapter one, we will see that it is the fate of everything 
corporeal to lose itself in some sense. A body limited to mechanical determinations 
would seem to have its self in its extension and precise figure: yet this extension and 
figure is only a relation to another extended body, which limits the first, making it what it 
is, and thus constituting its very self. The mechanical body has its own self outside of it 
therefore, and cannot bear this tension: thus it seeks unremittingly to unite with itself 
(viz., the other mechanical bodies which limit it), being drawn toward them by the closest 
thing such a body has to a life or a will: the force of gravity.108 Yet the career of the 
mechanical body is tragic insofar as it must necessarily fail ever to enter on possession of 
itself: whenever it meets with its other (i.e. its own self), it repels it.109 
The chemical however achieves the selfhood that nature denies to the merely 
mechanical body. A chemical is an element that is explicitly determined by its other (this 
explicit determination is expressed in the polarity of the chemical)—this it shares with 
the merely mechanical body; but the chemical, unlike the merely mechanical body, is 
able to seize the other which determines it in chemical bonding, wherein two chemicals 
which are polar relative to each other combine to form a new substance.110 This new 
substance is neutral, at least relative to the polarity that determined its constituents, and 
thus is in fact what the mechanical body only strives to be: viz. a body for which the 
privation of its own self by a spatial separation is nothing it cannot overcome. Yet it 
becomes clear that the chemical still has its own self outside of it when we understand 
                                                 
108 EPW §§262, 266. 
 
109 EPW §266. 
 
110 EPW §§326-327. 
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that the character of this ‘self’ has changed: the criterion of selfhood is here no longer 
(spatial) extension and figure, but rather chemical neutrality; and though the new 
substance is neutral relative to its constituents, it is still polar relative to another 
chemical.111 Moreover, no matter how many combinations and dissolutions a chemical 
undergoes, it remains merely relatively neutral: the prospect of absolute neutrality is only 
ever a phantom for the chemical, never actually achievable.112  
The living body however is able to maintain its identity throughout chemical 
combination and dissolution, and thus is in fact what the chemical only strives to be, just 
as the chemical is in fact what the mechanical body only strives to be. The animal body is 
a system of processes that maintains itself throughout the combination and dissolution of 
chemicals that constitutes its intercourse with nature (consumption, respiration, etc.).113 
Yet the animal is not simply in possession of itself, because its self is not defined in terms 
of chemism: rather, the self of the animal is the assimilation of inorganic nature, and the 
transformation of this matter into energy for the perpetuation of these assimilative 
processes—in a word, the self of the animal is its life.114  The animal is able to carry out 
this assimilation, but, as we mentioned earlier in this chapter, there remains for the 
animal a “moment of corporeity” which is inassimilable115; and in virtue of this moment 
                                                 
111 EPW §§328, 334. 
 
112 EPW §336. 
 
113 EPW §352. 
 
114 EPW §359&A 
 
115 EPW §365A&Z pp.489-492. 
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of corporeity, the animal is susceptible to disease116 and death117—the termination of 
its life (the loss of its self). 
To be sure, the human being does not succeed where the animal fails by living 
organically forever118; insofar as the human being is also organic, it is subject to death 
just as the animal is. Yet if we consider how the animal feels itself in its other and how 
the human being does so, we will see how the human being appropriates itself in a way 
that the animal fails to do, and how human life is not the same as animal (i.e. biological) 
life. As we explained in chapter one, though the animal is able to see through the 
appearance of alterity on the part of inorganic nature (i.e. the animal can see that 
inorganic nature is essentially its own self, such that the animal does not respect the 
appearance of nature’s independence, but rather falls upon it and devours it), the animal 
has no comprehension of why that which is essentially its own self should appear to it as 
something external and independent at all. That is, the animal is totally unaware of the 
structure of its own self, i.e. its own implicit subjectivity. In other words, the animal does 
not know itself, it does not know that as a concretion of the idea, its nature is to overflow 
its own boundaries and appear to itself as an other.  
                                                 
116 EPW §371. 
 
117 EPW §§375-376. 
 
118 The representation of such an everlasting life is a bad infinite, to use Hegel’s term: i.e. it would be the 
indefinite prolonging of organic life, without doing anything to alter the fact that organic life is mortal in 
principle, that the processes which constitute organic life are equally the processes that bring on death (see 
EPW §§94-95). The deduction of the soul for Hegel is thus not an affirmation of the doctrine of the 
‘immortality of the soul’ if by this is meant the everlasting life of the individual human being. (See p.101n 
for a remark on “deduction” in Hegel). God (spirit) alone is immortal, not human individuals. Human 
individuals (above all philosophers) have a role in God’s immortality, but not insofar as they are animated 
bodies. The only thing resembling immortality granted to the soul as such is its persistence through the 
transience of its feelings. 
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The human being on the other hand apprehends not only: (1) the fact that what 
is external to it is essentially its own self (this the animal also apprehends); but also (2) 
the fact that this, its own self, appears to it as something external (i.e. the fact that it 
realizes itself in determinacy and knows itself in its objectification).119 When Hegel 
opens the philosophy of spirit with an invocation of the commandment of Apollo (“know 
thyself”),120 it is precisely the human being’s knowledge of itself as idea and as spirit 
(the self-knowing idea) that he meant. It is this knowledge which constitutes spirit, and 
which is granted to human beings alone among all natural beings. Both the animal and 
the human being (as also the mechanical body and the chemical) have an other which 
determines them and makes them what they are (i.e. both have their selves external to 
them); but while the animal only manages to see through the otherness of this other, the 
human also sees that within its own self it is other to itself, such that the otherness of the 
other does not need to be annihilated. Instead, the human being communes with itself 
even in the very otherness of the other.  
Sensation, feeling, and habit 
To see how the human being does this, let us reconsider the differences between 
sensation, self-feeling, and habit. It was best initially to explain self-feeling and madness 
with an example that seemed like it could be a real case of obsessive madness: thus we at 
first spoke of a man obsessing over a woman, though this example presupposed many 
more complicated spiritual phenomena that have not been deduced in the anthropology. 
                                                 
119 Thus Hegel says that madness (in which the human soul first apprehends what it knows as particular to 
be its own self) is a privilege (Vorrecht) only of man (EPW §408Z p.168). 
 
120 EPW §377. 
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Here on the other hand, let us return to the simpler example of sensing or feeling heat, 
as this better allows a comparison of all three spiritual forms we are concerned with (viz., 
sensation, feeling, and habit).  
In sensation the human soul is ‘mixed’ with its body, such that it passively 
possesses certain properties (in the way that something merely natural does) as well as 
senses the properties of natural objects in its capacity as spirit. Yet because of this 
mixing, the soul senses only what is different from itself (being unable to sense anything 
with the same determination that it possesses itself in its capacity as a merely natural 
body). In other words, because of its being mixed with a body, the soul’s spiritual activity 
is limited by its corporeal, natural passivity, such that here nature and spirit are opposed, 
a sure sign that sensation is a poor representation of spirit.121 Thus in its tactile capacity, 
the sensing soul is mixed with the skin and its nerves, which, insofar as they are 
corporeal, already bear certain natural determinations: e.g. the skin is normally about 
70°F. As a result, the sensing soul is insensible to precisely such a determination among 
any natural bodies it may encounter (sensing only what varies from its own natural 
determination). 
In feeling on the other hand, the soul dispenses with the mediating senses and the 
corporeal organs they use (i.e. bypasses its own corporeity), and thereby is able to ‘feel 
its own self’ insofar as any of its contents can be immediately identified with it. 
However, this ‘bypassing’ leaves its body (the mediation between it and its sensations) as 
an unassimilated ‘moment of corporeity’ in virtue of which the soul is susceptible to 
                                                 
121 Recall, in its concept spirit is the truth of nature, such that it presupposes nature only in order to realize 
itself in it (EPW §381). See chapter two. 
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disease. That is, lacking any mediation between itself and its singular content (which 
is, recall, its own self), the soul becomes disordered, identifying completely with different 
and mutually exclusive feelings. In this state of madness, the soul knows that its feeling is 
itself, but has not grasped that its own self is internally divided and self-determining, such 
that it makes its own self into an object according to a particularizing (i.e. mediating) 
principle immanent within it. If the soul at this stage understood that as spirit it is self-
determining in this way, then it would not identify itself simpliciter with a single, 
contingent, limited feeling. Instead, it would organize its various feelings into a totality 
and feel itself in a given singular feeling only to the extent possible according to the 
rationale governing the whole of its ‘particular world.’ In other words, the soul would be 
habituated to its feelings, no longer identifying with each singular feeling immediately. 
In other words, the soul would have become incarnated in a spiritual ‘body’ of its own 
making. To the extent that the soul fails to organize and mediate its feelings in this way, 
it is the mere feeling soul in its immediacy, or self-feeling. 
Take for example the various relationships with one’s genius, such as hypnotism. 
The hypnotized feeling soul receives certain feelings immediately, without the normal 
sensible mediation. Thus if a hypnotist suggests to his patient that the latter is feeling 
heat, a feeling of heat will emerge in the patient’s soul, though the skin and the sense of 
‘concrete totality’ has been bypassed. The soul is in this case not sensing only what varies 
from its own unacknowledged corporeal determination (as the soul does in sensation), but 
instead is feeling something to which it is related immediately, and which is thus 
indistinguishable from its own self. We know however that this feeling of a determinate 
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degree of heat is incommensurate with the soul as such, insofar as this feeling 
excludes other feelings which the soul includes. The ‘moment of corporeity’ has been set 
aside, but not assimilated: insofar as feeling withdraws from the sensible mediation 
belonging to the body naturally (viz. the senses), identifying instead immediately with 
any and every content in its ‘indeterminate pit,’ feeling does nothing to assimilate the 
body to the soul, i.e. feeling does not replace the mediation given by nature with any of 
its own forms of mediation. However, the soul must not flee from the body; instead, it 
must become flesh. Feeling produces its own mediation only as habit. 
There are two especially pertinent aspects of habit that we should examine 
separately (to the extent that their separation is possible). First, in habit, as in sensation, 
the soul in some sense no longer feels certain things, or at least does not attend to certain 
things it feels. For example, though the human body has certain natural determinations 
not directly under the control of the person (e.g. the temperature of one’s skin), through 
habit the soul can become accustomed to feelings which vary from its own natural 
determination. Thus one can become used to cold or heat, ceasing in some sense to feel 
them. However, this apathy is not a result of the kind of ‘mixing’ with the body that 
characterizes sensation. In sensation the soul is unaware of its being mixed with its body 
(which itself is merely natural), and is unaware that consequently it passively bears 
certain natural determinations. The soul in sensation is likewise unaware that as a result it 
is insensible to the natural determinations characterizing its unacknowledged corporeity. 
In contrast, in habit the soul makes itself inured to certain contents by repeated and 
prolonged exposure to these feelings in their entirety (i.e. including the limitations of 
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these contents, that which is negative in them and unable to be immediately identified 
with the soul in a stable way), such that its apathy with respect to these contents is 
acquired through familiarity with them, not unawareness of them (as in sensation). Habit 
is able to inure the soul to contents which vary from the body’s own natural 
determinations because habit is a mediation with respect to feelings generally, including 
external sensations and inner feelings. Once anything is sensed, it is deposited into the 
soul’s ‘indeterminate pit’ as a feeling in the soul’s possession, with which it can (in 
sickness) unite immediately, bypassing the mediating senses. Yet by repeated exposure to 
this and similar feelings, the soul is able to produce within itself a sort of generalized 
image of these feelings in virtue of which it need never again relate to such feelings 
immediately. Thus while in sensation the soul is still a form of the merely natural soul 
(natürliche Seele), habit is the soul’s “second nature,”122 the nature (or corporeal element, 
i.e. body) that the soul has created for itself. 
Second, in habit the soul becomes aware of that in the feeling which is in some 
sense incompatible with the soul (i.e. that in the feeling which makes it unable to be 
stably identified with the soul immediately). This is precisely what makes it possible for 
the soul to become inured to a given feeling in the way described above. So long as the 
feeling is for the soul simply itself simpliciter (as it must be when the soul is related to it 
merely immediately), the soul relates to its feeling in the brutal way that the animal 
relates to inorganic nature: as something with only the semblance of objectivity (which is 
not to be dwelled upon or taken seriously), but which is really one’s own self (which for 
its part is unreflectively taken as something simple, undifferentiated, and only abstractly 
                                                 
122 EPW §410A. 
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independent). It is because the madman does not grasp that the singular feelings are 
incompatible (in some sense) with his own soul, yet identifies with each immediately that 
he feels the anguish and torment that characterize his insanity (just as the animal takes 
inorganic nature to be its own self simpliciter, and thus in the face of nature’s apparent 
independence feels rage (Zorn) toward its object123). The madman, like the animal, does 
not know that it belongs to the nature of his own self to appear to him as something 
objective, and thus though he communes with himself in his object, he does not do so in 
the objectivity, i.e. in the otherness of the object. Habit is that spiritual phenomenon in 
which the human being posits that it is identified with all of its singular feelings, but not 
immediately (rather, by mediation of the particular habits). In this way the human being 
is in fact what the animal only strives to be: viz., the assimilation of the final “moment of 
corporeity,” becoming truly the ideality of its body. Thus while habit differs from 
sensation (insofar as habit is the mediation that spirit provides for itself, such that the soul 
is familiar with the habituated content, in contrast to the determinations of the sense 
organs of which the soul in sensation is ignorant), habit seems in some sense to be a 
return to a form of “sensation” loosely understood.  
Habit as a kind of “sense” with a wider scope than Empfindung 
What I mean by saying that habit seems to be a return to a form of sensation is: 
(1) that habit involves the reintroduction of a form of mediation between the soul and its 
contents (in this habit resembles sensation, but differs from the intervening stage of self-
feeling); (2) that habit makes it possible for a person to have a ‘sense’ for a much wider 
range of phenomena than is possible with sensation proper (i.e. the form of the natural 
                                                 
123 EPW §365A. 
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soul that Hegel calls Empfindung). The wider range of phenomena that habit opens 
for experience includes social and other specifically human phenomena (see the examples 
I will provide below).  
The first point above (viz. that both sensation and habit involve the soul’s 
mediation of its contents) is true simply in virtue of the ontological structures of 
Empfindung and Gewohnheit. The second point on the other hand seems to depend also 
on the usage of the term “sense.” To be sure, when I say that habit is a kind of “sense” I 
am not arguing that what Hegel calls sensation in §§399-402 does not differ from what he 
calls habit in §§409-410: mediation through material sense organs belongs necessarily to 
how Hegel understands Empfindung, and it is just as necessarily absent from his 
understanding of Gewohnheit. I only mean that the essence of habit can be elucidated by 
attention to the similarities between sensation and habit, and the careful use of the term 
“sense”: if here (in contrast to the technical definition of Empfindung as given in §§399-
402) we understand the possession of a “sense” for something to mean only the 
possession of a medium for experiencing a certain dimension of the world, and the ability 
(through this medium) to discern contrary qualities of which one would be utterly 
ignorant in the absence of such a sense, then both Empfindung and Gewohnheit would 
qualify as “senses,” their differences notwithstanding. 
As Empfindung, the soul is simply given by nature the field of objects which can 
be sensed (e.g. light, sound, odor, taste, etc.) and in virtue of its naturally given form of 
mediation (viz. the sense organs), the soul as Empfindung is able to discern bright from 
dark, loud from quiet, fragrant from malodorous, sweet from bitter, etc. In this way, 
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Empfindung makes possible the soul’s experience of every natural object and natural 
quality—and this is no small feat. Yet habit is still more marvelous, insofar as it has no 
pre-determined field of objects: through habit the soul can unceasingly give itself new 
objects, new forms of experience. Indeed, we might say that through habit the soul 
creates for itself new senses which make possible its experience of a wider range of 
phenomena (including spiritual phenomena) and their attendant qualities.  
Some examples will help to clarify this feature of habit. If one becomes 
habituated to the terms of social interaction within a society, one acquires a sense of 
social grace or propriety in virtue of which one can distinguish good manners from bad. 
If one becomes habituated to the fine arts one acquires a sense of taste—not in the 
physiological sense but in the sense of being able to discern beauty and ugliness. 
Habituation to ambiguities in language allows one to develop a sense of wit, in virtue of 
which one can distinguish the witty from the dull. Habituation to the possible 
incongruities between the reputations others enjoy and their true merit, or to the disparity 
between what one says and what one may mean, engender a sense of satire, in virtue of 
which one can distinguish the satirical, sarcastic and ironical from the sincere and naïve. 
As social grace, wit and satire124 are not natural objects or qualities, and thus the 
apprehension of them is not assigned to any part of the human body, it is clear that habit 
                                                 
124 Let us leave aside the case of beauty since it may be that natural things can be beautiful even in their 
naturalness, and this would seem to indicate that a beautiful object would necessarily be correlated with a 
certain sense organ. Indeed, even among the fine arts, the appreciation of beauty in painting or sculpture 
can hardly be separated from vision, just as appreciation of beautiful music cannot be separated from 
hearing (though seeing something as beautiful is certainly not the same as simply seeing it). But we need 
not concern ourselves with the details of aesthetic controversies here. The point being made above is 
simply that we can through habituation become progressively aware of specifically human (not natural and 
not corporeal) phenomena (e.g. propriety, wit, satire), in this way developing a ‘sense’ for such objects, 
which can be continually refined by further experience.  
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is a way of developing a ‘sense’ for contents without having a certain sense organ 
devoted to the sensation of such a content. 
To be sure, one can become habituated also to purely natural contents (the objects 
of Empfindung): living in a cold climate, one becomes habituated to low temperatures; 
what is initially experienced as a very bright light can through habituation be stripped of 
its excessive brilliance; after a few minutes of hearing noises like rain falling or 
background chatter one becomes accustomed to them and ceases to be distracted by them. 
When giving examples in the anthropology Hegel restricts himself for the most part to 
cases of habituation to such natural contents (e.g. cold, heat, fatigue, sweet tastes).125 
However, he does give some examples there of habituation to contents that belong more 
to the spiritual side of the human being (e.g. habituation to misfortune, to renunciation of 
desire, to the skilled performance of a certain activity, even to the activity of thinking),126 
and habit figures largely in later developments of the philosophy of spirit, even if Hegel 
rarely notes it explicitly. 
Other spiritual phenomena in which habit plays a role: internalization, imagination, and 
ethical life 
For instance, internalization and imagination (discussed in §§452-460 of the 
psychology section) cannot be understood without presupposing the operation of habit in 
                                                 
125 EPW §410A. 
 
126 EPW §410A. As Moland notes (““Inheriting, Earning and Owning: the Source of Practical Identity in 
Hegel’s Anthropology” p.149), habit also functions to establish a certain distance between a person and the 
mores of her community, allowing her to call them into question. 
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the background.127 Internalization (Erinnerung) is the process whereby intelligence 
creates for and within itself a general image based on its repeated experience of certain 
contents: i.e. it is the transformation of external intuitions into an internal image.128 
Imagination (Einbildung) is intelligence’s ability to wield its images (Bilden), giving 
them existence as symbols and signs.129 Both of these processes depend on the ability of 
spirit to keep from becoming completely absorbed in each singular intuition: without this 
ability, internalization could not create general images of its received intuitions, because 
it would be unable to extricate itself from a total identification with each intuition singly 
(and so would not even be able to relate different intuitions to each other). Likewise, 
without habit imagination could not name objects, or generate language at all insofar as 
the system of signs (including words) is for imagination something like a complex of 
habits, in virtue of which the signified (intuited objects) can be subsumed under general 
terms and integrated into an intelligible order (just as in the anthropology feelings are 
shorn of their immediacy by being subsumed under the habits which mediate their 
relation to the soul).  
Thus both habit and internalization/imagination are spirit’s ability to create its 
own mediation between itself and its content: just as habit mediates the relation between 
the soul and the feelings which would otherwise be buried in the “indistinct pit 
                                                 
127 See also Kirk Pillow’s article “Habituating Madness and Phantasying Art in Hegel’s Encyclopedia.” 
There he makes the case for a connection not just between habit and imagination as it is given in the 
psychology, but also in between habit and the use of imagination in the creation of fine art.  
 
128 EPW §§452-454. 
 
129 EPW §§455-460. 
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[bestimmungsloser Schacht]” of the unconscious,130 so the production and use of 
images in internalization and imagination mediates intelligence’s relation to its intuitions 
which would otherwise be buried in the “night-like pit [nächtlichen Schacht]… without 
being in consciousness [ohne daβ sie im Bewuβtsein wären]”131 The difference between 
the unconscious proper to the soul and the unconscious proper to intelligence is that on 
the level of the soul, consciousness (awareness of an object understood as external132) has 
not yet been posited at all, whereas on the level of intelligence not only is the externality 
of objects posited, but the interiority of spirit and the presence of external objects within 
spirit’s interiority in the form of intuitions are also posited.133 Intelligence has an 
‘unconscious’ to the extent that the intuitions within it have not yet been sufficiently 
internalized (erinnerte), and thus are present within it as foreign contents, problematically 
accessible and not under intelligence’s complete control. In this way, the formation and 
use of images by intelligence is a parallel process to the soul’s habituation to feelings. 
Habit is also presupposed by is the third moment of objective spirit (see chapter 
three for an outline): what Hegel calls Sittlichkeit, which is usually translated as “ethical 
life.”134  This translation should be understood to refer to integration of the individual 
into the collective ethos of a people. The ethos of a people is expressed by its customs 
(Sitten): it is through these customs that the good is determined into definite and socially 
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131 EPW §453A. 
 
132 EPW §413. 
 
133 EPW §445. 
 
134 On this point see also Moland “Inheriting, Earning and Owning: the Source of Practical Identity in 
Hegel’s Anthropology” pp.155-164. 
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recognized practices, rights and obligations. Customs mediate between the individual 
conscience and her action in the world, which are immediately united in what Hegel calls 
“morality [Moralität].” In the absence of customs (i.e. in morality as such), there is 
always a disparity between the act and the intention insofar as the act only ambiguously 
represents the intention (see chapter three for a brief sketch of the transition between 
morality and ethical life). Custom provides a set of ready-made actions that are 
intersubjectively recognized as representing certain intentions: thus within a certain 
culture, an individual can express a friendly and non-threatening intention by certain 
gestures with her face and hands, the posture of her body, etc. All those in her culture will 
be able to interpret such gestures accurately, and her point of view will be successfully 
communicated to others. Without a culture antedating the individuals who are born into 
it, a culture into which these individuals can be integrated, the actions and speech of 
individuals would be ambiguous: these individuals would be unable to objectify their 
intentions in a way appropriate for communication and intersubjective understanding. 
It is thus in the process of acculturation that individuals develop the proper habits 
for social life: this process involves exposure to the kinds of experiences necessary for 
the development of the kinds of ‘senses’ (i.e. habits) we mentioned above: e.g. one 
becomes polite (i.e. develops a ‘sense of propriety’) through exposure to the proper way 
people should act in a given society, i.e. through habituation to the way of life proper to 
one’s culture. Just as there is a process of natural development (occurring prenatally) 
during which one develops the sense organs, there is a process of spiritual (or cultural) 
development in which one should cultivate the proper habits (i.e. the proper ‘senses’ for 
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spiritual phenomena). And, just as some people have the misfortune (as a result of 
natural factors) of being deprived of certain Empfindungen (e.g. the blind or deaf), so 
some people have the misfortune (as a result of social factors) of failing to develop the 
proper habits. For example, if one’s ethical environment (whether family, civil society, or 
state) is less than ideal, one may fail to develop the proper habits (the proper ‘senses’ for 
social phenomena). Such people would include for example louts (who fail to develop a 
sense of social grace), philistines (who fail to develop a sense of taste), bores (who fail to 
develop a sense of wit), etc. Such people are hobbled in their ability to move in the 
human, social world just as those deprived of a natural sense are hobbled in their ability 
to move in the natural world.  
Of course, we must not fail to note the differences between the natural and the 
cultural “senses.” One such difference lies in the possibility of rectifying a faulty “sense” 
or its lack altogether. One who is blind cannot have her sight restored, but a rude person 
(even a violent criminal) can always be reformed into a polite, courteous and law-abiding 
person (provided that the appropriate social circumstances, resources, and attention are 
brought to bear). Indeed, no habits are possessed naturally, just as no habits are 
intrinsically unattainable: all habits are acquired in the course of one’s lifetime through 
repetition of the proper experiences. Thus all habits are subject to waning or failure to 
develop altogether, just as all habits are subject to revision. The cultivation of the right 
habits is what is properly called education: this is what Hegel and Goethe meant by 
Bildung, and what Aristotle meant by paideia. 
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Indeed, the Aristotelian overtones here are unmistakable. For Aristotle, 
education is nothing other than the cultivation of the proper habits,135 and the precise 
character of these habits should be appropriate to culture to which one belongs.136 
Moreover, for Aristotle the cultivation of habit acquaints one with a certain dimension of 
the natural or social world which was always present but of which one was previously 
ignorant as a result of not having the proper attunement to this dimension, an attunement 
acquired through habit.137 Similarly, we have seen that for Hegel the cultivation of habits 
opens up a certain dimension of experience of which one had previously no idea, and of 
which one would remain ignorant unless properly educated. Much of Hegel’s philosophy 
of objective spirit is occupied with this kind of acculturation: thus the family is (in part) 
concerned with “the upbringing of children,”138 i.e. the spiritual development of human 
beings (rather than merely the natural birth of children), as are civil society139 and the 
state.140  
The Sitten of objective spirit are thus forms of mediation that resemble the 
Gewohnheiten of the anthropology. Moreover, these customs are themselves the habits 
that individuals cultivate during the process of their socialization.141 That habit is integral 
                                                 
135 Nicomachean Ethics 1103b23-25. 
 
136 Politics 1310a13-35, 1332b13-1334b28. 
 
137 Nicomachean Ethics 1103b14-21, 1113a23-35. 
 
138 GPR §§173-175. 
 
139 GPR §239. 
 
140 GPR §§268-270. See also GPR §153A. 
 
141 Hegel explicitly calls them habits frequently. See for example EPW §§485, 486, GPR §151, as well as 
when he refers to the role of the ethical “disposition [Gesinnung],” which is simply another way of saying 
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in both imagination and ethical life means that habit is necessary for the construction 
and interpretation of symbols and signs: that imagination is concerned with producing 
signs is obvious,142 but it takes only a bit of reflection to see that ethical action (action in 
the context of social customs) is also the production of signs. Recall, customs establish 
the meaning of actions for a certain culture: thus in our culture wearing black is 
understood as a sign of grief, while in China this meaning is expressed by a different 
action (viz. wearing white). Indeed, the fact that the process of acculturation is called 
“Bildung” indicates that it is a matter of making the individual into a sign or an image 
(Bild) of the culture itself. Acculturation can thus be likened to imagination (Einbildung), 
though on a larger scale. It is appropriate that habit should play such an important role in 
sign-making in the psychology and in objective spirit, since habit has this function in the 
anthropology as well: it is habit which gives the soul actuality in its body, rendering the 
body a mere sign for the soul.143  
Actual soul 
Once the soul is thoroughly inured to its feelings, then it has become ‘incarnate’ 
in the spiritual ‘body’ that is the system of its habits.144 We call the soul’s habits its 
‘body’ because they fill the role that the corporeal body and its sense organs filled in 
                                                                                                                                                 
the same thing, and even contains within it the connotation of ‘sense’ (Sinn) (EPW §§486A, 513-515, 537-
538, GPR §§268-269). 
 
142 EPW §§457-459. 
 
143 EPW §411. 
 
144 In fact, habit seems to belong to the feeling soul section only insofar as it is in a nascent state. It is plain 
that once a soul becomes habituated, it is ipso facto actual. Hans-Christian Lucas makes this point as well 
(““Die ‚souveräne Undankbarkeit’ des Geistes gegenüber der Natur“ p.286). 
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sensation. Since “feeling” is characterized by the bypassing of this natural mediation 
(viz. the corporeal body and its sense organs) and the consequently immediate relation of 
the soul to its content, there is an opportunity for habit to intervene by providing another 
form of mediation between the soul and its content. We saw in our discussion of feeling 
how an inner form of mediation was required. This is precisely what habit is: habit 
mediates the soul not only with the sensible determinacies of external nature, but even 
with the natural determinacy of the soul’s own body. Thus when the soul has created for 
itself its own ‘spiritual body,’ it has also completely assimilated its own natural body as 
well.145 Consequently, once the soul has attained this level of development, it shines 
through its body, revealing itself in this corporeity.  
The body as the ‘sign’ of the soul 
Hegel says that the body is only a sign for the actual soul: the body thus refers not 
to itself, but only to the soul.146 To see what he means by calling the body a “sign 
                                                 
145 Moland is incorrect when she says that “In ‘Actual Soul’ [...] the self concluded that it was essentially 
self-determination and so did not need the body”( “Inheriting, Earning and Owning: the Source of Practical 
Identity in Hegel’s Anthropology” p.163). The soul does not rid itself of its body through habituation and 
actualization: it merely assimilates its body to itself. It is rather immediate feeling and self-feeling which 
are characterized by the attempt to do without the body completely. 
 
146 EPW §411. Hegel may have had in mind the following passage from Rousseau’s Émile in which he 
contrasts the poorly raised young man, thrust too early into civil society, with the well raised Émile: “I 
cannot keep from imagining on the face of the young man described above something impertinent, sugary, 
and affected, which displeases and repels regular people and on the face of mine an interesting and simple 
physiognomy that shows contentment, true serenity of the soul, that inspires esteem and confidence, and 
that seems to wait only for the offer of friendship to give his own to those who approach him. It is said that 
the physiognomy is only a simple development of traits already marked by nature. As for me, I think that 
aside from this development, facial features are formed insensibly and take shape by the frequent and 
habitual impression of certain affections on the soul. These impressions make their mark on the face, 
nothing is more certain; and when they become habitual, they must leave lasting impressions on it. There 
you have my conception of how physiognomy presents character, and that one can sometimes judge the one 
by the other without looking for mysterious explanations that assume knowledge we do not have”(Émile 
tome premier p.386). However, Rousseau certainly goes further here than Hegel would be willing to go: 
Hegel denounced physiognomy as a pseudo-science (insofar as hard and fast rules cannot be applied in the 
induction of a person’s character by their appearance), even though it is the nature of the soul to reveal 
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[Zeichen]” for the soul, it is useful to refer to the psychology section, where Hegel 
distinguishes between a symbol (Symbol) and a sign (Zeichen). A symbol refers to 
something else, but in such a way that what naturally and immediately belongs to the 
symbol (its color, shape, sound, etc.) has a role in its representation, while a sign refers to 
something else in such a way that its natural, immediate shape has no role.147  
The perfect example of a sign is language, insofar as in language a certain 
thought-content is arbitrarily connected with a certain sound. Thus onomatopoetic words 
(i.e. words which reproduce the physical event of a certain sound, such as “crash,” 
“bang,” etc.) are in some sense not properly language, insofar as they are more symbols 
than signs (and for that reason less developed than language ought to be). Onomatopoetic 
words are symbolic because in them intelligence fails to properly exert its power by 
bestowing a certain sense on an otherwise unrelated sound, bowing instead to the merely 
natural phonic contours of a word.148 Another good example of a mere symbol is the 
association of an eagle with strength149: here spirit merely takes an immediately existing 
object (an eagle) which has a certain property (strength), and declares this property to be 
the essential part of the symbol, the rest (feathers, flight, oviparity) being inessential. On 
the other hand, the association of the color blue with Bavaria150 (i.e. a sign) is more 
                                                                                                                                                 
itself corporeally (EPW §411A) (here Hegel follows Aristotle, Physiognomy 805b2-806a7). We are thus left 
to lament with Medea: “O Zeus! Why have you given us clear signs to tell/ True gold from counterfeit; but 
when we need to know/ Bad men from good, the flesh bears no revealing mark?” (Euripides, Medea 516-
518). 
 
147 EPW §458&A. 
 
148 EPW §459A. 
 
149 VPG p.207. See also VPG pp.80-81. 
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arbitrary, and demonstrates the power spirit has over the immediate content which 
will serve as its sign: here everything immediate in the sign (e.g. the appearance of blue 
in this or that object, its status as a primary color, etc.) is inessential; and the only 
essential thing is the signification given by spirit.  
When Hegel calls the body a mere sign for the actual soul, he thus means that 
here the soul has fully extricated itself from nature, and subordinated nature to itself. To 
fully appreciate the significance of this development, we can turn to parts of the natural 
soul section which have to do with symbolism. In an Anmerkung Hegel indicates briefly 
that sensations can be symbolic for the sensing soul,151 but it is only in the lectures that he 
explains this at length. There he shows how colors and tones can be symbolic for the 
soul,152 giving rise to a mood (Stimmung) according to certain immediate properties of 
the sensation: e.g. black or white (as the absence of determination) symbolize 
innocence,153 while red, because of its intensity, symbolizes power and strength, while 
blue symbolizes mildness.154 Blue’s symbolical character as evoking a sense of mildness 
(in virtue of what immediately appears in the color) must be contrasted with its signifying 
role in representing Bavaria (which has nothing to do with blue’s immediacy).  
                                                                                                                                                 
150 VPG p.209. 
 
151 EPW §401A. 
 
152 Hegel says this with the caveat (given in Boumann’s Zusätze) that these cannot be symbols in the proper 
sense of the word, since symbolization (being deduced properly only in the psychology section) 
presupposes consciousness (the object of the phenomenology, which represents objects to itself as external) 
insofar as it involves taking a sensation (known to be external) as referring in some sense to an inner 
meaning (EPW §401Z p.108). (See p.101n for a remark on “deduction” in Hegel). 
 
153 VPG p.81. 
 
154 VPG p.82. 
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Sensations can be symbolic because they have an unposited immediacy: the 
soul simply finds itself with them: Hegel plays on the word Empfindung by noting that 
the soul in sensation simply “finds [findet]” its content within it,155 not having produced 
this content itself or mediated it by habits of its own creation. The soul at this stage is 
mixed with its body without being fully cognizant of this fact and its implications: it does 
not know that it is already mediating its relation to its sensations (through its sense 
organs), and is in no position to voluntarily determine the meaning of its contents (which 
would render them signs rather than symbols). To be sure, the actual soul is still far from 
the will (which is deduced only in the psychology section, after symbolization and 
signification proper are deduced), and thus it is a bit misleading to say that the actual soul 
‘voluntarily’ determines the meaning of its contents, rendering its body only a sign for it. 
However, it is at least true that the actual soul has created its own form of mediation in 
relation to its sensations and feelings (viz. its habits), and thus is related immediately 
neither to its feelings (as are the feeling soul in its immediacy and self-feeling), nor to its 
form of mediation (as sensation is ‘mixed’ with its body). In this sense the actual soul 
does succeed in cancelling the immediacy of both its sensations and its feelings, thereby 
rendering its body a sign, which refers only to it (the soul) and not to itself. 
In other words, the soul is the truth of the body: the body is only a presupposition 
(Voraussetzung) of the soul,156 i.e. the material which the soul sets (setzt) before (vor) 
                                                 
155 EPW §399. 
 
156 To be sure, the human body is never actually separated from the soul (except in death). The human body 
should always be considered already ensouled. However, when we say that the body is the presupposition 
for the soul, we mean only to abstract in thought the material element of the human being and affirm that 
this material element is not something independent, referring only to itself. Rather, this material element is 
the manifestation of the soul, as its sign. 
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itself in order to reveal or manifest itself in it. The soul here has reached its summit 
insofar as it has realized the concept of spirit (so far as such an achievement is possible at 
this stage). Recall, according to its concept, spirit: (a) is the truth of nature,157 or (b) the 
idea whose object, just as its subject, is the concept158; (c) spirit can suffer the infinite 
pain of withdrawal into itself away from all objectivity,159 while (d) maintaining itself as 
affirmative,160 and which through this absolute negativity (e) reveals or manifests 
itself,161 thus (f) rendering itself actuality.162 Let us proceed through these aspects one by 
one to see how the actual soul is the realized concept of spirit (to the extent that such is 
possible at this stage). 
(a) Spirit is the truth of nature 
Recall Table 2 above and its explanation. There we showed that the mechanical 
body strives to unite with that which determines it in its identity (and hence can be called 
its own self), but which is spatially external, though these strivings are frustrated by the 
same mechanical determinacies which render the body external to itself in the first place. 
The chemical on the other hand can bond with its opposite if the two are juxtaposed: 
spatial separation is nothing for the chemical, which is thus in fact what the mechanical 
body only strives to be. Insofar as the chemical is in reality what the mechanical body 
                                                 
157 EPW §381. 
 
158 EPW §381. 
 
159 EPW §382. 
 
160 EPW §382. 
 
161 EPW §§383-384. 
 
162 EPW §383. 
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ought to be but fails to be, the chemical can be called the truth of the merely 
mechanical body. Hegel defines truth as agreement between concept and existence163: 
what the mechanical body strives to be, what it ought to be, is its concept; it is the 
chemical however which in its existence actually attains this concept; thus the chemical is 
the truth of the merely mechanical body. 
In Table 2 we further showed that the living (animal) body is the truth of the 
chemical, and (more importantly) that the human ‘body’ (viz. habit) is the truth of 
organic, or animal life. The animal strives to assimilate nature completely: this 
assimilation is its concept. Yet the animal does not realize this concept perfectly: there 
always remains for it an inassimilable “moment of corporeity” in virtue of which it is 
subject to disease and death. In habit however, the human being mediates its relation to 
all of its sensible and feeling contents, and thus has completely assimilated its ‘corporeal 
moment,’ achieving in fact what nature in its highest form strove to achieve but could 
not; i.e. the human being realizes nature’s concept, and thus is the truth of nature. 
(b) Spirit is the idea whose object, just as its subject, is the concept 
We already know that everything in nature and spirit is the idea.164 To say 
however that spirit is the self-knowing idea, the idea which has itself for its object (which 
is precisely what it is to say that spirit is the idea that has the concept for its subject and 
its object) is only to restate what we have seen in the anthropology: the soul in sensation 
is determined into the five senses, and in virtue of this determination it is receptive to the 
                                                 
163 EPW §213A. 
 
164 EPW §§247, 381. 
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forms in which nature renders itself sensible (viz. light,165 sound,166 particularized 
airiness or odor,167 particularized water or taste,168 weight,169 heat,170 and shape171). There 
is a correspondence between the ways nature makes itself able to be sensed and the ways 
the soul is able to sense because both are the idea, and are ruled by the same ontology. To 
see how this same ontology is concretized in nature and in spirit, we must attend to the 
moments of the concept: universality (self-identity), particularity (distinction, 
determinacy), and singularity (the inward reflection of the universal, i.e. the positing of 
particularity in universality and universality in particularity).172  
In nature, light and sound express the unity of a body in abstraction from its 
material difference from itself; and sight and hearing are the soul’s capacities to sense 
precisely this “physical ideality.” Odor and taste express a body’s difference from itself 
in abstraction from its unity, as in these the body quite literally breaks apart; accordingly, 
smell and taste are the soul’s capacities to know this “real difference.” Finally, weight, 
heat, and shape express a body as a concrete totality, a determined universal that 
maintains its identity with itself even in its determinacy (thus for instance shape reveals a 
                                                 
165 EPW §§317-320. 
 
166 EPW §§300-302. 
 
167 EPW §321. 
 
168 EPW §321. 
 
169 EPW §293. 
 
170 EPW §303-307. 
 
171 EPW §§310-315 . 
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body extended and outside of itself, yet, in virtue of its figure, all one body); and 
touch is the soul’s receptivity to precisely this totality. 
In these three groups of natural phenomena ((a) light and sound; (b) odor and 
taste; (c) weight, heat, and shape), and the three corresponding types of senses ((α) sight 
and hearing; (β) smell and taste; (γ) touch), the concept is expressed in its: (1) 
universality, (2) particularity, and (3) singularity. Thus when the soul senses a 
determination of nature, the concept (in one of its moments) is both subject and object. 
Not only in sensation, but also and more adequately in feeling (in its highest 
concretion as habit), we can see the concept as both subject and object. It being 
presupposed that feeling in its first two stages has disturbed the soul’s relation to its 
content by setting aside the naturally given form of mediation (the sense organs), it is 
clear that habit provides a new form of mediation, one created by the soul for itself. The 
soul here may be related to natural determinations which are concretions of the concept in 
the way described above, or it may be related to spiritual determinations (as we have 
seen); yet the soul in habit is a concretion of the concept in a different way than it was in 
sensation. In sensation the three moments of the concept were realized in the three kinds 
of senses (physical ideality, real difference, concrete totality); in habit the soul itself is the 
universal (the ‘indeterminate pit’), the habits are the particularity immanent in this 
universality (the soul’s ‘particular world’), which mediates the relation between the soul 
(as universal) and the (singular) feeling. Thus in habit as well both subject and object are 
the concept. 
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(c) Spirit can suffer the infinite pain of its withdrawal from all objectivity 
To see how the soul suffers infinite pain, we must refer to two aspects of the 
feeling soul: (1) the circumvention of the body and its sense organs that characterizes the 
feeling soul in its immediacy and as self-feeling; (2) the ‘loss of self’ the soul suffers 
when it loses the feeling with which it identified (the loss in which habit is cultivated). In 
the circumvention of the body and its sense organs, the feeling soul withdraws from its 
corporeity, from that in virtue of which it was able to know certain determinacies of 
nature (viz. those varying from the determinations of its own sense organs) as objects (i.e. 
as sensations from which it, as soul, remained distinct in its universality). Thus in the 
transition from sensation to feeling, the soul withdraws at once from its own body, and 
from its sensation of the objects of the natural world. As a consequence of this 
withdrawal, the soul is only (initially) able to relate immediately to its contents, failing to 
know them objectively in distinction from itself.  
The immediacy of feeling however renders the soul susceptible to the suffering of 
infinite pain, absolute negativity, when this feeling passes into its opposite and the soul 
loses its own self. To see how the ‘pain’ here is infinite, and the ‘negativity’ is absolute, 
contrast feeling with sensation: in sensation the soul can feel pain or discomfort,173 but 
this pain will never be infinite because the sensation is always a determinacy in the face 
                                                 
173 In fact, feeling pain or pleasure presupposes much material that has not been deduced. (See p.101n for a 
remark on “deduction” in Hegel). It first becomes possible truly to speak of pleasure or pain when one 
arrives at practical feeling (where it has been deduced that thought is self-realizing, such that spirit as 
practical feeling exists as a mere demand that the world agree with its own inner determinacy), in the 
practical spirit section of the psychology (see chapter three). The kind of ‘pain’ we may discuss in relation 
to sensation is more abstract: the sensation of a natural determinacy which varies enormously with the 
sensing soul’s own unacknowledged corporeity (as when the soul with its skin at 70°F feels something at 
200°F). We could not call this “pain” in the proper sense only because spirit at this stage does not know 
that the determinations in the world of nature ought to agree with its own inner determinacy. 
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of which the sensing soul ‘maintains its universality.’ That is, the pain for the sensing 
soul is always something from which it knows itself to be separate and independent. In 
feeling however, the soul is related immediately to its content, not knowing itself as in 
any way distinct from this feeling: thus the loss of this feeling is the loss of the soul’s 
own self, the infinite pain of absolute negativity. 
(d) Spirit maintains itself as affirmative even in absolute negativity 
Insofar as the soul endures the loss of itself (i.e. the loss of the feeling with which 
it identified immediately) described above, then it ‘maintains itself as affirmative.’ This 
self-maintenance as affirmative on the part of the human being in habit is to be contrasted 
with the total destruction of the singular animal in its death. When the singular animal 
proves to be susceptible to organic disease (one organ operating at variance with the 
whole), the animal dies; and in this death, it (as singular) is totally annihilated. Only the 
genus survives (though even it survives only in another generation of equally imperfect 
and mortal singular animals—i.e. in the manner of a ‘bad infinity’). In contrast, when the 
human being shows itself to be subject to the sickness of the soul (the soul-like part 
operating at variance with the other moments of subjective spirit), the human being ‘dies’ 
only in a way that does not preclude its resurrection in the ‘spiritual body’ of its ‘second 
nature.’ The ‘death’ the human being undergoes and survives is the withdrawal from its 
body to the immediate identification with its content, and the subsequent loss of this 
content, the identification with its opposite. Yet not despite, but through the very 
experience of this loss, the human being emerges with a new form of sensible/feeling 
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mediation (i.e. a new ‘body’), viz. habit, thus ‘maintaining itself as affirmative’ even 
in absolute negativity. 
(e) Spirit reveals, or manifests itself 
We spent a good deal of time in chapter two explaining this aspect of the concept 
of spirit. We were at pains there to provide all sorts of examples and analogies to explain 
what this “revelation [Offenbarung]” or “manifestation [Manifestation]” involves, 
referring to the Athenian spirit being revealed in the city of Athens, and Achilles being 
manifested in his armor. At that time we had to use our imaginations to conjure up 
images of a concept which we did not grasp in the proper, rational way. Now that we 
have traversed the whole of the anthropology on the contrary, we have seen in concreto 
how spirit in its embodied immediacy suffers infinite pain, withdrawing from all 
objectivity, while yet remaining affirmative in some sense. We have seen, in other words, 
that the soul has fashioned its own ‘body’ for itself, a spiritual body, which is a sign (not 
a symbol) for the soul, i.e. which refers only to the soul, such that the soul is revealed in 
it. 
Recall the distinction we drew when explaining spirit’s revelation of itself in 
chapter two between a ‘relative self-determination’ and an ‘absolute self-determination.’ 
In any case of self-determination, the self renders itself something determinate and 
objective in some sense, but the difference between relative and absolute self-
determination hinges on whether this determinacy is something to which the self may 
remain removed and indifferent, or whether the very existence of this determinacy is 
immanent and implied within the self as such. 
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To illustrate, we described in chapter two a case of relative self-determination 
as when a nation (in its legislature) passes some obscure, almost insignificant law, e.g. 
regulating the minimum width of rural highways. The law that is passed here does indeed 
have its origin wholly in the national will: that is, absent the national will, the law would 
not exist. Examined from this perspective, the connection between the self and its 
determinacy appears strong—indeed, necessary. Yet examined from the opposite 
perspective (from the nation toward the law), it is clear that the nation does not invest and 
realize its very self in creating this law: if the law were never to be enforced, or were it 
never to have been drafted at all, the nation would remain largely—or perhaps even 
completely—the same. Thus although the law depends wholly on the national will for its 
existence, the national will does not depend on this particular law in order to be what it is. 
But now consider a case of absolute self-determination, in which the determinacy 
issues from the very heart of the self, which cannot do otherwise—at least not without 
ceasing to be itself. In keeping with the political example above, we can refer to a nation 
which, when invaded by another country, either throws itself wholeheartedly into defense 
and resistance, or capitulates and cedes its independence (and its very self) to its enemy. 
In this case, the act of the national will, its determination of itself in one course of 
another, is not something with respect to which it can remain indifferent: how the nation 
decides at this moment determines whether it persists and remains itself, or is destroyed, 
becoming something other than itself. In other words, the very continued existence and 
identity of the self is in question here, and in its determination of itself it realizes what it 
always was (be it independent or servile). To take another example, an individual human 
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being can love another person with all of his heart, and be completely devoted to her: 
when he makes a commitment to her, he limits his possibilities, but in doing so deprives 
himself of nothing essential to him; instead, he becomes what he is in this commitment, 
becoming really, in a determinate way what he previously was only essentially and 
implicitly. 
It is clear then that self-determination (making oneself into something 
determinate, limiting oneself) is not necessarily self-deprivation, or self-mutilation. 
Indeed, quite the contrary: were a person to remain indeterminate, then he would be 
potentially many things, but actually nothing. This is what has been demonstrated in the 
anthropology: the feeling soul has many feelings, and would identify completely with all 
of them, but this would only be to really identify with none. What the soul must do is 
fashion its mass of feelings into a particular world, a coherent totality in which its relation 
to its feelings is mediated by habit. It is only in its habits that the soul determines itself 
absolutely, and it is only for this reason that habit is called the soul’s second nature, the 
body which it has created for itself, and in which its own self is revealed.174 
(f) In revealing itself in habit, the soul renders itself actual 
Actuality (Wirklichkeit) is a technical term for Hegel. It refers to the “unity of 
essence and existence, of the inner and outer.”175 Actuality is deduced in the Science of 
Logic when it must be demonstrated that essence cannot hold itself away from existence: 
                                                 
174 To be sure, in the corporealization of the emotions that belongs to the section on sensation, the soul does 
realize itself in some way as well. Barbara Merker argues that this is to be distinguished from the soul’s 
realization of itself in a body that characterizes habit and actual soul by the fact that the corporealization of 
the emotions is involuntary, while habit is deliberately cultivated (and accordingly habit plays an important 
role in later phenomena covered in the psychology section) („Über Gewohnheit“pp.232-233). 
 
175 EPW §142. 
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that its very essentiality requires that it enter into existence—indeed, that the two be 
understood as but abstract moments of a higher ontological category (viz., actuality). It 
makes sense that Hegel would say that spirit makes itself actual in this way: as we saw 
above, in its ‘revelation’ or ‘manifestation,’ spirit goes outside of itself, ceasing to be 
merely inner, withdrawn away from all objectivity, and externalizes itself in a body. This 
body is only a sign for the soul: that is, the body refers only to the soul, as its pure 
expression. In other words, the ensouled body is an existence which reveals the 
essence—it is actuality.176 
Hegel says of spirit “Its possibility is thus immediate, infinite, absolute i,”177 
clearly invoking the ontological proof. It is well known that what we call ‘the ontological 
proof’ appears in different forms throughout the history of philosophy from Anselm to 
Descartes, Spinoza to Hegel. The one feature however that is common in each of these 
philosophers’ versions of ‘the ontological proof’ is that the actuality of God or the 
absolute (i.e. spirit) is deduced from its mere possibility, or the idea of it. Hegel writes the 
sentence quoted above (his version of the ontological proof) as the last sentence of 
Enzyklopädie §383. To understand what he means, we should refer to the final sentence 
of §382 and the first of §383. 
After stating that spirit can suffer absolute negativity and still maintain itself as 
affirmative, Hegel concludes §392 by saying “This possibility [viz. the maintenance on 
spirit’s part of itself as affirmative even in absolute negativity] is its [spirit’s] abstract, 
                                                 
176 It is in this sense that Wolff refers to Hegel’s conception of the “double-sidedness [Zweiseitigkeit]” of 
the soul (Das Körper-Seele Problem p.36, among other places). 
 
177 EPW §383. 
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inner universality, in which it has being-for-itself.” He begins §383 by continuing: 
“This universality is also its [spirit’s] existence [Dasein].” Hegel identifies spirit’s 
“universality” (its ability to abstract from all objectivity, i.e. to suffer infinite pain) with 
its “possibility” because in this withdrawn state, spirit is only a possibility: as withdrawn 
from all determinacy, spirit is actually nothing at all (i.e. it suffers “absolute negativity”). 
Yet just as we described in chapter two, in this withdrawal from all objectivity, spirit 
immediately makes itself into an object, i.e. objectifies, determines, realizes its own self. 
Since this realization is the unity of the essence (spirit in its universality, its mere 
possibility) and existence (spirit as object, determinacy) it is actuality; and since it is not 
despite, but in virtue of its withdrawal from all objectivity that spirit rendered itself 
objective, we can say that spirit’s pure possibility is immediately infinite, absolute 
actuality. 
We can see that the soul is actual in this sense because, as we have seen, the 
soul’s transition from sensation to feeling is its withdrawal from the body and from its 
knowledge of sensations as objective contents standing over against it. This withdrawal is 
spirit’s possibility, its inner universality in which it has its being-for-itself (in its feeling). 
However, in accordance with its concept, spirit in the form of the soul immediately 
objectifies its own self the moment it withdraws from all objectivity: thus in feeling 
(above all as self-feeling) the soul identifies its own self completely with its feeling. Yet 
here the concept is realized inadequately: the soul is not in fact the truth of nature, i.e. it 
does not achieve in its existence what nature in its highest form (animal life) merely 
strives for (viz. the complete assimilation of corporeity, becoming the ideality of its 
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body); the soul remains susceptible to sickness because the ‘moment of corporeity’ 
has not been assimilated (no mediation has arisen to replace the one provided by the 
body). The soul creates this mediation for itself only in habit, and only then is it the 
ideality of its body, and the truth of nature; only then is the body a sign for the soul, an 
existence which reveals the essence. The soul’s pure possibility (its withdrawal from its 
body in feeling) is thus immediately actuality: not in madness (the immediate 
identification with any feeling whatsoever), though madness does resemble the reality of 
spirit’s concept (and for this reason is honored with a place in the Encyclopedia as a 
distinct possibility of spirit, a certain expression of human nature); instead, it is through 
the soul’s determination of itself in habits that it becomes an actual soul, insofar as these 
habits are its own ‘spiritual body,’ a determinacy which reveals its own self.  
Conclusion 
My hope in writing this dissertation was to articulate, if only in some obscure and 
ultimately inadequate way, the place of corporeity in human life. To achieve this, I 
carried out an exegetical study of Hegel’s anthropology, in which I have tried to do 
nothing more than explain what Hegel meant in the twenty-five paragraphs belonging to 
that section. Yet it would perhaps not be inappropriate here to comment on the 
implications of Hegel’s understanding of the human body and soul, to indicate possible 
directions for future research.  
One such direction would be in responding to those today (of which there is no 
shortage) who present the human being as if it were simply natural (a machine or an 
animal)—or worse still, a bizarre and unstable combination of an otherworldly ghost and 
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a purely material machine or animal body (though I must reiterate here that I do not 
claim what I have written here, a mere exegesis of Hegel’s anthropology, to be a 
refutation of materialism). To present the human being in these ways allows one to raise 
all sorts of apparent ethical dilemmas and aporiae concerning the very possibility of 
ethics. For instance, if humans are embodied, and the body (including the brain, for 
materialists the seat of desire and even the will) obeys natural (mechanical) laws 
inexorably, then how can human actions be free? If human actions are not free, then how 
can anyone be praised, blamed, or in any way held responsible?  
Of course, the materialist conception of the human being is flatly ludicrous (to say 
nothing of the dualist conception). Consequently the common, uneducated person is more 
fit to define the human being than are many ‘philosophers.’ Even a child knows that the 
human being is not simply a machine, or an animal, that freedom belongs to the human 
being as such. The cause of the havoc materialism has been allowed to wreak on 
philosophy is an endemic failure to understand corporeity: viz., the failure to see that 
extension and mechanism do not exhaustively define corporeity, that there is a form of 
corporeity distinctive to human beings, and this form of corporeity is not animal 
corporeity—and still less is it mechanical. No one has thought more deeply than Hegel 
about the essence of corporeity and its meaning in human life, and so any effort to rid 
philosophy of the materialist scourge must draw on Hegel’s work. 
In his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline, Hegel shows that all 
of nature and spirit is the idea (the realized concept), and in this articulation of a kind of 
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monism, Hegel resembles the materialists.178 Of course Hegel is not a materialist, and 
in his Philosophy of Nature (volume two of his Encyclopedia) he shows a sensitivity to 
nuance that is utterly lacking in the materialist conception of nature and corporeity. For, it 
is there that Hegel demonstrates how the concept of nature (as the idea external to itself) 
unfolds in a system of interrelated natural phenomena. The first stage involves 
mechanical relations between spatial bodies, but Hegel quickly shows that as mere 
extension and mechanism, nature is not able to be what it is essentially (hence the tension 
involved in mechanism, with a body having its own ‘self’ outside of it, in another, which 
it is yet perpetually unable to appropriate).  
In Hegel’s deduction of “physics” he discusses natural phenomena which cannot 
be explained in mechanical terms (because mechanism is too poor and abstract of an 
explanatory framework): e.g. sound, light, heat, electricity, magnetism, and most 
importantly, chemical combination and dissociation. We have discussed this several 
times, and the reader may refer to earlier in this chapter, or to chapter one for a review of 
chemism. Suffice it to say that while chemism provides a more concrete version of 
nature, which is not subject to the defects of merely mechanical bodies, it too falls short 
of actualizing its concept, and thus is succeeded in Hegel’s account by organics, i.e. life, 
the highest form of mere nature.  
In Hegel’s presentation of organics he discusses natural phenomena which can be 
explained neither in terms of mere mechanism, nor in terms of mere chemism, though, 
again, this is not because of any defect in the phenomena in question, but rather because 
of inadequacies in the explanatory capacities of mechanism and chemism, owing to their 
                                                 
178 Accordingly, he esteems materialism higher than dualism (EPW §389A). 
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abstractness. For this as well, the reader may refer to our earlier presentation of this 
material. For us here, what is important is to note that the living, animal body is beyond 
mere extension, even beyond mere chemism. The animal is most properly a system of 
assimilative processes (digestion, respiration, etc.) which take in nature and transform it 
into energy for the perpetuation of these same processes. To be sure, an animal is still 
extended, and can be determined in other merely mechanical (and chemical) ways: but 
qua animal, it is not extended, and it would be a cruel person indeed who treated an 
animal as if it were merely an extended object, like a stone.  
If even the animal is not mere extension (and thus is not determined solely by 
mechanical relations and subject to mechanical laws with an iron necessity), then how far 
is the human being (who transcends even biological determinations) from mere 
extension, i.e. mechanical and unfree object! Why then do some philosophers179 still 
insist on treating the human brain as if it were a system of levers and pulleys (a mere 
machine) which acted on the rest of the body in the manner of a mechanical cause, and 
was acted upon (via the network of nerves throughout the body) by natural objects in a 
merely mechanical way?   
I hope that my dissertation will be able to contribute, if only in some small way, 
to the proper understanding of the place of corporeity in human life. That would mean 
showing that though the human being is in some sense mechanical (i.e. spatio-temporal), 
chemical (can react with other chemicals with respect to which it is polar), and organic 
(maintains its life by the continued assimilation of nature), it cannot be limited to any of 
                                                 
179 See for example Alec Hyslop “Methodological Epiphenomenalism,” David Chalmers “Materialism and 
the Metaphysics of Modality,” Stephen Yablo “Mental Causation.” 
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these forms of corporeity. The properly human form of corporeity is neither 
extension, chemical neutrality, nor life, but rather habit, the mediating power that the soul 
creates for itself, to replace in some sense (without destroying of course) the body from 
which it has the capacity (as spirit) to withdraw. 
It would be difficult to overstate the significance of habit for an understanding of 
Hegel’s account of human nature and human identity. Let us recount here the heroic 
labors habit performs.  
First, habit make possible the soul’s mediation of its relation to its natural 
contents, such that the soul need not remain transfixed by every passing feeling, but 
instead can experience a certain feeling while still directing its attention elsewhere.  
Second, habit makes it possible for the soul to become consciousness, i.e. to know 
itself as something distinct from the objects of its experience, and to know these objects 
as distinct from its own subjectivity.  
Third, habit liberates the soul from the disease to which it is subject by its very 
nature: madness.  
Fourth, by providing for the soul a properly spiritual ‘body’ (i.e. form of 
mediation of contents of experience), habit opens up a new world of experience by 
making accessible to the soul contents that do not belong to nature, but rather to relations 
between humans as such.  
Fifth, as the power of symbol and sign production, habit makes possible the 
imagination; habit thus indirectly makes possible language, and even artistic creation.  
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Sixth, habit makes possible the acculturation of individuals in nations, 
religions, and states (and thus is indirectly responsible for everything these forms of spirit 
make possible).  
From this catalogue of feats it is clear that habit is woven into the very fabric of 
human experience in the epistemological, psychological, social, ethical, aesthetic, 
political and religious dimensions. Habit forms the crux between the world of human 
culture and knowledge, and the world of nature, distinguishing and uniting them at the 
same time by assimilating the natural and determining it as an expression or sign of what 
is properly human. Hegel limits himself in the anthropology to an explicit demonstration 
of how the human body is thus rendered a sign for the soul; but implicit in this account 
are the demonstrations found in subsequent parts of his philosophy of spirit of how spirit 
shines through the appearance of natural externality: from the articulation of meaning in 
the sounds and shapes of language, to the aesthetic and religious expression and 
apprehension of the absolute itself in the natural world. An understanding of habit, and of 
what Hegel calls the ‘anthropological’ dimension generally, is therefore absolutely 
necessary for a grasp of the identity and vocation of embodied thinking and willing 
beings such as human beings are.  
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